Restoring Our Commercial Rights: Silk, Nationalism, Commercial Policy, and the Direct Trade Movement in Meiji Japan, 1868-1890 by Smith, Michael Brady
“RESTORING OUR COMMERCIAL RIGHTS”: SILK, NATIONALISM, COMMERCIAL 
POLICY, AND THE DIRECT TRADE MOVEMENT IN MEIJI JAPAN, 1868-1890 
 
 
 
 
Michael Brady Smith 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of History 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
W. Miles Fletcher 
 
Daniel Botsman 
 
Peter Coclanis 
 
Simon Partner 
 
Benjamin Waterhouse 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2012 
Michael Brady Smith 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 iii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
MICHAEL BRADY SMITH: “Restoring our Commercial Rights”: silk, nationalism, 
commercial policy, and the direct trade movement in Meiji Japan, 1868-1890. 
(Under the direction of W. Miles Fletcher) 
 
In 1858 Japan responded to demands from Western governments to remove restrictions on 
trading with foreigners by signing a series of trade treaties which opened up a number of 
Japanese ports to unrestricted foreign trade. After these ports were opened, Western 
mercantile firms armed with intimate knowledge of world markets and ready access to 
capital quickly became the dominant force in Japan’s overseas trade. When the new Meiji 
government assumed power in 1868, government officials, businessmen, and intellectuals 
who feared foreign domination of Japan’s overseas trade, began a concerted campaign to 
challenge the dominance of foreign merchants in Japan’s treaty ports and reclaim Japanese 
“commercial rights” (shōken) through the promotion “direct trade” (jiki yushutsu). Despite 
vigorous efforts to promote direct trade which culminated in a battle with foreign merchants 
over the control of Japan’s lucrative raw silk trade, the movement failed to break the foreign 
merchants’ stranglehold. This dissertation examines the failed direct trade movement as a 
way to reassess the popular assumptions about the Meiji government’s role in Japan’s 
economic development and “modernization.” While some scholars have argued the economic 
successes of the Meiji era were due to careful government planning and guidance “from 
above,” this dissertation argues that the story of the direct trade movement shows the 
government’s economic policies in the period were a series of confused and ill-considered 
 iv 
 
extemporaneous measures designed only to meet the immediate needs of the moment. This 
study also argues that although the Meiji state was an authoritarian regime, it was not 
invulnerable to influences “from below.” Businessmen and intellectuals advocating the 
adoption of direct trade policies were able to influence the direction of the government’s 
commercial policies thanks to a lack of stable institutions and processes for determining 
economic policy in the early Meiji period. Although the direct trade movement ended in 
failure, this lack of institutional structures and norms along with close collaboration between 
the state and the private sector gave commercial policy the flexibility needed to make the 
later economic successes of the Meiji period possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On July 2
nd
, 1853 four American warships commanded by Commodore Matthew C. 
Perry appeared at the entrance of Edo Bay, off the coast of Japan. Perry had come to deliver a 
letter from American president Millard Fillmore addressed to the emperor of Japan. 
Fillmore’s letter expressed the hope that “…the United States and Japan should live in 
friendship and have commercial intercourse with one another.”1 Emphasizing a strong desire 
for commerce with Japan among the American people, Fillmore suggested that if “your 
Imperial Majesty were…to change the ancient laws as to allow free trade between the two 
countries, it would be extremely beneficial for both.”2 After delivering Fillmore’s letter to 
officials of the Tokugawa shogun, Perry used both moral suasion and the not so subtle threat 
of military force to convince his Japanese hosts of the benefits of opening Japanese ports to 
foreign shipping. Tokugawa officials were not won over by Fillmore’s letter.  To them, the 
idea of opening the country to commercial relations with a group of barbarians who 
threatened them with violence was hardly appealing. Luckily for Perry, however, his 
warships were sufficiently intimidating to convince his Japanese hosts that it was better not 
to reject his request. When Perry’s fleet returned to Japan in February, 1854, the Tokugawa 
government reluctantly agreed to open two supply ports to American ships. 
                                                 
1
 “Letter of the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan,” in Commodore Matthew Calbraith 
Perry, The Japan Expedition, 1852-1854: the personal journal of Commodore Matthew C. Perry, ed. Roger 
Pomeau, with an introduction by Samuel Eliot Morison (Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1968), 220.  
 
  
2
 Ibid. 
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The historic agreement marked the beginning of Japan’s forced integration into an emerging 
world economic system dominated by the Western powers. By 1858 Japan had signed a 
series of trade treaties, commonly referred to as the Ansei treaties, with America, the 
Netherlands, Russia, Britain, and France which opened up the nation to nearly unrestricted 
foreign trade.
3
 While these treaties marked the beginning of Japan’s full participation in the 
capitalist world market, the treaties also relegated Japan to the status of an inferior nation in 
the emerging Western dominated world order. The treaties stripped Japan of tariff autonomy 
and granted extraterritorial privileges to Westerners living and conducting business in the 
island nation. No similar privileges were extended to Japan in return.
4
 Japan’s trading 
partners were free to erect tariff barriers against Japanese goods if they wished and Japanese 
subjects living abroad would have to do without the privilege of extraterritoriality.  
 Yet even without the humiliating concessions granted to foreigners by the Ansei 
treaties, Japan found its new position in the capitalist world order to be a precarious one. 
Lacking adequate (or often any) knowledge of foreign markets, modern financial institutions 
to facilitate long distance commercial exchange, and a merchant fleet capable of carrying 
domestically produced goods to foreign ports, Japan’s manufacturers and merchants were 
forced to depend on foreign commercial houses in Yokohama and the other treaty ports in 
order to sell their wares to customers overseas. As soon as Japan opened its ports, its 
emerging overseas trade was almost completely dominated by foreign merchants who were 
able to utilize their superior access to capital and detailed knowledge of world markets to
                                                 
3
 Nakamura Satoru, “Kaikō,” in Kōza Nihonshi, ed. Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai and Nihonshi Rekishi Kenkyūkai, 
vol. 5, Meiji Ishin (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1977), 55-56. 
 
 
4
 Ibid. 
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profit from servicing Japan’s foreign trade. In 1878, two decades after the signing of the 
Ansei treaties, nearly 98 percent of all of Japan’s exports and imports passed through foreign 
trading firms.
5
 As foreign banks such as the Oriental Bank and the Hong Kong Shanghai 
Banking Company established beachheads in the treaty ports and mercantile firms such as 
the Jardine Matherson Company grew in size and influence, the foreign economic presence 
in Japan threatened to transform Japan into an economic colony of the West.
6
 
 Widespread anger at the Tokugawa shōguns for their inability to stop the 
encroachment  of foreign powers helped spark a revolt against the Tokugawa regime by a 
group of rebel domains. The rebels succeeded in toppling the Tokugawa regime in 1868 and 
announced the restoration of imperial rule and the beginning a new era of “enlightened 
government” (Meiji).  Japan’s new leaders promised to begin an aggressive program of self-
strengthening reforms which would transform Japan into a powerful nation capable of 
resisting Western interference. 
 The commanding position foreigners enjoyed over Japan’s overseas trade deeply 
disturbed Japan’s new leaders. Japan’s elites were already worried that an influx of cheap 
factory produced Western imports would drown local manufactures and strip the nation of its 
indigenous industries. A young Matsukata Masayoshi, who would one day become the 
nation’s Minister of Finance, warned his superiors in the government that Japan’s people 
                                                 
5
 The percentage calculation is based on the total value of imports and exports handled by foreign firms 
compared to the total value of Japan’s import and export trade for that year. Naikaku Tōkeikyoku, Nihon 
teikoku tōkei nenkan, ed. Tōkei Kyoku,  vo l, (Tōkyō: Naikaku Tōkeikyoku, 1882: reprint Tōkyō: Tōkei Kyōkai, 
1968), 296. 
 
 
6
 Frank H. H. King , The History of the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, vol. 1The Hong Kong bank 
in late imperial China, 1865-1902: on an even keel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 96. 
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would soon “…lose their industries and fall into starvation.”7 The prominent writer and 
intellectual, Fukuzawa Yukichi, echoed similar sentiments, warning his audience at a public 
speaking event that Japan might soon be transformed into a nation of poor manual laborers 
inhabiting a, “hellish world of labor,” where Japan’s entire populace would be little more 
than coolies producing raw materials to fuel the advanced industries of the West.
8
 Maeda 
Masana, a young French-educated government official argued that the foreign economic 
supremacy would cause the “vitality of the whole country to weaken, wilt, and decay.”9 
 Overcoming Japan’s peripheral political and economic status and creating a new 
polity capable of maintaining its independence were major concerns of the new Meiji 
government which came to power in 1868. To accomplish this goal, the new regime believed 
it needed to reform all aspects of Japanese society and transform Japan into a Western style-
nation state. The desire for reform was particularly acute in the realm of trade. The Meiji 
oligarchs viewed the export trade as the primary instrument by which Japan would acquire 
the necessary wealth to fund ambitious modernizing programs.  They wanted to encourage 
exports by all means possible. Beyond this practical consideration, however, they believed a 
vigorous foreign trade was one of the defining features of all great world powers. The 
volume and value of the nation’s trade became a metric measuring the success of the Meiji 
government’s modernizing reforms. The state of the nation’s foreign trade became 
synonymous with the health of the Japanese nation-state itself.  
                                                 
7
 Quoted in Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan, 2
nd
 printing (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1955), 30.  
 
 
8
 Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Gaikokujin no naichi zakkyo yyurusu bekarazaru no ron,” in Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū, 
ed. Keiō Gijuku Daigaku, vol. 19 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1962), 124. 
 
 
9
 Maeda Masana, “Chokusetsu bōeki iken ippan,” in Keizai kōsō,  ed. Nakamura Masanori, Ishii Kanji, and 
Kazuga Yutaka, vol. 8, Nihon kindai shisō taikei  (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), 75. 
 5 
 
 Thus Japan’s leaders were convinced that transforming their country into a great 
commercial power was central to their effort to create a modern and powerful nation-state 
capable of resisting foreign encroachment. Yet the domineering position that foreign 
merchant houses enjoyed in Japan’s overseas trade posed a serious challenge to efforts to 
make Japan into a great trading power. In order for Japan to ensure its continued existence as 
an independent polity and establish itself as a great nation, Japanese had to challenge the 
dominance of foreign merchants in the treaty ports and reclaim Japan’s “commercial rights” 
(shōken).  
 Reasserting Japan’s economic independence and making Japanese merchants the 
masters of the nation’s foreign trade was the goal of the “direct trade” (jiki yushutsu) 
movement.  The concept itself was relatively simple. Japanese merchants and manufacturers 
would simply cut out the foreign middleman in Japan’s overseas trade by establishing direct 
contact between Japanese sellers and foreign buyers of Japanese goods residing in markets 
overseas. Putting the simple idea into practice, however, proved to be a herculean challenge. 
From the mid-1870s until the beginning of the 1880s a group of government officials, 
intellectuals, and businessmen worked furiously to establish direct commercial exchanges 
between Japanese merchants and manufacturers and the consumers of Japanese goods in 
foreign countries. Government agencies issued generous subsidies and loans to Japanese 
firms selling their goods abroad, ambitious entrepreneurs ventured abroad to sell their wares, 
and intellectuals drew up plans for a Japanese commercial renaissance that would establish 
the country as a mighty trading power in its own right. In short, both the public and private 
sectors witnessed major efforts to establish direct trading relationships between foreign 
 6 
 
consumers and Japanese suppliers and ensure the conduct of the nation’s trade would lie 
entirely in Japanese hands.  
 Although the Meiji government’s drive to transform Japan into a rich and powerful 
“modern” nation-state is usually remembered as an outstanding success story, the direct trade 
movement and the attempt to restore Japan’s commercial rights in the 1870s and 1880s ended 
in failure. In 1892 over 84 percent of the nation’s total export and import trade was still in the 
hands of foreign firms.
10
 Despite generous government support, the best efforts of talented 
businessmen, and a widespread popular desire to break the foreign stranglehold on Japan’s 
trade, foreign firms would continue to play a key role in Japan’s trade well into the twentieth 
century.  
 This dissertation examines this important case of Japanese failure in Meiji era 
economic policy. Through an examination of the commercial policies of the Meiji state and 
the direct trade movement, this study seeks to show that one of the greatest economic 
challenges Meiji Japan faced was not the establishment of “modern” industrial enterprises 
but rather the effort to master the art of foreign trade and establish Japan as a commercial 
power in its own right. By highlighting the difficulties Japanese officials and entrepreneurs 
faced in adjusting to practicing commerce in a global marketplace this study seeks to dispel 
some enduring myths of what is too often portrayed as a brilliantly successful, authoritarian 
Japanese state. Japan’s leaders and entrepreneurs were far from far-sighted visionaries 
motivated by patriotic devotion to national self-strengthening through economic development. 
Instead, the actions of businessmen and politicians in the Meiji era were reflexive responses 
                                                 
10
 Naikaku Tōkeikyoku, Nihon teikoku tōkei nenkan, ed. Tōkei Kyoku, vol. 19, (Tōkyō: Naikaku Tōkeikyoku, 
1900; reprint, Tōkyō: Tōkei Kyōkai, 1973), 536. 
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to contingencies of the moment carried out by elites desperate to ensure their own continued 
survival. 
  
Oversights and Controversies regarding the Modern Japanese Economy 
 What is the significance of examining the direct trade movement? The movement 
today remains essentially unknown in English language research on the Japanese economy 
and most economic histories of the Meiji period written in Japanese relegate the movement to 
a footnote.
11
 As has already been indicated, the movement also failed to accomplish its goal 
of overthrowing the rule of foreign merchants over Japan’s overseas trade and fell well short 
of recapturing “commercial rights” for the Japanese nation. If the movement has any 
enduring legacy one might point to the creation of a powerful Japanese trading company, the 
Mitsui Trading Company (Mitsui Bussan), which remains in operation to this day. Otherwise, 
however, direct trade appears to be more of a historical oddity as a failure than a topic 
requiring detailed investigation.  
 Yet even a historical oddity can shed light on important but previously ignored 
aspects of the past and the direct trade movement is one of those oddities. An examination of 
the direct trade movement not only focuses attention on neglected but important aspects of 
Japanese economic history which have been sadly overlooked in previous studies, but will 
also  shed light on two controversies about modern Japan’s economic history. In particular, a 
                                                 
11
 The two most prominent studies (“Jiki yushutsu no tenkai” in volume 3 part 1 of Yokohama Shishi and Meiji 
no Bōeki) that highlighted the direct trade movement as an important development in Japan’s economic history 
were both authored by economic historian Unno Fukuju in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the publication of 
Unno’s monographs, direct trade usually receives mention in most surveys of Japanese economic history, but 
the typically the subject of direct trade serves as a background for explaining the emergence of  trading 
companies beginning in the 1870s. See Unno Fukuju, Meiji no vōeki: kyoyūchi bōeki to shōken kaifuku (Tōkyō: 
Hanawa Shobō, 1967) and Unno Fukuju, “Jiki Yushutsu no tenkai,” in Yokohama Shishi, ed. Yokohama-shi 
Sōmukyoku Shishi Henshūshitsu, vol. 3 part 1 (Yokohama: Yokohama-shi, 1958). See also Hashimoto Jurō and 
Ōzuki Yuka, Kindai Nihon keizaishi (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2002), 36-39. 
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study of the direct trade movement will shift attention away from an unhealthy over-
emphasis on “industrial policy” and modern industrial sectors in Japan’s economic history 
and highlight the important and forgotten role played by commercial policy and indigenous 
industries (zairai sangyō)12in the economic development of the nation. A study of the direct 
trade movement will also  help resolve two enduring points of controversy regarding the 
economic history of nineteenth century Japan and the nature of the Meiji state and its 
relationship to Japanese society. The first controversy relates to the role of the Japanese state 
in the nation’s nineteenth century economy and the second debate concerns competing 
explanations of the respective power of the state and private industry in the formation of 
economic policy. Both controversies will be explained in detail below. 
 
Commerce and Silk: the forgotten pillars of the Japanese economy 
 Understanding the causes of Japan’s economic successes in the nineteenth century 
has been a central goal of research in Japanese economic history for some time, but the 
general tendency in previous studies has been to understand economic growth as equivalent 
to industrialization. A peculiar obsession with industry and industrial policy has over the 
years obscured other important aspects of Japan’s economic history. As a result Japan’s 
modern economic history often appears as little more than a technologically centered 
narrative focused on explaining the growth of industrial productivity.  
 Although it would be an exaggeration to say that English language scholarly research 
on modern Japanese economic history has focused exclusively on growth of industry and 
industrial policy, policies to promote industry have always remained at the forefront of 
                                                 
12
 Zairai sangyō could be literally translated as “previously existing industry.” Typical examples of such 
indigenous industries in Japan include silk, tea, lacquer ware, porcelain, and other handicraft industries which 
existed prior to the opening of the first treaty ports in 1854. 
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scholars’ concerns. Early studies by scholars like William Lockwood and Thomas C. Smith 
focused on the process of industrialization itself and tended to frame analysis of all economic 
developments in Japan in terms of how these developments contributed to or hindered the 
emergence of productive enterprise. The overwhelming focus of Lockwood’s pioneering 
work, The Economic Development of Japan, is on the growth of Japanese industry and even 
chapters on the topic of Japan’s foreign trade mainly portray the main contribution of trade as 
bringing new technology and raw materials to Japan to aid the growth of industry.
13
 Similarly 
the primary concern of Smith’s Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan is the 
“critical period of Japanese industrialization,”14 in analyzing the Japanese government’s 
establishment state owned enterprises in the 1870s and contributions to Japan’s economic 
development.
15
 
 It should be emphasized that although focused narrowly on industrial enterprise, 
Lockwood and Smith’s pioneering studies deserve credit for recognizing obstacles and 
complexities Meiji Japan faced in fostering economic development. In arguing that a 
reluctant Meiji regime felt forced to create government enterprises, Smith highlighted the 
seemingly insurmountable challenges that Japan had to overcome in order to industrialize. 
An ambitious entrepreneur who sought to set up a factory faced many obstacles in mobilizing 
the necessary capital, acquiring technical expertise, and learning new techniques of 
                                                 
13
 William W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan: growth and structural change, expanded ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 306. 
 
 
14
 Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan, viii. 
 
  
15
 Ibid., 101-103. 
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management to make industrial production profitable.
16
 In a related manner Lockwood 
argued that Japan’s successful industrialization resulted from an intricate interaction of 
individual aspirations, nationalist sentiment, management of human and natural resources, 
and access to technology among many factors.
17
Combined together their studies presented a 
picture of a vulnerable Japan that had to overcome daunting challenges in its program of 
economic modernization and an image of a Meiji state which contributed to, but did could 
not guarantee, the success of the Japanese economy as a whole. 
 Yet Lockwood and Smith’s overwhelming focus on the establishment of mechanized 
productive industries as the ultimate measure of economic success obscured the important 
role played by commerce and commercial policy in the efforts of the Meiji state to create a 
modern economy. Introducing new technologies and techniques in order to produce goods 
more efficiently was only one part of a larger effort by Japanese elites to reform their 
economy and create a wealthy and powerful nation state. Once goods had been produced 
there had to be some way of selling them abroad in order to increase the nation’s wealth. If 
Japan’s economy was not to be beholden to the whims of foreign merchants in this regard, 
Japanese had to create a network of Japanese firms and entrepreneurs stationed around the 
world who would sell Japanese goods in foreign markets and develop new outlets for 
Japanese products.  
 There is also ample evidence that Japanese leaders viewed developing and extending 
the nation’s export trade as being equally if not more important than the development of 
mechanized industry. Britain, the early object of Meiji leaders’ admiration as the ideal 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 52. 
 
 
17
 Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, 574. 
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modern and powerful state, received attention less for its industry than its status as a great 
trading nation.  Japanese intellectuals pointed to the Navigation Acts, a set of laws passed in 
the 1600s which required all goods imported into Britain to be carried on British ships, rather 
than Britain’s textile mills as the key to British economic and military supremacy.18 Japan’s 
own economic policies in the first two decades of the Meiji era also suggested a strong 
commercial orientation. Although the government  actively set up model factories that 
produced textiles, glassware, bricks and other objects, perhaps the most enduring government 
program for support centered on shipping in order to encourage the expansion of Japanese 
commerce.
19
  Considering the importance that Meiji leaders gave to commerce as a key to 
national strength and their unceasing desire to expand the nation’s export trade, an account of 
commercial policy as an important subject of inquiry in its own right is in order. 
 Following works of Lockwood and Smith, scholars writing in English took an intense 
interest in the more narrow issue of the role of the state and industrial policy in economic 
growth. More than any other study, Chalmers Johnson’s MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 
influenced this trend. In this now classic study, Johnson, whose primary concern was to 
understand the causes of Japan’s post-1945 economic miracle, argued that Japan was a 
“developmental state,” the defining features of which included a strategic, goal oriented 
approach to economic policy and a strong state bureaucracy to plan and guide national 
                                                 
18
 One example of Japanese interest in the Navigation Acts can be found in Ōkubo’s proposals to encourage the 
development of domestic industry. Ōkubo argued the implementation of a Japanese version of the Navigation 
Acts would be the most viable way keep imported goods out of Japan and protect Japan’s industries. See Ōkubo 
Toshimichi, “Ōkubo Toshimichi no shokusan kōgyō ni kansuru Iken,” in Keizai kōsō, ed. Nakamura Masanori, 
Ishii Kanji, and Kasuga Yutaka ,vol. 8, Kindai Nihon shisō taikei, (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), 18. 
 
 
19
 Although the Meiji government created a number of state owned enterprises, the majority of these enterprises 
were sold off in the early 1880s and the government retreated from direct involvement in the development of 
industry. In contrast, the government maintained an active interest in the shipping industry providing subsidies 
for major shippers well into the 1890s. See William Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., 1870-1914: Business 
Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 302-307. 
 12 
 
economic development.
20
 For Johnson a key feature of the developmental state was the 
creation and implementation of a carefully crafted set of industrial policies which explained 
the stunning economic success of postwar Japan from the mid-1950s though the 1970s.
21
 
 Although Johnson intended his developmental state paradigm primarily as a 
description of the post-1945 Japanese state, the concept had a profound impact on research 
on the Meiji economy. Like Lockwood and Smith before him, Johnson’s main interest was in 
explaining the growth of Japanese industry. Yet by highlighting industrial policy as a key 
element in explaining Japanese economic success, Johnson opened up the door to the study 
of what might be termed the “politics of development” in Japanese economic history.22 This 
new focus provided scholars with a whole new set of questions about the complex set of 
interactions between the state and interest groups which led to a deeper, more nuanced 
understanding of the dynamics involved in the policy making process in Meiji Japan. By 
framing the Japanese state’s role in the economy in an overall narrative of the evolution of 
the developmental state, Johnson prompted researchers to look beyond government 
enterprises and examine the Meiji government’s broader role in the economy.23 
 Yet Johnson’s focus on the politics of development and industrial policy have become 
such dominant themes in modern Japanese economic history that concerns with these issues 
                                                 
20
 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1982), 18 & 20-21. 
 
 
21
 Ibid., 19-20. 
 
 
22
 Steven J. Ericson, The Sound of the Whistle: railroad and the state in Meiji Japan (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), 3. 
 
 
23
 For a summary of the impact of Johnson’s ideas see Meredith Woo-Cummings, “Introduction: Chalmers 
Johnson and the politics of nationalism and development,” in The Developmental State, ed. Meredith Woo-
Cummings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 1-30. 
 13 
 
have narrowed the scope of the field. Almost every study of Meiji era economic history must 
now inevitably answer the question of whether or not Meiji Japan had an “industrial policy” 
or if antecedents of the postwar developmental state can be detected in the policies or 
political institutions of the Meiji period. While such questions are important, the underlying 
assumption is that the complexities of economic growth and economic activity can be 
reduced down to questions of policy and bureaucratic procedure. The emphasis on obstacles 
to growth and the play of economic forces that appeared in Lockwood and Smith’s works has 
largely disappeared from studies of Meiji economic history in English.
24
  
 A focus on commercial policy and the direct trade movement will not only help 
correct the industrial bias in research on the Meiji Japanese economy but will also serve as an 
important reminder of the many obstacles and complicating factors in Japan’s economic 
development that the current stress on the “politics of development” has tended to 
overshadow.  An examination of the direct trade movement will accomplish this goal in two 
ways. First, a study of commercial policy will remind us of the ways in which economic 
realities affected the economic policies of the Meiji regime. In its early years the Meiji 
government faced an acute crisis in raising revenue and even after this problem was solved 
by land tax reform, the problem of stabilizing the currency acted as a significant restraint on 
the Meiji government’s resources. Second, commercial policy presented the Meiji regime 
with some of its greatest challenges. Increasing exports could not be accomplished by 
bureaucratic fiat, but required government officials and entrepreneurs to learn how to adapt 
to doing business overseas. This task was at least as difficult as improving productivity. 
                                                 
24
 For two prime example of this trend, see Richard Samuels,. The Business of the Japanese State: energy 
markets in comparative and historical perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) and Kyoko Sheridan, 
Governing the Japanese Economy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). 
 
 
 14 
 
 Another general tendency in research on modern Japan’s economic history which 
needs correcting is the neglect of serious study of indigenous industries. The overwhelming 
concern of researchers had been with the development of mechanized “modern” industries in 
Japan. Extensive studies have appeared of railroads, steam shipping, and cotton spinning in 
the Meiji era and for many scholars no account of Japan’s economic history could be 
complete without at least passing mention of the famous Yawata Steelworks.
25
 The long-term 
importance of all of these industries is beyond dispute. Railroads and steamships 
revolutionized the Japanese economy by creating a truly integrated national market and 
giving Japanese products more convenient access to markets abroad. Cotton spinning and the 
cotton textile industry would also become a foundation of Japanese prosperity. Yet in the 
first two decades of the Meiji era these modern industries were in their formative stages. 
Investment in railways, shipping and cotton mills was taking in more capital in investment 
than it was generating in profits and they contributed little to the growth of Japan’s export 
trade. Instead indigenous industries provided most of Japan’s export earnings throughout the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Two products the Japanese had been producing for 
some time, tea and silk, in particular produced the bulk of Japan’s income from exports and 
played thus a vital role in funding investment in other industries.  
 The role of indigenous industry has, however, received scant attention. With the rare 
exception of David Wittner’s work on the diffusion of silk reeling technology in the Meiji era 
and Penelope Frank’s work on the relationship between rural industries and consumer culture 
in Japan, there are no major English language studies on Japan’s silk or tea industries, despite 
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the vital role that those two played in Japan’s economic history.26 Nor is there any serious 
analysis of government policy toward the tea and silk industries despite the intense interest 
that the state had in nurturing both industries. This situation is lamentable not only because it 
leaves a large blind spot in our portrait of Japan’s economic history but the story of 
indigenous industries provides ample examples of state intervention in the economy aimed at 
encouraging the growth of private industry. If there was a place to find antecedents to Japan’s 
postwar “developmental state” surely it would be in the industrial policies designed to 
support silk and tea producers.  
 This dissertation will provide only a partial remedy to this glaring oversight. Some of 
the most vocal and active advocates of direct trade were silk producers. This dissertation will 
therefore include an examination of the silk industry and the challenges silk exporters faced 
in attempting to export directly to foreign markets and the obstacles government officials 
faced in framing a set of commercial policies which would support silk producers and 
exporters in bringing their wares to consumers on distant shores. Raw silk was Meiji Japan’s 
most important export item as it along with other silk products generated nearly half of all of 
Japan’s export earnings. Not only did the central government want to promote silk exports, 
but local governments and elites took an interest in the health of the industry as an important 
part of the rural economy.  
 
The Role of the Meiji State: Grand Architect orAccidental Actor?  
Beyond examining the important role played by commercial policy and indigenous 
industries in modern Japan’s economic development, this study will also weigh in on two 
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issues that have remained the subject of controversy in scholarly works on the Japanese 
economy. The first controversy concerns how to assess the Meiji state’s role in the nation’s 
economy.  While scholars agree that the Meiji state played a vital role in modern Japan’s 
modern economic development, they disagree over how much credit the state deserves for 
the nation’s economic successes. Was the Meiji state a brilliant architect carefully planning 
and directing economic development or simply just an accidental actor who benefited from a 
convergence of favorable circumstances and happened to select some effective economic 
policies through almost sheer luck? 
 The origins of the controversy lie in the attempts to explain the causes of Japan’s 
successful economic modernization in comparison to the economic failures of other Asian 
polities, particularly China under the Qing Dynasty. In seeking to explain what had enabled 
Japan’s leaders alone among Asia’s elites to build a strong modern nation-state capable of 
resisting foreign encroachment several scholars saw the key to Japanese success in the 
reformist tendencies of Japan’s governing elites. Unlike their Chinese counterparts, Japan’s 
leadership moved swiftly to destroy the old “feudal” social structures that inhibited economic 
growth and wholeheartedly embraced a path of “economic modernization.”27 Lockwood and 
Smith argued that the bold decision by Japan’s leaders to embrace radical socio-political 
change rescued Japan from the fate of Qing China which obstinately clung to an outmoded 
socio-political status quo that inhibited growth and ultimately doomed the Qing Empire.
28
 
 This conclusion led Lockwood and Smith to view the role of the state to be decisive 
in pioneering early industrialization in Japan. Lockwood marveled at, “…the remarkable 
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capacity of the Japanese at critical points to produce vigorous leaders able to map out a long 
term program and then decisively put it into action, ” and credited the government with 
spearheading the industrialization process. 
29
 In his study of government enterprises, Smith 
also highlighted the critical pioneering role played by the state and concluded that without 
the state’s willingness to create such enterprises, “…economic development would have been 
delayed or arrested….”30  
 Yet if Lockwood and Smith viewed the decision by Japan’s leaders to destroy the old 
“feudal” socio-political order and initiate a crash program of industrialization as the correct 
set of policies for a late-developing nation like Japan to pursue, both scholars were quick to 
emphasize these decisions had developed largely by accident. Smith argued that there was 
“…no evidence in their writings that the Meiji leaders had any clear, preconceived solution 
to the problem [of making the transition from a traditional to a modern society].”31 He 
contended that the Japanese state took the initiative in industrial development in the late 
nineteenth century not because of any conviction that the state should do so, but rather 
because private industry lacked the necessary resources and willpower to invest in new 
technologies and production methods.
32
 Smith stressed that the Japanese leaders, “hammered 
out an industrial policy that was successful, precisely because it was geared to present needs 
                                                 
29
 Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, 13 & 506. 
 
 
30
 Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan, 103. 
 
 
31
 Ibid., 34. 
 
 
32
 Ibid., 42. 
 
 
 18 
 
and not distant arbitrary objectives.”33 Lockwood argued that the decisions of Japan’s 
leadership in the Meiji period were, “…ad hoc and stemmed from a variety of motives.”34 
For Lockwood, “There was often confusion and hasty improvisation in deciding upon an 
actual course of action…The experiments with State pioneering of industry, with banking 
institutions with railway financing, and with other ventures all show much trial and error 
throughout the nineteenth century.”35 Thus while highlighting the state’s role as critical, both 
Smith and Lockwood held that Japan’s nineteenth century successes were either almost 
entirely coincidental or the result of a focus on pragmatic problem solving rather than 
tenacious dedication to a grand modernizing project. 
 In subsequent decades some historians tended to give more credit to the Japanese 
state. Japan’s era of high speed growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, commonly hailed as an  
economic miracle, inspired comparisons to what one might call Japan’s first economic 
miracle, its success in industrialization in the Meiji period. At the same time, Johnson’s 
argument that postwar Japan was a developmental state raised new questions about how 
Japan’s economic and political institutions had evolved in a way so radically different from 
the Anglo-American regulatory state. Some researchers began to suggest that perhaps some 
roots of Japan’s postwar developmental state could be found in the late nineteenth century 
experiences of the Meiji state. By the 1990s a few scholars were ready to declare that even in 
the Meiji era Japan had been led by men of uncanny economic wisdom with an almost 
magical ability to conjure economic growth out of thin air. The Meiji state had gone from 
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being the accidental hero of Japanese industrialization to the ingenious master architect of 
economic development.
36
 
 Even though Johnson originally applied the concept of the “developmental state” to 
postwar Japan, Johnson himself also suggested that Meiji Japan might have also been a 
developmental state. Even in MITI and the Japanese Miracle he noted that “…modern Japan 
began in 1868 to become plan rational and developmental.”37Later Johnson classified  Meiji 
Japan as an example of a “capitalist developmental state” which shared traits common to 
Leninist-Stalinist “mobilization regimes” such as, “…social goal setting [by the state], forced 
saving, mercantilism, and bureaucratism,” but relied on indirect and market conforming 
means to control the economy.
38
 He thus implied the Meiji state had taken a strong role in 
both planning and guiding the direction of Japan’s economic development.  
 If Johnson was inconsistent in his characterization of the Meiji state, some 
researchers who were inspired by his developmental state paradigm were more consistent and 
bold. Bai Gao, who [like Johnson]  traced the beginnings of the Japanese developmental state 
back only to the 1930s, saw important antecedents to the developmental state in the Meiji era 
nationalist desire to, “…strengthen the nation’s power in international competition,” which 
Gao argued persisted into the postwar era.
39
 Steven Ericson argued that the concept of the 
developmental state did not accurately describe the Meiji state after the institution of a 
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national assembly, the Diet, in 1890 opened up the policy making process, but he asserted 
that Johnson’s image of a “strong, smart” developmental state applied, “…fairly well to 
Japan during the first two decades of the Meiji period.”40 Kyoko Sheridan has perhaps gone 
the farthest in awarding the Japanese state a critical role in consciously directing Japan’s 
economic development since 1868. She argued that “…state planning and direction of 
economic development has been continuous.”41 
 The twists and turns in portrayals of the Meiji state show that there is still 
considerable confusion about how to assess the role of the Japanese state in encouraging 
economic development in the Meiji period. A small, but significant group of researchers, 
many of whom do not specialize in research on the Meiji era, have portrayed the Meiji state 
as a master architect of economic development that skillfully mapped out the course of 
economic development and implemented carefully crafted policies to reach set targets for 
economic development. Although even advocates of this position are willing to concede the 
Japanese state was not always successful or competent, their accounts do not provide many 
examples of failure or even flaws in the government’s policies.42 
 One of the conclusions of this dissertation is that the Meiji state’s role was much 
closer to that of the accidental actor of Lockwood and Smith, than the grand architect of 
Sheridan or the capitalist developmental state suggested by Johnson. In fact, the story of the 
Meiji state’s policies to promote direct trade demonstrates that in the 1870s and 1880s the 
state resembled a bumbling amateur that occasionally stumbled upon an effective policy. To 
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be sure, the Meiji state deserves credit for actively attempting to do something to challenge 
the foreign dominance of Japan’s overseas trade and making an honest effort to aid 
struggling exporters. Even though the Meiji state failed to realize any of its short term aims, 
it did achieve some accidental and important successes in recovering Japan’s commercial 
rights because of its persistence in maintaining an activist stance and willingness to be 
flexible and change the direction of policies when they appeared to be failing.  
 
Consensus versus Conflict in the Making of Economic Policy 
 Just as scholars have different views on the effectiveness of state planning, they have 
also presented conflicting interpretations of the process of making economic policies in Meiji 
Japan. One view stressed that the forging of a broad social consensus about the direction of 
economic policy enabled government officials to determine policies. An alternate vision 
emphasized a complex process of conflict and negotiation between the state and business. 
Yet advocates of both visions tended to neglect the first two decades of the Meiji era.  
 If the Meiji state had indeed been a strong and smart developmental state as scholars 
such as Johnson suggested, the next natural question to arise was what factors had led to the 
rise of the strong and smart Meiji state? Unless one was willing to endorse the view that 
certain Japanese cultural tendencies could explain the existence of a strong, smart Meiji state 
and speak as Kyoko Sheridan did about Japan’s “unusual capacity for making deliberate, 
effective choices of national direction, or “the Japanese willingness to plan” the source of the 
Japanese state’s strength and ability to plan begged for a careful historically minded 
explanation.
43
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 Those who emphasize the power of the Meiji state to direct economic policy highlight 
Japan’s situation as a late developer in a world economy dominated by Western industrial 
powers. In this view, a broadly shared desire to construct a “rich nation, strong army” (fukoku 
kyōhei) motivated the government and eased the acceptance of its policies.  Johnson spoke of 
a situational nationalism which arose from “a desire to assume full human status by taking 
part in an industrial civilization.”44This popular nationalist desire to obtain equality with the 
industrialized west allowed the developmental state to pursue its ambitious programs.
45
 Other 
scholars like Bai Gao and Richard Samuels believed that the deep nationalist impulse in 
Japan induced Japan’s leaders to think about all economic problems in terms of their effect 
on the health of the nation-state rather than from the “individualistic” consumer oriented 
orientation commonly found in “Anglo-Saxon capitalism.”46 Both authors agreed that the 
privileging of the health of the nation-state as the ultimate aim of economic policy was the 
result of Japan’s experience as a late developer and the nation’s acute desire to “catch-up” 
with the West.
47
 
 As Carl Mosk indicated, the slogan fukoku kyohei served as “political cement” or a 
“big tent” accommodating the competing agendas of everyone from militarists to well-to-do 
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peasants.
48
Thus, in the early Meiji period few questioned the direction of national economic 
policy and the government’s policies. Real disputes would only arise later in the Meiji period 
when the desire for empire and expansion abroad began to place larger burdens on the 
domestic Japanese economy.
49
 While the perception of a hegemonic consensus did not 
preclude the possibility that rival interests existed in Meiji Japan, researchers posited that the 
overwhelming desire to “catch-up” with the West and nationalist impulses kept in check 
complaints about the methods used to pursue these goals. 
 Other scholars denied that any sort of consensus had ever existed when it came to 
matters of economic policy. In the preface to the second printing of his Political Change and 
Economic Development in Japan, Thomas Smith pointed out that, “…decisions were often 
painfully reached after bitter controversies and sometimes bitter ideological clashes between 
bureaucratic factions…There is no more persistent, widespread, or foolish misconception 
about early Japanese industrialization than that the Meiji leaders…knew precisely what they 
were doing and were all of the same mind.”50 Smith, however, did not provide any specific 
examples of such conflict.  
 Several decades later Richard Samuels’ first book, a study of the Japanese energy 
industry, showed how the formation of economic policy in a particular sector, depended upon 
a continuous process of negotiation between the state and private industry and “reciprocal 
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consent” between public and private actors.51 Samuels suggested that Japan’s private sector 
had its own self-interested agenda that needed to be taken into account in order to understand 
Japan’s political economy. Although his work, like Johnson’s MITI and the Japanese 
Miracle, centered on the twentieth century, his concept of “reciprocal consent” had potential 
implications for research on the Meiji era. 
 Studies of the shipping, railroad, and cotton spinning industries in the Meiji published 
in the 1980s and 1990s seemed to confirm the utility of Samuels’ approach by presenting a 
picture of conflict and contention over economic policy. William Wray’s study of the history 
of the NYK, a large shipping firm that had emerged from a government encouraged merger 
of two private firms, revealed bitter rivalries between different government ministries, 
disputes in the Diet, and differences of opinion over how to support and nurture a native 
shipping industry.
52
 Steven Ericson’s study of the railroads in the Meiji era also revealed 
similar intra-government disputes, and struggles between the state and private industry over 
economic policy, especially after the creation of the Diet in 1890.
53
 Miles Fletcher’s article 
on the cotton spinning industry painted a picture of a private industry group successfully 
lobbying politicians in the Diet to abolish tariffs on raw cotton imports.
54
 Together these 
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studies suggested a Meiji state where economic policy evolved through a complex process of 
contestation and negotiation between interested state and non-state actors.   
 The “reciprocal consent” model, though, may not apply to the early Meiji period. All 
three studies cited above examine events taking place after the opening of the Diet in 1890 as 
an institutional arena for companies and business groups to exert influence on Diet members 
in the making of national economic policy.
55
 The question of how economic policy 
developed during the first two decades of the Meiji era that preceded the establishment of the 
Diet remains an open question.  Did the lack of stable institutions and formally organized 
private interests give the state the necessary latitude to dictate economic policy or was policy 
decided through a process of contestation and negotiation even in the 1870s and 1880s? 
 The direct trade movement, which reached its zenith in the early 1880s long before 
the formation of the Diet, provides a valuable opportunity to examine how commercial policy 
developed during the most authoritarian period of the Meiji regime’s existence. The direct 
trade movement is also significant in that it was not simply a government initiative but had 
widespread and active support from a group of entrepreneurs and intellectuals who saw direct 
trade as a solution to dealing with the economic challenges of adapting to global trade. An 
examination of the direct trade movement reveals that although it attracted broad support on 
the goal of challenging the predominance of foreign merchants, serious disputes regarding 
implementation arose between different ideological camps and interest groups Despite the 
Meiji state’s monopoly on political power, economic policy still involved a process of 
negotiation between interested parties. The process resembled Samuels’ model of “reciprocal 
consent,” only more confused. 
 
                                                 
55
 Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State, 8. 
 26 
 
Commercial Policy and the Meiji State 
 In sum, this examination of the direct trade movement that attempted to challenge the 
dominant position of foreign merchants in Japan’s overseas trade presents four main 
arguments. First, commercial policy played a vital role in Japan’s economic development. 
Commercial policy was important not only because Japan’s prosperity depended upon 
increasing exports and finding new outlets for its products but also because Japan’s 
leadership considered commercial prowess to be a vital feature of a modern and powerful 
state. Commercial policy was thus not only crucial to the Meiji regime because of its 
practical economic benefits, but also because transforming Japan into a great trading nation 
was a central goal of the Meiji regime. Second, the work will focus on Japan’ indigenous 
industries as a vital engine propelling Meiji Japan’s economic development. Because 
indigenous industries, such as raw silk and tea, provided the bulk of Japan’s export they 
merit attention.  
 The next two arguments pertain to the role of the state in the Meiji economy and the 
way in which economic policy making occurred in the Meiji state. These two points are 
interrelated in that they have a vital bearing on our understanding of the nature of the Meiji 
state and its relationship to Meiji society. Contrary to the view that the Meiji state was the 
master architect of Japan’s economic development by carefully planning and guiding 
industrialization, this study finds that the Meiji state was at best a reluctant and clumsy actor 
in the story of the Meiji economic “miracle.” Far from being carefully planned, the 
government’s interventions in the economy were ad hoc and were driven largely by the 
contingencies of the moment. More often than not government actions ended in failure with 
only occasional and often unanticipated successes. If the Meiji government helped to 
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encourage economic development, its positive contributions resulted from its remaining an 
activist and flexible state that continued experimenting with economic policy. In brief, in its 
interventions in the economy the Meiji government was grasping at straws and occasionally 
it was able to grab one. 
If the Meiji state was not the master architect of economic development in Japan but a 
pragmatic and often desperate actor struggling to find ways to spur economic growth, what 
implications does this insight have for our understanding of the way in which economic 
policy evolved during the first two decades of the Meiji period? Despite the government’s 
autocratic powers to create new laws and regulations by fiat, in the realm of economic policy 
there was a remarkable amount of contestation between members of the political and 
economic elite. This conflict over policy issues illustrates the ways in which the Meiji regime 
even in its first two decades was a competitive and pluralistic autocracy.
  
 
 
CHAPTER 1: 
Silk, Tea, and Foreign Devils: foreign trade in the early Meiji period 
 
 Japan will always be remembered as the one that got away. In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century as much of the rest of Asia fell under the colonial rule of the Western 
powers and China was in the process of becoming a colonial outpost with only nominal 
independence, Japan alone managed not only to escape domination by the Western powers, 
but even managed to become a great world power in its own right. Japan’s seemingly 
miraculous ability to escape the sad fate of its colonized and semi-colonized Asian 
counterparts has always been a topic of fascination for historians. Many have wondered, 
what was different about Japan? Were there some special factors that made Japan different 
from other Asian societies? Of course, such kinds of questions assume the existence of some 
type of Japanese “uniqueness” lacking in other Asian societies. This assumption can make 
Japan’s “modernizing” successes seem inevitable.  
 In reality, however, Japanese achievements in creating a powerful modern nation-
state were anything but inevitable. Japan began its modern era as a polity that, in an 
economic sense, was indistinguishable from other Asian societies. After the opening of its 
ports in 1858, Japan was a semi-colonized peripheral zone in the world economy where trade 
was dominated by Western merchants, much like the rest of Asia.
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Although it is undeniable that Japan would eventually become the world’s first non-
Western industrial power, in the 1870s there was nothing to indicate that Japan’s fate in the 
world economy would be any different from that of other colonized and semi-colonized 
regions in Asia. Like many of the other Asian economies in the early modern period, Japan 
experienced a period of dynamic economic growth under the Tokugawa regime.
56
 By the 
time Perry’s black ships first appeared in Edo Bay in 1853, Japan could boast large, well 
developed urban centers in Tōkyō, Ōsaka and Kyōto, an integrated national market, and an 
impressive record of proto-industrial growth fueled by an emerging consumer economy.
57
 
Some scholars have pointed to these developments as proof that Japan underwent a unique 
series of economic transformations that set it apart from its continental Asian neighbors and 
gave Japan a special advantage in its transition to an industrial capitalist economy.
58
 Despite 
these significant developments, however, Japan enjoyed no special competitive advantages 
when it opened itself up to foreign trade with the West in 1858. Japan remained a 
predominantly agrarian nation and had relatively little to offer the newly industrialized West 
beyond a few primary commodities that could be utilized as the raw inputs for factory 
production and lightly processed agricultural consumer goods. Japan had little in the way of 
exportable value-added manufactures. In this respect, Japan was indistinguishable from other 
Asian economies. 
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 Japan did possess a vibrant handicraft manufacturing sector, but the future of 
Japanese indigenous manufacturing was by no means certain in the late nineteenth century. 
Rapid technological advances in the production of everything from textiles to porcelain and 
tea in the industrialized West threatened to make Japan’s handicraft industries outdated and 
inefficient. The sudden forced opening of Japan to unrestricted foreign trade and the 
beginning of country’s integration into global circuits of trade in 1858 therefore posed a 
serious challenge to indigenous manufacturers who were at risk of drowning in a flood of 
cheap factory produced Western imports. Among the sectors that were particularly hard hit 
by Western imports were sugar and cotton textiles, two important rural industries which 
appeared to be entering into a terminal decline and which demonstrated the serious challenge 
Western industry posed to Japan’s indigenous manufactures. 
 On the positive side, the beginning of unrestricted foreign trade between Japan and 
the rest of the world proved lucrative to other sectors of the Japanese economy. Since 
foreigners proved to have a seemingly insatiable demand for Japanese silk and tea, exports of 
those goods boomed, causing the rapid growth in silk and tea production. There was, 
however, a hidden peril behind the growth of the silk and tea industries in Japan. Silk and tea 
were also the primary export products of Japan’s neighbor, China, a country with 
substantially more arable land and a larger labor force.
59
 Strong competition from China and 
other tea and silk producing nations could, in theory, completely drown out Japanese 
products in international markets. The existence of alternative suppliers of tea and silk also 
made the international market for those products a buyers’ market. If a potential buyer did 
not like the prices of Japanese teas and silks he could easily take his business elsewhere. This 
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situation gave Western merchants who came to Japan to purchase tea and silk significant 
power in determining prices. Thus tea and silk, while lucrative, appeared to be at best an 
uncertain foundation upon which to base the nation’s economic future. 
 With important domestic industries experiencing decline due to competition from the 
industrialized West and a domestic economy increasingly reliant on the export of a few 
lightly processed commodities, Japan in the early Meiji period appeared to share much in 
common with other societies that would experience decades of “underdevelopment.” 
Although Japan would ultimately escape the trap of underdevelopment, it is important to 
remember that there was nothing in the early 1870s to indicate that Japan would manage this 
feat. A heritage of economic growth and innovation in the Tokugawa period by no means 
guaranteed future economic success in the global marketplace.  
 It is also vital to remember the precarious nature of Japan’s position in the world 
economy in the Meiji period to understand the economic challenges Japan faced and the 
problems its government’s commercial policies had to address. The following brief overview 
of Japan’s foreign trade will outline the promises and challenges of Japan’s foreign trade in 
the 1870s. Some of the greatest economic challenges the nation faced did not involve 
technology transfer or the introduction of mechanized production, but rather lay in barriers to 
the establishment of a foreign trade free from the mediation of foreign merchants in the treaty 
ports. The desire to overcome these challenges would give rise to the direct trade movement. 
 
Foreign Trade by the Numbers: An overview of Japan’s foreign trade 
 A brief overview of Japan’s foreign trade in the early Meiji period displays a gloomy 
picture of Japan’s future prospects. True to the patterns of a peripheral, under-developing 
 32 
 
nation, Japan’s exports consisted almost entirely of primary commodities or lightly processed 
agricultural goods. Table 1 below shows the product categories that made up Meiji Japan’s 
key exports in the early 1870s when the government first compiled official statistical records 
of Japan’s trade. In the table key exports are defined as any category of products totaling 
more than 1 million yen in exports per annum. Also included are a few select categories of 
goods which averaged total exports in the hundreds of thousands of yen per annum.   
 Raw silk (kiito) and tea stand at the top of the list. Japan’s main exports in the early 
Meiji period, they serve as prime examples of the fundamentally agrarian, low-value added 
nature of most Japanese exports. Japanese raw silk served as the raw material for the 
production of silk fabrics in the advanced industrial economies of the West, particularly 
France and the United States.  Raw silk and related silk products (silkworm egg cards, waste 
silk) accounted for almost half of Japan’s export trade well into the 1890s.60 Tea came a 
distant second, although by the mid -1890s its status as a major export began to wane.
61
 
Japanese tea was a consumer good that proved popular in the American market in the last 
half of the nineteenth century. 
 In addition to these two goods, a secondary group of primary commodities; rice, coal 
copper, and camphor also accounted for sizable portion of Japan’s export trade. Other 
important exports included konbu, an edible type of seaweed, along with other marine 
products. Most of of the konbu and marine products were exported to China. There was also 
a wide variety products classified by Japanese authorities as “miscellaneous goods” (zakka), 
a category that came to include a variety of handicraft items such as bamboo products, 
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lacquer ware, and matches which added together made up for a respectable chunk of Japan’s 
exports.
62
 With the exception of matches, these items were the products of Japan’s traditional 
industries (zairai sangyō) which were dominated by small scale manufacturers with 
insufficient capital to engage in overseas trade independently.
63
 The only significant valued 
added product exported by Japan at the time was lacquer ware. 
 This is, of course, only a rough sketch of the overall characteristics of Japan’s export 
trade. Trade statistics kept by the Meiji government divided Japan’s exports into hundreds of 
separate categories, many of which registered at the most only thousands or hundreds of 
thousands of yen in exports per annum. It is neither possible nor desirable to list all the 
numerous categories here; many are simply not statistically significant. Moreover, some of 
the categories changed over time so that they included different products at different times. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the majority of Japan’s exports were lightly processed 
commodities.  
Table 1. Japan’s Primary Exports, 1879-1882*64 
Year Tea Raw 
Silk 
Lacquer 
ware 
Coal  Rice Copper Konbu Camphor Total 
                                                 
62
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1874 7,193 5,302 223 555 322 17 259 155 19,315 
1875 6,745 5,424 167 1,010 18 80 284 138 18,611 
1876 5,530 13,197 116 776 810 133 397 174 27,511 
1877 4,288 9,626 185 735 2269 164 339 238 23,333 
*unit of measurement-1,000 yen 
 
 Analyzing the composition of Japan’s imports is a more challenging task. Some 
goods such as machinery and raw materials do not show up in official trade statistics.
65
 The 
official records also divide imports into a larger number of itemized sub-categories than 
exports. Still, one can discern that Japan’s import trade followed the classic trading pattern of 
a peripheral country in the world economy which typically exchanges primary commodity 
exports for manufactured products from the industrialized West. The largest and most 
prominent category of imports was cotton yarn and textiles which accounted for 
approximately 50% of the total value of all goods imported into Japan per annum in the late 
1870s and early 1880s.
66
 Another major import was processed sugar which made up about 
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10% of the Japan’s annual imports by value.67  The remainder of imports consisted primarily 
of various types of machinery and “productive inputs” (seisan shudan) from the 
industrialized West to be used in the creation of Japan’s own industries.68 
 Table 2 shows Japan’s main imports, defined here as any category of goods totaling 
one million yen or more of imports per annum. Cotton yarn easily stands out as the top 
import. Grosgrain (goro), a type of coarse corded cloth, and canequim (kiganekin), a type of 
unbleached muslin, vied for second place, along with red sugar. The figures in this table fail, 
however, to demonstrate the true predominance of the import of textile products, which 
amounted to around 10 million yen per annum, because official statistics divided textile 
imports into a large number of sub-categories that are too numerous to list here.
 69
  Also 
obscured in the information provided in Table 2 is the rapid shift in consumer preference 
away from the less processed “red sugar” to highly processed white sugar which begins to 
show up in official trade statistics in 1880.
70
 
 
Table 2. Japan’s Primary Imports, 1879-1882*71 
Year  Red Sugar  Cotton Yarn Grosgrain Canequim Total 
1874 1,888 3,573 981 3,594 22,926 
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1875 2,582 4,058 2,393 2,425 29,332 
1876 2,185 4,151 2,263 2,817 23,478 
1877 2,105 4,084 2,373 1,835 27,063 
*unit of measurement-1,000 yen 
  
 Japan’s general trading pattern, exchanging primary commodities and agricultural 
goods for finished products and manufactures fits the general picture painted here of Japan as 
a peripheral region in the world economy indistinguishable from other Asian economies at 
the time. Yet the summary overview of Japan’s exports and imports alone is not sufficient to 
prove that Japan in the nineteenth century deserves the moniker of “peripheral economy.”72 
The term suggests a subservient position in the international division of labor in which the 
peripheral region supplies the raw inputs for production in a metropolitan industrial core in 
exchange for finished manufactured products from the core. In short, Meiji Japan’s trade 
patterns must also demonstrate that Japanese raw materials are exchanged for Western 
finished manufactures. Demonstrating this point requires a brief examination of the 
destinations of Japan’s exports and the sources of imports.  
 Table 3 shows the four largest markets for Japanese exports--North America, China, 
France and England. North America proved the biggest customer for Japanese goods, taking 
in roughly a third of all of Japan’s exports. Thirsty Americans consumed the bulk of Japan’s 
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tea exports and, starting in the 1870s, a large share of Japan’s raw silk found its way to 
American textile factories which wove it into a variety of silk garments. The French silk 
textile industry was another important buyer of Japanese raw silk. Exports to China consisted 
mainly of foodstuffs with konbu being the most notable example. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Primary Destination of Japanese Exports and Amounts*†73 
Years  China North 
America 
England  France Total 
1873-1875 4,209 6,194 3,638 3,305 19,312 
1876-1880 5,727 7,959 4,790 5,822 26,226 
1881-1885 6,547 13,486 3,939 8,383 34,218 
 *unit of measurement- 1,000 yen 
† “Total” figures represent the total value of all Japanese exports including exports to markets outside of the 
four listed in the table 
 
 As shown in Table 4, Britain provided the largest share of imports. British goods 
accounted for almost one half of the total value of Japan’s imports from 1873 to 1885. In 
comparison imports from America and France were negligible in light of the important place 
both counties occupied in Japan’s export trade. Each nation provided only around 10% of the 
total value of Japan’s total import trade. China alone stood as both a major market for 
Japanese goods and a significant supplier of goods to Japan. Although China maintained a 
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slightly favorable balance of trade relative to Japan, throughout most of the period 
between1873 and 1885 Sino-Japanese trade was almost equally balanced. 
 
Table 4. Primary Origins of Japanese Imports*
74
 
Years China America  Britain France Total 
1873-1875 8,916 1,328 12,372 2,179 27,181 
1876-1880 5,928 2,294 16,513 3,362 30,768 
1881-1885 6,237 2,685 13,673 1,891 29,622 
*unit of measurement- 1,000 yen 
  
 The pattern that emerges from this rough and generalized examination of Japan’s 
foreign trade largely confirms the picture of Japan as a “peripheral” economy acting as a 
supplier of raw inputs for foreign industries and receiving finished products from abroad in 
exchange. Japan was largely supplying American and French factories with raw silk while it 
imported textiles and advanced machinery from Britain. However, one should make some 
caveats to this overall picture. While Japan may have been a peripheral supplier of raw inputs 
to the industrialized core economies of the West, Japan was never economically so closely 
tied to a single metropolitan core economy as to be completely reliant on only one trading 
partner as both a source of its imports and destination for its exports. Japan enjoyed a large 
favorable balance of trade with America and France, two important export markets which 
helped cover the large deficits Japan had with Britain. This situation may have abated any 
negative effects from Japan’s peripheral status in the world market, in the sense that a single 
Western nation was never able to effectively capture the Japanese economy to serve its own 
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interests. Thus, Japan was never completely a captive plantation economy of a single 
metropolitan power. Japan’s large and balanced trade with China also displayed patterns that 
deviated from the stereotype of a peripheral producer of primary goods. 
 The last distinguishing feature of Japan’s foreign trade in the early Meiji period was a 
stubborn and persistent trade deficit which resulted in the outflow of large amounts of specie 
from Japan.
75
 Trade deficits from 1869 to 1881 totaled roughly 105, 833,000 yen according 
to the calculations of Baba Masao and Tatemoto Masahiro.
76
 As Baba and Tatemoto 
themselves point out, this figure tends to present a relatively rosy picture of Japan’s overall 
balance of payment deficits, because the figure fails to take into account goods imported by 
the Meiji government and debts incurred through shipping and freight services.
77
 After 1873 
when the Meiji government effectively rejected the idea of foreign investment in Japan or 
foreign borrowing, the Japanese paid for these deficits by exporting gold and silver specie. 
The yearly outflows of specie, which amounted to 10 million yen per year in the years 1874 
to 1881, added up to a significant loss.  
 One of the cornerstones of underdevelopment theory is the argument that 
international trade in a capitalist world economy is an inherently unequal form of exchange. 
Industrial nations reap large profits from the export of high value-added manufactures while 
peripheral nations obtain only paltry returns from exports of primary commodities. As a 
result, a flood of manufactured imports from the industrial core areas stunts the potential 
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growth of domestic industry.
78
 The persistently unfavorable balance of trade provides further 
proof of Japan’s status as a peripheral agrarian Asian nation existing on the fringes of a world 
economy driven by demands of the industrialized West. This deficit occurred, because 
Japan’s exports of primary commodities and lightly processed agricultural goods with low 
profit margins could not cover the costs of purchasing higher valued added imports from the 
West. The constant outflow of specie merely manifested a fundamentally unequal trading 
relationship between Japan and the West which drained specie from Japan. 
 
The Challenges of Primary Commodity Exports 
 These patterns in Japan’s foreign trade are significant for two reasons. First, Japan’s 
reliance on primary commodity exports had important implications for Japan’s future 
economic potential and shaped the practical problems the new Meiji regime had to address. 
The reliance on primary commodities was at best an unsteady foundation upon which to 
build a new national economy capable of providing the necessary financial resources for the 
Meiji leaders’ ambitious goal of creating a strong central government. Japan’s trading 
patterns also caused much hand wringing among the Meiji elite who worried that foreign 
trade was stripping Japan of its indigenous industries. For them, an export trade consisting 
largely of primary commodities was a hallmark of weak and vulnerable nation.  
 Economies that rely on primary commodities exports usually suffer from several 
potential weaknesses. As goods which are minimally processed or left close to their natural 
state, primary commodities are by definition typically low value-added products which 
require little technological expertise and minimal amounts of capital investment to produce. 
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Thus, the “entry barrier” for market participation is low.79 Anyone with a minimal amount of 
knowledge and rudimentary capital can engage in the production of primary commodities. In 
the first two decades of the Meiji era when silk production and tea production were still 
largely dominated by artisanal producers, a peasant household in Japan needed only a small 
amount of capital to dedicate a portion of its land or labor to begin cultivating tea leaves or 
raising silk. 
 The relative ease by which anyone can enter the market and begin production of 
primary commodities, in turn, suggests that production will be highly sensitive to movements 
in prices. As the price of a primary commodity rises, individuals or firms will rush to exploit 
the opportunity and join in production of the commodity. This rush leads to an upswing in 
supply of the commodity which is eventually accompanied by an eventual drop in price.
80
 
The general tendency in primary commodity production will be price volatility and a long 
term tendency toward deterioration of the terms of trade as any price increase for the product 
will merely encourage a rush to join the bonanza leading to increased production that 
eventually cancels out any increases in price. This general model applies most closely to 
agricultural commodities which can be cultivated in a variety of different regions. 
 Japan’s two most prominent exports in 1870, tea and raw silk, had all the 
characteristics of primary commodities. Their production required little in the way of 
advanced technology and only minimal investments of capital.  In fact, the primary 
requirements for the production of both goods were largely limited to favorable climate and 
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availability of labor.
81
 Low barriers to market participation allowed a large portion of Japan’s 
farming population to engage in the production of tea and silk and quickly respond to 
increases in prices by ramping up production. 
 This phenomenon occurred in Japan’s silk industry in the 1870s when foreign 
merchants began to complain about noticeable declines in the quality of Japanese silk being 
delivered to Yokohama. In this decade, previously reputable raw silks from Northeastern 
Japan (Ōshū) and Maebashi (modern day Gunma) lost their good reputation among foreign 
buyers due a sudden drop in quality.
82
Experienced silk producers blamed the decline in 
quality on a sudden increase in the number of silk producers, many of whom had little or no 
knowledge of the proper methods of silk production and were seeking to turn a quick profit.
83
 
 Because tea and silk were two globally produced and consumed commodities, Japan’s 
tea and silk exports were easily affected by fluctuations in supply and demand on the global 
market and by foreign competition. In the 1860s an outbreak of silkworm blight in Europe 
and an ensuing worldwide shortage of silk played a key role in transforming Japan into a 
major silk exporter.
84
 Later, beginning in the late 1870s, declining silk prices in Europe 
coupled with the emergence of a mechanized silk textile industry focused on mass production 
in America triggered a shift in the focus of Japanese silk exports from France to 
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America.
85
Although both the European silkworm blight in the 1860s and the rise of the 
American silk textile industry in the latter half of the 1870s proved fortuitous for Japan’s silk 
producers, the events demonstrate how easily changes in the global marketplace could affect 
Japanese exports. 
 Foreign competition was also a constant specter threatening to devastate Japanese silk 
exports. Japanese silk had to battle with silks from China, Italy, and India for customers in 
the global market.
86
 Any buyer of silk had any number of sources around the globe to choose 
from as a source of supply. Japanese silk producers were well aware of their precarious 
position in the world market and were sensitive to developments in silk industries abroad. 
When France enacted mildly protectionist legislation to encourage the revival of domestic 
sericulture, Japanese silk producers quickly organized to demand their government provide 
subsidies that would help counteract the protectionist measures being introduced in France.
87
 
 Foreign competition and shifts in the global market also affected Japanese tea exports. 
Japanese tea exports had formidable rivals in Indian and Sri Lankan teas, not to mention 
Latin American coffee which quickly came to dominate the American market which had 
previously consumed large amounts of Japanese tea. Like other producers of primary 
commodities, Japan could benefit and suffer from natural phenomena. If before Japan had 
benefited from a silk blight in Europe, an outbreak of coffee leaf blight in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
which resulted in a massive shift to tea production on the island, affected Japanese exports of 
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tea by increasing global supply at a time when demand for tea in the United States was 
beginning to wane.
88
  
 Other primary commodities produced in Japan faced similar competitive pressures. 
Production of coal and copper required larger outlays of capital but there was nothing special 
about Japanese coal or copper which made those goods more attractive than coal or copper 
extracted elsewhere in the world. Among Japan’s primary commodity exports perhaps only 
konbu, a kind of edible seaweed, was unique enough to be especially prized.
89
 
 Fluctuation in the global market and the threat of competition on the world market 
were only the most obvious drawbacks to an export trade based on primary commodities. A 
deeper problem was that primary commodity exports offered few opportunities for the future 
development of Japanese industry. As H.W. Singer pointed out in his discussion of the 
impact of the commodity dependency in developing economies, the production of primary 
commodities, “diverted the underdeveloped countries into types of activity offering less 
scope for technical progress…and withheld from the course of their economic history a 
central factor of dynamic radiation which has revolutionized society in industrialized 
countries.”90 Because products like tea, raw silk or copper needed only minimal amounts of 
industrial processing they provided both less opportunity and less incentive for technological 
innovation which might have positive impacts on economic growth. Even if technological 
innovations did increase the productivity of those goods, strong pricing pressures on the 
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world market meant any savings in production costs were more likely go to consumers rather 
than producers. 
 
Foreign Imports and Economic Change: A case of deindustrialization? 
 If Japan’s export trade promised to do little to encourage the growth of modern 
industry, Japan’s import trade posed a major challenge to the indigenous industry that still 
remained in Japan. A generation ago scholars analyzing Japanese trade after the opening of 
the treaty ports tended to take at face value alarmist assessments of the impact of foreign 
trade on the Japanese economy made by contemporaries and concluded the “heavy artillery” 
of cheap commodities from abroad had devastated Japan’s indigenous industries.91  The 
reality was more complex, as some traditional industries survived for a while by transforming 
the way in which they ran their businesses and marketed their goods. 
 The sugar and textile industries presented examples of different outcomes in this 
process. An influx of cheap foreign produced sugar and changing consumer tastes devastated 
Japanese sugar producers to the extent that domestic sugar production nearly ceased.
92
 In 
contrast, foreign cotton textiles had much less of a negative impact on Japan’s cotton textile 
producers thanks largely to rapidly increasing demand and an increase in the purchasing 
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power of farm families due to inflation in rice prices.
93
 The cotton textile industry, though 
still relying largely on handicraft production, proved surprisingly resilient in the 1870s. 
Survival for domestic manufactures, however, depended on the ability to switch rapidly from 
the utilization of domestic cotton yarn and cloth to the employment of cheaper imported yarn 
and coarse cloth, a trend which increased Japan’s import bill.94 The arrival of foreign imports, 
however, was not completely painless. Some regions of cotton textile production that failed 
to make the switch to utilizing imported foreign yarns and coarse cloth were unable to 
compete and experienced a process of deindustrialization.
95
 
 A more serious challenge to Japan’s indigenous industries was the booming export 
sector. As Japan in nineteenth century became part of networks of global economic exchange, 
productive activity in the countryside gradually shifted from a domestic orientation to 
production for world markets. This process has been most masterfully described and 
analyzed by Kären Wigen in her work on the Shimoina region in present day Nagano.
96
 As 
Wigen shows, handicraft industry slowly withered away as an increasing amount of 
resources and effort went to silk production. The region changed from encompassing diverse 
proto-industries to a mere supplier of raw materials to distant industrial centers.
97
 Often the 
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“pull” of the export economy and production for the world market, rather than the “push” of 
foreign imports caused deindustrialization in a region.  
 Japan’s leaders viewed deindustrialization as a pressing problem. The two most 
readily visible indicators of Japan’s poor economic health, persistent trade deficits and the 
boom in production of low value added-goods, convinced officials that the nation was losing 
its manufacturing industries. Moreover, cotton textiles and sugar, two relatively advanced 
sectors of the traditional manufacturing economy, were clearly suffering from foreign 
competition. Reflecting the pessimistic mood amongst the Meiji leadership, a young 
Matsukata Masayoshi, later to become one of Japan’s most famous ministers of finance, 
warned his superiors the Japanese people might, “lose their industries and fall into poverty 
and starvation.”98 On a deeper level, however, the anxiety about reliance on primary 
commodity exports reflected Japanese anxieties over its international status. Meiji leaders 
hoped to build a strong, wealthy and modern nation which would have all the trappings of 
Western civilization. The new rulers of the nation viewed modern industries as central to this 
vision. Reliance on the export of raw materials demonstrated Japanese backwardness and 
subservience to the West. In a public speech the prominent intellectual, Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
warned the gradual disappearance of Japanese industry signaled Japan’s slide down to the 
lower rungs of the international pecking order. Fukuzawa mused that Japan faced a real risk 
of becoming a nation of coolies forever consigned to the “hellish world of burdensome 
labor.”99 
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Foreign Merchant Dominance of Japan’s Trade 
 Another menace to national prosperity and strength lay in the foreign domination of 
Japan’s overseas trade. Soon after the opening of the treaty ports, foreign banks and merchant 
houses flocked to Japan where they immediately established a dominant position as 
middlemen in overseas trade.  Japanese merchants and producers became almost totally 
dependent on foreign merchants and financers to sell their goods abroad; virtually no 
Japanese merchant sold his wares directly in a foreign market without the intermediation of a 
foreign merchant. Table 5 shows that foreign merchant houses handled the overwhelming 
bulk of Japan’s exports in the late 1870s. What accounted for the overwhelming dominance 
of foreign firms in Japan’s overseas trade? A glance at the barriers to Japanese merchant 
activity abroad shows the true extent of the obstacles facing Japanese exporters and the 
development of overseas trade. These challenges had nothing to do with production, but 
rather lay in the difficulties of doing business in distant and unfamiliar markets.  
 Several barriers stood in the way of Japanese merchant activity abroad. The 
commercial and diplomatic treaties Japan signed with the Western powers created the most 
visible problems. The treaties stripped Japan of legal jurisdiction over foreign merchants 
living within its own borders and robbed the nation of the ability to protect its domestic 
industries from foreign competition with tariffs by imposing a low treaty enforced tariff rate 
on Japan. Japan’s merchants also faced several practical difficulties in expanding their 
activities overseas. Japanese traders lacked useful information about foreign markets and 
access to capital to fund overseas trade. As a result, Japan’s merchants were forced to satisfy 
themselves with selling their goods to foreign merchants in the treaty ports. 
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Table 5. Percentage of Total Exports Handled by Japanese and Foreign Merchants*
100
 
Year Japanese Merchant Houses Foreign Merchant Houses 
1877 11.7% 88.2% 
1878 9.1% 90.8% 
1879 16.3% 83.7% 
1880 19.9% 80% 
*percentages calculated from comparison of total yen value of trade exports handled by 
foreign versus Japanese merchants. All figures have been rounded to the nearest tenth 
decimal place and therefore do not exactly equal 100%. 
   
The Unequal Treaties 
 The trade treaties Japan signed with the Western powers beginning in 1858 limited 
the nation’s economic autonomy and helped determine the shape of Japan’s international 
trade. As noted above, the treaties denied Japan autonomy over its own tariffs and conferred 
extraterritorial privileges on foreigners living in Japan. Japanese leaders all reviled the 
unequal treaties as the primary instrument of Western domination designed to check Japan’s 
economic progress. Yet, at the same time, extraterritorial privilege and treaty enforced tariffs 
shaped the structure of Japan’s trade in ways that were more complex than the simplistic 
Meiji era laments of commercial exploitation by the West suggested.  
 Treaty mandated tariff rates most obviously restricted Japan’s economic sovereignty. 
The loss of tariff rights occurred gradually. Japan’s first trade treaty with the United States, 
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concluded in 1858, allowed a generous 20 percent ad valorem tariff on several key imports 
from the West.
101
 Subsequent treaties incrementally lowered this relatively high rate. Foreign 
pressure, particularly the demands of the American consul for lower import tariffs to allow 
American tea merchants to import cheap materials from China to use in packaging Japanese 
teas for export, was only one reason for the reduction in Japanese tariff rates.
102
 The 
Tokugawa bakufu initially agreed to reduce import tariffs on selected goods in the hopes that 
such concessions would aid in obtaining the consent of the Western powers for the closure of 
Yokohama, the treaty port closest to the administrative capital, Edo (present day Tōkyō).103 
By the 1860s the attitude of the Tokugawa regime toward trade had changed as officials had 
come to see it as a way to obtain extra tax revenues for stabilizing tottering government 
finances. Desperate to find new sources of cash and convinced that there was a limitless 
demand for Japanese goods abroad, these officials predicted that reduced tariff rates would 
encourage the growth of trade and provide a new, broadly based stream of revenue for the 
Tokugawa bakufu. In 1866 a final round of commercial treaties reduced tariff rates in Japan 
to a treaty enforced maximum rate of 5 percent ad valorem on all exports and imports.
104
 
These treaties committed Japan’s rulers to the low 5 percent rate without any reciprocal 
concessions on tariff rates for Japanese goods exported to the Western nations. 
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 This low mandated tariff rate had two important effects. It left the state without the 
ability to protect domestic industry through the use of protective tariffs. It also limited the 
state’s ability to capitalize on the taxation of trade. Whether or not a protective tariff would 
have ultimately proved a benefit to Japanese industry is open to debate, but the low tariff 
rates meant that there would be no protective sheltering of Japanese industry which was now 
exposed to the full brutality of international competition. More importantly, the limited 
ability to generate revenue through tariffs had a major impact on Japan’s domestic political 
economy. Tariffs were a key source of revenue for many national governments in the 
nineteenth century.
105
 Lacking this major potential source of cash to fund its various 
programs of national self-strengthening, the Meiji government had to seek revenues from a 
politically unpopular land tax and equally despised excise taxes on saké (rice wine) and 
tobacco. For the Meiji government the challenges faced in generating sufficient tax revenue 
nudged government officials toward the promotion of Japanese exports as a way of enriching 
the nation and strengthening the population’s ability to bear the burden of high rates of 
taxation.  
 More than low tariff rates, the extraterritorial privileges became the most hated 
infringement on Japan’s sovereignty. Upon signing the unequal treaties, Japan surrendered 
all legal jurisdiction over Westerners living within its borders. The authorities in Japan 
promised to refer any crime or legal dispute involving foreigners to foreign consular courts 
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that would operate according to foreign laws. The granting of extraterritorial privileges 
marked Japan as one of the “backward” and “inferior” nations in the world order, in the 
company of such polities as the Ottoman Empire, Qing China and Siam. Extraterritoriality 
made all Westerners residing in Japan members of a legally privileged elite for whom 
Japanese law did not apply. 
 The potential for the abuse of this special legal status was especially acute in 
commercial transactions. Extraterritorial privilege translated into potential commercial 
advantages for the Western merchant since he was protected by the familiar legal codes of 
his own country and consular courts staffed by his fellow countrymen. Although consular 
courts may have been, for the most part, fair in their rulings on commercial disputes between 
Japanese and foreign merchants, there were occasionally rulings that raised doubts about the 
fairness of consular courts. In one famous case, a dispute broke out between Swiss merchants 
and Mitsui, a prominent Japanese merchant house, in 1875. The Swiss firm had received a 
shipment of seaweed products from Mitsui, but after the firm sold the goods at a loss in the 
Shanghai market, the Swiss firm refused to pay Mitsui for the goods, claiming that Mitsui 
had not acted in good faith and had knowingly sold sub-standard quality goods to the firm. 
Local Japanese officials argued in favor of Mitsui by pointing out that the goods had been 
thoroughly inspected before delivery. Yet when Mitsui sued the firm to force payment, the 
Swiss consulate issued a ruling in favor of the Swiss firm, arguing that Mitsui could indeed 
be held responsible for the quality of its goods even after the Swiss firm had inspected and 
accepted the goods and both parties had signed a binding sales contract. As a result, Mitsui 
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lost over 3,000 yen and was forced to close its main operations in the port city of Kōbe due to 
the large financial losses the firm had incurred.
106
 
 There was, however, one important concession the Japanese managed to obtain from 
the Western powers in exchange for extraterritorial rights, the limitation of foreign residence 
and commercial activity to a small area surrounding the concession areas in the treaty ports. 
The treaties allowed foreigners to travel no further than ten li (roughly 20 miles) from the 
concession areas.
107
 This provision confined the scope of foreign commercial activity to 
small areas around the six treaty ports that were eventually opened to unrestricted foreign 
commerce: Yokohama, Kōbe, Ōsaka, Niigata, Hakodate and Nagasaki.108 The rest of Japan’s 
interior was officially off limits to travel and residence by all foreigners without special 
permission. The government in 1873 further forbade foreign investment in Japanese assets. 
That year the Ministry of Industry’s Directive Concerning Mines (Kōzan Shintokusho) 
proclaimed that in principle all the nation’s mineral resources belonged to the Imperial 
Household and prohibited foreign ownership of mines and other natural 
resources.
109
Subsequent directives effectively banned all foreign direct investment. 
 The restrictions on foreign residence, travel, and capital helped give a peculiar shape 
to Japan’s economy. The treaty ports became the sites of freewheeling global trade, while the 
domestic market remained the exclusive domain of native capitalists. Japan’s merchants were 
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able to exercise a strong influence over the nation’s import trade because of their exclusive 
access to the country’s interior.110 Some scholars see the decision to exclude foreign capital 
as one of the main reasons Japan escaped economic colonization by the West and 
industrialized in spite of fierce foreign competition.
111
 There may be some truth to this 
argument, but the short term impact on the Meiji state seems to have been anything but 
advantageous. Excluding foreign capital meant that the Meiji government had to finance all 
of its initiatives to strengthen the nation solely through the mobilization of domestic 
resources or by funds earned through the sale of goods abroad. This limitation exacerbated 
the great dilemma that early Meiji state faced in trying to expand revenue. Because it had 
prevented itself from tapping into the international money market, the Meiji government had 
to look toward commercial policy and increasing exports as a method of increasing national 
wealth and building up a reliable tax base. 
 The restrictions also played a key role in the diplomacy and politics of the early Meiji 
period. Many observers at the time credited the exclusion of foreigners from Japan’s interior 
as the main barrier protecting Japan against complete economic colonization by the Western 
powers. Even as late as the 1890s, arguments in favor of removing the restrictions on foreign 
travel and residence or “mixed residence” (naichi zakkyo) and allowing foreign direct 
investment in Japan sparked dire warnings from critics who predicted such mistaken policies 
would result in nothing less than the enslavement of Japan’s population to foreign capitalists. 
Leading figures of Japan’s early labor movement emphasized the need for labor unions by 
reasoning that Japanese workers would soon be laboring for rapacious Western capitalists 
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who would neither share Japanese communitarian values nor be concerned with the welfare 
of a workforce made up of people of an alien race.
112
 Top officials in the Ministry of Finance 
worried that allowing foreign capital into Japan would transform the country into an Ireland 
of Asia, where a class of wealthy foreigners ruled over a native underclass.
113
 These 
underlying anxieties lay behind debates over economic policy and motivated the 
establishment of a vigorous and independent Japanese export trade.  
 The Meiji regime which came to power in 1868 fully intended to revise the unequal 
treaties and abolish the commercial and diplomatic restrictions that the Western powers had 
imposed upon Japan. The creation of an independent Japanese export trade was a crucial part 
of the effort for the recovery of “commercial rights” (shōken kaifuku). Until Japan scored its 
first success in negotiating treaty revisions with Britain in 1894, however, the short term 
solution to overcoming the economic disadvantages created by the treaties lay not in 
diplomacy but in economic policy. 
 
Market Barriers 
Added to the burdens imposed on Japan by the unequal treaties was a set of severe 
handicaps Japanese merchants suffered in the global marketplace. Foreign firms in the treaty 
ports conducted most of Japan’s overseas trade by purchasing Japanese products and 
packaging, shipping and selling those goods to consumers in the West. Serving as mediators 
between the Japanese and the world market, foreign merchants extracted profits by buying 
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cheaply in Japan and selling dear in their home markets. By cutting the foreign firms out of 
the picture, Japan’s merchants and producers stood to capture the profits that would 
otherwise end up in the pockets of the unwelcome outsiders. This task was, however, easier 
said than done. Doing business abroad posed several daunting challenges for which even 
Japan’s most adventurous entrepreneurs were ill prepared.  
 The most formidable of these challenges was a lack of useful information about 
markets overseas which any potential exporter desperately needed in order to participate 
directly in the world market. As economic historian Tsunoyama Sakae observed, despite an 
impressive understanding of Western politics, science, and culture, few in Japan possessed 
the kind of knowledge that would be helpful for conducting trade with the West. Merchants 
and producers simply had no idea of what to sell, where to sell, or what kinds of demand for 
Japanese products existed abroad.
114
 Reliable information about tariffs and legal and 
technical regulations governing commercial activity in other countries was in short supply. 
Many aspiring Japanese exporters abandoned the idea of venturing beyond Japan’s shores 
simply because they had no information about markets overseas and simply did not know 
what opportunities might exist in foreign markets. 
 There were also no guarantees that information would be timely. Arriving late to an 
emerging world market, Japanese entrepreneurs lacked the means to readily obtain important 
commercial information. The 1840s and 1850s had witnessed a revolution in commercial 
information in the West. New publications and news services dedicated to relaying the latest 
information about markets, such as Britain’s Economist, America’s Banker’s Magazine and 
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the Reuters news service all sprang into existence in this period.
115
 The rapid extension of 
telegraph lines around the globe beginning with the first trans-Atlantic cable connection 
which was completed in 1866 spurred the expansion of these publications and services.
116
 
The first business oriented weekly magazine did not appear in Japan until the 1879 
publication of the Tōkyō Keizai Zasshi.117 Telegraph links with the outside world came 
earlier, arriving with a cable line between Shanghai and Nagasaki in 1870, but the domestic 
network which would allow entrepreneurs across the country to benefit from the links was 
still under construction.
118
  
 The newly created Meiji government also lacked extensive networks of embassies 
and consulates that could serve as gatherers of commercial information about foreign markets. 
Japan did not have a consulate in Europe until 1872 and did not establish a consulate in 
London, arguably the commercial nerve center of the nineteenth century world economy, 
until 1876. Furthermore the Foreign Affairs Ministry did not begin gathering and 
disseminating commercial information until the publication of a regular circular, the Tsūshō 
Ihen, in 1882.
119
 The lack of sources of timely commercial information put Japanese 
exporters at a disadvantage in relation to their foreign competitors, who often benefited from 
                                                 
115
Tsunoyama Sakae, Tsūshō kokka Nihon no jōhō senrayku: ryōji hōkoku wo yomu (Tōkyō: Nihon Hoso 
Shuppan Kyōkai, 1988), 43. 
 
 
116
 Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: telecommunications and international politics, 1851-1945 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 18-19. 
 
 
117
 Sugihara Shirō, Nihon no keizai zasshi (Tōkyō: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1987), 23.  
 
 
118
 Tsunoyama, Tsūshō kokka Nihon no jōhō senryaku, 43. 
 
 
119
 Ibid., 61-63. 
 58 
 
an extensive network of embassies and consulates capable of issuing timely reports on 
foreign markets.
120
 
 If Japan lacked the information networks necessary to participate directly in world 
markets, the lack of financial networks that could aid firms engaging in overseas trade was 
also a significant obstacle.  Japan’s trade depended on the services provided by foreign banks. 
To engage in trade Japanese entrepreneurs required access to credit and foreign exchange. 
Credit had a vital function in overseas trade because of the distance and time involved. In 
cases where the exporter had sufficient capital, the exporter could simply ship the goods to an 
importer overseas, while counting the shipment as a form of credit that the importer must pay 
back at a later date.
121
 Most Japanese businesses in the Meiji period, however, did not have 
sufficient capital to finance their exports. Foreign banks which could have extended credit to 
Japanese firms, refused to do so, because they viewed Japanese businesses as unreliable, high 
risk clients.  
 Instead Japanese entrepreneurs transacted their business entirely in cash or relied on 
credit extended by foreign importers in the form of some form of commercial paper. Foreign 
merchants’ operations in Japan either paid Japanese producers and merchants for their goods 
in cash (typically Mexican silver dollars which served as the common currency in East Asian 
trade) or with checks drawn from business accounts held at foreign banks operating in the 
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treaty ports or with banknotes issued by foreign banks.
122
 If a Japanese entrepreneur received 
a check, only foreign banks operating in Japan could redeem these checks and banknotes. 
This situation reinforced the foreign banks’ grip on the finance of Japan’s overseas trade. 
 A second and equally important function of banks in international trade was 
providing international exchange and the remittance of payments. If Japanese entrepreneurs 
could manage to sell goods overseas, they needed some method of remitting the money back 
to Japan and converting the payments from foreign currency into yen. The Japanese exporter 
faced difficulties on this front as well. Foreign banks were not eager to provide services for 
merchants from a strange, faraway land that they had little reason to trust. For example, in 
1876, when Japanese businessman Arai Ryōichirō sealed a historic deal with New York silk 
traders for the delivery of raw silk to be shipped directly from Japan, Arai could not convince 
any of the New York banks to issue him a bill of exchange to send the money that he 
received from American silk dealers back to his brother in Japan. Instead he had to resort to 
requesting a Japanese traveler passing through the area to stuff the money (all Mexican silver 
dollars) into his suitcase.
123
 
 The lack of financial backing and financial services for exports made the 
establishment of an independent Japanese export trade next to impossible. In theory, Western 
banks working in close partnership with Japanese firms could have helped Japanese exporters 
by providing needed financial services in the form of loans and foreign exchange, but 
Japanese businesses lacked credibility in the Western bankers’ eyes. The extensive financial 
networks operated by the imperial powers excluded Japanese businesses because of their lack 
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of any track record in dealing with Western banks. Gaining trust and credibility among 
foreign creditors therefore became a top priority for Japanese exporters. Yet Japanese 
entrepreneurs were caught in a conundrum. Without an established reputation in foreign 
markets, no Western bank would deal with a Japanese entrepreneur, but without the support 
and services of a foreign bank, most Japanese entrepreneurs could not operate in a foreign 
market. 
 Foreign control also extended to one more vital area of Japan’s international trade: 
shipping and insurance. Tokugawa era prohibitions on the construction of vessels capable of 
long distance ocean voyages hampered the development of a merchant fleet and the training 
of experienced Japanese seamen to transport Japanese goods abroad. Soon after the 
conclusion of the first commercial treaties with Japan, foreign shipping companies rushed to 
service Japan’s newly opened overseas trade. Within a few years Western shipping 
companies not only controlled all long distance shipping in and out of Japan, but even began 
to make serious inroads into the coastal trade shipping goods between different regions inside 
the country. The American Pacific Mail Steamship Company was so eager to participate in 
the coastal routes that it lobbied the Meiji government for a special charter to service them.
124
 
In the 1870s only four of a total of 74 different shipping companies operating in Japan were 
Japanese and none of the Japanese companies possessed steam ships capable of long distance 
voyages.
125
 The extent of Japan’s dependence on foreign shipping became painfully clear in 
1874 when the Meiji government planned a punitive expedition to Taiwan to avenge the 
killing of Ryūkyūan fishermen by Taiwanese “bandits.” Lacking adequate transport for the 
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army, the Meiji government contracted with the Pacific Mail Company to provide troop 
transport, but at the last minute, the American government forbade the company from 
carrying out the contract for diplomatic reasons. Forced to scramble to secure transport, 
Japanese officials eventually purchased steamships and contracted with a Japanese 
businessman, Iwasaki Yatarō, to operate the ships.126 
 Maritime insurance was crucial for shipping. Insuring goods for export greatly 
reduced the risk for the exporter and was absolutely essential for many small scale Japanese 
exporters who could not bear the risk of losing a shipment of goods in transit. Foreign 
shipping companies required insurance for all transported goods as a precondition of service. 
Yet, foreign firms did not recognize insurance policies from Japanese insurers, because 
Westerners viewed them as too small to have adequate reserves to cover whatever losses 
might occur. Japanese firms’ lack of any established relationships with insurers in London 
and other important Western markets did not help either. In this way Western insurers gained 
the ability to stop the export of Japanese goods by refusing to insure goods for shipment.
127
  
 
Conclusion 
 Looking back upon Meiji Japan’s remarkable success in transforming a peripheral 
Asian nation into a powerful and prosperous nation-state, it is all too easy to forget the 
serious challenges and constraints Japan’s new leadership had to confront. The Meiji 
government inherited an economy that was being radically re-organized by growing 
connections to the world market and was beginning to display all the characteristics of a 
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peripheral supplier of raw inputs for factory production in the industrialized West. There was 
little to suggest that Japan’s economic fate would be any different from the other colonized 
and semi-colonized regions in Asia.  
 On top of this threat, the foreign domination of Japan’s overseas trade and the 
daunting challenges the nation faced in establishing independent commercial links with the 
outside world posed a major obstacle to economic development. A host of factors—the 
conditions imposed by the unequal treaties, the commodity export nature of Japan’s trade, 
lack of information about foreign markets, limited access to financing and foreign dominance 
in shipping and insurance—presented seemingly insurmountable barriers to the establishment 
of an independent Japanese export trade and tended to reinforce reliance on primary 
commodity exports in Japan’s trade.  
 The story of Japan’s foreign trade in the 1860s and 1870s was not, of course, entirely 
negative. The tea and silk trades because highly lucrative and made many merchants and 
producers into wealthy men. A trade that primarily relied on the export of such lightly 
processed commodities was, however, at best a precarious foundation for the construction of 
a powerful nation-state. Japan’s leaders worried that their nation’s dependence on the export 
of commodities and unfinished goods would eventually undermine any efforts to ensure 
Japan’s independence from the Western powers. Unease with Western dominance of Japan’s 
foreign trade added to Japanese anxiety. Many believed that only when Japanese gained 
control of the nation’s foreign trade would they secure economic independence. The Meiji 
government was determined to reassert control over Japan’s foreign trade, but first officials 
had to deal with the even more pressing problem of survival by gaining sufficient revenues.
  
CHAPTER 2: 
Feeding Baby Leviathan: the Meiji state and the origins of commercial policy 
  
 When the Meiji regime came to power in 1868, it had a strong if somewhat vaguely 
defined vision for Japan’s future. Japan’s new leaders pledged to revive the nation’s flagging 
political and economic fortunes and transform Japan into a rich nation with a strong army 
capable of resisting Western encroachment. Despite possessing a strong sense of its own 
historic mission to rescue Japan, the new regime was uncertain about what practical measures 
would most effectively accomplish its lofty ambitions. Economic historian Ishii Kanji aptly 
summed up the atmosphere of uncertainty over policy questions during the first years of the 
Meiji period when he observed, “…in fact there was no unified opinion within the 
government itself as to what it was aiming for or in which direction it should lead the 
country.”128  
 Moreover, in the early years of the Meiji period, the primary challenge facing the new 
government was ensuring its continued existence by generating revenue to cover the costs of 
governing the country and pay for a host of ambitious military and industrial projects the new 
regime now hastily rushed to undertake. Far from being the “strong state” capable of re-
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fashioning Japanese society as it is sometimes portrayed as being
129
, in its initial years, the 
Meiji state was, as Carol Gluck has recently observed, a “not-so-strong state” with severely 
limited resources that constrained its ability to act.
130
 As part of their attempt to solve 
revenue problems, the leaders of the Meiji regime hoped to boost exports to strengthen the 
nation’s tax base, re-organize the nation’s commercial life to give the central authorities 
stronger hold on the nation’s commerce, and even considered having the state become 
directly engaged in foreign trade itself. 
 In their efforts to accomplish these goals, Meiji leaders drew extensively on the 
commercial policies implemented by the domains and the bakufu in the late Tokugawa 
period. Because these officials came of age in the late Tokugawa era, they were well aware 
of debates over the virtues and drawbacks of trade that arose in the uncertain political and 
economic climate of the 1850s.  Some of officials in the new government had also been 
heavily involved in formulating new commercial policies in their home domains prior to the 
Restoration. Not surprisingly, these officials initially sought to apply what they had learned 
in their domains to commercial policy on a national scale.  
 Commercial policy in the initial years of the Meiji period therefore closely resembled 
the commercial policies the domains of the previous Tokugawa era. The Meiji state 
experimented with a modified version of Tokugawa era practices in which political 
authorities worked closely with a group of selected merchants to buy up domestically 
produced goods with paper currency and then sell those goods to foreign merchants for 
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specie. Thus through the alchemy of commerce, the Meiji state hoped to transform plentiful 
paper currency into the gold and silver coin the state desperately needed.  
 These initial experiments in commercial policy were largely unsuccessful and were 
ultimately abandoned. In the process, however, a new focus on promoting “direct trade” (jiki 
yushutsu) would gradually emerge. Although the idea of creating direct trading links between 
Japan and the outside world remained little more than a fanciful aspiration by the end of the 
first half of the 1870s, the Meiji leadership had at least recognized the potential benefits of 
direct trade and had begun to nurture ambitions to transform Japan into a great commercial 
power by promoting direct trade. 
 
Tokugawa era precedents: domain monopolies  
 By lucky coincidence, the economic difficulties of the Tokugawa period served as a 
useful preparation for the challenges of the early Meiji period. Wobbly government finances 
and economic instability were constant features of life for the Tokugawa bakufu and many of 
the domains in Japan from the late 18
th
 century onward. Under Tokugawa rule, the 
Tokugawa exercised a loose hegemonic control over the Japanese archipelago. Over 230 
separate domains ruled by great lords, or daimyō pledged allegiance to Tokugawa household, 
but were otherwise allowed to manage their own affairs as they saw fit. As Luke Roberts 
argues, the Tokugawa economy therefore resembled an international economic order where 
various independent states were free to pursue their own economic policies.
131
 During this 
time various developments exposed the fundamental flaws of the old system of political 
economy based on warrior rule and taxes paid in kind and forced the domains to reconcile 
                                                 
131
 Luke S. Roberts, Mercantilism in a Japanese domain: the merchant origins of 18
th
 century Tosa (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1.  
 66 
 
themselves with the ascendancy of a market based cash economy.
132
 Due to a long term 
decline in rice prices, taxes collected in rice-the primary source of income for the domains-
experienced diminishing purchasing power. The diminished purchasing power of tax revenue 
eventually led to large deficits in domain finances as local leaders of the domains (daimyō) 
struggled to meet their various obligations with rapidly shrinking real incomes.
133
 
Desperately needing new sources of revenue, some innovative domains devised an ingenious 
solution to their fiscal problems, a form of domain mercantilism in which the domain-state 
established a trade monopoly in goods produced within its own borders. Such monopolies 
operated under a variety of different names, but historians today refer to the general system 
of domain monopolies as the kokusankaisho system, a term which might be rendered 
somewhat inelegantly in English as the “country product office system”(hereafter the domain 
monopoly system).
134
 
 The key elements of the system are worth examining here since they share many of 
the same purposes and features of commercial organizations that the national government 
would later create in the early Meiji period. The goal of the domain monopoly system was to 
obtain cash in the form of hard specie such as gold or silver through the sale of goods 
produced domestically within a domain in one of the central urban markets of Tokugawa 
Japan: Ōsaka, Kyōto and Edo (modern day Tōkyō). This system depended upon the domain 
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reserving for itself monopoly rights on the purchase and/or sale of goods produced within its 
territory. The exercise of this monopoly took three basic forms:  an indirect monopsony 
system in which the domain reserved exclusive rights to sell specified goods outside the 
domain’s borders, a direct monopsony system in which the domain claimed the exclusive 
right to purchase certain goods, or, in a handful of cases, a production monopoly in which the 
domain itself engaged in the production of goods for sale outside of the domain.
135
 In the first 
two cases, the domain typically purchased goods from producers or merchants using paper 
money issued by the domain (hansatsu).
136
 The domain then shipped those goods to be sold 
in one of the three largest urban markets in exchange for gold or silver coin.
137
 In the case of 
production monopolies, the domain paid for labor and production costs in paper hansatsu, 
and then sold the goods for hard specie outside the domain, usually in one of the three large 
urban markets.  
 Just how the domain gained profits from this venture depended on the specific type of 
monopsony or monopoly it ran. In an indirect monopsony the domain acted as a commission 
merchant buying goods from merchants or producers and then selling them for a profit in 
Tokugawa Japan’s urban markets. A portion of the profits would usually go back to the 
merchant or producer while the domain retained a commission fee. This was the case in the 
Himeiji domain’s cotton monopoly where the domain purchased cotton directly from cotton 
merchants by paying roughly 80 percent of the price in paper hansatsu.  The domain then 
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sold the cotton for specie and remitted the remainder of the money owed to the cotton 
merchants while subtracting it from the profit it derived from sales of cotton in Edo.
138
  
 In contrast, a direct monopsony operated simply as a method of expropriating an 
economic surplus from the peasantry. In this case, commoners had to pay a portion of their 
taxes in a lucrative trade good or sell certain goods to the domain at a fixed price, usually set 
well below the market price. In the Yonezawa domain an official monopsony on lacquer 
trees required that commoners pay a fixed amount of cash and sap to the authorities as taxes 
which varied according to how many lacquer trees the peasants cultivated. They then had to 
sell any surplus to the domain at a fixed price.
139
 In the case of production monopolies, the 
profits from sales of domain produced goods went directly into domain coffers. In all three 
scenarios, the domain acquired lucrative trade goods to convert into gold and silver through 
sales outside of the domain’s territory. 
 Beyond the use of domain power to gain a monopoly on the purchase and sale of 
profitable goods produced within its territory with the ultimate goal of bringing specie into 
domain coffers, the third prominent feature of the system was the use of a group of privileged 
merchants (tokken shōnin) to take charge of the daily operations of the system. Domains 
typically entrusted the management of many of the domain monopolies to a group of favored 
merchants appointed to conduct commercial operations on the domain’s behalf. The Tosa 
domain’s paper monopoly was run by seven merchants who acted as official purchasing 
agents in charge of procuring paper from producers.
140
 Similarly, the Himeiji domain 
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restricted the sale of cotton and cotton products within the domain to a small group of select 
merchants as part of its cotton monopoly.
141
 Once the “exports” reached Ōsaka or other 
urban markets, they were stored in domain warehouses. There selected local merchants took 
charge of selling the goods.
142
 
 The domain monopolies embodied all the contradictions of the Tokugawa era 
economy which combined of feudal and capitalistic features. The domain monopolies 
depended on the power of their lords to enforce monopoly trade regulations within the 
domain and expropriate a surplus from producers who were usually forced to sell lucrative 
trade goods at discounted rates to the domains.
143
 The lords also insisted on using hansatsu 
paper bills in the place of gold, silver or copper coins to fund productive activities and 
purchase goods from producers. At the same time, the system was only able to function 
because of the existence of a market oriented economy where goods were freely traded in the 
large cities.  
 The selection and employment of an inner circle of favored merchants to run the day-
to-day operations of domain monopolies locked the state and Japan’s nascent private capital 
into a tight embrace to create a mutual dependence between merchant and domain. The 
domain thus became dependent on a select inner circle of merchants to implement its 
commercial policies and take care of the procurement and sale of goods outside of the 
domain. The inner circle of merchants, in turn, required the backing of political authorities 
for special privileges. The continued expansion of a market oriented economy, however, had 
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the potential to subvert the various monopolies and trade restrictions imposed by the domains 
and their merchant allies. In the case of the Himeji cotton monopoly, as merchants from 
outside the domain penetrated the cotton market, they encouraged producers to ignore 
domain regulations and engage directly in trading on the open market.
144
 The result in the 
late Tokugawa period was an uncomfortable bifurcation of the merchant classes into 
“privileged merchants” (tokken shōnin) closely tied to the lords of the domains or the bakufu, 
and a class of relatively autonomous “non-privileged merchants” (hi-tokken shōnin) whose 
market oriented activities threatened the existing order. Domain monopolies reinforced this 
division between politically well connected “insiders” and alienated “outsiders,” a feature of 
Tokugawa society that would occur again in the Meiji era because of commercial policies 
that gave rise to a class of entrepreneurs known as the “political merchants” (seishō). 
 Domain monopolies sparked some resistance. In some cases it took the form of direct 
protests against a domain’s commercial policies. In 1787 more than seven hundred villagers 
from the paper producing regions of Tosa fled to the nearby Matsuyama domain in a bid to 
convince their lord to abolish the paper monopoly by threatening to enter the service of the 
neighboring domain.
145
 More common, however, were more passive forms of economic 
protest. Because Yonezawa’s lacquer monopoly made cultivating lacquer trees largely 
unprofitable, peasants uprooted many of their trees rather than pay taxes on them.
146
 Such 
incidents demonstrate one of the primary flaws in the domain monopoly system. While the 
use of state power to expropriate peasant surplus was effective to an extent, market forces 
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could limit that exploitation. If peasants or merchants could not benefit by engaging in the 
production of lucrative trade goods, then they would resist producing and dealing in those 
goods.  
 
The Pioneers of Commercial Policy: Yokoi Shōnan and Yuri Kimimasa 
 After the opening of Nagasaki and Yokohama to unrestricted foreign trade in 1858, 
several domains sought to adapt their domain monopoly systems to take advantage of the 
new economic opportunities offered by foreign trade. Many domains rushed to establish 
warehouses and trading posts in the treaty ports. There the domains hoped peddling domain 
goods to foreign merchants would serve as a further source of specie at a time when they 
faced increased expenditures due to the urgent need to buildup military capabilities in a time 
of growing political instability.
147
  
 One notable attempt by the Fukui domain to adapt the domain monopoly system to 
the new possibilities offered by foreign trade set an important precedent for Meiji era 
commercial policy. The domain created a centralized office, the General Commodity 
Exchange (Bussan Sōkaisho), that brought together prominent merchants and domain 
officials in a collective effort to trade with foreigners. The General Commodity Exchange 
was the brainchild of one of the leading intellectuals of the time, the Confucian scholar and 
educator, Yokoi Shōnan. Originally from the Kumamoto domain, Yokoi had been hired by 
the Fukui domain to serve as an advisor to the government and an educator in the domain 
academy.
148
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Shōnan was highly critical of both traditional approaches to economic management 
which stressed frugality and fiscal conservatism and the ways in which domain monopolies 
operated.
149
 Yokoi provided a rough outline of a bold alternative economic program which 
advocated an expansive fiscal policy and an enthusiastic embrace of foreign trade in an 1860 
proposal titled, Three Theses on State Policy (Kokuze Sanron).
150
 In his Three Theses, Yokoi 
argued for both the moral necessity and economic advantages of active engagement in 
foreign trade.  Commercial intercourse between nations and people was, according to Yokoi, 
simply the natural order of things and Japan had no right to obstinately refuse to trade with 
other nations. More importantly, engaging in trade with foreign countries offered a way for 
the state (kuni) to gain a profit and restore its financial health. In Yokoi’s opinion, foreign 
trade would also allow Fukui’s lord to carry out his true mission in the implementation of 
humane and benevolent government.
151
 To ensure the full benefits of foreign trade the 
domain had to adopt both a liberal fiscal policy and a form of managed trade. A liberal fiscal 
policy would encourage the production of goods by lending money, grain, fertilizer, and 
other necessary supplies to anyone free of interest. The state should then collect the goods 
produced by its subjects and sell them to foreigners. In the process the domain would not 
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only recover the capital expended in issuing loans to the peasantry, but would also earn a tidy 
profit.
152
 
As with other domain monopolies, Yokoi’s proposed trading scheme promised to 
enrich domain coffers by turning paper money into precious specie through the alchemy of 
trade, but it departed from previous domain monopoly schemes in several important ways. 
Yokoi realized that because many of the monopolies simply expropriated goods from the 
peasantry, such schemes only served to discourage production and damage people’s 
livelihoods. Yokoi wanted to transform this exploitative form of domain monopoly into a 
practical instrument to achieve his own vision of benevolent rule. An expansionary fiscal 
policy and a series of interest free loans doled out to the general public would not only 
encourage the production of goods for trade, but would also enrich the general populace and 
rescue it from the parasitic grip of moneylenders who dominated the agricultural economy. 
Managed trade would remove the control of trade out of the hands of self-serving merchants 
and put it safely in the hands of moral rulers who had the common people’s interests at heart. 
State management of trade also allowed the domain to dole out interest free loans to the 
people. By controlling trade and collecting a profit on the sale of goods to foreigners, both 
the state and the people would be able to share the benefits of foreign trade equally. In 
Yokoi’s mind, instead of the close, interdependent relationship between political authority 
and merchants that domain monopolies reinforced an activist state should promote trade on 
behalf of the welfare of society as a whole. 
 While Yokoi’s ideas would form the basis for the Meiji government’s initial 
commercial policies, his vision failed to take into account the harsh realities that Japan faced. 
His proposal for managed trade with the outside world assumed the continuation of 
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monopolistic trade practices within Japan, something that the new trade treaties Japan signed 
with the Western powers in 1858 would no longer allow. The Western powers were quick to 
denounce any regulations which threatened to interfere with their merchants’ freedom of 
action in the treaty ports. Yokoi also failed to appreciate fully the complexities of foreign 
trade. Like many of his contemporaries, Yokoi imagined trading with foreigners would 
operate in much the same way as the trade that the various domains conducted in the large 
urban centers of Tokugawa Japan. The treaty ports would function as free market centers 
linking Japan to distant markets in foreign lands, just as Ōsaka or Edo served as central 
clearing centers for products from around the country. He erred in assuming that trade in the 
treaty ports would be an economic interaction among equals. He underestimated the 
significant power that foreign merchants would be able to exercise over Japan’s export trade 
thanks to their superior knowledge of world markets, easy access to capital, and ability to 
acquire goods from around the world at the cheapest price. Yokoi also never really 
considered what kind of demand for Japanese goods might exist on the world market, nor did 
he give any thought to the issue of international competition in the world economy.  As Tessa 
Morris-Suzuki suggests, Yokoi betrayed a rather naïve view of foreign trade by assuming an 
unlimited foreign demand for Japanese goods.
153
 He gave no consideration to the possible 
risks of price fluctuations for goods caused by movements in the global market or the threat 
that foreign competitors might pose to Japanese producers. Such violent price swings 
threatened to undermine Yokoi’s carefully constructed vision of managed trade at any time. 
Yokoi remained largely unaware of these risks, instead assuming a natural order with 
unlimited demand and static prices. 
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 Despite these shortcomings, the Fukui domain put into practice Yokoi’s bold vision 
of managed trade in the late 1850s with relative success. Yuri Kimimasa, a disciple of Yokoi, 
immediately set out to establish a new domain managed trading venture, the General 
Commodity Exchange (Bussan Sōkaisho), roughly along the lines expounded by Yokoi. 
Through it, domain authorities would extend 50,000 ryō worth of credit to reliable producers 
and merchants in the form of letters of credit (kite).
154
 As preparation for the implementation 
of his plan, Yuri then spent the better part of the year in 1858 investigating economic 
conditions in the trade port of Shimonoseki and learning the mechanics of mercantile 
activity.
155
 More importantly, Yuri also travelled to Nagasaki where, with the help of a local 
merchant Kozone Rokurō, he established a warehouse for goods and successfully negotiated 
a sales contract with the Dutch Trading House (Oranda Shōkan) for the delivery of silk and 
soy sauce.
156
 Upon his return to Fukui, he set up the headquarters for the General Commodity 
Exchange near Fukui Castle. A mix of domain officials and merchants staffed the office to 
procure goods in the domain and prepare them for shipment to the treaty ports.
157
 
 As soon as the necessary preparations were complete, Yuri set about implementing 
Yokoi’s vision of a managed and virtuous trade. A last minute dispute resulted in the 
scrapping of plans to dole out letters of credit to producers and merchants in favor of printing 
50,000 ryō worth of paper bills (hansatsu). In any event, the domain government injected a 
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large amount of cash into the local economy.
158
 The end result was a stunning success. 
Goods flooded into the General Commodity Exchange, which was able to earn handsome 
profits by selling the goods in the treaty ports and around Japan. The contract with the Dutch 
Trading House for delivery of silk alone brought in sales amounting to 25,000 Mexican silver 
dollars (roughly 1,000,000 ryō).159 Almost overnight the Fukui domain’s financial situation 
improved as it could rapidly pay off debts and the budget moved into the black. 
 While Yuri demonstrated the effectiveness of the principle of inflationary finance to 
stimulate production, convert paper money into precious specie, and fill the pockets of the 
domain’s lord, the General Commodity Exchange fell short of Yokoi’s original vision. 
Despite the intent of enriching the domain by enriching the common people, the former 
benefited more than the latter. As Mikami Kazuo points out, since the domain’s primary 
concern was to prop up its own finances, officials had a strong incentive to maximize profits. 
To do, they relied heavily on a small circle of well-connected merchants to act as its agents in 
buying and selling domain wares.
160
 This approach led to the same type of tensions between 
the interests of merchants and producers that had existed in other domain monopolies, as 
merchants closely tied to the state were able to profit handsomely off of goods they had 
monopsonistic rights to purchase.  Although domain bureaucrats tried to ensure that 
merchants did not accrue “unjust profits” from the sale of domain goods, producers could sell 
their goods only through the domain’s approved network of merchants and agents whose 
primary mission was to maximize profits. 
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 The success of the managed trade scheme also required a favorable market for the 
domain’s goods. Yet such a favorable market could never be guaranteed in a world market 
which experienced constant booms and busts. One of the most profitable products that the 
General Commodity Exchange sold, raw silk, brought in such large profits primarily because 
silkworm blight in the two main European silk producing nations, Italy and France, had 
created a scarcity in international markets that Japanese raw silk quickly filled.
161
 Although 
relatively little is known about the details of the General Commodity Exchange’s business 
activities or the venture’s balance sheet, by Yuri’s own account the domain trading venture 
started to register large losses soon after the Meiji Restoration. Yuri blamed the interference 
of merchants from his own domain as the primary cause, but large swings in the international 
price of raw silk and other goods may have had a larger impact on the fate of the venture.
162
 
 In spite of its failure to live up to Yokoi Shōnan’s ideals, the success of the General 
Commodity Exchange in rescuing the Fukui domain’s finances for several years counted 
most in the eyes of the new Meiji government that came to power in 1868. It desperately 
needed to generate funds to solidify its control over the country. Yuri Kimimasa was 
immediately put in charge of managing new government’s finances and hammering out an 
effective economic policy. Naturally, Yuri attempted to solve the Meiji government’s 
revenue problems by applying the same successful techniques he used in Fukui on a national 
scale. 
 True to form, Yuri first issued new paper notes, called Dajokansatsu, or literally 
Council of State Bills named after the supreme ruling organ in the new government. The 
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notes were to serve two primary functions. First, the notes were to provide the Meiji 
government with necessary funds to continue operating. Essentially the government sought to 
fund its activities by using its own authority and the power of the printing press to provide 
funds for itself. The second function of the Dajokansatsu was to encourage production by 
providing producers and merchants with access to capital, just as had been the case in Fukui. 
Yuri hinted at this second function of the new currency when he pronounced that the new 
bills would serve as the “foundation of national wealth” (fukoku no kiso).163 The central 
government would loan bills to the various daimyō so that they, in turn, would loan the bills 
to producers. The government also loaned additional funds to newly formed organizations, 
the Commercial Offices (Shōhōshi).164  Created in 1868 to support and regulate economic 
enterprise in Japan, the Commercial Offices served basically as a pipeline for money flowing 
from the government to various entrepreneurs. After receiving loans from the government, 
the local Commercial Offices in the treaty ports would in turn loan money to local merchants 
engaged in private enterprise.
165
 
 Prominent merchant families of Edo and Ōsaka ran the Commercial Offices. Meiji 
officials hoped that placing prominent leaders of the business community at the head of the 
offices would lend credibility to the new government bills among the general public.
166
 This 
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arrangement, in effect, re-constructed the same pattern of mutual dependence between 
business and the state fostered under the domain monopolies.  
 The Commercial Offices provided prosperous urban merchants a privileged position 
from which they could extend their grip over the large urban markets and by extension the 
national economy. By design the Commercial Offices were supposed to use their ready 
access to capital to extend loans to the manufacturers of lucrative export goods. The delivery 
of the merchandise was to serve as repayment.
167
 This policy would not only stimulate 
domestic production, but would also establish a virtual  government monopoly on Japanese 
exports by securing exclusive sales rights on important exports from producers. Yet 
merchants running the offices were given wide latitude to do as they wished with government 
funds. The merchants in the Commercial Offices could easily borrow for their own purposes 
large sums from the offices they managed simply by filling out rudimentary paper work. One 
silk merchant who was involved in managing the Commercial Office in Yokohama had only 
to provide a single IOU in order to award himself a sizeable loan amounting to 7,000 ryō in 
new government currency.
168
 
 Unfortunately, with mounting military expenses from consolidating the new 
government’s control over the country and the central government’s difficulties in finding 
reliable sources of revenue, confidence in the new government bills collapsed and their value 
fell. Lending to the daimyō also proved to accomplish little in the way of promoting industry. 
Because many of the lords were deeply in debt, they had little choice but to use the loans to 
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prop up their finances.
169
 Money meant to stimulate production simply became a debased 
currency to dispose of bad debts. 
 The Commercial Offices also provoked much controversy. Britain and the other 
foreign powers criticized the Commercial Offices as an impediment to free commerce and 
therefore in violation the trade treaties.
170
 Opposition to the Commercial Offices also arose 
within the Meiji government. Godai Tomoatsu, an official from the powerful Satsuma 
domain serving as the governor of Ōsaka, harshly criticized Yuri’s policies. Godai argued 
that they placed too many unnecessary restrictions on commercial activity and called for the 
creation of a clearly articulated system of commercial laws, the establishment of new trading 
companies, and foundation of a specialized banking system.
171
 Because Godai would go on 
to become a leading figure in Ōsaka’s business community and a founder of the Ōsaka 
Chamber of Commerce (Ōsaka Shōkōkaigijo), his attacks on government policy may have 
represented the dissatisfaction among relatively small Ōsaka merchant houses that were 
excluded from official positions in the Commercial Offices. They may have feared that large 
merchant families might establish a monopolistic grip on the financing of overseas trade.
172
  
 The objections to the Commercial Offices and the deteriorating value of the 
Dajōkansatsu put this brief experiment in commercial policy to an end in early 1869. Yuri 
Kimimasa resigned from his post in February of that year and the Commercial Office was 
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hastily dismantled.
173
  The government created a new authority, the Trade Office (Tsūshōshi) 
to supervise a wide variety of economic matters ranging from stabilizing prices to shipping 
and insurance.
174
  The new Trade Office assumed supervisory powers over a network of 
subsidiary Trade Companies (Tsūshō Kaisha) and the Exchange Companies (Kawase 
Kaisha) that were to implement government policies in the treaty ports. 
 The Trade and Exchange companies that operated under the Trade Office’s authority 
shared many of the same features of the previous Commercial Office. Together the Trade 
Companies and Exchange Companies were supposed to control and regulate all trade in the 
treaty ports. The government appointed leading urban merchants to manage the companies 
and gave them the right to issue paper money to stimulate production and aid in the 
establishment of centralized control over trade in the treaty ports.
175
 The only significant 
difference between the new system and the previous Commercial Offices was the separation 
of the financial functions of the Exchange Companies from the trading activities of the 
Trading Companies in the management of the offices and companies more transparent. 
 In theory the Trade Companies would receive financing from the Exchange 
Companies to procure exportable goods from producers to sell to foreign merchants. In 
reality the Trade Companies struggled to establish their position as official middlemen in the 
overseas trade. Ultimately the Trade Companies ended up functioning simply as auction 
houses for goods moving in and out of the main ports. Merchants would gather to buy and 
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sell at the Trade Companies’ offices, which offered services such as the storage and 
protection of goods in transit.
176
 
  Though more successful than the very short-lived Commercial Offices, the Trade and 
Exchange Companies similarly appeared to fail to live up to expectations. The government 
abolished the Trade Companies in 1871. This was the same year in which the government 
abolished the remaining feudal domains and established a system of prefectures under the 
direct control of the central government (haihan chiken). The Trade Companies had been 
expected to help control and regulate the foreign trade of the various domains, but now the 
domains no longer existed, a major part of the raison d’être of the Trade Companies also 
disappeared. The Exchange companies continued to operate, but the government would soon 
replace them with a system of national banks (kokuritsu ginkō) modeled after the national 
bank system in the United States. 
 The dismantling of the Trade and Exchange Companies marked the end of an initial 
period of experimentation in commercial policy. These early years of the Meiji period saw an 
attempt to apply a modified version of the Tokugawa era domain monopoly system to foreign 
trade on the national level. All of the organizations created to carry out the Meiji 
government’s commercial policy resembled domain monopoly organizations in that they 
were staffed by wealthy merchants with close connections to the political authorities and 
aimed to monopolize the trade in major exportable goods which would be sold for specie. 
The ultimate goal of the organizations was to use inflationary finance and cheap paper money 
as a way of stimulating the production of exportable goods. Officials assumed that simply 
expanding the production of lucrative exports would be sufficient to correct Japan’s balance 
                                                 
176
 Miyamoto, Ono-kumi no Kenkyū, vol. 4, 454-455. 
 83 
 
of trade and stop the outflow of specie. Only after 1873 would this basic assumption start to 
be questioned. 
 
Ōkubo Toshimichi and the Origins of Direct Trade 
 Commercial policy in the early years of the Meiji period was experimental in nature. 
It relied heavily on past precedents from the Tokugawa period and did virtually nothing to 
address the fundamental obstacles keeping Japan’s merchants from engaging in international 
trade directly.  The new rulers of the nation, after all, had little experience in managing the 
affairs of state and confronted the daunting task of constructing new institutions of 
governance. It was only natural that they reached for seemingly successful precedents in the 
recent past in forging their commercial policy. Even though they were inexperienced, Japan’s 
new leaders were ultimately pragmatic in their approach to commercial policy. They had no 
ideological commitment to the preserving the practices of the past and were only seeking to 
find policies that worked. They were more than willing to embrace change. 
 Gradual but important shifts in Japan’s commercial policy began to take place after 
the Iwakura Embassy returned from Europe in 1873 and the Meiji government experienced 
its first major split when several powerful officials in the government resigned as the result 
of a dispute over a proposed invasion of Korea. The Iwakura Embassy, led by imperial 
Prince Iwakura Tomomi, was a major diplomatic mission to Europe and America. The 
original goal was to renegotiate the unequal trade treaties with Western powers. To ensure 
success the Meiji government sent many of its top officials. When the Western powers 
indicated that they did not have even the slightest intention of changing the trade treaties and 
treating Japan as an equal member of the international community, the Embassy turned into a 
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fact finding mission to investigate the sources of Western wealth and power. For two years 
members of the mission enthusiastically toured Western factories and consulted with a wide 
range of business and political leaders in Europe and America.  
 The experience of the lengthy tour of Western nations left a deep impression on the 
Embassy’s participants. The considerable gap they perceived between Japan and the Western 
nations in terms of industrial and military technology frightened them. For the first time, they 
realized that the goal of achieving equality with the West would be a much more daunting 
task than they had originally anticipated.  The sunny optimism of Yokoi Shōnan seemed now 
naïve.
177
 At the same time, the trip also awakened the members of the Embassy to the full 
power of Western industry and commerce.
178
 The Meiji government had already accepted the 
idea that trade with the outside world would help enrich the nation, but the participants in the 
Iwakura mission now saw a nation’s volume of trade as both an important barometer of a 
nation’s international status and the primary instrument by which nations obtained wealth 
and power. 
 The views of the members of the Iwakura Embassy had an important impact because 
the officials who participated would dominate the Meiji government after 1873. The Iwakura 
Embassy returned to Japan, just in time to enter the fray of a heated debate over a proposed 
punitive military expedition to Korea to punish the kingdom for rejecting Japanese 
diplomatic overtures.  The conflict in the government essentially pitted a group of foreign 
policy hardliners supporting an expedition to Korea, most of who had stayed behind in Japan 
to oversee the day to day operations of government, with officials returning from the Iwakura 
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Embassy who believed any Korean adventure to be premature and foolhardy. The spat over 
Korean policy resulted in a victory for the Iwakura Embassy members and the mass 
resignation of most of the members of the caretaker government.  
 During the Korean controversy, the main economic policy concerns of the Iwakura 
Embassy group came into focus. Ōkubo Toshimichi, soon to become the most powerful 
leader of the Meiji government, pointed to the nation’s economic worries as the most 
important reason for opposing military conflict with Korea. He explained the reasons for his 
opposition in a forceful seven point brief.  It expressed two central economic concerns that 
would shape his commercial policy. Primary in Ōkubo’s mind was Japan’s persistent trade 
deficit because the rapid outflow of gold specie and domestic inflation were sapping the 
country of its strength. Any premature foreign adventures would merely exacerbate what was 
already a dire economic problem. Ōkubo also worried about the Japanese government’s 
foreign debt. After the abolition of the domains in 1871 the Meiji government had assumed 
all the debts of the former daimyō, some of which were owed to foreigners. The Meiji 
government had also floated 3.4 million pounds worth of government bonds on the London 
market to fund the construction of Japan’s first railroad.179 Ōkubo believed that if the 
government did not promptly repay these loans, any dispute over foreign loans might be used 
by Britain as a pretext for the invasion and colonization of Japan.
180
 
 If Ōkubo had a clear definition of Japan’s main economic challenges, the new 
commercial policy to solve these problems did not take shape until early in 1874. By this 
time Ōkubo had become one of the preeminent figures in the Meiji government due to the 
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resignation of his chief rivals. With a firm grip on the machinery of the state he was now 
prepared to set the agenda for a new series of policy initiatives. He first sought to tackle the 
urgent issue of repaying the bonds issues in London. He, along with Minister of Finance 
Ōkuma Shigenobu submitted a memorandum, A Request Concerning the Retirement of 
Foreign Loans with Export Goods (Yushutsu Bupin o motte Gaisai Shōkyaku no Gi ni tsuki 
Ukagai). It advocated the adoption of a system very similar to the domain monopolies of the 
now bygone Tokugawa era. The Meiji government would collect, ship, and sell select 
Japanese goods directly to the London market and deposit the profits in a special account set 
up in the London branch of the Oriental Bank, an Anglo-Indian bank that had branch offices 
in Japan and did a good deal of business with the Japanese government.
181
 The deposited 
profits would be applied to the repayment of the bond issue.
182
 The Ministry of Home Affairs 
would collect and ship the goods and the Ministry of Finance would oversee sales and 
management of the profits through a specially created Bond Section (Kokusairyō) in the 
Ministry of Finance.  
 Ōkubo’s plan was little more than a proposal to create a slightly modified form of 
domain monopoly at the national level. Again, the primary goal was to generate much needed 
hard cash for the state to stabilize its finances and ensure the repayment of state debts. Ōkubo 
also proposed the recruitment of a small number of merchants to implement and manage the 
actual sale of goods in keeping with the Tokugawa era custom of entrusting the management 
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of monopolies to a circle of well-connected merchants.
183
 The only element that was missing 
was the creation of a monopsony system to procure exportable goods. The unequal treaties 
excluded this option. There was, however, a convenient way around this handicap. Ōkubo’s 
plan envisioned the sale of goods produced in the state run enterprises which the Meiji 
government had recently set up, including raw silk produced in the government run Tomioka 
silk reeling factory. Since the Meiji state itself was now engaged in the production of goods it 
could claim property rights over whatever it produced in a manner completely in keeping 
with acceptable commercial and legal standards in the West. Western nations could not then 
accuse the Meiji government of engaging in monopolistic trade practices.
184
 
 Later in the same year Ōkubo and Ōkuma turned their attention to the issue of Japan’s 
unfavorable balance of trade. Both men agreed that Japan’s persistent trade deficits and the 
outflow of specie were draining the country of wealth.
185
 The primary task of commercial 
policy was therefore to correct trade imbalances thereby halting the outflow of specie and 
stabilizing the (theoretically) convertible Japanese yen. The government first attempted to 
balance the nation’s trade by restricting imports by ordering all government offices to obtain 
their supplies from domestic manufacturers whenever possible and putting all government 
purchases of foreign goods under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance.
186
 Yet, such 
measures alone would prove insufficient to correct the balance of trade problem. 
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 Ōkubo issued a second memorandum entitled, An Opinion Concerning the Opening 
of Direct Sales Enterprises Abroad (Kaigai Chokubai no Kigyō o Hiraku no Gi) detailing the 
new orientation in commercial policy. Observing that Japan’s industry and commerce would 
never prosper without finding a steady demand for Japanese goods abroad, Ōkubo argued 
that the expansion of foreign trade was vital for Japan’s industries.187 Unfortunately, the 
dominance of Japan’s overseas trade by foreign merchants presented a major roadblock to 
developing new outlets for Japanese goods abroad. He argued that Japanese exports had the 
potential to expand dramatically if Japanese merchants put sufficient care and effort into 
selling directly to consumers overseas. The memorandum pointed to reports from Japan’s 
vice consul in New York, Tomita Tetsunosuke, describing the potential for increasing tea and 
silk exports to the American market. Ōkubo also highlighted the large price differentials 
between the prices of the two commodities in the Yokohama and New York markets that 
Tomita reported.
188
 Here was clear proof that trade imbalances were partially due to the 
unequal trading relationship between Japan and the Western countries. To address this 
problem Ōkubo stressed the need for Japanese merchants to set up shop in foreign markets 
and sell their wares directly to the customers in consuming countries. To accomplish this 
goal, Ōkubo proposed government financial backing for a small group of companies to 
promote Japanese exports and engage in direct trade. 
 Ultimately Ōkubo was able to enact only some of his grand designs for the promotion 
of Japanese exports and the balancing of the trade deficit. The government quickly enacted 
the proposal to establish an organization to sell Japanese goods on the London market, as two 
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officials from the Ministry of Finance traveled to London to set up an office to receive and 
sell Japanese goods.
189
 Beyond this single initiative, the government did not act on the rest of 
his proposals regarding direct trade, such as the creation of direct trading companies. 
Nevertheless, his proposal would serve as an inspiration for later advocates of direct trade 
who would take up the cause after Ōkubo’s assassination in 1877. 
 Ōkubo’s advocacy of “direct trade” marked an important milestone in openly 
criticizing the dominance of foreign merchants in Japan’s overseas trade. He identified the 
foreign merchants as one of the main sources of Japan’s economic distress because they took 
advantage of Japanese producers and merchants to reap outsize profits. In a fascinating twist, 
just as Yokoi and Yuri had sought government intervention to prevent regional merchants’ 
exploitation of the domain monopoly system in Fukui, Ōkubo promoted government 
initiatives to wrest control of Japan’s foreign trade from predatory foreign merchants. 
  Ōkubo’s specific proposals built on previous precedents with some limited changes. 
Most of the key features of the domain mercantilism remained. The main goals of 
commercial policy were obtaining specie, propping up state finances, and stabilizing the 
currency. Reliance on a few merchants to implement key parts of the commercial policy and 
the buying and disposal of goods continued a practice established in the Tokugawa era. The 
one key difference was the absence of monopoly trade practices, because the unequal treaties 
prevented the Meiji state from utilizing its power to restrict trade in any goods. While the 
Meiji state could claim property rights as a justification for selling the goods produced in 
state run enterprises, this argument applied to a handful of commercially viable products. 
Instead a system of financial support and subsidies to select merchants became the key 
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feature of commercial policy, as indirect methods of support replaced monopoly trade 
practices 
  
Conclusion 
 The new regime that came to power in 1868 faced daunting challenges. Not only was 
the new government determined to guard the nascent Japanese nation-state from further 
encroachment by foreign powers, but it also hoped to refashion Japan into a strong and 
wealthy polity capable of reclaiming lost sovereignty. These broad aims would become the 
underlying rationale for an array of energetic reforms of almost every aspect of society.  
 Before pursuing any of it larger aims, however, the young Meiji state had to ensure its 
own survival. The most immediate challenge to the new regime was generating revenue and 
ensuring the state had sufficient resources to realize its various modernizing ambitions. To 
accomplish this task the new government looked toward commercial policy as a way of 
increasing Japanese exports and generating revenue both indirectly, by strengthening the 
domestic tax base, and directly, by involving the state in commercial activity. In the process 
of crafting a coherent set of commercial policies, Japanese officials utilized time honored 
practices stretching back to the domain monopolies of the Tokugawa period that had evolved 
at the regional level specifically to achieve similar goals. Yet applying these “traditional” 
commercial policies on a national scale proved to be difficult.  Neither Commercial Offices 
nor Trade and Exchange companies were adequate to the task of expanding Japan’s export 
trade. These policies failed because the Meiji officials did not take into account changing 
trends in foreign demand, price fluctuations or ways to build effective links between 
Japanese producers and foreign markets. 
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 Despite these inadequacies the continuity in commercial policy between the 
Tokugawa period and Meiji was important in several ways. For example, the Tokugawa era 
pattern of close collaboration between political authority and a favored circle of merchants 
continued in various forms after 1868. The reconstruction of Tokugawa era divisions 
between favored merchants with close connections to the state and a group of outsiders set 
the tone for later commercial policies which sought to provide direct state support for a small 
group of favored enterprises, a practice which would have mixed success. The Tokugawa era 
obsession with utilizing commercial policy as a method of propping up state finances would 
also be a central feature of Meiji era commercial policy. Meiji officials would continue to 
look at commercial policy, first and foremost, as a method of obtaining specie for the state. 
Ultimately fiscal and monetary concerns became the primary influences that determined the 
shape of commercial policy rather than a commitment to particular principles of economic 
development. The next chapter will examine how the state’s fiscal and monetary concerns 
impacted the continuing evolution of the Meiji regime’s commercial policies and the 
interactions between the state and the private sector.
  
 
CHAPTER 3: 
National Champions and Model Entrepreneurs 
  
1876 was a momentous year in the annals of Japanese commerce. In that year, two 
seemingly minor but important events occurred which were to have a major impact on the 
future development of Japan’s foreign trade. That summer, Masuda Takashi, a top executive 
in the First Profit Company (Senshū Kaisha), received an unexpected invitation from 
Minomura Rizaemon, the head manager of the prestigious merchant house of Mitsui. 
Minoura asked Masuda to join Mitsui as chief executive of a new trading company that 
Mitsui planned to launch in the next few months. Minoura envisioned the new company as a 
mercantile venture which would be engaged in the purchase and sale of all manner of goods 
both within Japan and abroad. Minoura believed Masuda was one of the few men in Japan 
with the sufficient expertise to run the new business and pressed Masuda to agree to serve as 
the company’s head.190 
 Masuda had no intention of working for Mitsui which was one of the main rivals of 
the First Profit Company, but the planned Mitsui venture had strong support from powerful 
men. Several government officials including the Minister of Finance, Ōkuma Shigenobu, 
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urged Masuda to accept Minoura’s offer.191 Despite his reservations, Masuda eventually gave 
in to the pressure and agreed to join Mitsui. With the government’s blessing Masuda’s First 
Profit Company and Mitsui’s various trading operations merged to create a new firm, the 
Mitsui Trading Company (Mitsui Bussan).  
 Under Masuda’s guidance and with generous government support, the Mitsui Trading 
Company flourished and expanded rapidly. Following the direction of the Meiji government, 
the company established branch offices in London, Shanghai, and several other important 
centers of international commerce all within a few years of the company’s founding. As the 
company grew it slowly began to displace foreign firms in the handling of important portions 
of Japan’s import and export trade. Eventually the company would assume a commanding 
position in Japan’s foreign trade. By 1940 almost half of all of Japan’s imports and exports 
were handled by the Mitsui Trading Company.
192
 
 The same year the Mitsui Trading Company was founded, Arai Ryōichirō boarded 
the steamship Oceanic bound for the United States. Arai was a freshly minted graduate of 
one the first business schools established in Japan. He was headed for New York where he 
planned to work as an apprentice shopkeeper in a small store hawking tea and sundry goods 
imported from Japan to New Yorkers with a taste for “oriental” curiosities.  
 Arai’s apprenticeship had been arranged by his elder brother Hoshino Chōtarō.193 
Hoshino was the struggling owner and operator of one of Japan’s first mechanized silk 
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reeling factories. He had paid $250 dollars for Arai’s passage to America and signed a 
contract with the shop’s owner agreeing that Arai would serve as a salaried apprentice in the 
shop for several years in return for practical training in running a business. 
Hoshino had sent his younger brother to New York as part of a last desperate gamble to save 
his business. He had entrusted Arai with a sample of raw silk from the family’s silk reeling 
factory and ordered Arai to use the silk sample to convince New York silk brokers to place 
orders for raw silk directly with his factory. By dealing directly with New York’s silk brokers 
Hoshino hoped to avoid doing business with merchant intermediaries in Japan who 
dominated the country’s silk trade and with it a good chunk of the profits the trade generated. 
After suffering the indignity of being booted out of the offices of several silk brokers before 
even getting a chance to make a sales pitch, Arai managed to seal a contract for the delivery 
of raw silk with B. Richardson & Son.
194
 
The historic deal marked the first direct sale of Japanese raw silk in a foreign market 
and signaled an initial step in the beginning of the direct trade movement. Arai’s initial 
success opened up the floodgates for more direct orders to Hoshino’s factory. Within a few 
years the two brothers’ successful silk business transformed Arai, the humble apprentice 
shopkeeper, into a prominent member of New York’s business community and allowed his 
elder brother, Hoshino, the struggling factory owner, to become the vice president of one of 
Japan’s largest silk exporting companies and a leading spokesman for silk industry interests. 
Both the Mitsui Trading Company and the Hoshino brothers’ silk selling venture 
stand out as early successful direct trading ventures. For contemporaries, the two ventures 
served as inspiring examples of what was possible. By proving that Japanese firms and 
individual merchants could successfully sell goods abroad the Mitsui Trading Company and 
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Hoshino and Arai would become models a host of latter would-be direct trading ventures to 
emulate. In a longer term historical perspective, the two ventures were also important in the 
development of Japanese commerce. By establishing a foothold in foreign markets the two 
businesses blazed a trail for later followers who could benefit from connections established 
by the two pioneering firms. 
To those that argue that Meiji Japan was a “developmental” state, the story of the Mitsui 
Trading Company and the Hoshino brothers present two ideal case studies which show the 
Japanese developmental state at work. The government created the Mitsui Trading Company 
through a brokered marriage of Mitsui’s trading operations and the First Profit Trading 
Company and nurtured the new company through state contracts and subsidies; it prospered 
by serving as a commercial agent of the Meiji state.  The Hoshino brothers also benefitted 
from state support. Prior to Arai’s sale of silk in New York, Hoshino had relied on loans 
from the government to keep his silk filature open. 
 Yet why did the state provide such generous support for these two ventures? Even if 
government officials touted a general commitment to the goal of creating a rich nation, 
strong army (fukoku kyōhei), they could not afford to subsidize all business ventures. Nor, it 
turned out, did they have a clear strategy for selecting which enterprises to support. The story 
of the two businesses reveals that the motives that lay behind the Meiji government’s 
decisions to support individual enterprises were complex and varied. Often it was various 
practical needs and concerns that informed the state’s commercial policies which tended to 
be decided on an ad hoc basis. The Meiji state encouraged the creation of the Mitsui Trade 
Corporation and provided generous support to the company because it needed a mercantile 
firm that could serve as a national champion. The government which was largely 
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inexperienced in commercial matters needed to draw on the expertise of the prestigious 
mercantile house to assist it in conducting its own commercial operations and in the 
management of the national economy.  Only the scale of the house of Mitsui and the modern 
management techniques of the Mitsui Trading Company fit the bill. The government also 
hoped the Mitsui Trading Company would serve as a national champion in the international 
arena capable of competing with foreign mercantile firms. 
 In contrast, the Meiji state’s support for Hoshino’s silk filature was based on a very 
different set of motives. The government did not need Hoshino’s economic expertise, nor 
was it seeking to encourage the creation of a national silk reeling company. Instead, Hoshino 
represented a model of how the Meiji state hoped a new breed of Japanese entrepreneur 
would behave. He boldly embraced new techniques and technologies in silk production, was 
willing to take on big risks, and aspired to venture abroad to sell his goods directly to foreign 
consumers. Hoshino therefore symbolized a model entrepreneur who the Meiji government 
hoped others would emulate. The success of Hoshino’s venture was therefore essential in 
order to convince other entrepreneurs that Hoshino was a model worth emulation.  
 This difference was in part due to important differences between large-scale merchant 
capital and small and medium scale producers in indigenous industries. Mitsui was one of a 
handful of large highly organized mercantile concerns with which government bureaucrats 
could work with relative ease, because they needed only to issue directives or make requests 
to a small number of urban based managers. In contrast, the Hoshino brothers operated in an 
industry with a large number of small and medium sized firms that were almost impossible 
for the government to regulate or influence. Even if government officials could effectively 
communicate to rural entrepreneurs, authorities had no leverage to enforce its directives. 
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Therefore the government had to resort to leading by example in order to prompt 
entrepreneurs to adopt methods of business. The state’s support for the Hoshino brothers was 
an attempt to create a role model which others in silk industry would emulate. 
  A comparison of the two ventures is also useful in revealing important differences in 
what direct trade meant to various entrepreneurs and the ways in which these differences 
would affect the later direct trade movement. The Mitsui Trading Company’s involvement in 
direct trade ventures was a natural outgrowth of its business activities as a commercial agent 
of the Meiji state. The company first established offices overseas in response to officials’ 
orders to promote Japanese exports, but was then able to use information gathered from its 
activity abroad to find and pursue business opportunities in foreign trade. Engaging in direct 
trade was merely one way in which the company sought to maximize profits and exploit 
business opportunities. It was a business strategy, but not a goal in itself.  
 This attitude toward direct trade stood in stark contrast to Hoshino’s perspective. He, 
like many of his fellow entrepreneurs running small and medium scale businesses in Japan’s 
indigenous industries, relied on a hierarchically organized network of merchant middlemen 
to ship his goods to Japan’s treaty ports and sell them there. These merchant middlemen 
charged commissions which ate into the profits of struggling producers of tea and silk. 
Establishing direct trade links that would allow producers to sell their goods directly to end 
consumers of Japanese tea and silk promised both higher profits for producers and freedom 
from the middlemen that dominated the silk and tea trades. The concept of direct trade thus 
took on a meaning that went beyond a mere business strategy for maximizing profits to 
represent an ideal of re-organizing Japan’s foreign trade to serve the interest of producers.  
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 This motives behind the Meiji state’s commercial policies were complex, as were the 
goals and aims of the entrepreneurs who served as instruments and beneficiaries of those 
policies.  This complexity shows that far from having a coherent strategy in commercial 
policy, the Meiji state’s actions were driven by a mix of practical concerns, lofty aspirations, 
and recognition of the limits of state power. This chapter will examine that complexity in the 
case of these two rare and notable commercial success stories of the 1870s.   
 
The Mitsui Family and the Mitsui Trading Company 
 The house of Mitsui occupies a central place in the history of the modern Japanese 
economy. In part Mitsui’s prominence rests in the sheer scale of the family’s business 
ventures. Mitsui became one of imperial Japan’s largest business concerns involved in almost 
every conceivable branch of economic activity from banking and mining to fisheries and silk 
production. Mitsui’s trading arm, the Mitsui Trading Company (Mitsui Bussan) by itself 
could be counted as one of prewar Japan’s largest corporations, a sprawling behemoth that by 
1940 handled over a third of all Japan’s foreign trade.195 Mitsui is also one of Japan’s oldest 
large scale enterprises with roots stretching back to the 17
th
 century. Mitsui and the Mitsui 
Trading Company also merit special mention in any study of Japanese commercial policy 
because of the unique role the company played in the development of Japan’s overseas trade. 
The Mitsui Trading Company was one of the first firms to establish branch offices overseas 
and was a pioneer in the expansion Japan’s overseas trade. As a commission merchant 
business engaged in the buying and selling of goods both at home and abroad, the Mitsui 
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Trading Company was also the first of a uniquely Japanese institution, the general trading 
company (sōgō shōsha).196 
 Mitsui has also been the subject of intense scrutiny in continuing historical debates 
over the nature of the relationship between the state and the private sector in modern Japan. 
In the early Meiji period, Mitsui was one of the most prominent members of a small circle of 
“political merchants” (seishō), a group of well connected crony capitalists who prospered 
from lucrative government contracts, generous subsidies, and other forms of state patronage. 
No historian has disputed this simple fact. What is disputed is the dynamics of Mitsui’s 
intimate relationship with the Meiji state. Did Mitsui maintain close connections to key 
government officials because it was initially a weak capitalist enterprise incapable of 
surviving without government assistance? Or, conversely, was Mitsui in fact the senior 
partner in what amounted to a conspiratorial alliance of economic and governing elites? Or 
perhaps, as Takeda Haruhito argues, businesses like Mitsui tended to be closely tied to the 
state in the early Meiji period simply because in an underdeveloped agrarian economy 
working for the state offered the most lucrative opportunities.
197
  
 To understand how Mitsui came to be one of the most prominent merchant 
enterprises of the Meiji period it is necessary to briefly examine Mitsui’s origins in the 
Tokugawa period. As a business, Mitsui’s roots go back to the early years of the Tokugawa 
period when in 1616 the members of the Mitsui family started a modest saké and soy sauce 
brewing business in their hometown of Matsusaka, a town founded in what is today part of 
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Mie prefecture.
198
 Mitsui was at the forefront of a rising merchant class during the early years 
of the Tokugawa period when the changing political environment provided opportunities for 
ambitious businessmen.  With the unification of Japan under Tokugawa rule and the 
introduction of restrictions on foreign trade, the great merchant families of the feudal era 
whose prosperity through depended heavily on overseas trade began to lose their grip on 
Japan’s commerce.199 In their place, a group of merchants from the economically advanced 
regions of Omi and Ise emerged. Acting as suppliers of handicraft products from Japan’s 
proto-industrial core regions, the Omi and Ise merchants began branching out of their home 
territories utilizing newly constructed transportation networks between the three great urban 
markets of Japan, Edo, Ōsaka, and Kyōto to establish a commanding presence in long 
distance trading within Japan.
200
 With roots in the Omi region, but residing in the Ise region 
the Mitsui family was, like many of its neighbors at the time, taking advantage of the peace 
to exploit new commercial opportunities.
201
 
 Mitsui’s business empire began when the family opened up a clothing store, Echigoya, 
in the shōgun’s capital of Edo. In managing its store, the family introduced several 
innovations in business practice. The Mitsuis moved the headquarters of the business to 
Kyōto establish direct contact with fabric suppliers based in the city in order to buy in bulk 
while offering to sell fabric to consumers in any size they required. The Mitsuis also 
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eliminated complications involved in extending credit to customers by insisting that all sales 
be conducted on a strict cash only basis. With these innovations the Echigoya soon became 
the premier fabric retailer in Edo with branch shops in Kyōto and Ōsaka.202  In order to remit 
the profits from the gold based economy of Edo to the silver coin based economy of the 
Kyōto region the family also added money changing to the growing list of family run 
enterprises.
203
  
 As the extended Mitsui family came to engage in a variety of businesses from selling 
cloth, to money lending, and to brewing saké and soy sauce, the family determined that the 
family businesses needed some sort of coherent structure to prevent family squabbles that 
might hurt the enterprise. Members decided to create a kind of early modern corporate 
conglomerate. Divided into distinct branch families, each one assumed a specific Mitsui 
business as its primary responsibility and received access to a share of Mitsui resources. All 
of the families agreed to remain loyal to the main family and obey the orders of the 
Ōmotogata, an organization that functioned much like a corporate board or holding company 
for the various Mitsui enterprises. A percentage of the profits from all Mitsui enterprises 
were pooled into the Ōmotogata. It then lent funds to the branch families to cover their 
operating costs from the common fund.
204
 Each unit of Mitsui operated independently of the 
others, so that the rest of the family businesses were insulated if a single line of business 
went under. Pooling profits had the added advantage of enabling the Mitsuis to quickly 
mobilize capital to invest in promising new opportunities. 
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 Most importantly the family developed close contacts with the Tokugawa authorities. 
Its growing wealth, prominence and shrewd business acumen caught the attention of the 
bakufu authorities which appointed the family as the official purveyors of apparel and 
personal accessories to the Shogun in 1689. Later in 1691 Mitsui became one of the official 
money-changers for the Tokugawa family. From 1691 onward Mitsui maintained close ties 
with the Tokugawa regime by helping to manage the Tokugawa family’s household wealth.  
 By the end of the seventeenth century Mitsui had became one of Japan’s most 
important merchant families. Innovations in its original business of selling clothes had led to 
a thriving chain of stores in Japan’s largest urban markets, the creation of the Ōmotogata 
gave the Mitsui family the financial resources for continued expansion of its businesses, and 
close connections to the Tokugawa regime ensured that the Mitsuis would never be lacking a 
rich customer and patron. The Mitsuis, together with, the Ono and Shimada merchant houses, 
became one member of the urban merchant triumvirate that dominated commerce in early 
modern Japan. By the dawn of the eighteenth century Mitsui was a firmly entrenched part of 
the Tokugawa regime. 
 
The Meiji Restoration and Mitsui’s Struggle for Survival 
 Under the long rule of the Tokugawa regime, Mitsui flourished. The dawning of  
Japan’s modern era, however, was not so kind to the illustrious merchant house. If the 
Tokugawa regime had provided Mitsui with the ideal political and economic environment to 
grow and thrive, the decline of that regime and the dramatic changes of the Meiji era posed a 
serious threat to the established merchant house’s survival. Mitsui along with the other 
prominent merchant houses of the Tokugawa era found itself under threat from political 
 103 
 
changes and a new breed of rural entrepreneurs who seized the opportunities the opening of 
Japan’s ports offered for unrestricted foreign trade. 
 A primary threat to Mitsui’s survival was its intimate relationship with the Tokugawa 
regime. As a wealthy merchant house with long experience working for the Tokugawa 
shōguns, Mitsui was one of the first sources the Tokugawa regime sought out whenever it 
needed additional funds in a time of crisis. In its final years the bakufu developed an almost 
insatiable need for money as it desperately attempted to maintain its control the country and 
implement modernizing reforms. Unable to raise sufficient tax revenues to cover its expenses, 
the Tokugawa shoguns resorted to implementing a series of crippling emergency levies on 
wealthy merchants. Between 1863 and 1866, Mitsui had to transfer a staggering sum of 3.5 
million ryō to the bakufu.205 Although these payments were technically loans, the Mitsui 
family knew that the government would most likely not be able to repay this amount. In its 
last throes of life, the regime that had once been an important source of revenue was now 
draining Mitsui’s finances. 
 The future under the new imperial regime, the Meiji government, did not appear 
promising either. As one of the managers of the Tokugawa fortunes, Mitsui had long enjoyed 
easy access to capital from the bakufu treasury. The collapse of the regime cut off that 
important source of financing. The Mitsuis’ close association with the ancien régime was 
also a political liability. In order to avoid ending up on the wrong side of history, Mitsui 
wasted little time in establishing relationships with the powerful groups and leaders who 
would form the backbone of the new regime. In 1866, when the long-term survival of the 
Tokugawa regime was beginning to be questioned, Mitsui hired Minomura Rizaemon, an 
independent businessman who was known for his uncanny ability to gain the trust and 
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respect of powerful men, to serve as its manager. Though rumored to be illiterate, Minomura 
was a shrewd businessman who was also a skillful diplomat who managed the seemingly 
impossible task making Mitsui appear to be the natural ally of both sides in the Restoration 
conflict.
 206
  
 The Mitsui clan utilized important contacts it had acquired through its business 
activities to establish a degree of rapport with anti-bakufu forces. Mitsui established a 
working relationship with the Satsuma domain through an agreement to provide exchange 
services for the domain’s paper money, ryūkyū tsūdama.207 Mitsui also quietly established a 
dialogue with anti-bakufu forces in the rebel domain of Chōshū. Links with important leaders 
of the anti-bakufu movement outside Chōshū and Satsuma were made with the help of Mutsu 
Munemistu, a longtime friend of the Mitsui family, who provided information about 
developments in rebel circles.
208
 These efforts ensured that well before the fall of the 
Tokugawa bakufu Mitsui had already established contacts with the important players in the 
new regime and had built up a store of good will with the leaders of the nascent Meiji state. 
 A display of largess toward Japan’s new rulers also helped ensure Mitsui would not 
fall victim to the upheavals of Restoration politics. As pro-imperial forces appeared more 
likely to emerge victorious from the Restoration struggle, Mitsui opened up its still sizable 
coffers to Japan’s new rulers. After seizing power in Kyōto they desperately needed funds 
both to supply their military forces and extend control over the countryside. In 1868 when the 
Meiji government officials helpfully announced that wealthy merchants needed to purchase 3 
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million ryō worth of government “bonds,” Mitsui in conjunction with the Ono and Shimada 
families led their compatriots in the Kyōto merchant community in contributing almost three 
fourths of the needed money.
209
  
 Mitsui also faced severe challenges to its economic survival due to changes in the 
domestic economy and the forced opening of Japan to foreign trade. As explained in Chapter 
2, Japan’s domains sought to shore up their finances by promoting local industry through the 
establishment of commercial offices run by local merchants.
210
 These enterprises created 
competition for urban merchants like Mitsui. Rural merchants were beginning to muscle into 
the main urban markets of Japan and played an increasingly prominent role in domestic long 
distance trade, areas of economic activity where the great merchant houses like Mitsui had 
traditionally dominated.
211
 More worryingly, these rural upstart merchants were assuming a 
dominant position in Japan’s rapidly expanding foreign trade.212 As tea and silk exports 
soared, rural merchants based in silk and tea producing regions began setting up shop in 
Yokohama and taking over the lucrative domestic tea and silk trades. Despite possessing 
extensive commercial networks and capital, Mitsui failed to play a large role in silk or tea 
exports. Employees of Mitsui’s Yokohama shop, which was established to engage in foreign 
trade after the opening of the ports, found themselves jealously looking on as Nakaiya 
                                                 
209
 Tanaka Akira, Meiji ishin (Tōkyō: Kōdansha, 2005), 176-177. 
 
 
210
 Nakanishi, “Kinsei, kindai no shōnin,” 170. 
 
 
211
 Edward E. Pratt, Japan’s Proto-industrial Elite: the economic foundations of the gōnō (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 86-88. 
 
 
212
 Nakanishi, “Kinsei, kindai no shōnin,” 177. 
 
 
 106 
 
Juheiei, previously a lowly rural merchant, handled the bulk of the silk trade.
213
 Even the 
money lending business was suffering from high rates of default due to the turbulent 
economic conditions in the wake of the old regime’s collapse. Mitsui’s financial losses were 
large enough that the family had to take the unprecedented step of dipping into cash reserves 
held by the Ōmotogata to recapitalize its businesses.214  
 Solving these economic challenges was, however, a difficult challenge that simply 
neither money nor connections with the right people could solve. The firm’s only choice was 
a painful restructuring of its business. Accordingly, the family abandoned less profitable 
enterprises. For example, it spun off its ailing clothing business, once the crown jewel of the 
Mitsui business empire, by selling it to a distant branch family who eventually transformed it 
into the Mitsukoshi department store chain.
215
  
 Facing a turbulent market, Mitsui sought to survive by transforming itself into a vital 
purveyor of services to the Meiji state.  Mitsui redirected its entrepreneurial efforts to focus 
on new lines of business that would allow the firm to seize new opportunities offered by 
doing business in the service of the government. The firm sought to capitalize on its 
extensive business experience and national scope of operations to make the merchant house a 
vital tool in the management of the economy of the new nation-state. 
 Mitsui was able to do so because Japan’s new rulers found that they needed the 
expertise and services Mitsui could provide particularly in managing the rickety currency and 
tax systems that the Tokugawa regime had bequeathed. In the wake of the Tokugawa 
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bakufu’s collapse, Meiji leaders confronted the daunting task of trying to manage and reform 
a byzantine and fragmented system of taxation. After over two centuries of “centralized 
feudal” rule under the Tokugawa, tax rates and methods of collection varied widely across 
the country.
216
 In many areas of the country taxes were still collected in kind, often rice, 
instead of cash. This practice made the transportation and storage of tax rice, and its 
conversion into money a major problem for the Meiji authorities.  
  Japan also lacked a unified monetary system. Throughout the Tokugawa period 
Japanese had used a complex array of gold, silver, and copper coinage, and the types of 
currency and coinage in common usage varied widely according to region.
217
 Added to this 
mix of specie were a large number of paper notes issued by the various domains in the 
closing years of Tokugawa rule. As a result, by 1868, the first year of the Meiji era, a total of 
over sixteen hundred different kinds of paper notes, and a confusing array of copper, silver, 
and gold coinage were in circulation.
218
  
 The Meiji government desperately needed assistance in transforming the chaotic 
collection of local practices and currencies into a modern national tax and currency system. 
While a few officials in the new government possessed limited knowledge economic matters 
either through prior experience managing the finances of their home domains or through 
supervising one of the many domain trade monopolies that proliferated in the late Tokugawa 
period, these experiences were of limited utility in managing the national economy. The great 
merchant houses like Mitsui, on the other hand, had been deeply involved with managing the 
                                                 
216
 Fukaya Tokujirō, Meiji seifu zaisei kiban no kakuritsu (Tōkyō: Ocha no Mizu Shobō, 1995), 3. 
 
 
217
 Suzuki Kozo, Shihonshugi wa Edo de umareta (Tōkyō: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2002), 26. 
 
 
218
 Roberts, Mitsui, 95. 
 108 
 
complex Tokugawa era tax and monetary systems in various regions for well over a century. 
With long experience as a money changer for the Tokugawa regime in charge of managing 
tax collection and state revenues, Mitsui was one of the few firms that could ensure the 
continued operation of the tax system as it existed.  This capability combined with its 
extensive network of shops and agents across the nation make it one of the only 
organizations capable of handling the complex financial operations required to keep the new 
government running. Mitsui’s solid reputation as a reliable business also made the Mitsui 
family an agent in which the Meiji state could place its confidence.  
 It is unsurprising then to find that Mitsui assumed an important role in the economic 
administration of the country. In return for its generous purchase of government “bonds” in 
1868, Mitsui was among the select number of merchant houses appointed as one of the Meiji 
government’s official exchange purveyors (kawase kata). This assignment put Mitsui in 
charge of holding and managing government funds.
219
 This was essentially the same role 
Mitsui had performed for the Tokugawa regime. The post also had an additional benefit; as 
an exchange purveyor Mitsui could tap into the money it held in government accounts to 
engage in money lending and engaging in new lines of business.
220
 Mitsui had once againi 
obtained privileged access to capital.  
 The important role Mitsui came to play in managing the tax system supplemented its 
position as one of the government’s bankers. In order to obtain revenue, the Meiji 
government in its early years had to maintain most of the taxes levied by the shōgun and the 
domains during the Tokugawa period. As mentioned above, local authorities usually 
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collected these taxes in rice and shipped it to central markets in Ōsaka or Edo to sell for 
cash.
221
 The Meiji government, however, decided in 1873 to end this cumbersome method of 
tax collection and replace it with a unified tax system based on cash payments. To this end, 
the Meiji government created a uniform system of land taxes which were to be paid in cash. 
While this system removed the government’s headache of having to ship rice to central 
markets to be auctioned for hard currency, the system placed the burden of converting 
agricultural commodities into cash squarely on the back of landowning farmers. The new tax 
system assumed that strong, functioning local rice markets would enable peasants to convert 
their rice into cash to pay their taxes. 
 In 1872 Mitsui and Ono joined with other rich merchants to offer themselves as 
intermediaries in the new tax collection system.
222
 Under the proposed plan, merchants 
agreed to purchase tax rice from peasants in regional markets at the local market price, but 
instead of handing the seller cash for his rice, the merchant would issue a letter of credit for 
the total cash amount. The seller could then convey the letter of credit to tax authorities who 
would exchange the letters of credit for cash from Mitsui. Essentially, Mitsui proposed to 
function as a pipeline for cash between taxpayers and the government. In return Mitsui 
received ownership over the tax rice to sell.
223
 
 The system had several advantages for all involved. It allowed Mitsui to utilize the 
funds the government had entrusted to it to speculate in rice. Because Mitsui was one of the 
large merchant houses that served as the government’s banker, the merchant house had 
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access to the sizable funds required to underwrite large scale purchases of rice across the 
country. Once the rice was in hand, Mitsui could take advantage of differentials in rice prices 
across the nation and transport and sell the rice where the prices were highest, gaining a 
profit. For the Meiji government the arrangement ensured the smooth functioning of the new 
tax system and simplified the collection of taxes by funneling individuals’ payments through 
large merchant houses. Most peasants preferred the new system because it liberated them 
from the burdensome responsibility of shipping their own tax rice to the authorities and 
eliminated the annoying need for local authorities to inspect tax rice.
224
 
 Mitsui also rendered a vital service to government by serving as its chief commercial 
agent in international rice sales. The first major example of this new role came in 1872 with 
the sale of surplus tax rice to the Hong Kong and London markets.
225
 The Meiji government 
arranged the sale in order to prevent a decline in domestic rice prices which threatened to 
undermine efforts to introduce a reformed tax system requiring cash payments.
226
 Mitsui 
organized the sale on the government’s behalf working with the assistance of the Walsh Hall 
Company, a foreign firm operating in Japan.
227
 While Mitsui merely sold the rice on the 
government’s behalf, the company received a sizable commission fee.228 The sale also 
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provided Mitsui with an invaluable early experience in trading in the international 
marketplace, a vital first step in helping Mitsui establish a presence in Japan’s overseas trade.  
 By 1872 Mitsui emerged as a vital supporting agent in the economic administration of 
the Meiji state. The role Mitsui assumed for the new government was in some ways identical 
to the one Mitsui had performed for Tokugawa regime. Yet this mutually beneficial 
arrangement was headed for a shake-up. Debates within the government over a possible 
invasion of Korea, rising tensions with China, and increased concerns over domestic political 
stability in 1873 triggered a major shift in government policy.  
 Diplomatic tensions with China over the murder of Ryūkyūan fishermen who had 
intruded into the territory of aboriginal tribes living on the island of Taiwan and a heightened 
state of military alert caused by the 1873 crisis regarding Korea caused Meiji leaders to 
reassess the wisdom of entrusting large portions of government revenue in the hands of 
wealthy merchant houses. Rumors targeted Ono and Shimada, two of Mitsui’s sister 
merchant houses that also served as official government exchange purveyors, with 
accusations that they had used government funds to invest in a series of risky ventures. 
Government officials began to doubt that they could promptly recover the money managed 
by its exchange purveyors in the event of war.
229
  
 At the same time widespread discontent over the privileges awarded to large 
merchant houses became a political liability for the Meiji regime. Wealthy peasants 
complained about the role of merchants like Mitsui in the rice trade. In some areas merchants 
had colluded with local authorities to force payment of taxes in kind to officials who then 
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sold the rice to the merchants.
230
 This practice prevented peasants from selling the rice on 
their own initiative when rice prices were high and paying their taxes in cash in order to 
pocket any surplus value that the high rice prices might create.
231
  
 The Meiji government’s efforts to address these problems damaged the interests of 
Japan’s prominent merchant houses. Fearing local unrest the government first banned the 
merchant houses from involvement in local rice markets with the result that Mitsui, Ono, and 
Shimada had to give up that lucrative trade.
232
 The Meiji government then announced new 
capital requirements for merchant houses handling government accounts. Mitsui along with 
other firms were required to prove that it held sufficient collateral to repay all monies the 
government entrusted to them or return the money immediately.
233
 In response, Mitsui and 
other merchant houses that had lent out government money began desperately calling in 
loans and scrambling to assess the value of their properties.  
 In the end, the government order caused the bankruptcy of Ono and Shimada. Neither 
family was able to come up with sufficient collateral or funds because each enterprise had 
committed substantial funds to risky investments. Mitsui barely escaped bankruptcy, as it 
claimed to have enough collateral to cover its holdings of government money. Although 
Mitsui had escaped the crisis, the merchant house still lost its easy access to capital in the 
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form of government funds. The government soon announced it would hold its money in its 
own vaults rather than loaning the funds out to merchants.
234
 
 These developments signaled a major shift in the government’s economic policies. 
The government began to distance itself from reliance on merchant houses like Mitsui to 
manage its economic affairs and began to take a more direct role in the economic 
management of the state by building new public institutions to serve the functions merchants 
had previously filled. At the same time a renewed dedication to building up the national 
economy led the government to employ merchants as instruments of state policy in foreign 
economic relations 
 Economically, the trauma of 1873 was a blessing in disguise for Mitsui. Although 
other large merchant families such as Sumitomo and Konoike also survived, they were 
smaller in scale and more limited in the scope of their operations. Mitsui was the only one of 
the truly great merchant houses of the Tokugawa era to remain standing and therefore stood 
out as the most appropriate partner for the government in new commercial ventures. With its 
main rivals eliminated, Mitsui was in a much stronger position than before. 
 
Creating National Champions: Ōkubo Toshimichi and Mitsui 
After 1873 a new approach in economic policy stressing the protection and nurture of 
a select group of enterprises which would serve as national champions in strategic sectors 
emerged. This new policy began with efforts to promote the growth of the shipping industry. 
In a famous memorandum Ōkubo Toshimichi, widely regarded as the most powerful 
government official after 1873, urged the Meiji government to subsidize promising private 
firms in the shipping industry rather than continuing support for the state run firm, the Japan 
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Mail Steamship Company (Nihon Yubin Jyōkisen Kaisha).235 Acting on Ōkubo’s 
recommendation, the Steamship Company merged with a private firm, Mitsubishi, owned by 
Iwasaki Yatarō. This government brokered merger resulted in the creation of a new national 
champion in shipping, the Mail Steamship Mitsubishi Company (Yubin Kisen Mitsubishi 
Kaisha).
236
 The new company received ships and equipment by the government free of 
charge along with a sizable annual subsidy of 25,000 yen in exchange for maintaining regular 
service to Shanghai, in addition to domestic coastal shipping.
237
  
 Ōkubo’s focus on shipping stemmed from deeper concerns about the state of Japan’s 
foreign trade. He saw the increasing import of manufactured goods as a threat to the future 
development of Japanese industry.
238
 Inspired by what he saw as the positive role that 
Britain’s Navigation Acts, a series of mercantile era British laws which required all goods 
imported into to the British Isles to be carried exclusively on British ships, had played in the 
development of British industry, Ōkubo hoped that the creation of a strong domestic shipping 
firm might stimulate the development of Japan’s own export industries and check the influx 
of foreign imported goods.
239
 
 Ōkubo’s policy recommendations for the shipping industry deeply affected the 
general tone for the nation’s commercial policy. His insistence that state sponsorship and 
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support for existing private industries was, in principle, preferable to creating state-owned 
enterprises, ensured that the state would always seek to rely on private industry to implement 
commercial policy, rather than directly intervening in commercial matters itself. Ōkubo’s 
idea of supporting a few private firms also meant that commercial policy would focus on the 
selection and nurturing of a small number of “national champion” firms that could compete 
in international markets. 
 Ōkubo also hoped to take a similar approach in creating a trading company to serve 
as the commercial agent for the government and assist the government in retiring its foreign 
debt. As previously mentioned, the Meiji regime had sold a total of 3.4 million pounds worth 
of bonds on the London market to fund the building of the nation’s first railroad and retire 
debts the domains had incurred.
240
 Facing high interest payments on Japan’s debt and with 
370,000 pounds worth of bonds set to mature in June 1875, Ōkubo became anxious about 
making those payments.
241
 Back in 1873 he had predicted that the British would use even the 
slightest complication in repaying Japan’s debts would be as a pretext for intervening in 
Japan’s internal affairs.242 Opposed to the idea of paying back the debts in specie as a drain 
of precious resources, he urged repaying the bonds through the sale of Japanese goods 
abroad.
243
 
                                                 
240
Ishii, Nihon no sangyō kakumei, 34. 
 
 
241
 Ōkubo Toshimichi, “Yushutsu buppin wo motte gaisai shōkyaku no gi ni tsuki ukagai” in Ōkubo Toshimichi 
Monjo vol. 6 (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1927; reprint, Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1968), 462-463. 
 
 
242
 Kiyama, Kindai Nihon to Mitsui Bussan, 26. 
 
 
243
 Ōkubo Toshimichi, “Yushutsu buppin wo motte gaisai shōkyaku no gi tsuki ukagai” 462-463. 
 116 
 
 The problem with this idea was the logistics. Most of Japan’s foreign trade was firmly 
controlled by foreign merchants who were likely to claim the bulk of the profits from the sale 
of Japanese goods for themselves. To repay Japan’s foreign debt and expand Japanese 
exports abroad Ōkubo proposed a policy similar to what he had recommended for the 
shipping industry. He suggested finding “one or two merchants” and giving the selected 
merchants subsidies in return for opening up an export business in Yokohama which would 
maintain ties to foreign mercantile houses and sell Japanese goods directly to foreign 
markets.
244
 
 Ōkubo’s proposal, of course raised the whole question of which merchants the Meiji 
government would select as the officially sanctioned trading company. Mitsui was a strong 
candidate. After the collapse of Ono and Shimada, Mitsui became Japan’s most prominent 
merchant house almost by default. Its prior experience in managing the Meiji government’s 
sale of surplus rice abroad also gave the firm a legitimate claim to some expertise in foreign 
trade. These were not, however, the only factors that led to the creation of the Mitsui Trading 
Company (Mitsui Bussan). Fortuitous timing and connections with the right people helped 
create the Mitsui Trading Company. 
 As briefly mentioned above, this firm resulted from a merger between Mitsui’s 
trading arm, the Kokusan-kata, and the First Profits Company Senshū Kaisha, a company 
founded by Inoue Kaoru. Inoue was a high ranking government official who served as 
Japan’s de facto Minister of Finance from roughly 1871 until May of 1873 when he resigned 
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from the government in protest over budgetary policy.
245
 During his tenure at the Ministry of 
Finance, Inoue’s duties brought him into frequent contact with Japan’s most prominent 
businessmen. Inoue developed especially strong ties with Mitsui after it became the official 
agent for the government mint in charge of retiring old currency for the new yen.
246
 The 
intimate relationship between the wealthy merchant house and the Inoue sparked suspicions 
about corruption at high levels in the Meiji government. Political rival Saigo Takamori 
famously dismissed Inoue as “Mitsui’s clerk,” suggesting Inoue was little more Mitsui’s 
representative in the government.
247
 
 After resigning his government post in 1873, Inoue decided to try his hand at business 
and founded a small trading company, the First Profit Company (Senhū Kaisha). He 
successfully utilized the connections he formed in his political career to secure lucrative 
business from the government. The First Profit Company received several government 
contracts to import weapons and other supplies for the military.
248
 The company also did a 
bustling business dealing in tax rice, in addition to selling coal and metals produced in 
government owned mines.
249
 The day-to-day operation of the company was handled by 
Masuda Takashi, a protégée of Inoue in the Ministry of Finance who resigned along with his 
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mentor. With Inoue’s connections and Masuda’s careful management, the company 
prospered. 
 In 1876, however, Inoue decided to rejoin the government, as his old rivals were now 
out of power. Inoue’s decision did not, however, bode well for the First Profit Company. 
Many observers thought Inoue was already too close to merchant interests. Inoue could ill 
afford to show any favoritism toward the company even though a certain amount of 
government patronage seemed vital for the continued health of the business. Inoue and 
Masuda had either to find a way of winding down the company or ensuring the business 
could survive independent of Inoue’s patronage.  
 To aid the survival of the First Profit Company and to foster the development of 
Japan’s overseas trade, the Meiji government encouraged a merger between the First Profit 
Company and Mitsui’s trading business to create a new trading company which would serve 
as a national champion trading firm. According to Masuda Takashi’s account, Minister of 
Finance Ōkuma Shigenobu acted as an intermediary. Ōkuma first approached Mitsui’s 
manager, Minomura Rizaemon, and urged him to start an import and export business. Ōkuma 
then asked Masuda to join Mitsui as the manager of the new venture.
250
 After further 
consultations with Inoue, Minomura decided to go ahead with the merger and agreed to 
create a new company within the Mitsui group which would operate as a trading company 
managed by the former employees of the First Profit Company with Masuda serving its 
head.
251
 In 1876 Mitsui’s trading arm, the Kokusankata, merged with the First Profit 
Company to form the Mitsui Trading Company (Mitsui Bussan). 
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 Judging by the lack of enthusiasm for the merger on the part of the management of 
both Mitsui and the First Profit Company, one can deduce that the government was the 
driving force behind the creation of the Mitsui Trading Company. Mitsui’s attitude was 
lukewarm. Declining to invest any of its capital in Mitsui Trading, the Mitsui family 
announced that the new company would sink or swim on its own.
252
 Masuda, the First Profit 
Company’s de facto manager, was also ambivalent about the merger. He did not believe he 
would be able to command the loyalty of Mitsui employees and had doubted that the new 
company would be successful.
253
 As a result, Masuda demanded complete managerial 
autonomy for the Mitsui Trading Company.
254
  His initial hostility towards Mitsui was 
evident in statements in his memoirs that Mitsui’s Kokusankata “played absolutely no role in 
the foundation of the Mitsui Trading Company” even though much of the Kokusankata’s 
domestic business carried over to Mitsui Trading.
255
  
  
Commercial Agent of the Japanese Government: Mitsui and the Meiji Regime 
 Thanks to support from the Meiji government, however, the Mitsui Trading Company 
needed little support from the Mitsui group itself. Now that the government had created a 
national champion trading firm, Meiji leaders were prepared to provide strong support to 
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ensure the venture’s success. In return, Mitsui was to act as an official commercial agent of 
the Meiji state charged with implementing key elements of national commercial policy.  
 The cooperative relationship between Mitsui Bussan and the government was readily 
apparent in Mitsui’s expansion abroad. Between 1877 and1880, the years immediately after 
the company’s founding, the Mitsui Trading Company opened branch offices in Shanghai, 
Hong Kong, Paris, New York, London, Lyon, and Milan in rapid succession. This period of 
rapid expansion roughly corresponds with the years the Meiji government pursued rapid 
inflation fueled growth and aggressively promoted Japanese exports. After 1880, the 
government adopted a tighter monetary policy and a shift toward a “go slow” approach 
toward expanding the nation’s export trade.  The Mitsui Trading Company’s growth reflected 
the shift in policy. After a feverish period of expansion, the company did not open another 
foreign branch office until 1886.
256
 In other words, the Mitsui Trading Company’s early 
growth depended on government backing. 
 The company’s first and ultimately most important foreign branch office resulted 
from a government initiative. In 1876 the Chinese government requested a 10 million yen 
loan from the Japanese government. Though willing to respond to the request, the Meiji 
leadership sought to avoid doing anything that might antagonize the Western powers. 
Extending a government loan directly to China might raise suspicions about Japanese 
intentions in China. Instead, the Meiji government consulted with the head of the First 
National Bank of Japan (Dai Ichi Kokuritsu Ginkō), Shibusawa Eiichi, about the issue.257 
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Shibusawa recommended a consortium of the First National Bank and Mitsui extend the loan 
with the understanding part of the money be used by the Chinese to purchase goods from 
Japan.
258
 The government ordered Shibusawa and Masuda Takashi to travel to Shanghai to 
work out the details of the possible loan with the Chinese authorities.
259
 
 Believing the loan would provide an opportunity to open up trade to China, 
Shibusawa and Masuda immediately began making plans for the opening of a joint branch 
office in Shanghai. Together the two companies lobbied the government for a 250,000 yen 
loan repayable in 10 years to fund the creation of a branch office in the city. They ended up 
receiving two smaller loans amounting to 10,000 yen and 75,000 yen to fund the opening of 
commercial offices in Shanghai and Hong Kong respectively.
260
Although negotiations with 
the Chinese authorities failed to reach any agreement and the loan deal never came to fruition, 
Mitsui was still able to open its first branch office in Shanghai in 1878. 
 A direct government order established Mitsui’s second branch office in Paris. In 1878 
the Meiji government decided to participate in the Paris Exhibition which the French 
government hosted to celebrate France’s revival after the nation’s crushing defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War. The Meiji government ordered Mitsui to open a branch office in Paris 
to handle the Japanese exhibition display and serve as a sales agent for the Japanese goods 
displayed there. Masuda initially objected to the order, arguing that a Paris branch office 
would be too expensive for the company to maintain. To convince Masuda to cooperate, the 
Meiji government granted Mitsui exclusive rights to sell high quality raw silk from the 
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government run Tomioka filature and offered the company a 300,000 yen interest free loan to 
obtain the necessary foreign currency to conduct trading operations. Masuda agreed to the 
conditions, and the Mitsui Trading Company opened up a Paris branch office immediately 
after the exhibition.
261
  
 The Meiji government also encouraged Mitsui Trading’s expansion into London. 
Ensuring that Japan would have some commercial foothold in the world’s most important 
financial market was a high priority for the Meiji leaders. Still worried about paying off 
Japan’s foreign loans, government officials thought that the quickest and easiest way to do so 
would be to pay off the debts by increasing exports to Britain. After 1876 Mitsui Trading 
took over the small import and export business that the Ministry of Finance had created in 
London several years beforehand.
262
 The company worked closely with the government to 
manage the shipment and sale of Japanese products in London, primarily rice, to help retire 
Japanese bonds.
263
  
 Beyond simply paying off the bonds, the presence of a Japanese firm in London 
promised to be extremely useful for the Meiji government. By using Mitsui’s services to 
obtain foreign currency and import goods, Japanese officials could avoid having to pay high 
fees to foreign mercantile firms. A direct link between Tokyo and London also promised to 
undermine foreign domination of Japan’s trade by allowing Japanese firms to access the 
London financial discount market. For the Mitsui Trading Company, a presence in London 
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opened up a portal to an important European market and gave the firm a foothold in an 
important center of world commerce. 
 Mitsui also established offices in New York, Lyon, and Milan, all at the government’s 
request. The New York office provided foreign currency exchange services for Japanese 
businessmen seeking to repatriate profits earned by selling goods on the New York market. 
Consular officials had been performing these duties for Japanese merchants in the area, but 
the duties were transferred to Mitsui’s branch office. The branch offices in Lyon and Milan 
encouraged the export of silkworm eggs to the French and Italian markets where, due to 
occasional outbreaks of silkworm blight, demand was strong. The Lyon and Milan offices 
also served as information gathering centers which would report movements in the Italian 
and French silk markets.
264
  
 During the first few years of Mitsui’s life, the company served as a general 
commercial agent for the government which expanded largely at official’s request. The firm, 
however, was not a helpless pawn of the government. Masuda was able to extract 
concessions from the government and the company would never have acquiesced to 
government demands if there was no potential to profit from those ventures. Yet the 
relationship demonstrated the growing interdependence between political merchants and the 
government. The Mitsui Trading Company willingly followed government suggestions 
because doing so was a relatively inexpensive way to expand. The government increasingly 
looked to the Mitsui Trade Company to aid it in the implementation of national trade policy. 
This mutually dependent relationship between the Mitsui Trading Company and the 
government can best be seen in the case of Japanese coal exports. 
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 It is oddly appropriate that coal, the dirty mineral fuel that powered the steamships 
that brought Western traders to the Far East, which also served as primary motor for the 
growth of Japan’s premier international trading company. Although not widely known for 
being richly endowed with natural resources, Japan was nevertheless an important source of 
coal for ships travelling in East Asian waters. Rich coal deposits in Kyūshū and Hokkaidō 
provided a cheap source of fuel for Western shipping. Realizing the commercial potential of 
these coal deposits, foreign firms attempted to buy mining rights in Japan only to be rebuffed 
by the Meiji government which effectively banned all foreign investment in the country in 
1873.
265
 Instead the Meiji government itself set out to develop Japan’s coal industry. 
Although officials could easily set up modern coal mining operations in Japan, marketing the 
coal produced in government owned mines proved a different issue altogether.  
 According to Masuda Takashi, the Meiji government first approached the Mitsui 
Trading Company about selling government produced coal in early 1876. Itō Hirobumi, then 
the head of the Ministry of Industry (Kōbushō) and later to become Japan’s first prime 
minister, proposed to make the Mitsui Trade Company the exclusive sales agent for coal 
from the government run Miike coal mine in Kyūshū.266 Not one to pass up an opportunity, 
Masuda soon agreed to make the Mitsui Trading Company the sales agent for government 
coal in return for receiving a low fixed price on the purchase of coal from the Miike mine. 
Mitsui shipped the coal to the nearby port city of Nagasaki for sale to foreign shippers.
267
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 The Mitsui Trading Company’s coal business got off to a good start and by 1877 the 
company was rapidly expanding.
268
 Masuda was soon contemplating a new deal with the 
government to expand his company’s coal business abroad. During his time in Shanghai 
when he was still attempting to negotiate a Japanese loan for the Chinese government, he hit 
upon the idea of shipping coal to Shanghai.
269
 Smelling an opportunity for profit, Masuda 
appealed to two top officials, Ōkuma Shigenobu, the Minister of Finance, and Inoue Karoru, 
the Mitsui family’s trusted advisor and friend in government, asking for a renegotiation of his 
company’s contract with the government. Citing the development of coal mines in China 
which might soon compete with Japanese coal, the petition argued that the immediate and 
aggressive expansion of Japanese coal exports to China was essential to the survival of 
Japan’s coal mining industry. To accomplish this expansion, Mitsui proposed a scheme that 
included a sizable, long-term government loan to fund the company’s sales business in China. 
The government was also to provide transport of coal from the Miike mines to the nearest 
domestic port facilities for shipment abroad and provide Mitsui a commission fee for its 
services in selling government coal. Mitsui would repay the loan gradually by using profits 
gained from the sale of coal; any profits left over from coal sales after making regular loan 
payments would go into a general fund to cover any losses from dips in the price of coal.
270
 
 The plan appealed to the Meiji government for several reasons. Coal exports 
promised to help plug Japan’s persistent trade deficits and bring in much needed hard 
currency. An exclusive contract also helped to keep the government operated mine minimally 
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profitable and ensure that it would not become a fiscal burden. Having a private company 
plan logistics and assume the risks in arranging for the sale of Miike coal also relieved public 
officials of the unwelcome task of having to manage such matters themselves. The 
government agreed to Masuda’s proposal and promised to provide the Mitsui Trading 
Company with coal for the Miike mine at the low cost of 1 yen 50 sen per ton.
271
 In addition, 
the Meiji government would provide the company a 2.5% commission fee for all sales and 
split the profits from all sales. A government loan of 12,500 yen enabled Mitsui to purchase 
land in Shanghai to store coal shipments and an additional 12,000 yen in loans went toward 
the purchase of cargo ships to transport coal to Shanghai. Mitsui gained the use of a 
government owned ship for the transport of coal.
272
  
 Backed by generous government support, Mitsui’s trade in coal soon became a key 
source of revenue for the company. In 1877 coal exports accounted for a tiny amount of 
4,834 yen out of a total income of 294,000 yen. By 1881 coal trading accounted for slightly 
less than one sixth of the company’s profits (64, 357 yen out of a total of 355, 746 yen).273 
The contract between the government and the Mitsui Trading Company gave the firm a 
steady and reliable source of income in a turbulent marketplace. Thus the coal trade played a 
key role in maintaining the company’s bottom line. More importantly, however, coal played 
a vital role in giving Mitsui Bussan a foothold in the Chinese market. Without a steady profit 
from coal exports, the company’s Shanghai office might have suffered the fate of other 
Mitsui branch offices which folded in the early 1880s. With steady profits, the Shanghai 
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office could continue to operate and provide information on developments and future 
opportunities in the Chinese market.  
 
Mitsui: merchant capital and foreign trade 
 The experiences of Mitsui and the Mitsui Trading Company in the first decade of the 
Meiji era revealed a great deal about commercial policy and the relationship between 
merchant capital and the state in Meiji Japan. Mitsui and the Meiji state became intimately 
intertwined, because both Mitsui and the Meiji government needed one another. The Meiji 
government needed the mercantile expertise of the house of Mitsui and its commercial 
network to help manage tax collection and assist in the economic management of the nation. 
Later, the Meiji government also looked to Mitsui to serve as the commercial agent of the 
state, assisting government officials in repayment of debts and other overseas transactions. In 
the process, the Meiji government hoped to transform Mitsui into a national champion which 
would replace foreign firms as a major force in Japan’s overseas trade.  
 For its part, Mitsui saw close ties to the government as a way to survive and thrive in 
an uncertain economic environment. Mitsui sought out a close relationship to the Meiji 
government because working as the government’s commercial agent offered stable profits at 
a time when other lines of Mitsui’s business were confronting increasing competitive 
pressures as the result of economic liberalization. Mitsui was willing to create a trading arm 
and actively engage in overseas commerce because doing so was necessary to maintain good 
relations with its prime customer, the Meiji state, and also because engaging in foreign trade-
-especially when such activity was heavily subsidized by the state, as in the case of Mitsui’s 
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coal exports--presented the possibility of profits and growth. Mitsui became an instrument of 
the state because doing so promised to be lucrative. 
 Although the Mitsui Trading Company would eventually become a powerful 
mercantile firm that would one day replace foreign firms as a dominant force in Japan’s 
overseas trade, ironically the company did not play a leading role in the direct trade 
movement. The Mitsui Trading Company was not founded as a direct trading company, nor 
did it ever declare the promotion of direct trade to be a central aim of the company. Direct 
trade for the Mitsui Trading Company was never anything more than a business strategy. If 
shipping and selling goods directly in foreign markets promised to be lucrative, the Mitsui 
Trading Company would pursue direct trade. If the risks seemed to outweigh the rewards, the 
Mitsui Company was happy to operate within the confines of the domestic Japanese market. 
 The establishment of foreign branch offices and Mitsui’s involvement in the coal 
trade are prime examples of the firm’s approach to direct trade as a business strategy. Mitsui 
opened almost all of its foreign branches as a result of direct orders from the Meiji 
government only after extracting concessions from the officials to ensure the foreign 
branches would prove profitable. Mitsui’s trade in coal was an opportunistic effort to engage 
in direct trade for profit. When the Mitsui Trading Company’s manager, Masuda Takashi, 
saw promise in coal exports to China, he successfully managed to talk the government into 
giving his company a sweetheart deal, it would give the company access to cheap 
government produced coal which would provide a relatively risk free profit stream for the 
firm. This pragmatic attitude toward trade would differ markedly from that of producers in 
Japan’s indigenous industries who wanted to restructure the entire export system in Japan.  
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Rural Producers and the Silk Trade: Hoshino Chōtarō and Arai Ryōichirō 
 Mercantile enterprises like Mitsui were an important part of the Meiji economy, but 
such enterprises were by no means representative of Japanese business as a whole.  
Consisting of a small number of well connected “insider” firms whose profits derived from 
their ability to secure lucrative work from the government, the Meiji era firms like Mitsui 
were an important but nevertheless tiny minority. At the dawn of the Meiji era, the 
overwhelming majority of Japanese businesses were small and medium sized firms most of 
which were located in rural Japan and managed by local elites. Despite their smaller size and 
location, these rural entrepreneurs were to play a crucial role in Japan’s economy. They 
produced the silk, tea, and other agricultural commodities that formed the backbone of 
Japan’s export trade and propelled the nation’s economic growth. 
 These rural enterprises differed from their larger mercantile cousins in several 
important ways. Compared to political merchants, rural entrepreneurs had a much more 
tenuous and ambivalent relationship with the state. The new regime swept away Tokugawa 
era restrictions that had stifled rural entrepreneurial activity and enacted new policies to 
encourage rural industry.
274
 At the same time, the true concern of the Meiji leaders was 
always the development of modern industries.
275
 The role of rural industry in their minds was 
to provide a taxable economic surplus to subsidize state projects in the construction of a 
modern manufacturing economy. The Meiji state was therefore less willing to grant the type 
of generous state support it showed to firms like Mitsui.  
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 Rural entrepreneurs also had a different relationship to the market. During the 
Tokugawa period most rural merchants and producers lay at the bottom rung of distribution 
chains controlled by wholesaler merchants (ton’ya) like Mitsui based in Japan’s major urban 
markets of Edo, Ōsaka, and Kyōto. Although the urban wholesalers’ dominance eroded as 
rural merchants began to bring products from their home territories directly to the large urban 
markets, most rural producers and merchants still largely depended on urban based 
merchants as a source of capital and for arranging the sale of their goods.
276
 After the 
opening of Japan to unrestricted commerce, a small group of Yokohama based wholesalers, 
known as export merchants (urikomishō or urikomi ton’ya), eventually came to dominate the 
silk and tea trades. Rural entrepreneurs were also more exposed to the vagaries of the world 
market. Because they were active in the export trade where the unequal treaties effectively 
banned intervention by the Japanese government, rural entrepreneurs could only receive 
indirect support from the Meiji state. Hence rural entrepreneurs were more independent of 
the state.  
 One of the most successful small scale entrepreneurs in the early Meiji period was the 
silk trading business of Hoshino Chōtarō and his brother Arai Ryōichirō. The two brothers’ 
enterprise was very different from Mitsui. Having no direct ties to high government officials, 
they received little in the way of special favors from the government, and had to rely on their 
own wits and initiative to survive. Like the Mitsui Trading Company, Hoshino and his 
younger brother were some of the first Japanese to directly engage in foreign trade, yet their 
story reveals a very different picture of the business-government relationship in the Meiji 
period. 
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Rural Elites in Crisis: the Hoshino family and the end of the Tokugawa bakufu 
 The Hoshinos were a family of “wealthy farmers” (gōnō) from Mizunuma, a village 
located north of Edo in a region that was under the direct rule of the Tokugawa bakufu. The 
family rose from relatively humble origins in the beginning of the Tokugawa era to become 
one of the wealthiest and most powerful peasant households in their immediate region. Like 
many other wealthy peasant households of the early modern period, the Hoshino family’s 
fortune derived from a wide variety of entrepreneurial activities. Years of successful farming 
allowed the family to acquire large land holdings and branch out from agriculture to become 
landlords, moneylenders, and pawnbrokers.
277
 The Hoshinos also became involved in the 
production of raw silk, which was a vital side industry for peasant households in the area.
278
 
By enlisting the labor of the tenants living on their land and utilizing a putting-out system, 
the Hoshinos manufactured silk thread which they then sold to silk cloth weavers.
279
  
 Although still technically commoners the family had a close relationship with 
Tokugawa bakufu authorities and gained a level of social prestige roughly equivalent to that 
of members of the samurai elite. In 1667 the Hoshinos were made hereditary headmen of 
their village by the Tokugawa bakufu.
280
 A series of other important official appointments 
from the bakufu soon followed, including an order making the Hoshinos supervisors of the 
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Ashio copper mine.
281
  In 1816 the head of the Hoshino household was awarded the privilege 
of use of a surname and the right to carry a sword, privileges normally reserved for 
samurai.
282
 These new privileges made the Hoshino household hereditary magistrates in 
charge of tax collection and maintenance of law and order of the area surrounding 
Mizunuma.
283
 Like the Mitsuis the Hoshinos were very much part of the old regime, albeit, a 
much less prominent component of that ruling system.  
 Despite their wealth and status, however, members of the Hoshino family faced a 
myriad of challenges in the nineteenth century. The connections with the bakufu that brought 
the family prestige and social status proved to have serious hidden economic costs as the 
Tokugawa regime spiraled into terminal decline. As the bakufu’s finances spun out of control, 
it compelled the Hoshino family to contribute financial and other resources to the bakufu 
with increasing frequency. In the 1830s, the government ordered the head of the Hoshino 
household, together with another wealthy farmer from the region, to donate a large amount of 
lumber to Edo Castle for repairs after a devastating fire. Procuring the lumber and 
transporting it to Edo cost the two men over 5,000 ryō, a considerable sum.284 The outbreak 
of the Tempō famine in the same decade dealt the family another powerful blow. To quell 
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unrest among its tenants and other local peasants the Hoshinos forgave many debts owed to 
them and reduced the rents they charged their tenants.
285
  
 The near fatal blow to the family finances came during the Restoration struggle in 
1868. The head of the Hoshino household was held hostage by rebel troops who suspected 
him of providing financial and moral support for pro-Tokugawa forces.
286
 Securing his 
release may have required the family to pay a hefty ransom of over 2,000 ryō.287 This was a 
significant sum for even for a wealthy family of local notables like the Hoshinos .The 
collapse of the Tokugawa regime shortly thereafter was a further setback, as the family had 
to write off loans extended to local bakufu officials.
288
  Family finances became so tenuous 
that the Hoshinos themselves borrowed from others to stay afloat.
289
 For a brief time, the 
family relied on the income of their eldest son, Hoshino Chōtarō, who became the chief 
accountant for the new local government in 1869. After only a year, however, he resigned his 
post to assume the headship of the Hoshino household from his ageing father. The family 
expected Chōtarō to concentrate his full energies on helping the family to get back on its 
feet.
290
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Hoshino Chotarō and the Early Meiji Silk Industry 
 As the newly installed head of the household, Hoshino Chōtarō’s biggest challenge 
was to find a way to revive the family fortunes. Family members agreed that the first step to 
revive their fortunes was to divide responsibility for their various entrepreneurial activities. 
Chōtarō would dedicate his full energies to farming while his younger brother, Shūjirō, 
would manage saké brewing, money lending and other family businesses.
291
 After dedicating 
himself exclusively to agriculture for a few years, however, Chōtarō decided that raw silk 
production offered a better chance to restore the family’s former prosperity. Given his 
family’s history and the context of the times, Chōtarō’s decision made perfect sense. The 
Hoshinos had long experience in the silk trade. They had been producing raw silk for decades, 
and the silk of their region was famous for its high quality.  More importantly, the silk 
industry was expanding rapidly at the time, thanks to Japan’s booming export trade in raw 
silk.  
 Hoshino Chōtarō may have also drawn inspiration from new developments in Japan’s 
silk industry after the Meiji Restoration. When Japan’s ports were opened to foreign trade, 
raw silk production was still a handicraft industry. All raw silk was reeled by hand either in 
peasant households as part of a putting out system or in small rural establishments. As raw 
silk exports began to increase, foreign silk buyers sought to improve the quality of Japanese 
silk by disseminating knowledge of Western silk reeling technology to producers. Daimyō 
and merchants in silk producing regions also began to consider adopting Western 
mechanized silk reeling technology as a way of improving the quality of locally produced 
silk. The daimyō of Maebashi, a domain located nearby Hoshino Chōtarō’s home in 
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Mizunuma, carried out the first successful experiments with mechanized silk reeling. With 
the assistance of a Swiss silk reeling expert, Hayami Kensō, a retainer of Maebashi, built a 
small mechanized filature in the domain.
 292
 Although Hayami’s filature turned only a modest 
profit, it proved that mechanized reeling could produce a superior product capable of fetching 
a handsome price from Western buyers. Chōtarō determined that his family should set up its 
own mechanized silk filature.
293
 
 To acquire the necessary technical knowledge to build his own silk filature, Hoshino 
traveled to Maebashi to see the new filature and consult with Hayami Kensō. For the next 
several months Hoshino worked under Hayami as an apprentice in the filature in order to 
study and familiarize himself with the new silk reeling technology.
294
  He was not the only 
person to do so. As soon as news of the Maebashi experiment spread, a number of merchants 
and retainers from other domains traveled to Maebashi to inspect the factory.
295
 
 After several months in Maebashi, Hoshino’s next step was to build his own 
mechanized filature back in Mizunuma. His main challenge was to find the necessary 
financing. Hoshino first borrowed some 1,000 yen from Hayami Kensō who was now 
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serving as both an investor and advisor.
296
 Then in November 1874 he began to lobby the 
local prefectural authorities for a loan. In a letter to one official, Kawase Hideji, Hoshino 
argued that silk production was a pillar of the regional economy but that the quality of local 
raw silk suffered because of outdated hand reeling methods. Hoshino promised that his 
business would serve as a model which other entrepreneurs would seek to emulate, thus 
helping to improve the quality of locally produced silk by encouraging the diffusion of 
mechanized silk reeling.
297
 He requested a 3,000 yen loan to help pay for the construction 
costs of a silk filature.  
 The local government was hesitant to issue a loan. Officials had concerns about the 
viability of Hoshino’s proposals and feared the political fallout that might occur if they 
extended loans to a business that proved unsuccessful.
298
 Nevertheless, the government 
eventually agreed to loan Hoshino 3,000 yen in 1874, after Hoshino had already invested 
some 6,000 yen in the construction of his water powered silk reeling factory in Mizunuma 
and had already opened the filature for business.
299
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 While he received significant support from local authorities, Hoshino also bet a 
significant portion of his family’s diminished fortune on the success of his silk factory.300 
Indeed, he had built one of the best factories money could buy. When his factory opened in 
1874, its 32 silk reeling machines made it the biggest silk filature in the prefecture.
301
 At the 
same time Hoshino had underestimated the complexities of the business. Hoshino faced great 
difficulty in securing the necessary female labor. In a society in which the idea of factory 
work was still novel, convincing local women to leave their homes to work in the factory 
proved extremely difficult and Hoshino was forced to scour the country for workers. He 
eventually recruited women from the remote northern island of Hokkaidō by offering them 
higher than average wages. In addition to the difficulties in securing labor, the new silk 
reeling machinery did not operate as Hoshino wished. Because several technical bugs in the 
reeling machinery had to be fixed before full scale production could begin, costly delays in 
production resulted.
302
 
 
Government loans and the Model Entrepreneur 
 Delays and complications did nothing to improve Hoshino’s financial situation. By 
the middle of 1875, Hoshino was once again petitioning the government for a loan to keep 
his silk filature in business. This time, Hoshino requested a 5,000 yen loan to operate his silk 
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filature until his business started generating profits.
303
 This time prefectural officials 
forwarded the request to Ministry of the Interior. There Ōkubo Toshimichi approved the 
release of 5,000 yen as a loan.
304
 
 Ōkubo approved the loan, because he believed that supporting Hoshino’s business 
would contribute to the improvement of the quality of local silks. In a letter to the nominal 
head of the Meiji government, Prince Sanjō Sanetomi, Ōkubo noted the importance of silk as 
one of the, “unique products of our country,” (honpō koyū no meisan) and argued the loan to 
Hoshino’s factory would help encourage the production of high quality silks.305 It appears 
that Ōkubo accepted Hoshino’s argument that his factory would present a positive example 
for silk producers in the region which would encourage the diffusion of superior raw silk 
production techniques. Much as the model factories the Meiji government was constructing 
to facilitate technology transfer of advanced production techniques and inspire private 
industry to adopt new innovations, Hoshino was to serve as the government’s model 
entrepreneur. 
 Ōkubo wished not only to build an industrial economy by importing Western 
techniques of mechanized production, but he also wanted to create a new kind of Japanese 
entrepreneur. This desire is clear in his writings on economic policy. In a memorandum 
addressed to Prince Sanjō in 1874, Ōkubo argued that in terms of geography and natural 
resources, Japan was almost identical to Britain, but lacked Britain’s economic might and 
dynamism only because “…the spirit of our people is weak,” (wagakokujin kishō usujaku 
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naru).
306
 In other writings on direct trade Ōkubo was particularly critical of Japan’s 
entrepreneurs who he saw as obsessed with short term profits, risk averse and fundamentally 
unable to compete with foreign business.
307Ōkubo hoped for the eventual emergence of an 
entrepreneurial class similar to the one he believed existed in Britain which was ready to 
assume any risk and journey to the farthest corners of the globe in pursuit of profit.  
 While there is only circumstantial evidence to suggest that Ōkubo saw in Hoshino the 
ideal adventurous entrepreneur that he hoped would emerge, the generous support the central 
government gave to Hoshino suggests it hoped that Hoshino would serve as a positive role 
model for modern Japanese businessmen. Ōkubo clearly believed that Hoshino’s factory 
would play a vital role in encouraging quality improvements in local silk manufacture. The 
failure of one of Japan’s first mechanized silk reeling factories would send the message that 
investing in modern production techniques was too risky. Therefore Hoshino’s venture had to 
succeed in order to ensure other silk producers would be willing to set up their own 
mechanized filatures.   
  
Selling Silk: the market structure of the early Meiji silk industry 
 While securing financing and getting his filature up and running presented significant 
difficulties, the real challenge for Hoshino proved to be disposing of the raw silk he produced. 
The booming demand for silk on the world market did not always translate into profits for 
silk producers.  They were prevented from capturing the full value of the fruits of their labor 
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by a hierarchically organized distribution system that was full of middlemen and dominated 
by foreign merchant houses. 
The production and merchandizing of silk in the 1870s consisted of several different 
layers. At the bottom were the silkworm cultivators in small farm households that engaged in 
sericulture to supplement household income. Sericulture was a convenient side business for 
farm families in that it was labor intensive and only required a minimal amount of capital and 
land. Because the work of tending silkworms did not require a great deal of physical strength, 
women along with older and younger members of the household could help.
308
 The low 
barriers to participation in sericulture meant that small producers were predominant.  In 1899 
an estimated 1.35 million rural households (1 out of every 4) in Japan raised silkworms.
309
 
The prevalence of numerous small producers meant that individual farm households 
possessed little bargaining power when selling silk cocoons. The large number of producers 
also made any sort of collective action or regulation of the silk industry at this level difficult. 
Silk reelers occupied the next rung of the silk industry. They turned the silk cocoons 
into silk thread.  This process involved boiling the cocoons to loosen the silk strands and then 
putting the strands through a reeling machine to make uniform thread. Most silk reeling 
occurred in individual peasant households either as part of a putting out system organized by 
a local silk merchant who provided the raw material or on an independent basis with a 
household using silkworm cocoons that it raised. The use of small hand operated reels 
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(dokuri, tembiki, zaguri) was the norm.
310
 The appearance of mechanized factories in 1870s 
began to change the nature of reeling. By then farm households were starting to focus on just 
selling cocoons directly to the agents of the factories which then processed the cocoons to 
produce raw silk.
311
 
Mechanization of silk reeling, however, caused new problems. The main headache for 
silk reelers was mobilizing the necessary capital to purchase their raw materials. Purchasing 
cocoons accounted for roughly 80% of the total costs of production.
312
 Because of the short 
life cycle of the silk worm and the seasonal nature of cocoon production, the reelers had to 
cram all their purchases of cocoons into two relatively brief periods during the months of 
May and June and again in July through September. The short time frame for securing raw 
materials meant that reelers had to obtain huge amounts of capital in a short period of time. 
Because most reelers did not possess large reserves of capital, they needed outside sources of 
funding in the form of loans during the critical cocoon purchasing seasons.
 313
 Hence those 
who could provide these loans were able to exercise a powerful influence over the output of 
silk.  
Two different types of merchants acted as the financiers of the silk trade. At the local 
level were silk dealers (ninushi) who purchased raw silk from reelers and sold it in 
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Yokohama, the port city that became the center of Japan’s silk export trade.314 In areas where 
the putting-out system or small scale silk reeling was still predominant, silk dealers provided 
loans for reelers to buy silkworm eggs or purchase cocoons.
315
 Mechanized silk filatures 
tended to handle the purchase of raw materials themselves, but up until the latter 1880s when 
the spread of rail transport and telegraphic communication links made them largely 
redundant in the silk trade, silk dealers still played an important role as middle men linking 
rural silk producers with silk merchants in Yokohama. 
  Above these shippers were the Yokohama export merchants (urikomishō). They 
collected silk from regional silk producers and silk merchants and sold it to foreign 
mercantile houses that purchased silk for export. For the domestic producers the Yokohama 
export merchants served a vital role by financing the production of silk. They loaned large 
amounts of capital to either local silk merchants or even directly to mechanized silk reelers in 
the various regions of Japan for their purchases of cocoons.
316
 In return for providing loans, 
the export merchants demanded exclusive rights to sell silk from individual reelers or 
shippers.
317
 As early as 1873 roughly 80% of the silk export trade was carried out through the 
export merchants.
318
 The export merchants worked on a commission basis. After selling the 
silk, the commission merchant would then subtract the amount of the original loan along with 
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a commission fee and send whatever profits remained from the sale to the reeler or 
shipper.
319
 
Foreign mercantile houses based in Yokohama, however dominated the silk industry. 
They purchased silk from the export merchants, shipped it abroad (usually back to their home 
markets) and sold it to consumers in the West. In other words, foreign merchants served as 
the final intermediaries between Western markets and Japan. Backed by large capital 
reserves of foreign banks and enjoying the support of Western commercial networks, 
foreigners exerted the most influence on the silk trade. Since no Japanese entrepreneur or 
firm sold raw silk directly to Western markets, foreign merchants effectively had a chokehold 
on exports. Only the ban in the unequal treaties on foreign economic activity in Japan’s 
interior prevented total foreign domination of Japan’s silk sector and made the existence of 
the Yokohama export merchants possible.
320
  
Foreign merchant houses frequently used their market power to their own advantage. 
The most common complaints from Japanese silk merchants and producers leveled against 
foreign merchants pertained to disputes over the quality of silk. All foreign mercantile 
establishments required that Japanese merchants deliver raw silk stocks to their warehouses 
for inspection before finalizing any sale.
321
 In part this practice stemmed from legitimate 
concerns about the quality of Japanese silk. More often than not, however, foreign merchants 
would use the inspection as an excuse to delay the final sale until they could gain information 
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about the movements of silk markets in Europe and America. If prices in consumer markets 
proved to be too low, foreign merchants would send the silk back to export merchants with 
the excuse that the silk did not meet necessary quality standards.
322
 Such abuses strengthened 
arguments in Japan for the need to establish stronger domestic control over the silk industry. 
The structure of the silk trade was also a major cause of concern for Japan’s elite. The 
low value added nature of silk exports and the failure of Japanese industry to gain control of 
the distribution of the product signaled deeper weaknesses in Japan’s economy in the eyes of 
the nation’s leaders and intellectuals. For critics, the operation of the silk trade symbolized 
everything that was wrong with the state of Japan’s trade in the treaty port of Yokohama and 
in the activities of the foreign trading houses and their Japanese co-conspirators, the 
Yokohama export merchants.  
Yet the Western powers frustrated Japanese attempts to regulate the silk industry. In 
1873 a government order to submit all silk to inspection by government officials met swift 
and strong opposition from Western diplomats.
323
 Japanese leaders hoped that a government 
certification of the quality of silk shipments would allay the concerns of Western traders and 
deny them a convenient pretext to abrogate contracts at will. The Western powers claimed, 
however, that the inspection system acted as a barrier to the unrestricted commerce 
guaranteed by the unequal treaties. The dispute ended with a return to the status quo.
324
 After 
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the 1873 experiment, the Meiji government essentially abandoned any further attempts to 
establish control over the silk industry. 
Hoshino Chōtarō’s story exemplifies many of the difficulties domestic silk producers 
faced in the hierarchically organized silk trading system dominated by Yokohama export 
merchants and foreign trading houses. Once silk production was well underway at his factory 
in Mizunuma, he began seeking a profitable outlet for this raw silk. He entrusted his first 
shipment of raw silk to a local silk dealer who ended up selling the silk at a loss to an export 
merchant in Yokohama. The dealer informed Hoshino that while the quality of factory’s silk 
earned high praise, the factory was not producing enough volume to make sales profitable.
325
 
Shocked by his failure to turn a profit and determined to keep his business afloat, Hoshino 
tried selling his silk directly to foreign merchants in Yokohama in order to eliminate the high 
commission fees shippers and the Yokohama export merchants usually demanded from him. 
He eventually managed to find an English merchant willing to give him a good price for his 
silk, but Hoshino was dismayed to discover that he still ended up selling at a loss after he 
subtracted the costs of transporting the silk to Yokohama from his gross profits.
326
 
These initial losses were no small matter for the Hoshino family. The Mizunuma silk 
factory’s operating costs were close to 4,000 yen per year, double the total income the 
Hoshino family earned from all its other business activities.
327
 As a producer of raw silk, 
Hoshino had reason to be dissatisfied with the hierarchical nature of the silk trade. The 
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commission fees charged by local merchants and the Yokohama based export merchants cut 
into his potential profits, robbing him of the desperately needed cash that might keep his 
business afloat. Because he earned only a fraction of the true value that his raw silk fetched, 
Hoshino struggled to keep his business afloat by seeking funds from relatives, lobbying the 
government for low interest industrial loans, and accepting several high interest loans from 
local banks.
328
  
With debts piling up and the promise of a profitable operating year still out of sight, 
Hoshino caught wind of reports of a wide gap between domestic raw silk prices in Japan and 
the prices in the growing silk market of New York. Confident that the quality of his factory 
produced silk would be highly attractive to New York buyers, Hoshino seized on the idea of 
selling his silk directly to on the New York market. By bypassing the export merchants and 
foreign trading houses in Yokohama and selling directly to buyers in the West, Hoshino 
could, in theory, capitalize on the large price differential, capture more profits for his wares 
and save his filature from bankruptcy.  
Hoshino looked to his younger brother, Arai Ryōichirō, to aid in his plans. Hoshino 
has already begun to groom his younger sibling for a career in international business. 
Hoshino not only paid for Arai’s schooling in English, but also encouraged his brother to 
learn as much about Western business methods as possible. Hoshino had high hopes that his 
brother would be an asset in negotiations with foreign merchants. Now Hoshino began to 
entertain a bolder vision for Arai’s future in marketing the family’s silk in New York City. 
Yet there was no easy way for Hoshino to avoid the Yokohama traders and export his silk 
directly to foreign markets. He lacked contacts and the necessary knowledge to expand 
abroad. 
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Luckily for Hoshino fortune would soon come to his aid. A broad movement arose in 
Japan in the mid-1870s that reflected dissatisfaction with the unequal treaties and a popular 
desire for treaty revision and equality with the Western powers. This movement was not only 
concerned with improving Japan’s legal status through abolishing extraterritoriality but also 
sought to reclaim Japan’s “commercial rights” (shōken).  In addition, the dire economic 
circumstances in the wake of the collapse of the houses of Ono and Shimada made trade and 
economic issues become a subject of increasing concern among Japanese intellectuals. 
Popular agitation for a more muscular foreign policy and the revision of the unequal treaties 
also drew attention to economic issues. Economic nationalists wanted to sweep away the 
unequal treaties because they prevented Japan from raising tariffs to protect domestic 
industries. At the same time, advocates of economic protection were wary of re-negotiating 
the unequal treaties because doing so might require Japan to abolish restrictions on foreign 
travel and investment in Japan’s interior and allow for “mixed residence” (naichi zakkyo).  
 In 1875 a group of prominent figures in the Tōkyō business community banded together to 
fund the creation of a new commercial academy, the Short Term Commercial School (Shōhō 
Kōshujo) in Tōkyō. It opened as the first step in a plan to create a business college that would 
educate a new breed of Japanese entrepreneur well versed in Western business techniques 
and thus equipped to challenge foreign merchant dominance of Japan’s international trade. 
The idea for founding a commercial school was originally hatched by Minister of Education 
Mori Arinori who reportedly struck on the idea after a visit to Bryant, Stratton and Whitney 
Business College in Newark, New Jersey in 1872. Mori was so impressed with the director of 
the school, William C. Whitney, that Mori immediately offered Whitney a generous five year 
contract to set up a similar school in Japan. 
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Unfortunately, Mori had overstepped the authority of his post. He had not bothered to 
obtain prior approval for his plan from the government and the Council of State refused to 
fund the school. Bereft of public funds, Mori issued an appeal to wealthy citizens in Tōkyō to 
donate to the school.
329
 It promised to give students practical instruction in Western business 
methods, knowledge that would be invaluable to any aspiring trader. Hoshino quickly had his 
younger brother enroll so that he could study accounting and basic economics.
330
 
The same year Satō Momotarō, an ambitious young man who had left Japan to study 
in the United States and had opened up a small shop in New York selling Japanese sundry 
goods, made a widely publicized return to Japan. Satō announced that he had returned to 
Japan with the express aim of finding recruits to work as apprentice shopkeepers in his New 
York store. He consulted with Fukuzawa Yukichi, a prominent journalist and intellectual 
who helped create the commercial school, to identify potential recruits from the school. 
Fukuzawa referred Satō to Hayami Kensō, Hoshino’s mentor in the silk business. Hayami 
told Satō about Hoshino and his desire to start exporting silk directly to foreign markets. A 
conference between Satō, Hayami, and Hoshino a few days later sealed a bargain. Satō 
agreed to take Hoshino’s younger brother Arai Ryōichirō as an apprentice in his shop so that 
Arai could gain practical business experience in America. Hoshino, however, had more 
ambitious plans for his younger brother.
 331
 Hoshino entrusted Arai with a skein of silk from 
the Mizunuma factory so that in his spare time he could take the sample of silk to New 
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York’s silk merchants and convince them to place a direct order for raw silk to Hoshino’s 
factory. 
When Arai in early 1876 departed for America along with Satō and 4 other young 
men Hoshino had finally begun to make progress in his plans to establish direct links to 
foreign markets. Soon after his arrival in New York, Arai began visiting New York silk 
merchants to find an interested buyer of Hoshino’s silk. Although initially unsuccessful, by 
May Arai had finally made a sale. He signed a contract with a prominent New York silk 
merchant for the delivery of raw silk directly from the Mizunuma factory to New York. Arai 
had contracted to sell the silk for $6.50 per pound, but between the time the contract was 
signed and the time the goods were ready for shipment some months later, the price of silk 
had risen dramatically due to news of a new silkworm blight outbreak in Europe. Hoshino 
begged his younger brother to re-negotiate the contract, but Arai refused and delivered the 
silk shipment at the originally agreed upon price. Hoshino ended up swallowing a $2,000 
loss.
332
 The real value of the deal, however, did not lie in the temporary monetary losses it 
incurred or gains it might have wrought. Through his solid commitment to keep to his word, 
Arai gained considerable recognition in New York as a reputable businessman and square 
dealer. This reputation helped ensure that many orders would come in the future. In the 
coming months Hoshino’s factory was busy filling orders for New York buyers and within a 
short time the Hoshino brother’s business was finally beginning to prosper. 
 
Conclusion 
 If the experience of the Mitsui TradingCompany and the Hoshino brothers in 1870s 
demonstrates anything it is the fact that the motives that informed the Meiji state’s 
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commercial policies were more diverse than is typically recognized. While it is undeniable 
that the Meiji oligarchs were determined to create a rich nation and a strong army, this vague 
commitment to national self-strengthening did not mandate specific commercial policies in 
the 1870s. Instead, commercial policies resulted from a mix of practical needs, officials’ 
desire to encourage economic development through the creation of national champions and 
an ideal entrepreneurial class, and varying state capacity to organize different segments of the 
private sector. 
 The Mitsui Trading Company illustrated how one type of business-state relationship 
shaped commercial policy. As a large and prestigious mercantile firm with a nation-wide 
network of agents and a long history of experience in long distance commerce, Mitsui 
offered the state indispensable help in managing the national economy. Size and experience 
also made Mitsui a natural choice to serve as the government’s commercial agent when the 
government needed to engage in overseas commercial transactions and made the firm an 
obvious candidate for the establishment of a national champion trading firm.  
The case of the Hoshino brothers presents a very different case. Silk production was 
still largely a small scale handicraft industry with numerous firms and individuals, all 
operating independently. Regulation of the industry was difficult if not impossible. 
Government officials not only faced difficulties in attempting to communicate state 
directives to the industry, they could not be certain that those directives would be respected 
even if silk producers did receive them. No potential “national champion” stood out in this 
sector.  
 Instead the Meiji government hoped to encourage change in silk production by setting 
examples that they hoped would be sufficiently attractive to encourage emulation. The 
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government’s model silk filature in Tomioka and the venture of the Hoshino brothers in 
Mizunuma were examples Officials hoped that the Hoshino brothers would become models 
of successful, modern silk producers willing to embrace new methods and challenge foreign 
dominance of overseas trade.  
 If the motives informing the state’s commercial policies were complex, the motives 
of entrepreneurs in becoming willing instruments of state policy also varied considerably. 
Mitsui and its trading arm, the Mitsui Trading Company, forged a close relationship to the 
state and followed government directives to establish foreign branches largely because the 
firm had decided serving as the commercial agent of the state provided the best chance to 
survive and prosper during a period of turbulent economic change. For Mitsui direct trade 
was merely a business strategy to be pursued if it held out the promise of profits, not an end 
to be pursued in itself.  
 For the Hoshino brothers direct trade was, in a sense, also a business strategy, but it 
was also much more. Indeed the Hoshino brothers initially seized on the idea of shipping and 
selling their silk directly in the New York market as a way of capturing a larger share of the 
profits generated by silk sales and saving their business. Yet for Hoshino Chōtarō, who had 
experienced great frustrations in dealing with the network of merchant middlemen who 
dominated Japan’s silk trade, direct trade promised to give him complete independence of 
merchant middlemen and make him master of his own fate. Thus direct trade was not merely 
a business strategy but an end to be pursed. Only through direct trade could Hoshino escape 
the dominance of the merchant class.  
 This difference between the interests of merchant capital and productive 
capital in the direct trade movement would later become a reason for the movement’s failure. 
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Yet in the mid-1870s a clear conflict of interests between merchants and producers had yet to 
emerge. Direct trade was vague idea with that the government only partially sought to realize 
through a series of ad hoc policies. There was no clear theory of direct trade, no 
comprehensive system of policies to promote trade, and no public direct trade movement. It 
would take an economic crisis and an intellectual debate over the nature of foreign trade 
beginning in 1877 to change that circumstance. The crisis and the debate it sparked is the 
subject of the next chapter.
  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: 
Taming the Paper Tiger: the inflation crisis of the 1870s, direct trade, and the debate 
over commerce 
 
 In 1875 and 1876 interest in direct trade gradually increased among Japan’s 
bureaucrats and businessmen.  Yet despite the proclamations of Ōkubo Toshimichi about the 
need to promote direct trade and a few ad hoc policies initiated to assist individual firms and 
businessmen in selling their goods abroad, there was no organized direct trade movement. 
Direct trade was little more than a phrase which expressed vague aspirations about the future 
shape of Japan’s commercial relations with the outside world. There were no overall strategy 
for promoting direct trade and no groups advocating direct trade. The idea of direct trade had 
yet to capture the popular imagination and become a subject of public interest. 
 This situation would start to change in 1877. In that year a major rebellion against the 
Meiji regime broke out in the Southwest region of the country. Although the uprising was 
short-lived, the rebellion plunged the country into an economic crisis. Quelling the rebellion 
required emergency military spending of daunting proportions which the Meiji government 
financed through a combination of massive loans and printing millions of yen of 
inconvertible paper currency. Government debt skyrocketed and the sudden injection of large 
sums of cash into the economy triggered inflation.  By 1878 the declining value of paper
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money bit into the real incomes of government officials and urban dwellers and triggered 
discontent. Japan’s elites agreed on the need to halt inflation and reorder government 
finances.  
 Many informed observers firmly believed that the inflation was caused by the 
recurring foreign trade deficits Japan had experienced almost every year since 1868 and that 
a correct understanding of the relationship between foreign trade deficits and inflation was 
vital to solving the nation’s economic problems. Yet journalists, intellectuals, and 
government officials held conflicting views of about the nature of this relationship. These 
differences of opinion were based on radically different ideas of the nature of international 
trade, its impact on Japan, and the relationship between trade and money. In the midst of 
debates over these issues a coherent theory of direct trade emerged that equated Japan’s 
future prosperity and survival as an independent nation-state with direct trade and the 
recovery of Japan’s “commercial rights.” 
 This chapter will examine the formation of an ideology and coherent program of 
direct trade during the debate over inflation and foreign trade deficits that were later to form 
the basis of a popular movement. To truly understand the viewpoint shared by advocates of 
direct trade it is also necessary to examine both the ideas of direct trade ideologues 
themselves and competing interpretations of the relationship between foreign trade deficits 
and inflation. Analyzing the ideas of journalists, bureaucrats and businessmen regarding the 
question of trade deficits and inflation, this chapter identifies three distinct theories or 
schools of thought regarding foreign trade. 
 The first school is what one can term industrial reformers. They believed that 
inflation stemmed from Japan’s relative industrial underdevelopment. They argued that 
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Japan’s trade deficits caused inflation and that these trade deficits arose because Japan traded 
low-value raw materials for high-value manufactures from the West. In order to balance the 
nation’s trade and halt inflation, Japan needed to thoroughly reform its industrial structure 
and apply industrial policy to nurture modern productive enterprise.  
 Commercial nationalists, the second school, shared the same central assumptions 
about the causes of inflation as industrial reformers, but differed considerably in their view of 
the solution to Japan’s economic problems. Commercial nationalists believed that foreign 
trade deficits were the main cause of inflation but they argued that trade deficits resulted 
from Western merchants’ dominance over Japan’s foreign trade which robbed Japan of the 
full profits generated by its export trade. The solution to ending inflation lay in breaking the 
foreign chokehold over Japan’s international trade through the promotion of direct trade. 
 Economic liberals represented the third school of thought that presented a radically 
different view of the inflation problem. They argued that foreign trade deficits were the result 
of an inflationary monetary policy which raised the domestic price of goods and encouraged 
imports. Halting inflation simply required the government to shrink the money supply. Then, 
Japan’s trade would naturally come into balance. Economic liberals did, however, share 
some of the concerns of commercial nationalists, as they also argued that Japan’s had to 
transform itself into a great commercial nation. 
 By examining the debate between the three different theories of foreign trade and its 
relationship to inflation, this chapter will present a view of the economic debates of the latter 
1870s that is very different from that given in previous studies. The debate over inflation in 
the 1870s is well worn territory, but most studies of the debate have argued that the 
fundamental source of conflict was a disagreement over fiscal and monetary policy between 
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two opposing camps, one advocating so-called “positive” (sekkyokuteki), economic policies 
the other calling for “negative” (shōkyokuteki) economic policies.333 In this scenario, 
“positive policies” suggested expansionary monetary policies designed to spur economic 
development. Advocates of positive policies argued that the government could use a plentiful 
paper currency to subsidize export-oriented industry and invest in the nation’s transportation 
infrastructure to bolster trade. In contrast, “negative polices” emphasized the need for tight 
monetary policy and low levels of government spending to prevent inflation and promote 
healthy economic growth.
334
  
 There are three main problems with this interpretation. First, as most historians 
readily admit, the positions and ideas espoused by participants in debates in the 1870s do not 
readily fit into a simple narrative of a conflict between supporters of positive and negative 
policies. As will soon be clear, even the positions of Ōkuma Shigenobu and Matsukata 
Masayoshi, the two men in the government frequently portrayed as the chief advocates of 
positive and negative policies respectively, do not fit comfortably into either camp. Second, 
to argue that the key economic issues in the 1870s were government spending and monetary 
policy overlooks another subject of fierce controversy in the 1870s, the issue of foreign trade. 
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Too often historians have forgotten that the two key issues of the 1870s were inflation and 
the foreign trade deficit. Finally, even if one could safely assume that the real conflict in the 
1870s was a battle between advocates of positive and negative economic policies, one still 
needs to explain the underlying economic logic that informed both policy stances. To 
understand the conflicting worldviews that informed competing ideological camps in the 
economic debate one must examine ideas about foreign trade and Japan’s place in the world 
economy at the time.  
 The economic crisis of the late 1870s was a formative moment in Japan’s economic 
history and in the development of Meiji economic thought. Studies that examine the impact 
of the experience of inflation and foreign trade deficits on Japanese fiscal and monetary 
policy in that period have done much to broaden our understanding of Meiji economic 
development, but these scholars tell only part of the story. An equally crucial debate took 
place between competing ideas about foreign trade and Japan’s place in the world economy. 
This latter controversy produced the direct trade movement. 
  
Trade Deficits and Inflation 
 As noted above, the years between 1877 and 1881 were a time of economic crisis for 
the Meiji government. Rampant inflation was undermining the value of paper currency and 
gold and silver specie, which was supposed to back the paper money, was scarce. Between 
1877 and 1881 average prices of a range of goods roughly doubled.
335
 This surge included a 
rapid rise in the price of rice, a vital necessity for most of Japan’s population. A single koku 
of rice (roughly 150 kilograms) which traded for 6 yen in 1878 was selling for 11 yen three 
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years later.
336
 With rising prices confidence in the value of paper currency steadily declined 
and the gap between the value of paper and silver widened. Although a one yen note was 
supposed to have a value equivalent to a one yen silver coin, by 1880 it required 1 yen 69 sen 
to purchase a single yen of silver.
337
 The price of silver itself was declining relative to gold 
on international markets which also helped push up the price of imported goods.
338
 
 The inflation in rice prices was a boon to farmers but posed serious economic and 
political problems for the state, as revenues fell in real terms. The land tax reforms 
introduced in 1873 requiring land owners to pay their taxes in cash instead of rice seemed 
like a brilliant innovation at the time, but in the inflationary era of the late 1870s they became 
a burden, because the amount of cash payments were based on fixed assessments of the value 
of land which were not adjusted for inflation.
339
 Inflation also threatened the livelihood of 
Japan’s urban population and all those living on a fixed income.  
 Most historians have traced the beginnings of the inflationary crisis back to the start 
of the Meiji government in 1868.
340
Like most revolutionary regimes, it frequently resorted to 
printing money to fund its activities and in the process unwittingly encouraged inflationary 
tendencies in the economy. Especially during its first few years when it lacked a solid tax 
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base the government relied on printing bills to fund its activities. Its first currency, known as 
Council of State bills (Dajōkansatsu) were theoretically exchangeable for gold coin, but mass 
printing of the bills coupled with merchant resistance to the new currency made them 
effectively inconvertible.
341
 Naturally, the value of the Council of State bills quickly declined. 
Despite its failure to establish the Council of State bills as a stable currency, the Meiji 
government would continue to resort to printing money whenever it failed to find other 
methods of funding its activities. 
 A prime example of this policy was the Southwest War in 1877. The government had 
to make unexpected and large expenditures to mobilize military forces to defeat the rebellion 
Officials ended up printing over 40 million yen of new inconvertible notes to cover its 
expenses.
342
 This amount was nearly equal to its total tax revenues of 52 million yen that 
year.
343
 The additional currency also helped push the domestic money supply up from its 
1876 total of 124 million yen to 189 million yen by 1878.
344
 
The Meiji government also assumed large debts in carrying out its most important 
programs of economic reconstruction and internal reform. The Meiji government, however, 
was not particularly profligate. In fact, Meiji leaders could boast modest budget surpluses in 
most years.
345
 Officials had used debt to construct rail lines and model factories early on 
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before a reliable system of taxation existed. In general, though, the Meiji government 
attempted to live well within its means. 
 The Meiji government incurred its largest debts in liquidating various Tokugawa era 
obligations of the bakufu and the various domains. The government’s single largest bond 
issue in 1876 was a 174 million yen mass distribution of bonds to samurai households in 
return for ending the feudal era stipends that either the bakufu or domains had paid. The 1876 
bonds also amounted to the instantaneous creation of massive amounts of capital that greatly 
increased the money supply. 
 Japan’s banking system in the 1870s played an enabling role in fueling inflation. The 
National Bank Ordinance in 1872 established a banking system modeled along American 
lines. The American national bank system, which developed during the Civil War in the early 
1860s, consisted of a group of nationally chartered banks each of which were authorized to 
issue banknotes equal to the amount of government bonds the bank purchased.
346
 This system 
contrasted with European central banks where paper currency was backed by gold or silver 
specie. In effect, the American system replaced gold and silver coin with government debt as 
the ultimate guarantor of the value of paper currency and the basis of the U.S. financial 
system. Itō Hirobumi the primary architect of the National Bank Ordinance believed the 
American banking system presented, “an ingenious method without compare in the world” 
(bankoku muhi no ryōhō).347 Because his compatriots were less certain, initially the Japanese 
national banks were required to hold reserves consisting of both bonds and a significant 
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amount of specie.
348
 However, the requirement to hold specie in reserve to guarantee the 
value of banknotes was removed by a revision of the ordinance in 1876 (Kaisei Kokuritsu 
Ginkō Jōrei), partly at the request of the national banks themselves but also in the hopes that 
the revision would encourage the samurai recipients of government bonds to use them as 
capital in founding banks. 
The revision of the law did in fact result in an explosion in the growth of the Japanese 
banking industry. Prior to 1876 there were only four national banks, but by the end of 1879 
153 banks held national charters.
349
 The practical effect of this frantic scramble to found 
banks was however, a proliferation of banknotes as the new banks quickly converted the 
government bonds they held in reserve into paper currency.  
 The Meiji state might have handled this situation if trade deficits were not draining 
Japan of specie that theoretically backed government issued paper currency. The beginning 
of the Meiji era coincided with the emergence of a persistent imbalance in Japan’s foreign 
trade. By some estimations, Japan enjoyed trade surpluses from the opening of its ports to 
unrestricted foreign trade up until 1867.
350
  The Meiji regime would not be so fortunate. Poor 
rice harvests in the first years of the Meiji era required the government to import large 
quantities of rice to feed Japan’s populace with the result that imports far outstripped 
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earnings from exports. Each following year imports outpaced exports by a wide margin 
except for 1876 when Japan enjoyed a modest trade surplus.
351
 
 One of the main concerns with Japan’s trade deficit was that it led to the outflow of 
gold and silver which the government desperately needed to back domestic currency and 
stabilize the monetary system. Domestic inflation caused intense worries for Meiji leaders. 
Shrinking specie reserves, high levels of government debt and decreased real revenues and 
purchasing power convinced the oligarchs that they had to stem inflation and stabilize the 
currency. Economic instability was also a serious political liability for the regime. Several 
opposition figures accused the government of economic mismanagement and pointed to 
domestic inflation as proof positive of the autocratic government’s ineptness. Thus, between 
1878 and 1881 a sense of urgency arose to rein in inflation.  
 
Inflation and Industrial Reform: Ōkuma Shigenobu and Godai Tomoatsu 
 One of the central figures in the debate about the inflation was Minister of Finance 
Ōkuma Shigenobu. He was one of a group of able young officials that rose to prominence 
soon after the Meiji Restoration and who would continue to dominate the nation’s politics 
until the second decade of the twentieth century. After the assassination of Ōkubo 
Toshimichi in 1878 Ōkuma became the main architect of all of the Meiji regime’s fiscal and 
economic policies until his unceremonious ouster from the government in 1881. His ideas 
and policy recommendations set the agenda for the debate within the government. 
 Throughout the debates over monetary policy in the latter 1870s, Ōkuma maintained 
that Japan’s persistent foreign trade deficit had caused the collapse in the value of paper 
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currency and domestic inflation.
352
 Because Japan continually imported more than it exported, 
Ōkuma argued, the Japanese had to cover the resulting deficits by exporting silver specie. 
This outflow of silver reduced domestic supply. The lack of silver to back paper currency 
reduced the value of the latter.
353
 The decreasing value of paper currency also undermined 
public confidence in paper money and discouraged the circulation of capital needed to 
maintain a healthy level of economic activity.
354
 
 Even after the Southwest War, when rising prices for goods suggested that 
inflationary pressures might be the product of something more than just trade deficits, 
Ōkuma staunchly maintained that foreign trade was the primary cause of the nation’s 
currency problems.
355
 Ōkuma thoroughly rejected the arguments of his critics who 
proclaimed that it was an excess supply of paper currency engendered by the government’s 
reckless printing of money and not trade deficits that fuelled inflation. He countered that 
increasing commercial activity and the land tax reforms which required Japan’s subjects to 
pay their taxes in cash rather than rice had increased the need for paper currency among 
Japan’s populace.356 He also offered calculations which demonstrated that the ratio of money 
in circulation relative to total population in Japan was only a fraction of what it was in 
                                                 
352
 Maruyama, Matsukata zaisei kenkyū, 27. 
 
 
353
 Ōkuma Shigenobu, “Shūnyū shishutsu no genryū wo kiyomashi rizai kaikei no konpon o tatsuru no gi,” in 
Ōkuma Monjo, ed. Waseda Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo, vol. 3 (Tōkyō: Waseda Daigaku Shakai Kagaku 
Kenkyūjo, 1960), 104.-105. 
 
 
354
 Ibid. 
 
 
355
 Ōkuma Shigenobu, “Zaisei yonken o kyokosen koto o kou no gi,” in Ōkuma Monjo, ed. Waseda Daigaku 
Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo, 1960), 350. 
 
 
356
 Ibid., 354.  
 164 
 
Western countries. There was an average of 30 Mexican silver dollars of currency in 
circulation per every man, woman, and child in America and Britain compared to a paltry 4 
yen
357
 for each person in Japan.
358
 Ōkuma admitted this comparison of ratios was a crude one, 
but he pointed to Japan’s low ratio as proof that the nation could not be suffering from an 
oversupply of paper currency. 
 Ōkuma’s arguments enjoyed wide support in Japan. Godai Tomoatsu, a former 
government official turned entrepreneur and head of the Ōsaka Chamber of Commerce 
(Shōhōkaisho), presented a nearly identical analysis of Japan’s economic problems in a 
petition to the government urging it to adopt protectionist economic policies.
359
 Like Ōkuma, 
Godai argued that trade deficits were draining the country of specie and driving the decline in 
the value of paper currency. The use of silver specie was almost unheard of in the domestic 
market where paper currency now fulfilled the role of medium of exchange. The high price 
of silver could therefore only result from the unusually high demand for silver to pay for 
imported goods.
360
  
If trade deficits and the accompanying outflow of specie were the root causes of 
Japan’s economic troubles, the next big question confronting Ōkuma was discerning the 
causes of trade deficits and devising ways of balancing Japan’s trade. He assumed that a 
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structural imbalance caused Japan’s trade deficits. He noted that Japan exported primarily 
low-value primary commodities and simple semi-finished goods while it imported high-value 
finished goods from the economically advanced Western economies.
361
 Because Japan was 
trading lower value goods for higher value products, expenditure on imports would always 
outstrip income from exports and drain the nation of wealth. In other words, because of 
Japan’s relative underdevelopment, it was impossible to for the nation to obtain a net benefit 
when engaging in trade with more economically advanced countries. 
 The solution to the trade deficit problem therefore lay in escaping the trap of 
economic backwardness by transforming the nation into a major industrial and commercial 
power. This effort would require a radical change in the nation’s industrial structure. Only 
when Japan established advanced manufacturing industries and began producing and 
exporting high-value added products would the nation be able to truly benefit from foreign 
trade. Transforming Japan’s industrial structure required the introduction of industrial 
policies that provided protection and government support to encourage the growth of 
advanced sectors in the economy. 
  A close ally of Ōkuma’s, scholar and journalist Fukuzawa Yukichi, stated the point 
more succinctly in an 1875 article written in opposition to opening up Japan’s interior to 
foreign merchants. Fukuzawa argued that the exchange of primary commodities for 
manufactured goods not only robbed Japan of any possible gains that might come from 
exporting manufactures, but also threatened to strip Japan of any manufacturing industry 
with a constant inflow of foreign manufactured goods and transform the Japanese into a 
nation of unskilled manual laborers who had “fallen into the hellish world of toil” (rikiyaku 
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no kukai ni ochiiru).
362
 Unless Japan developed, protected and promoted its domestic 
industries the nation would be reduced to a permanent state of poverty and economic 
backwardness in which it could aspire to nothing more than being an economic appendage to 
more wealthy industrial nations.  
 The solution to Japan’s inflation problem therefore lay in protecting Japan’s 
industries from foreign competition and encouraging the development of more advanced 
industry. Ōkuma believed the best way to achieve this goal was through protective tariffs. He 
constantly stressed that the fundamental solution to balancing the nation’s trade and 
eliminating inflation could only be achieved through raising tariff rates.
363
 Tariffs would 
block imports of foreign manufactures and encourage the development of domestic industry. 
They also had the added attraction of providing revenue for the government.
364
 The main 
problem with this idea, as Ōkuma admitted, was that the unequal treaties that Japan had 
signed with the Western powers banned import tariffs above 5 percent ad valorum. Raising 
tariffs would require renegotiating these treaties, an unlikely possibility in the near future.
365
 
In the meantime, Ōkuma proposed a series of other measures to reduce imports and promote 
domestic industry.
366
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 To reduce imports, Ōkuma suggested the Ministry of Finance work closely with 
domestic industry in attempting to encourage import substitution. The ministry was to 
scrutinize all purchases of foreign made equipment. If similar goods were produced 
domestically, the ministry would place orders with domestic firms to supply the government; 
if no similar goods were available the ministry was to consult with private industry to see if 
domestic production was viable.
367
 The government was to encourage and help fund 
companies which undertook to supply the government with goods that were technically 
difficult to produce. Throughout, Ōkuma advocated policies which would block imports, 
protect Japanese industry, and help the nation upgrade its industrial structure so that it could 
exploit the full benefits of participation in world trade. 
 Promoting Japanese industry was another way to help balance Japan’s trade that 
Ōkuma enthusiastically embraced. Arguing that Japan’s entrepreneurs were hesitant to invest 
capital in new ventures, Ōkuma proposed the government issue bonds to gather private 
capital and use the money to promote coastal shipping, build new rail lines, and otherwise 
improve domestic transport networks. These measures would lower transport costs for 
business and help promote exports abroad.
368
  
 Ōkuma’s ideas resonated with at least some businessmen. Similar proposals appear in 
a petition issued by the Ōsaka Commercial Chamber (Shōhō Kaigijo). The document 
authored by Godai and mentioned above urged the government to subsidize several key 
industries such as textiles, sugar cultivation, and kerosene oil production as a method to 
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reduce imports and encourage the growth of more advanced manufacturing sectors.
369
 Godai 
proposed that the government purchase and lend spinning machines to domestic companies at 
low rates to encourage the growth of a modern textile industry. He argued that similar 
subsidies should encourage oil exploration and the cultivation of sugar to supply the 
domestic sugar refining industry.
370
 The measures recommended by the Ōsaka Commercial 
Chamber had the same basic goal of eliminating trade deficits through blocking imports and 
upgrading Japan’s industrial structure. 
 Several scholars examining developments in the economic thought of the Meiji 
period have viewed the calls for tariff protection and policies to nurture the development of 
infant industries voiced by Ōkuma and others as influenced primarily by Friedrich List’s 
ideas of political economy. List was a nineteenth century German economist who is most 
famous for his rejection of laissez-faire economic doctrines and his advocacy of 
protectionism. Scholars seeing similarities between the protectionist sentiment of the 
industrial reformers and Friedrich List’s ideas suggest that Meiji leaders fully embraced 
protectionism and rejected laissez-faire doctrines of economic liberalism.
371
 While this 
conclusion oversimplifies the ideas and policies of the Meiji oligarchs, the adjective “Listian” 
seems to fit Ōkuma and Godai’s economic proposals well. Like List both men embraced the 
idea that international trade did not necessarily benefit all participants equally and that lesser 
developed nations might actually suffer from engaging in international trade. Like List, both 
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Ōkuma and Godai proposed tariffs and state support for domestic industry to spur 
industrialization and help “catch up” with the more advanced West.372  
 Yet if both men advocated a “Listian” program of industrial development, it was only 
a “program” in the vaguest sense of the word. Ōkuma never clearly identified the specific 
industries the government should seek to promote or protect. In a similar fashion the Ōsaka 
Chamber of Commerce proposal for subsidizing industry was mainly concerned with keeping 
out imports. Their plans amounted to a series of ad hoc policies designed to promote the 
development of specific industries, rather than an organized scheme of overall economic 
development. Still the proposals were important because they set forth the principles of 
protecting domestic industries and promoting new ones in order to balance the trade deficit. 
Favoring the creation of mechanized manufacturing, the industrial reformers had little 
interest in developing indigenous industries and the agricultural sector. 
 
Commercial Nationalism: Maeda Masana’s theory of inflation and direct trade 
 Because industrial reformers believed that Japan’s trade deficits were the result of 
Japan’s relative economic backwardness, they saw the solution to Japan’s problems primarily 
in economic modernization and the reform of the domestic industry. Once Japan gained a 
level of economic development equal to the West, Japan could enjoy the full benefits of trade. 
Industrial policy would solve the problem of trade deficits and inflation. Although Ōkuma 
and other industrial reformers were interested in expanding Japan’s exports, commercial 
policy was not their primary concern. 
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 Commercial nationalists had a different perspective. They argued that the trade 
deficits were the result of foreign merchant domination of Japan’s trade. In order to eliminate 
trade deficits and solve the nation’s economic ills, Japan had to break free of foreign 
influence, sell its own goods in foreign markets, and reclaim its “commercial rights.” The 
commercial nationalists were not necessarily opponents of industrial reformers; in fact, the 
commercial nationalists found much common ground with the industrial reformers and their 
views complemented those of the industrial reformers in many ways. Yet by identifying the 
source of Japan’s economic ills as commercial in nature, the commercial nationalists 
suggested that the solution to Japan’s problems also had to be found in commercial policy. 
Economic modernization and industrial structure mattered less than promoting direct trade 
and reclaiming the nation’s economic sovereignty. 
 The most important theorist of the commercial nationalist school, so to speak, was 
Maeda Masana, a young official in the Ministry of Finance who some consider the 
“ideologue of Ōkuma’s export promotion policies.”373 Maeda was born in 1850, the youngest 
son of an impoverished lower class samurai household eking out a living in the rural 
periphery of the Satsuma domain.
374
 When Maeda was nine years old, his father found work 
for him as an apprentice to a local scholar of Dutch Studies, Yagi Shōhei. Maeda attended to 
household duties and assisted Yagi in his work in return for room, board, and education in 
Chinese and Western learning.
375
 Maeda’s apprenticeship had the added advantage of 
familiarizing him with the realities of trade and mercantile activity. As one of the domain’s 
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top specialists in Dutch Studies, Yagi helped manage the domain’s growing illicit trade with 
Western merchants occurring through Satsuma’s vassal state, the Ryūkyū kingdom. Maeda 
gained his first practical lessons in the workings of international trade by assisting his mentor 
who entrusted to him the more mundane aspects of dealing with contracts, shipping invoices 
and other paperwork involved in Satsuma’s dealings with Western traders.376 
 These experiences fostered Maeda’s intense fascination with the West and in 1865 
when the domain announced a plan to send a mission to Europe he immediately applied to 
join.
377
 To his great disappointment, his application failed, but as compensation the domain 
awarded him a scholarship to study Western languages in Nagasaki, the center of the 
bakufu’s trade with the Netherlands and a center of Dutch studies.378 The time in Nagasaki 
proved to be a turning point for Maeda because there he made acquaintances with many of 
the men who were to become powerful figures in the new Meiji government after 1868. The 
most important of these contacts was a fellow Satsuma samurai Godai Tomoatsu who had led 
the Satsuma mission to Europe and had returned to Japan in 1866 to assume duties as 
Satsuma’s representative in Nagasaki.379 
 Maeda’s connections helped him realize his dreams of reaching the West. In order to 
scrounge up the large sums of money needed to finance study abroad, Maeda, one of his 
brothers, and a friend seized on the idea of compiling an English-Japanese dictionary. When 
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the three friends completed the dictionary, the famous Satsuma Dictionary (Satsuma Jishō), 
Maeda used personal connections to convince the new Meiji government to purchase all the 
available copies. He also gained crucial support from Ōkubo Toshimichi and Ōkuma 
Shigenobu who arranged for Maeda to become a government supported student and receive a 
stipend to help finance study abroad in France.
380
 
 With government sponsorship in hand, Maeda departed for France in 1869 where he 
would remain for roughly eight years. Little is known about how Maeda’s studies in France 
impacted his later economic thought, although this ignorance has not prevented some 
researchers from making some bold assumptions. From 1871 Maeda studied under the 
direction of Eugene Tisserand, an expert in agricultural economics who served a brief stint as 
Vice-Minister of Agriculture in the French government in 1874.
381
 Sydney Crawcour 
describes Tisserand as a “thoroughgoing dirigiste” and speculates that it is “reasonable” to 
think that Tisserand introduced Maeda to the works of German protectionist economist 
Friedrich List.
382
 In a similar vein, John Sagers speaks of Tisserand and Maeda as sharing 
“common economic nationalist views.”383 Soda Osamu, who wrote the most recent 
biography of Maeda, argues that Tisserand advocated protectionist policies for agriculture 
and possessed a vision of economic development which placed emphasis on the harmony of 
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interests between agriculture, industry, and commerce.
384
None of these conclusions are based 
on any examination of Tisserand’s works.385 
 Instead of instilling Maeda with any particular economic ideology, Tisserand’s real 
influence may have been to teach Maeda an approach to the analysis of economic problems. 
Most of Tisserand’s major works deal with issues of rural economy. The two works he 
published shortly before Maeda’s arrival in France, Études économiques sur le Danemark, le 
Holstein et le Slesvig and Étudie sur l’économic Rurale de l’Alsace are both careful studies 
of regional rural economies beginning with detailed analyses of climate and population and 
ending in an examination of livestock species.
386
 Tisserand appears to have been more 
interested in the detailed workings of the rural economy with a focus on the problems and 
challenges faced by the agricultural small producer rather than grand economic debates 
regarding free trade versus protection. Considering that Maeda would spend several years in 
the 1880s compiling a massive survey of the Japanese economy, region by region, and was a 
tireless advocate for rural industry, one can conclude that if Maeda did learn anything of 
lasting value from his mentor in France it was probably a habit of intense investigation of 
local economies and a concern for the plight of the small producer in the countryside. 
 Maeda’s career as a civil servant began upon his return to Japan in 1877, just in time 
to enter the fray of the debate over inflation and economic policy. Maeda entered the 
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Industrial Promotion Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior (Naimushō Kangyōryō) where he 
was assigned the tasks of overseeing Japan’s preparations for the 1878 Paris Exhibition and 
assisting the Mitsui Trading Company in setting up a branch office in Lyon, the center of 
France’s silk industry.387 The Paris Exhibition of 1878 was a world fair held to celebrate 
France’s recovery from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Japan’s participation in the 
celebrations had commercial motives.
388
 Japanese officials hoped that a display at the fair 
would generate interest in Japanese products and promote Japanese exports.
389
 
 Maeda’s task in France was twofold. He had to help coordinate the collection and 
shipment of over 45,000 products gathered from various regions in Japan for exhibition.
390
 
Maeda’s second project was to assist the economic fact finding mission that traveled to 
France in conjunction with Japan’s participation in the exhibition. A number of government 
officials under the leadership of Matsukata Masayoshi, who would later replace Ōkuma as 
Minister of Finance, arrived to gather information on economic conditions in Europe.
391
 
Maeda served as a translator in conversations between Mastukata and France’s Minister of 
Finance, Leon Say. These conversations would eventually lead to an investigation of 
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Belgium’s banking system which would provide the model for the creation of the Bank of 
Japan in 1882.
392
 
 After Maeda returned to Japan and entered the Commerce Bureau (Shōmukyoku) of 
the Ministry of Finance in 1879, he threw his full energies into developing his own analysis 
and solution to Japan’s inflation problem.393 It was Maeda, rather than Ōkuma, who 
developed the most sophisticated analysis of the root causes of Japan’s persistent trade 
deficits and proposed an ambitious and comprehensive solution to Japan’s trade problems 
through an aggressive program of promoting exports. He outlined these ideas in a series of 
writings beginning with A Summary Opinion on Direct Trade (Chokusetsu Bōeki Iken Ippan), 
a pamphlet which was originally written in 1879 but was not published until 1881.
394
 Two 
official documents that Maeda wrote in 1880 or 1881 refined and expanded upon the ideas 
expounded in this pamphlet: A Theory of Direct Trade (Chokutestu Bōekiron) and An 
Opinion on Direct Trade (Chokusetu Bōeki Ikensho).395 
 The point of departure for Maeda’s analysis of Japan’s economic ills was Ōkuma’s 
theory of trade deficits as a cause of inflation. Maeda agreed that the nation’s persistent trade 
deficits caused a constant outflow of specie which was undermining the value of the paper 
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currency.
396
 Yet Maeda took his analysis one step further by claiming that the reason Japan 
suffered from continual trade deficits derived from fundamental problems in the nation’s 
commerce. Trade deficits existed because the nation’s producers were being ruthlessly 
exploited by the powerful foreign merchants who dominated Japan’s overseas trade.397 
Through their superior knowledge of world markets and ability to tap large reserves of 
capital from their home countries, foreign merchants were able to manipulate the market for 
Japan’s export products in their favor and capture the lion’s share of the revenues generated 
by Japan’s foreign trade.398 How else could one explain the fact that the volume of Japan’s 
foreign trade was rapidly increasing while domestic industry only became ever more 
impoverished?
399
 
 In Maeda’s eyes, the key element of foreign merchant houses’ power was their ability 
to dictate the price of export goods in the treaty ports. Japan’s main exports were produced 
by a myriad of unorganized small-scale producers. Because these producers lacked any 
independent access to foreign markets, they depended on a handful of foreign merchant 
houses in the treaty ports as customers. This dependence allowed the foreign merchants to 
use their market power as buyers to encourage fierce price competition between the 
producers and keep the sale price of Japanese goods in the treaty ports low.
400
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 Maeda warned that the pressure the foreigners put on prices had a devastating effect 
on Japanese industry. As market prices were pushed downward, producers attempted to 
reduce their costs and maintain profitability by cutting corners in the production process and 
putting out shoddy goods. Expectations of declining prices also encouraged panic selling, 
dumping and fraud as producers attempted to dispose of their goods as quickly as possible 
while market prices were still relatively favorable.
401
 Yet such actions merely worked to 
further disadvantage the producer. The decline in the quality of Japanese goods due to 
excessive price competition undermined the reputation of Japanese goods in foreign markets. 
The loss of foreign confidence would result in lower demand for Japanese goods which could 
only be overcome by further lowering prices. This development would merely perpetuate the 
cycle of lower prices, more cheaply made products, and a decline in consumer trust until 
foreign demand for Japanese goods collapsed and all of Japan’s export industries were 
thoroughly and completely devastated.
402
 
 In short, foreign merchants were robbing Japan’s producers of the profits they might 
rightfully obtain for their goods if they were able to sell them directly to consumers in 
foreign markets. Realizing that Japanese goods fetched higher prices in foreign markets than 
in the treaty ports, Maeda believed that the prices that Japanese goods gained abroad 
represented their “true price” (seika).403 The difference between the two prices proved to him 
that foreign capitalists were victimizing Japanese producers. For a merchant to buy goods 
cheaply in one market and sell dear in another market was a legitimate way of business if 
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buying and selling between producers and merchants were transactions conducted among 
equals. For Maeda, however, the unequal treaties imposed on Japan and the monopolistic 
hold foreign traders had over the nation’s trade had relegated Japanese entrepreneurs to a 
position of inferiority and helpless dependence.
404
 
 The idea that Japan’s trade was suffering due to the exploitation of foreigners struck a 
deep cord with nationalist sentiment. Many government officials and intellectuals were wary 
of international trade and suspected the West of using trade as a weapon of domination.  
While the Western powers publicly espoused principles of equality among nations and the 
need to adhere to international law, many Japanese believed this rhetoric was merely a flimsy 
façade hiding brutal realities of how Western governments bullied weaker nations. The real 
principle of international relations as practiced by the West was the law of the jungle where 
the, “weak become food for the strong” (jyakuniku kyōshoku).405 International trade was, for 
these Japanese skeptics, merely one vital part of the larger struggle between nations for 
survival and supremacy. Even though Western powers utilized commerce as a tool to extend 
their domination over weaker nations, the latter could employ it as a weapon to regain their 
independence and ensure national survival. In other words, if commerce was a form of war 
by other means, Japan’s trade deficits indicated that Japan was losing the battle.   
 In A Theory of Direct Trade, Maeda argued that commerce was the basis of national 
strength and supremacy. “The secret [behind] relations between the nations is nothing more 
than the expansion or contraction of trading rights (bōeki kenri),” declared Maeda.406 If a 
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nation’s “trade rights” expanded it would become wealthy and powerful and would gain the 
ability to determine its own destiny.
407
 
 Maeda was not alone in his view. In debates over the inflation question Prince 
Iwakura Tomomi, a key figure in the government, linked the economic competition for trade 
with the struggle for political dominance in a similar way. He observed, “…many nations 
compete for greatness and fight for strength…but the deciding factor between strength and 
weakness is not necessarily the result of combat, but the result of the wealth or poverty of 
trade. If [a nation’s] trade is plentiful, that nation will be prosperous and powerful. If [a 
nation’s] trade is small, that country will be weak. This world is one great battlefield of 
trade.”408 It was therefore vital that the government do everything it could to promote the 
nation’s trade.409 
 The belief that commerce was an integral part of a Darwinian struggle for survival 
between nations also pervaded Fukuzawa Yukichi’s essay, “Opposing Foreign Residence in 
Japan” (Gaikokujin no naichi zakkyo yurusu bekarazaru no ron). Written in 1875 in response 
to rumors that Japan was about to revise the unequal treaties to allow foreigners unrestricted 
access to Japan’s interior, Fukuzawa voiced his opposition by arguing that unrestricted 
access to the domestic market would allow foreigners to dominate Japan’s economy even 
more. In justifying this position, Fukuzawa declared that international trade was “the struggle 
over profits between different peoples,” (naigai no jinmin ri wo arasou no koto) and that 
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“trading ports are the site of these struggles.”410 In the struggle, so to speak, of foreign trade, 
Fukuzawa noted there were many alarming signs that Japan was losing. Fukuzawa declared, 
“If we observe trade since the opening of the ports, all too often we see our country suffering 
losses while foreigners profit. Thus, when debating the overall effect of the growth of our 
nation’s trade up until today, it is clear that trade is decreasing our national wealth.”411  
 If commerce was an extension of the struggle for survival and supremacy among 
nations, it followed that the implications of losing the war of commerce were nothing less 
than loss of independence, colonial subjugation, and the extinction of the nation itself. In A 
Theory of Direct Trade Maeda argued that establishing control over another nation’s trade 
was always the first step for the Western powers in bringing weaker nations under their 
colonial control.
412
 Britain had subjugated the Indian sub-continent, not through the use of 
brute military power, but through the work of the British East India Company which allowed 
the British to monopolize India’s trade and control the flow of Indian gold and silver.413 
Other Western ventures that extended trade contributed to Western control over commerce 
which added to the wealth and power of the West.
414
 Maeda mused that Japan had only 
maintained its independence from Western interlopers until now largely because of the wise 
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decision made by Japan’s Tokugawa rulers to strictly limit foreign trade for several centuries. 
415
 
 Unfortunately, Japan had now ceded control over its commerce to the foreign 
merchants in the treaty ports. According to Maeda, Japan’s relationship with the West had 
become similar to the relationship of the Ryūkyū Islands to the Satsuma domain in 
Tokugawa times, when the Ryūkyū islands became a de facto colony of that domain. 
Although the Ryūkyū islands produced tradable goods, such as sugar, the Ryūkūans had 
failed to profit from their trade with Japan because they had to conduct all of their trade 
through Sastuma merchants who monopolized the profits.
416
 With its trade currently in the 
firm grip of foreign traders, Maeda queried, was Japan’s position really any different from 
the colonized nations of Asia like India?
417
  
 Maeda’s concerns about the state of Japanese commerce struck a chord with other 
observers. Fukuzawa compared the position of Japanese entrepreneurs in relation to foreign 
merchants in slightly different but no less stark terms. In a speech at the opening of a 
commercial school in Tōkyō, he compared the relationship between Japan’s merchants and 
their foreign counterparts to that of the relationship between a shopkeeper of a general store 
(man’ya) in rural Japan and urban wholesale merchants (ton’ya).418 According to Fukuzawa, 
the typical rural shopkeeper sold all manner of items from umbrellas to porcelain which he 
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purchased from urban merchants without any knowledge of the origins of the products or 
their actual wholesale prices. The rural shopkeeper’s ignorance allowed the urban merchant 
to exploit him by concealing the true nature of the goods he bought and overcharging the 
hapless rural merchant for them. The situation of Japan’s merchants in the world marketplace 
was in a way similar, proclaimed Fukuzawa. Japan’s merchants were too ready to trade with 
foreign merchants at whatever price the foreigners dictated without inquiring about the true 
value of the goods in question or what price they sold for in other countries. 
In fact, Fukuzawa suggested, the situation of Japanese merchants in the world market 
was even worse than that of the rural shopkeeper. At least a few rural shopkeepers possessed 
the business acumen to travel to the major cities and investigate prices and the sources of the 
goods they bought to ensure that they were not being cheated. In contrast, Japan’s merchants 
had been content to sit idly in the treaty ports happy with the meager profits they obtained by 
helping foreigners bleed the nation dry. A new generation of Japanese entrepreneurs had to 
venture out into the world and make direct contact with Western consumers and producers.
419
 
 To Maeda and Fukuzawa, loss of control over the nation’s foreign trade meant the 
loss of an integral part of national sovereignty. The only way to cure Japan’s economic ills 
and save the nation from utter destruction was to recover Japan’s “commercial rights” 
(shōken) or control over its own trade. 420 In the formulation used by Maeda and other 
nationalists, the phrase “commercial rights” indicated the control every truly independent 
nation should be able to exercise over its own commercial affairs. Although never precisely 
defined, the idea of recovering Japan’s commercial rights was a powerful political rallying 
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cry in that it expressed the economic aspects of a more general desire among the Japanese to 
gain equality and respect from the West.  Maeda believed that for Japan to regain commercial 
rights, the nation must participate in the international economy on an equal footing with the 
West. 
 For Maeda, achieving this goal meant promoting “direct trade” (jiki yushutsu). 
Japanese merchants and producers would have to venture abroad and start selling their goods 
directly to consumers in foreign markets.
421
 In essence the entire system of trade in the treaty 
ports, which relied on foreign merchants, would have to be replaced by direct commercial 
ties in which Japanese merchants themselves exported and sold Japanese products abroad.  
Through direct trade the nation could recapture the profits from its export trade that had been 
monopolized by foreign middlemen and a new foundation of national wealth and prosperity 
could emerge.
422
 
 As noted above, Maeda was not alone in calling for the recovery of the nation’s 
commercial rights and implement direct trade. What made Maeda unique was that he was the 
only one to propose a comprehensive system to achieve those precise goals. He crafted an 
ambitious plan involving a system of banks, trading companies, and producer cooperatives 
which would work hand-in-hand to transform the nation into a well oiled export machine and 
great commercial power. The basic elements of Maeda’s vision remained constant from its 
initial formulation in Some Summary Opinions on Direct Trade in 1879 and the intricately 
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detailed proposals of An Opinion on Direct Trade which he drafted by 1881.
423
 There was, 
however, a shift in the details of Maeda’s proposals. His vision for Japanese trade quickly 
evolved from a grassroots call-to-arms which exhorted rural small producers to form local 
cooperatives and advocated government support for indigenous industry to a highly 
structured system of export promotion which the Meiji state would supervise and manage. 
  Maeda continually stressed three essential elements of his system to promote 
exports. First, a designated bank had to fund Japan’s foreign trade. In 1879 Maeda called for 
the creation of an “Imperial Bank” (Teikoku Ginkō) to finance Japan’s overseas commerce.424 
He proposed that the Meiji government provide10 million yen--a figure equal to roughly one 
sixth of the government’s annual budget at the time- to capitalize the financial entity. The 
bank would support trade in two ways. It would issue advance loans to the producers of 
export goods to fund the manufacture or cultivation of export goods and provide money to 
cover the shipping costs of goods from their point of production to the treaty ports. The bank 
would also provide loans to specially designated trading companies to cover the costs 
involved in the shipping, handling, and sale of Japanese goods abroad.
425
 Later, Maeda 
would call for the Yokohama Specie Bank to play the role of Japan’s central trade bank, but 
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otherwise the basic outlines of his original plan, including the idea of providing 10 million 
yen in government funds, remained unaltered.
426
 
 The idea of a trade bank was absolutely essential to Maeda’s direct trade vision, not 
only because it would provide much needed credit to Japanese producers and exporters but 
also because it could utilize artificially low interest rates to promote the recovery of the 
nation’s commercial sovereignty. If the bank used the 10 million yen in government provided 
capital to issue special low-interest loans to Japanese exporters, it would reduce their 
borrowing costs dramatically. Unburdened by the need to repay loans at the higher interest 
rates their foreign competitors had to pay, Japanese merchants could afford to offer domestic 
suppliers a better price for their goods and still turn a profit on sales abroad. Because 
domestic producers would scramble to sell their goods to Japanese firms, Japanese merchants 
would gain access to the cream-of-the-crop of Japanese export goods. Meanwhile foreign 
firms which could not afford to offer higher prices would be stuck with whatever scraps 
remained.
427
 Thus command of Japan’s trade would naturally shift from foreigners to 
Japanese firms. In order to keep domestic merchants’ borrowing costs low, Maeda stressed 
that in return for a large infusion of public funds from the government, the bank must issue 
loans at favorable, below market interest rates.
428
  
 Once the government had created the Yokohama Specie Bank, Maeda insisted that it 
use public funds to support Japanese commerce. Since he believed direct trade ventures 
would not prove to be very profitable in their initial stages, he feared the bank would have 
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little incentive to provide credit to exporters. Therefore Maeda recommended a complete 
restructuring of the Yokohama Specie Bank. He suggested either creating a new unit within 
the bank supervised by a government official to manage the 10 million yen government fund 
or transforming the Specie Bank into a central bank like the Bank of England or the Bank of 
France which were both privately owned but were tightly regulated and financially backed by 
their respective governments.
429
  
 Similarly, the government needed to make sure that the recipients of the low interest 
loans used them exclusively for direct trade and not other purposes. With silver prices 
skyrocketing, there was a real risk that borrowers might use the loans to speculate in silver 
rather than export goods. The only way to prevent such abuses was to create a system of 
licensed companies that would receive loans in return for accepting strict supervision. 
Therefore specially sanctioned trading companies were the second vital element of Maeda’s 
proposed system.  
 These firms would operate under special charters. In return for access to low interest 
loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank, a government appointed supervisor (bōeki kanrikan) 
there would possess the right to inspect the account books of the trading companies at any 
time and change the terms of any loans the trade companies might receive. All of them were 
to operate under the authority of the Ministry of Finance’s Commercial Bureau according to 
procedures outlined by official directives.  The government was to have the power to suspend 
the operations of any of the trading companies if they violated government orders.
430
 Trading 
companies that received loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank would have to repay them 
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promptly in specie to the nearest branch of the bank. This measure aimed to prevent trade 
company executives from engaging in speculation or in any business other than exporting 
Japanese goods. 
 Working as intermediaries, trading companies were to stand between the Yokohama 
Specie Bank and the producers of export goods. All producers of export goods applying for 
special subsidized bank loans to ship their goods to the treaty ports had to present their goods 
for examination by the trading companies. They had to report their findings to the Yokohama 
Specie Bank. Any producer whose goods did not meet the approval of the trading company’s 
inspectors would not qualify for loans for shipping his goods.
431
 
 The companies were also expected to aid domestic producers and the Specie bank 
through issuing regular reports to producers regarding economic conditions in foreign 
markets and providing information on the preferences of foreign consumers. Maeda also 
demanded that representatives of the trading companies working abroad issue immediate 
reports about sudden fluctuations in the prices in foreign markets and respond immediately to 
requests by government officials to provide commercial intelligence. The companies were 
also supposed to advise the bank on its lending policies and issue regular reports about the 
domestic demand for loans.  
 The third central element in Maeda’s vision for a direct export system was supporting 
the producers of export goods. Maeda stressed the need for producers to band together and 
form cooperative associations. By pooling scarce capital and acting collectively, producers 
could end the cycle of self-destructive competition between one another.
432
 Assisting each 
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other in improving the quality of their goods might increase their market price. The vicious 
cycle of competition on price and underselling that depressed the price of Japanese goods 
would then become a virtuous cycle in which producers helped one another to produce better 
quality goods which fetched higher prices abroad, helped expand foreign demand for 
Japanese goods, and enriched both producers and the nation in the process.  
 To encourage producers to form companies or cooperatives, Maeda forbade awarding 
subsidized loans to individual businessmen.
433
 The companies formed by producers were to 
sell their goods either to the designated trading companies or directly to foreign markets.
434
 
To sell their goods to anyone else would mean forfeiting subsidized loans.
435
 Anyone could 
create a company, but organizers had to be able to post a minimum amount of capital either 
in the form of cash or land deeds which would be held by the industrial promotion section of 
their local government.
436
 Only then could a company or cooperative obtain a license 
qualifying them to receive low interest bank loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank. They 
had to offer their goods for inspection by trading companies, but in return trading companies 
were to give producers technical advice on how to improve the quality of their products.
437
 
 Maeda viewed as crucial a system of cooperative companies to promote traditional 
handicraft production. He hoped that Industrial Promotion Companies (Kankōkaisha) would 
encourage and improve the production of handicraft goods in regions with strong established 
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traditions of handicraft production.
438
 The companies were to mobilize local craftsmen in the 
production of goods by giving them advance loans to produce goods. The loans would have 
generous terms with no collateral required from borrowers. The Industrial Promotion 
Companies were also to provide technical assistance to individual craftsmen in improving the 
quality of their goods.
439
 
 Finding Maeda’s place in the pantheon of Meiji economic thought is a difficult task. 
Scholars like Sydney Crawcour, Mark Metzler, John Sagers, and Richard Smethurst have 
tended to emphasize Maeda’s similarities with other protectionists in deeming Maeda to be a 
fervent advocate of dirigisme policies and economic protectionism, a staunch nationalist, and 
a true believer of “Listian” economic doctrines.440 After examining Maeda’s proposals to 
promote direct trade, one can conclude that these interpretations seem, on the surface at least, 
to have considerable merit. Yet, although Maeda did share many of the same concerns as 
other exponents of protectionism and economic nationalism, his economic vision differed 
from that of his fellow travelers.  To label him simply as protectionist and/or a nationalist 
obscures the specific stance he took on the economic challenges facing Japan. By advocating 
the importance of commerce, Maeda was articulating a strategy for economic development 
that fundamentally differed from advocates of tariff protection and industrial restructuring. 
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With its emphasis on indigenous industry and small producers, Maeda’s nationalist 
economics also had strong populist overtones which informed an interpretation of the 
national welfare that conflicted with the statist oriented nationalism of industrial reformers. 
 Maeda was undoubtedly an ally of protectionism and a firm nationalist on economic 
issues. In A Summary Opinion on Direct Trade, he urged the Meiji government to “protect” 
(hogo) domestic industries and emphasized the need for robust government support for 
Japanese industry to ensure the survival of domestic producers and successful economic 
development.
441
Along with other protectionists, he voiced strong opposition to doctrines of 
laissez-faire liberalism and argued that only the power of the state could rescue Japan’s 
economy from the certain ruin which would occur if trends were left to run their course.
442
 
As a nationalist, Maeda’s primary concern was with the larger interests of the nation which 
he believed were in conflict with the short term interests of the individual. He called on 
individual businessmen to sacrifice short term profits for the greater long term interests of the 
nation and to cease competing against one another so they could fight the “enemy,” the 
foreign merchants.
443
 
 At the same time, Maeda departed from industrial reformers and other advocates of 
protectionism in important ways. His strategy for closing the trade gap and ending inflation 
focused exclusively on the reform of Japan’s commerce and maximizing the profitability of 
Japan’s indigenous industries, not industrial reform. Maeda did not share the industrial 
reformers’ anxieties over Japan’s industrial structure. Protective tariffs, subsidies for infant 
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industries, and the creation of state owned enterprises, all issues which animated other 
protectionists and nationalists, were of no concern to him. Instead, Maeda believed that the 
nation’s indigenous industries were sufficient to deliver national wealth and prosperity, 
provided that Japanese merchants and producers would fetch a good price on international 
markets and prevent foreigners from monopolizing the profits gained from the sale of 
Japanese goods. To achieve that goal, the Japanese had to establish a position of equality in 
the international economy by changing the way in which Japan’s goods were traded. Maeda 
did not oppose the idea of industrial reform, but he believed that only reform of the conduct 
of the nation’s overseas commerce would allow Japan to truly benefit from the fruits of its 
own industries. 
 Maeda also differed from other more statist articulations of nationalist and 
protectionist economics in that his nationalism had a strong populist flavor. In portraying 
Japan’s overseas trade as a struggle between domestic small-scale producers and wealthy 
foreign merchants, Maeda identified indigenous industries and agriculture as the main 
protagonists in a nationalist struggle for economic independence. It was rural common folk--
the small scale silk producers, tea cultivators, and craftsmen making traditional goods like 
lacquer ware and porcelain--who desperately needed government support to fend off the 
menace of foreign merchants who were attempting to feast “on their bones.”444 Ultimately 
only collective action, “from below” with aid from the state, could rescue the nation from its 
economic trap.  
 Maeda’s focus on the reform of the nation’s commerce and his unabashed support of 
the country’s rural indigenous industries shows that protectionism and economic nationalism 
in Meiji Japan were not simple matters of raising tariffs and excluding foreign goods. 
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Beneath a common set of anxieties and anti-foreign sentiment, tensions existed between 
industrial reformers and commercial nationalists over the answers to several important 
questions. Were Japan’s problems a matter of the country’s economic structure and 
peripheral position in the world economy, or was the nation the victim of exploitation in an 
international economic system that was inherently unfair? How would Japan achieve wealth 
and prosperity and how was the national good to be defined? What role would indigenous 
industry and the less “advanced” sectors of the economy play in the economy? 
   
The Monetary Solution: Taguchi Ukichi’s liberal answer to inflation 
The variants of protectionism and economic nationalism represented by Ōkuma 
Shigenobu and Maeda Masana were not, however, the only responses to the problem of 
domestic inflation and trade deficits. Nor did everyone subscribe to the theory that trade 
deficits were the primary cause of inflation. A small but significant minority concluded that 
inflation was the result of loose monetary policy and the rampant printing of paper currency 
and that trade deficits were merely a symptom, not a cause of domestic inflation. This group 
of dissenters, primarily made up of adherents of economic liberalism, argued the answer to 
Japan’s economic problems lay in reducing the amount of currency in circulation and 
restoring full convertibility. In other words, the solution to inflation and trade deficits lay in 
better monetary policy, not trade policy. This conviction did not mean, however, that 
economic liberals viewed trade as unimportant. On the contrary economic liberals sought to 
prove that protectionist and nationalist economics rested on a fundamentally mistaken 
understanding of international trade. 
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The dissenting position drew inspiration from nineteenth century economic liberalism 
and its theories of international trade. Whereas the nationalists posited a world where control 
of trade translated into wealth and dominance and believed that Western nations used 
commercial policies as tools of colonial domination, dissenters studied the writings of 
Western liberals and came to see trade and commercial activity as something operating 
according to its own laws and logic. States could not manipulate these laws. They set forth 
that an excess of currency and high prices attracted imports and generated trade deficits. The 
answer to Japan’s inflation and trade problems was therefore to reduce the amount of 
currency in circulation to allow the normal function of market mechanisms to balance 
Japan’s foreign trade. 
The most prominent member of the dissenting camp and a fierce critic of Ōkuma’s 
policies was Taguchi Ukichi. As a young man, he had resigned a minor post at the Ministry 
of Finance to take up a new career as editor and publisher of The Tōkyō Economic Journal 
(Tōkyō Keizai Zasshi), Meiji Japan’s premier business and economic journal. Taguchi’s 
articulate and uncompromising opposition to Ōkuma’s fiscal policies and his economic 
works catapulted him to national recognition as the pre-eminent voice of economic liberalism 
in Meiji Japan and a respected commentator on economic matters. 
Unlike Ōkuma and Maeda who were part of the new ruling elite that came from the 
domains in Japan’s southwest which triumphed in the Meiji Restoration, Taguchi belonged to 
the losing side in the conflict. Born in the capital of Edo in 1855, he was the eldest son of a 
family which had for generations served as personal retainers of the Tokugawa shoguns.
445
 
He spent his childhood training to serve the shogun. In his early teens he received 
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preliminary military training in Edo Castle where it was expected he would start his career as 
a lower level guardsman.
446
 
 The fall of the Tokugawa bakufu put a premature end to the teenage Taguchi’s career 
as a retainer to the shogun and delivered a devastating blow to his family. Without a lord to 
serve the family lost its stipend from the bakufu which was the sole source of income. 
Stripped of the means to make a living, Taguchi, his mother, and older sister moved to 
Yokohama where they survived by opening a small shop where they sold charcoal, firewood, 
and tobacco.
447
 After a few years spent scraping by and moving from place to place, 
Taguchi’s family found a measure of economic stability in Shizuoka where Taguchi’s 
brother-in-law found employment serving the Tokugawa family, which still retained some 
wealth if not political power.
448
 Taguchi returned to Tōkyō to pursue the study of Western 
languages, but had difficulty finding the funds to continue his education. In 1872 he was on 
the verge of abandoning his studies for financial reasons when the Ministry of Finance 
announced it was recruiting prospective students for a newly created Translation Bureau 
(Honyaku Kyoku) in the ministry. The brainchild of Inoue Kaoru and Shibusawa Eiichi, two 
top officials in the ministry, the Translation Bureau was to serve as an exclusive academy to 
create a new breed of official thoroughly trained in Western economic practice. The bureau 
promised prospective students training in Western languages, math, and accounting, and, 
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most importantly for a near penniless Taguchi, a generous stipend for students. After 
applying and passing an entrance exam, he entered the section as an “advanced” student.449 
Taguchi’s time as a student in the Translation Bureau proved to be just as short-lived 
as his career as a castle guardsman. As a result of a conflict over government spending that 
preceded the Korean controversy of 1873, Inoue and Shibusawa, the creators of the 
Translation Bureau, resigned from the Ministry of Finance. The ministry’s new boss, Ōkuma, 
who replaced Inoue as the head of the ministry, wasted little time in deeming the bureau a 
wasteful extravagance and ordered it abolished. The bulk of the section’s students were 
immediately transferred to lower level posts within the ministry. Taguchi ended up in the 
Currency Bureau (Shiheiryō) where he spent his time translating foreign works on 
banking.
450
 By an accident of fate, Taguchi the student found himself becoming a petty 
bureaucrat serving the government that overthrew his former masters.  
This turn of events was not necessarily an unwelcome one for Taguchi. A job in the 
ministry brought him the economic stability he had lacked, but the ambitious young man 
soon found reason to be dissatisfied with his new position. Taguchi discovered his new 
workplace was rife with personal conflicts between lower-level civil servants in the Ministry, 
many of whom, like Taguchi, were from families that had served as the financial and 
economic technocrats in the Tokugawa regime and high level officials who were 
predominantly from Satsuma and Chōshū, the two domains that had overthrown the 
Tokugawa.
451
 By his own account Taguchi particularly disliked his boss, Tokunō Ryōsuke 
                                                 
449
Ibid., 51-52. 
 
 
450
 Matsunoo, Taguchi Ukichi to Keizaigaku Kyōkai, 20. 
 
 
451
 Taguchi, Taguchi Ukichi, 65.  
 196 
 
who hailed from Satuma. On several occasions violent arguments between them over issues 
of monetary policy made Taguchi seriously consider resigning his post.
452
 
Taguchi’s dissatisfaction was not, however, due solely to old pre-Restoration era 
loyalties. His reading of foreign economic texts led him to doubt the wisdom of Ōkuma’s 
monetary policies. Taguchi was convinced that Japan’s economic woes and the outflow of 
specie were primarily caused by a loose monetary policy and not Japan’s negative balance of 
trade as Ōkuma and his supporters argued. Excess printing of paper currency and inflationary 
fiscal policies were the main culprits behind domestic inflation.
 453
 The main problem with 
Taguchi’s revelations on the weighty matter of state monetary policy was no one was 
listening. As a lower level bureaucrat who did not get along with his superior, Taguchi’s 
opinions meant little to his colleagues in the Ministry of Finance.  
Taguchi sought an outlet for his views in journalism. In 1875 he began writing a 
series of editorials on economic matters for the major metropolitan newspapers in Tōkyō 
under various pseudonyms. Ironically, his first article appeared in the pages of the Yubin 
Hochi Shinbun, a paper which supported Ōkuma’s policies.454 Taguchi’s three part editorial 
identified the excessive supply of paper currency in circulation as the cause of domestic 
inflation.
455
Over the next two years, Taguchi elaborated his own solution for the inflation 
problem in a second series of editorials in the Tōkyō Yokohama Mainichi Shinbun. He called 
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for a reduction in the money supply and the restoration of full convertibility with silver.
456
 In 
his view, if the government reigned in inflation and tightened the money supply, the inflow 
and outflow of specie would eventually reach a harmonious equilibrium and Japan’s trade 
would come into balance.
457
  
Taguchi’s public criticism of the policies of his superiors put him in an awkward 
position within the Ministry. If they discovered his moonlighting career as an editorialist, his 
career might reach a dead end. Yet the articles opened a new career path to Taguchi as a 
writer and journalist. Since his entry in the Ministry of Finance, he had begun work on a 
treatise outlining his own economic philosophy and was trying to save enough money to have 
it published. He also started working on a history of the opening of Japan’s ports, which he 
hoped would prove popular enough not only to earn him fame as an author, but also a 
significant sum in royalties as well.
458
In 1878 he finally managed to have both works 
published: A Short History of Japan’s Opening (Nihon Kaika Shoshi), and A Theory of the 
Japanese Economy: Free Trade (Nihon Keizairon: Jiyū Kōeki). He soon resigned his post at 
the ministry.
459
  
Taguchi’s first major work on economics, A Theory of the Japanese Economy, 
provided a definitive statement of the basic economic philosophy that informed all of his 
later writings. Taguchi wrote the book as an academic work, rather than a political polemic, 
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but the views that he expounded clearly conflicted with Ōkuma’s understanding of 
international trade and the causes of inflation in Japan.  
The foundation of Taguchi’s economic philosophy was the belief that humans are 
“economic men” or rational self-interested beings who act to fulfill their own wants and 
needs.
460
 Taguchi did not, however, state this belief in exactly these terms. In A Theory of the 
Japanese Economy he defined economics as the study of the laws that govern “human 
phenomena,” (jini no genshō).461To explain what this phrase meant, Taguchi took his readers 
back to a time before the appearance of human beings when the world existed in a state of 
nature. This world was governed by the laws of nature which Taguchi defined in terms of a 
Darwinian law of survival of the fittest. As plants and animals struggled for survival, some 
prospered and some died out. The end result was a “natural distribution” (tensei no haibun) 
of species and resources across the world.
462
 The appearance of human beings upset this 
natural order. Humans transformed nature to meet their needs beginning with the re-ordering 
of physical environments to create usable farmland and changing the natural balance of life 
by favoring some plants and animals while exterminating others deemed as pests.
463
 
The result of this human transformation was a, “human distribution” (jinsei no 
haibun). Taguchi defined the new world order of human distribution as one in which 
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“phenomena are distributed in accordance to the dictates of human nature.”464 Taguchi 
understood the essential part of human nature which determined the shape of the world to be 
economic demand.
465
 Jumping ahead a few eons, Taguchi explained that readers could easily 
grasp the logic of his views simply by looking at their towns and villages. Saké shops were 
more common than clothiers, because people demanded saké more than they did clothes. 
Similarly rice stores were more numerous than the saké shops because people hungered for 
rice more than they thirsted for alcohol.
466
 By the act of identifying human nature as a bundle 
of demands, Taguchi reduced the essence of all human activity down to self-seeking efforts 
to fulfill individual desires and wants. 
Yet if demands to fulfill desires were the driving force behind all human action, 
actually meeting these demands required a process of negotiation, otherwise known as trade. 
Self-subsistence was, according to Taguchi, a woefully inefficient way to meet one’s 
demands. Human nature had therefore impelled humans to find a more effective way to meet 
their needs by exploiting the efficiencies in production gained through the division of 
labor.
467
 Because no one produced all that one demanded, everyone was forced to exchange 
the product of one’s labor with others. Trade was nothing more than the flow of goods 
between economic actors driven by the laws of supply and demand.
468
  Mass demand (shūju) 
determined the proportion of people who would engage in producing a given good and the 
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proportion of people engaged in the production of a good determined whether the good was 
plentiful or scarce.
469
  
A third vital foundational element in Taguchi’s economics is the role of price. If 
human demand was the fundamental driving force behind economic activity and the division 
of labor necessitated a flow of goods governed by the law of supply and demand, it was price 
that controlled the relationship between supply and demand. Taguchi observed that price 
served the same function as a “regulator” on a steam engine.470 When supply was scarce the 
price of a good would rise, reducing demand. Conversely, when a good was plentiful, the 
price would drop increasing demand. High prices encouraged production of a good and 
increased supply, while low prices discouraged production and decreased supply. In short, 
Taguchi posited the economy as a fundamentally self-regulating system governed by demand, 
supply, and price in which economic actors responded to price signals.  
Taguchi’s basic assumptions about the nature of economics served as the foundations 
of a vision of international trade that fundamentally opposed the ideas of industrial reformers 
and commercial nationalists. The idea that Japan had fallen victim to the malevolent 
machinations of foreign merchants was for him utter nonsense. To Taguchi, who believed the 
world to be populated by rational, self interested individuals, trade could never be anything 
but beneficial to all who engaged in it.
471
 Trade would not occur in his view unless both 
parties profited from the exchange of goods. If one party in an exchange failed to profit, that 
party would promptly stop trading. The demands of self-interest ensured that the exploitation 
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of one group by another would not occur since anyone engaged in an unprofitable line of 
business would quickly switch to a more profitable one.
472
 Nor did it make any sense for 
foreigners to try to exploit Japan. Foreign merchant houses in Yokohama exporting Japanese 
products shared the same economic interests as the Japanese themselves. The self-interest of 
the foreign merchants in Yokohama dictated that they strive to expand the market for 
Japanese silks and teas abroad and ensure that Japanese producers made only top quality 
goods that could fetch a high price. Foreign merchants were therefore natural allies of 
Japan’s producers. 
Protectionists who argued that the nation’s wealth was draining away because Japan 
exchanged mostly lower value primary commodities for Western manufactured goods were 
also mistaken. Protectionists pointed to the net outflow of specie as proof Japan was 
becoming impoverished by trade, but this argument betrayed a faulty understanding of the 
nature of wealth in Taguchi’s view. National wealth was not measured by how much specie 
was lying in bank vaults, but instead was the total sum of profits earned by the nation’s 
people.
473
 None could deny that exports of silk and tea were still reaping profits for Japanese 
merchants and producers and, as a result, contributed to increasing the overall national 
prosperity. The export of specie which protectionists saw as a loss of wealth could actually 
enrich a nation if it provided consumers with goods that were produced more cheaply and 
efficiently abroad.
474
 To claim that foreign trade was making Japan impoverished was to 
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adopt an extremely narrow and mistaken view of wealth which held gold and silver as the 
sole source of value. 
Taguchi was not blind to the fact that imports and foreign competition posed a serious 
danger to the survival of some of Japan’s domestic industries but he believed some of these 
industries were destined to disappear. It was all part of a normal process of economic 
transition. The opening of Japan’s ports had changed Japan’s economy fundamentally. Now 
that Japan was linked to the world economy the fate of its industries was determined by shifts 
in supply and demand in international markets more than anything else.
475
 The end of the 
Tokugawa regime and the modernizing policies of the Meiji government had also changed 
the nature of domestic demand as goods common in the Tokugawa period became obsolete 
or consumer preferences changed. Efforts to try and save traditional industries were 
misguided. Japan was undergoing a period of change and economic restructuring, industries 
to meet the needs of a new era were emerging and the industries that had produced the goods 
of the past were dying out.
476
 This was part of a natural process that mirrored changes in 
Japanese society and the economic environment in which the Japanese economy operated. To 
try to arrest the process of change was both counter-productive and doomed to fail.  
Similarly, protective policies to encourage the growth of “infant” industries were 
ineffective and harmful. Awarding tariff protection or subsidies for a certain industry would 
certainly be a boon to the industry in question. Yet this policy would do nothing to increase 
the nation’s wealth. Tariffs and subsidies only served to encourage entrepreneurs to divert 
capital that might have otherwise flowed toward profitable businesses into economic activity 
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that depended on government aid to turn a profit.
477
 Moreover, protective policies were self-
defeating since they artificially increased profits in an industry. The higher profits would 
encourage new entrepreneurs to enter into the fray, increasing competition and driving down 
prices until the protected industry was no longer profitable.
478
 Tariffs might not even help 
balance the nation’s trade. America had levied high protective tariffs but still managed to 
experience persistent trade deficits which were only covered by the production and export of 
silver and gold.
479
 
Instead of worrying about the impoverishment of the nation at the hands of foreigners 
or advocating protectionist policies to artificially (in Taguchi’s view) balance the nation’s 
trade, Taguchi argued his readers should lay the blame for Japan’s predicament where it 
actually belonged, in the government’s monetary policy. To prove his point, Taguchi 
presented a theory of currency and international trade that was essentially identical to that of 
British economist David Ricardo.
480
 Like Ricardo, Taguchi began with the hypothesis that 
there was a natural proportion between the amount of money and the supply of tradable 
goods in every nation on earth.
481
  If this natural proportion stayed at a constant level the 
price of goods would remain stable and trade between nations would remain in balance. 
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Complications arose when the proportion between money and goods in any single country 
changed. If the money supply in one country suddenly increased while the amount of goods 
in that country remained constant, the value of money would decrease because money was 
plentiful and goods relatively scarce.
482
 This development would encourage imports into the 
country because goods could fetch a higher price there. Alternatively, if the money supply 
shrank, the value of money would increase because there were now more goods lying around 
than cash. This would trigger exports, because the merchants in the nation with a reduced 
money supply could fetch a higher price for their goods abroad.   
Over time, of course, either a scarcity or oversupply of money would tend to balance 
itself out. Either imports would bring in scarce goods and dispose of excess money, or 
exports would get rid of plentiful goods in exchange for much needed cash. When net exports 
and net imports persistently failed to balance, the problem could only be a monetary one. 
Taguchi’s explanation of the mechanism driving imports and exports implied that only the 
Japanese government’s issue of an excessive amount of paper notes could explain the 
persistent trade deficits. The unstated message of A Theory of the Japanese Economy was 
that a reduction in the amount of money in circulation should correct the imbalance of trade. 
If the government merely stopped printing bills the outflow of specie would eventually make 
money more scarce and goods cheaper. Imports would drop, while exports expanded.
483
 The 
only way to stop inflation was to reduce the amount of paper notes in circulation and allow 
Japan’s trade to adjust itself automatically. 
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In place of protectionist policies he believed to be deeply flawed, Taguchi offered an 
alternate method of achieving national wealth and prosperity. He argued that a massive 
injection of foreign capital could stimulate domestic industry, because a large amount of 
cheap and idle labor was waiting to be employed.
484
 Importing foreign capital would provide 
funds to many entrepreneurs who might otherwise not have access to credit to start up a 
business and would spur the growth of domestic industry.
485
  
Taguchi contended that Japan could become a great commercial power. The first hint 
of his vision for Japan’s economic future came in 1884 in an article entitled “The Measure of 
Wealth” (Tomo no Tabi) which appeared in the Tōkyō Economic Journal. Taguchi began 
with the observation that Japan’s position relative to the rest of East Asia closely resembled 
the position of Britain to Europe. Japan could play a role in Asia similar to that of Britain in 
Europe by becoming a center of international trade. He also noted that Japan served as a 
coaling station for the ships hauling freight between China and North America. This bustling 
trade between China and America was times larger than Japan’s trade with America. Taguchi 
discerned that participation in this trans-Pacific trade offered Japanese merchants a lucrative 
commercial opportunity. If Japan could somehow capture the Sino-American trade and 
ensure cargo ships that merely stopped at Japanese ports instead unloaded their cargoes in 
Japan and traded in the Japanese market, the servicing of the trade alone would bring 
tremendous wealth and prosperity to the nation.
486
 Although there would seem to be little 
compelling reason for traders in the Sino-American trade to do business in Japan when they 
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could deal with one another directly, Taguchi believed that with the proper incentives Japan 
could be transformed into the center of trans-Pacific trade 
Taguchi outlined a simple plan to realize this goal and extolled the potential benefits 
to all parties involved. To capture the Sino-American trade, Japan had to gain most favored 
nation trading status from China and obtain preferential tariff rates that would allow Japan to 
procure Chinese produced goods and commodities at a lower price than other countries. This 
arrangement would benefit all parties involved. America would be able to purchase 
inexpensive Chinese produced raw materials for its growing industries on the Japanese 
market with Japan playing the role of intermediary in securing Chinese supplies. Japan would 
gain full access to the Chinese market and the infinite commercial opportunities it offered. 
China would benefit from Japanese participation in its domestic market, because Japanese 
traders would introduce modern Western business practices and standards of ethical behavior 
to the country and serve as a positive force for reform of what Taguchi believed to be a 
business culture rife with corruption.
487
 
In short, Taguchi’s vision for Japan’s future was that of a great mercantile power 
which would acquire wealth by acting as a broker and middleman in the Asian trade, rather 
than a great industrial power. In Taguchi’s mind, it was not the productive powers of the 
nation but the position a country occupied in the international order that determined its 
prosperity. Britain, Taguchi noted was not wealthy and powerful because of the material 
richness of the nation itself but because of London’s role as the center of European and world 
trade, a place where the various products of the world were bought and sold.
488
 By attracting 
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the world’s trade to its ports, Britain could capitalize on servicing the financial and logistical 
needs of international trade and enrich itself through these mercantile activities. Taguchi 
hoped that Japan might play a similar role in Asia. 
Thus for Taguchi, Britain served not only as a source of sound economic theory but 
also as an ideal vision of what a commercial nation should be and what Japan could one day 
become. He was not so optimistic as to believe that Japan would become a “Britain of the 
East” overnight; instead he looked toward small trading nations that might serve as better 
models for Japan in the near future. He paid particular attention to the Netherlands and 
Belgium. Both were small, wealthy, and independent nations deeply involved in international 
trade. Because both nations were relatively weak militarily their status more closely 
resembled Japan’s own peripheral place in the international order than did Britain, the 
hegemonic military power.
489
 
The first practical step in realizing the dream of a great mercantile Japan for Taguchi 
was the opening of Tōkyō, the nation’s capital and largest city, as a port of international 
commerce and the city’s transformation into a world class commercial center. In the 1880s 
only six Japanese ports were open to foreign commerce: Yokohama, Kōbe, Ōsaka, Niigata, 
Hakodate, and Nagasaki.
490
 As discussed in previous chapters, Yokohama, which was close 
to Tōkyō, quickly became a hub of international trade, but the capital remained off limits to 
foreign shipping and commercial activity. Taguchi believed that Yokohama’s presence as a 
major financial and business center now held Tōkyō back from becoming a world 
commercial center. Arguing that, “…a nation’s commerce should be concentrated as much as 
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possible in a single city,” Taguchi advocated opening Tōkyō to foreign commercial shipping 
and completely renovating the city’s port facilities to accommodate more commercial 
activity.
491
 Beyond being impressed by the model of London, Taguchi’s local ties 
undoubtedly influenced his strong advocacy for making Tōkyō Japan’s commercial capital. 
A native son of the city, he had recently gained a seat on the newly formed metropolitan 
assembly. Yet there can be no doubt that given his views of the benefits of commerce for the 
nation Taguchi sincerely believed that what was good for Tōkyō would, by extension, be 
good for Japan as a whole. 
 In the context of the views of Ōkuma, Iwakura, and Maeda, Taguchi’s vision of a 
great commercial Japan paid strikingly little heed to the fate of Japan’s own domestic 
industry. This stance resulted from his staunch belief in the principles of economic liberalism. 
Taguchi opposed the protectionist ideas of industrial reformers by arguing that government 
driven attempts to reform the structure of Japan’s industries and modernize the economy 
were worse than useless. State support for infant industries would merely divert revenue from 
profitable sectors to unprofitable, inefficient industries that could not survive without state 
support. However desirable the economic transformation of Japan might be, the process had 
to occur through the work of market forces, not government intervention.  
 While Taguchi viewed the contribution of indigenous industries to the economy in a 
positive light, he had no sentimental attachment to them and emphasized that market forces 
would inevitably alter Japan’s economic landscape. Noting that some indigenous industries 
were suffering from foreign competition, he declared the collapse of Japan’s traditional 
industries might be regrettable but such economic restructuring was both unavoidable and 
necessary. Eventually the focus of economic activity would shift to the production of those 
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products in which Japan enjoyed a natural competitive advantage. Similarly he placed little 
emphasis on maintaining a capacity for manufacturing because of his belief in the 
international division of labor.  
 Ultimately, in Taguchi’s view, there were obvious limits to a prosperity based on 
production alone since no nation could ever enjoy a competitive advantage in the production 
of more than a few products. It would be more advantageous for Japanese merchants to gain 
a command of trade flows so that they could buy cheap in one country and sell dear in 
another. International commerce offered the greatest potential to enrich the nation. 
 While Taguchi presented a logical and well thought out position of economic 
liberalism, his views overlapped in intriguing ways with those of the industrial reformers and 
especially the commercial nationalists. Both Taguchi and Maeda, for example, placed great 
emphasis on commerce and access to cheap capital for industry as keys to national prosperity. 
For Maeda, commerce served a vital role in supporting domestic industry. Only when 
Japanese traders carried and sold Japanese goods abroad could the nation derive the full 
benefit of its export trade that foreign exploitation had denied. Taguchi placed an equal stress 
on commerce but he viewed it primarily as a source of wealth in and of itself. In both cases, 
however, both Taguchi and Maeda emphasized the importance of establishing Japan as an 
important player in international commerce and saw the control over the flow of goods as the 
key to wealth and prosperity. Maeda defined this control as the exercise of state power while 
Taguchi dreamed of making Japan the place to do business in Asia by attracting business to 
Japan. In both cases, however, the focus was on the creation of a commercial state that would 
actively embrace the world economy, rather than a protectionist response that sought to 
shield the domestic market until industrial development could take place. 
 210 
 
 The focus on access to cheap capital is another common thread tying Taguchi to 
Maeda. For all Taguchi’s warnings against the excess printing of currency, he ironically 
suggested that cheap credit to stimulate business activity would save Japan’s economy. Both 
Maeda and Taguchi stressed the important benefits of lowering lending costs for domestic 
businesses as a measure to make Japanese enterprises more internationally competitive. The 
main difference between the two lay in the means of providing cheap credit. Maeda hoped 
the state working through the Yokohama Specie Bank would provide low cost credit to 
producers and merchants and thereby make Japan more competitive. In contrast, Taguchi 
hoped opening up Japan fully to international capital markets was the best way to funnel 
cheap capital to business.  
 In regard to industrial reformers, Taguchi rejected Ōkuma’s diagnosis of the nation’s 
economic ills in blaming trade deficits for inflation and the need for state-led industrial 
restructuring. Taguchi instead criticized the finance minister’s loose monetary policy as the 
main cause of inflation. Still, Taguchi agreed with Ōkuma on the benefits of importing 
foreign capital to provide cheap financing for Japanese enterprises. 
 
Conclusion 
 The inflation crisis of the late 1870s triggered a lively debate over foreign trade and 
its relationship to Japan’s economic problems. In the midst of this debate an ideology of 
commercial nationalism that advocated the promotion of direct trade and the recovery of 
commercial rights as the cure to the nation’s economic ills emerged.  The idea that inflation 
was caused by the abuse and exploitation of Japan by Western merchants transformed the 
concept of direct trade into something more than a mere economic issue and made direct 
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trade and commercial rights a integral part of the quest for equality with the West in the 
minds of some intellectuals, officials, and businessmen. With the debate over foreign trade in 
the late1870s, the idea of direct trade developed into a program capable of sustaining a 
popular nationalist movement, as will become clear in the next chapter.  
 Advocates began to devise a comprehensive program to achieve direct trade. Maeda 
Masana, who would pay a key role in the movement as the pre-eminent theorist of direct 
trade, created a set of policies designed to establish an independent commercial network free 
of Western dominance which could deliver and sell Japanese goods to foreign markets. 
Maeda proposed state subsidized financing for direct trade through specially created banks 
and the creation of state supported trade companies which would serve as bridges between 
Japanese producers and Western consumers. Although some elements of Maeda’s program 
were perhaps too ambitious to put into practice, his vision of a type of quasi-managed trade 
with strong state support for producers provided an attractive vision for small producers in 
Japan’s indigenous industries.    
 The commercial nationalism of Maeda and other direct trade advocates was not the 
only school of thought concerning foreign trade or economic policy. Some officials, such as 
Ōkuma believed that high inflation reflected structural problems in Japan’s foreign trade due 
to Japan’s relative economic underdevelopment. Advocates of this theory urged the 
strengthening of the Japanese economy through a series of protective industrial policies 
which would nurture new industries. This idea of industrial reform would exercise a strong 
hold over Japanese policy makers in the coming decades, yet the idea held little attraction to 
the bulk of Japan’s entrepreneurs running small and medium sized businesses. Enthusiasm 
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for industrial reform would therefore center on a group of reform minded civil servants and 
elite urban businessmen. 
 Economic liberalism also made its public debut as an intellectual force for the first 
time in the debates over inflation and foreign trade in the 1870s. Unlike commercial 
nationalists or industrial reformers, the economic liberals, such as Taguchi, argued that both 
inflation and trade deficits were the result of lax monetary policy. They contended that if the 
government reduced the money supply to an appropriate amount, market forces would bring 
Japan’s trade into balance. Although the perspective of these economic liberals on policies 
toward international trade differed from that of the commercial nationalists, the former 
shared the latter’s desire to transform Japan into a great commercial power and belief that 
commerce would bring national prosperity. Despite the impressively tightly reasoned 
arguments of advocates, such as Taguchi, economic liberalism held little attraction for 
entrepreneurs in Japan’s indigenous industries who did not view freedom of trade as one of 
their primary problems. The implicit cosmopolitanism of laissez-faire economic liberalism 
also made its ideals less attractive to a Japanese public sensitive to its apparent subservience 
to the Western powers and eager for a show of national strength. Economic liberalism was 
not yet ready to offer a compelling alternative vision to inspire a popular movement.  
 Finally, this analysis of the debate over inflation has suggested the complexity of 
economic thought in early Meiji Japan. Examining the economic ideas of that period in 
simple binary terms such as “positive” and “negative” policies (as described in the 
introduction of this chapter) will not suffice. There were, for example, at least three different 
approaches to interpreting the causes of inflation and positing solutions to it. Moreover, lines 
could blur between aspects of the three approaches.  
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In any event, the approach of the commercial nationalists represented by Maeda 
gained enough traction to spawn a national movement that included intellectuals, officials, 
and entrepreneurs. It was, indeed, perhaps the first national movement to enlist support from 
what one might call an emerging business community in Japan. The dynamics of the rise and 
ultimate fall of this movement revealed much about the process of determining national 
economic policy in early Meiji Japan and the nature of the state in that era.
  
 
CHAPTER 5: 
Profits and Patriotism: the direct trade movement and the improvisation of economic 
policy 
 
 An editorial in the Tōkyō daily newspaper, the Yūbin Hōchi Shinbun, hailed it as, 
“one of the most splendid undertakings that has been mooted since our country opened to 
foreign intercourse,” and promised that, “it will without fail, enable our country to derive 
great benefit from trade.”492 The spending undertaking to which the Hōchi Shinbun referred 
was the creation of a new trade company, christened with the rather unimaginative name, the 
Trade Company (Bōeki Shōkai), by a group of Tōkyō based businessmen. The founding of a 
new company was not a rare occurrence in Meiji Japan and while any group of entrepreneurs 
might expect a few lines in the major Tōkyō paper if they announced a new business venture, 
few could expect an extended editorial in a major newspaper full of the kind of flowery 
praise that the Hōchi Shinbun heaped upon the Trade Company. At first glance an entire 
editorial devoted to the founding of a new company no doubt seemed odd to the newspaper’s 
readership. 
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 Yet the Hōchi Shinbun was willing to devote a significant amount of column space to 
discuss the company’s creation because its editors believed that the event signaled a vitally 
important first step in recovery of Japan’s economic sovereignty. Noting the lamentable state 
of Japan’s trade, the newspaper informed its readers that, “From the very commencement of 
Japan being opened to foreign intercourse…foreign merchants have invariably acted on the 
aggressive and increased their influence over our commerce.”493 The newly founded Trade 
Company promised to reverse this trend by creating direct links between Japanese 
entrepreneurs and the consumers of Japanese goods overseas, thus, “…securing the means 
now possessed by foreigners of monopolizing the benefits of our trade…”494 If the Trade 
Company proved successful and similar ventures followed, eventually, the Hōchi Shinbun 
speculated, “…it will not be difficult to achieve the premier position of England which 
always gains profit from her commerce.”495 Because the company proposed to operate 
abroad and engage directly in trade with foreign countries, the editors believed that it 
signaled the first step toward the commercial revival of the nation. 
 The founding of the Trade Company in the summer of 1880 and the Hōchi Shinbun 
article that announced this news were two examples of growing enthusiasm for the idea of 
direct trade among businessmen, civil servants, and the general public. Until the last few 
years of the 1870s direct trade had been little more than a vague goal half-heartedly pursued 
through a set of impromptu policies. Toward the end of the 1870s, however, this situation 
began to change. As if suddenly seized by a fever, businessmen and bureaucrats excitedly 
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discussed the prospects for direct trade and launched a series of new initiatives to promote 
Japanese exports and the extension of Japanese controlled commercial networks abroad. At 
the same time calls for Japanese patriots to raise up and challenge foreign merchants’ control 
over Japan’s international trade through the pursuit of direct trade began to emanate from the 
popular press and the general public. In a short time direct trade transformed from an abstract 
concept to a nation-wide campaign to reclaim the nation’s “commercial rights.”A direct trade 
movement was now in full swing.  
  The emerging direct trade movement was the result of a confluence of several 
different developments in the last years of the 1870s. Informing the new movement was a 
sense of crisis and urgency caused by anxieties over inflation, as explained in Chapter 4, and 
a sense that stabilizing the economy required drastic measures. Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, officials such as Maeda Masana developed a thoughtful rationale and a 
comprehensive program for implementing direct trade, which included national trade 
companies. Nationalist sentiment and a burning desire to overturn the status quo established 
by the “unequal treaties” which relegated Japan to the status of a second class nation were 
also driving forces behind the movement which promised to give Japan’s people control over 
their own economic destiny. The movement was also in part a reaction to the emergence of 
the Mitsui Trading Company and the Hoshino brothers’ silk business (see Chapter 3) which 
suggested that direct trade offered the adventurous entrepreneur an opportunity for profit.  
 While all these factors helped to bring direct trade to public attention as both a viable 
solution to pressing economic problems and an effective method for reclaiming the nation’s 
“commercial rights,” those participating in the push for direct trade joined the fray for a 
variety of reasons. Government officials saw direct trade as a remedy for inflation as well as 
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a way to promote the nation’s long term economic development. Urban entrepreneurs 
believed direct trade promised an attractive ideal business opportunity which offered both 
lucrative profits and a chance to strike a blow against the foreign merchant oppressor. 
Producers in the Japan’s indigenous industries saw direct trade as a way of escaping the 
hierarchal networks of merchant middlemen who dominated the domestic trade in Japanese 
export goods and capture a larger slice of the profits generated for their goods for themselves. 
Ordinary Japanese saw direct trade as part of a wider campaign to enable their country to 
gain a position of equality with the Western powers. The broad attraction of direct trade gave 
the movement a constituency that included a large portion of Japanese society. 
 The direct trade movement also occurred at a critical time when the Meiji regime was 
beginning its slow transition from an autocratic to a constitutional state.  In 1881 the 
oligarchs promised the enactment of a constitution within ten years, a pledge they kept. An 
examination of this sudden movement for direct trade reveals much about the relationship 
between business and the state in this transitional period and how economic policy developed. 
First, the direct trade movement shows that despite possessing autocratic powers government 
officials did not play a dominant role in developing economic policy or in guiding the 
development of private industry as some scholars have suggested. Instead, state and business 
pushed and pulled each another in complex ways and were able to influence one another to 
the degree that it is impossible to declare that either party set the agenda for economic policy. 
Private individuals could shape the direction of government policy through offering advice to 
important officials, volunteering to assist the state in the realization of important projects, or 
petitioning state agencies. Government policy in turn could influence the behavior of 
business through offering incentives. 
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 Within the push and pull between businessmen, intellectuals, and businessmen over 
direct trade a set of new institutions and policies to promote Japanese exports emerged, but 
these measures to promote direct trade were still mostly ad-hoc measures. While the Meiji 
state did adopt several important policies to promote Japanese exports and direct trade and 
provided funding for Japanese exporters, these policies came about almost by coincidence 
rather than as the product of a concerted or well thought-out strategy for economic 
development. Although some officials did possess an overall vision of economic policy that 
would prove inspiring to advocates of direct trade, these visions were not what drove policy.  
 Finally, an examination of the direct trade movement reveals emerging divisions and 
tensions between different actors who were all ostensibly united in a common drive to 
promote direct trade and committed to the recovery of the nation’s commercial rights. 
Although the state, urban merchants, and producers in Japan’s silk industry all became 
enthusiastic supporters of direct trade and sought to promote direct trade as part of a patriotic 
mission, the motives and agenda of each actor were slightly different in each case. 
Understanding the variety of motives behind policies to promote direct trade is necessary to 
understand why policies evolved in the manner that they did. Realizing that actors with a 
shared sense of patriotic mission also might, nevertheless, have conflicting motives for 
advocating direct trade also reminds us that a mere surface level examination of the rhetoric 
of Meiji era economic policy can often give a misleading impression of unity of purpose and 
coherence in the efforts of different economic actors when, in fact, no such unity or 
coherence existed.  
 
Fukuzawa Yukichi, Ōkuma Shigenobu and Currency Stabilization 
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 One of the most important government sponsored initiatives to promote direct trade 
and a key component of the direct trade movement arose as a byproduct of the late 1870s 
debate over what to do about inflation. As we have seen in the previous chapter there was a 
lively debate about the causes of inflation and the relationship between inflation and 
recurring foreign trade deficits. The person who exercised the strongest influence over the 
Meiji government’s economic policy at the time, Ōkuma Shigenobu, supported the view of 
the “industrial reformers” who believed that the only effective long-term cure for halting 
inflation and eliminating trade deficits lay in a fundamental reform of the Japanese economy 
which would upgrade Japan’s industrial structure and transform the nation into a 
manufacturer of high value-added products. 
 The main problem with Ōkuma’s ambitious plan for transforming the Japanese 
economy was that it did not offer a quick way of halting inflation. The development of a 
strong manufacturing sector that could seriously compete with foreign industry and reduce 
the amount of imports would take years, if not decades. Ōkuma’s idea of erecting tariff 
barriers to keep out foreign goods would simply be impossible until Japan was able to 
renegotiate the commercial treaties with the Western powers and remove the treaty enforced 
restrictions on tariff rates, something no one expected to happen in the near future. Despite 
the determined rhetoric stressing industrial development in Ōkuma’s policy proposals, the 
reality was that he desperately needed a set of immediate measures to curb inflation and 
stabilize the value of paper currency. 
 In his search for a quick solution to curb inflation Ōkuma found a powerful ally in the 
prominent intellectual and author, Fukuzawa Yukichi. Already a leading scholar of “Dutch 
studies” (Rangaku) in the final years of the Tokugawa bakufu, Fukuzawa had established 
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himself as Japan’s foremost expert on all things Western with the publication of his 
multivolume bestseller, Conditions of the West (Seiyō Jijō), the first volume of which 
appeared in 1867.
496
 Deeply concerned about the problem of inflation, Fukuzawa would in 
the last years of the 1870s become both an important advisor to Ōkuma and a key agent in 
the formulation and implementation of his commercial policies.  
 Fukuzawa and Ōkuma’s collaboration on economic policy began in 1878 when the 
problem of inflation was just beginning to attract public attention. Believing that a lack of 
public confidence in paper currency was the main cause of inflation, Fukuzawa determined 
that in order to restore the public’s faith someone had to convince the public of the soundness 
of paper money. Fukuzawa wrote Ōkuma to declare his intent to write a short tract on the 
theory of currency in order dispel poplar misconceptions about the proper function of 
currency. He asked Ōkuma to have the Ministry of Finance supply him with relevant 
statistics about the issuance of paper currency in both Japan and the West.
497
 Ōkuma gladly 
supplied the figures. 
 Armed with Ōkuma’s statistics, Fukuzawa published a short book on currency in late 
1878 entitled, A Theory of Currency (Tsūkaron). The book did not overtly endorse Ōkuma’s 
monetary policies, but Fukuzawa’s main message placed Ōkuma’s policies in a favorable 
light. The book’s strong condemnation of utilizing precious metals as currency and advocacy 
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of replacing gold and silver coin with a paper fiat currency indirectly supported Ōkuma’s 
relatively loose monetary policy.  
 In his work, Fukuzawa endeavored to prove to his readers that the real value of any 
currency lay solely in its utility as a method of exchange and that in terms of utility, paper 
cash was far superior to gold or silver coin. Not only could paper serve as a medium of 
exchange equally well as precious metal coins, but paper had the added advantage of being 
cheap and easy to produce. In contrast, gold and silver were merely “lumps of suffering” 
(kutsu no katamari), or metals whose sole value lay in the fact that they required the costly 
expenditure of labor and energy to obtain both in mining the raw material and minting them 
into coin.
498
 
 The advantages of a paper currency were so clearly obvious that Fukuzawa argued 
the continued use of specie in the economy could not be explained by anything other than an 
irrational attachment to gold and silver originating in a more primitive era of human 
history.
499
 Any civilized and rational society would view the use of gold and silver money as 
a wasteful and barbaric practice that condemned otherwise useful labor to waste away in dark 
mines to dig out shiny, decorative metals which had no real practical use.
500
 Fukuzawa 
proposed that it would be much better to do away with gold and silver coin entirely and rely 
on paper bills as the sole method of exchange. Several of Japan’s feudal domains in the 
Tokugawa period had in fact done away with gold and silver coin and created functioning 
economies based on the circulation of paper currency. Citing the success of paper bills in his 
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home domain of Nakatsu in Kyūshū, Fukuzawa informed his readers that a well-functioning 
currency system based on paper was possible.
501
 
 Although a nation could ban the use of gold and silver coin in the domestic economy 
with no ill effects, Fukuzawa admitted that there was one area in which paper currency could 
not yet operate effectively as a medium of exchange. This area was foreign trade. Even if 
Japan could easily replace specie with paper currency in its domestic economy, foreign 
merchants would be unlikely to accept Japanese paper currency as payment for their goods 
and would continue to demand gold and silver coin. The nation would therefore always need 
some reserves of precious metals to fund its foreign trade. Fukuzawa lamented this situation 
by comparing the use of precious metals in international trade to the maintenance of standing 
armies by the world’s nations, a regrettable reality of international relations where the 
enlightened principles of civilization had not yet conquered the savage instincts of “strong-
eat-the-weak” (jyaku-niku kyō-shoku) diplomacy.502  
 The need to maintain gold and silver reserves would not, however, necessarily have 
to impose a great burden on the national economy, provided those reserves were well 
managed. Fukuzawa posited that if Japan’s trade were carefully balanced, the reserves 
necessary to service foreign trade might actually be miniscule.
503
 Assuming a regular flow of 
specie could be maintained, one could expect that payments of specie for imports and the 
intake of specie as income from exports would largely cancel each other out. Thus a 
relatively small fund of silver might be sufficient to provide the entire demand for payments 
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in foreign trade. In this observation lay the seeds of what would become the centerpiece of 
Ōkuma’s commercial policies, the Yokohama Specie Bank. 
  
  
From Silver to Trade: the Yokohama Specie Bank and the exchange loan fund 
 Soon after it was founded in 1880, the Yokohama Specie Bank became both the 
single most important tool the government utilized in promoting Japanese exports and a key 
pillar supporting the direct trade movement. Ironically, however, the bank’s assumption of 
these prominent roles occurred largely by accident, because the bank did not emerge as the 
product of the grand designs of any single individual, social group, or government agency. 
Instead it resulted from efforts of several actors all with different and oftentimes conflicting 
ideas about what they wished to accomplish by creating the bank. As a result, its rapid 
evolution from the “silver bank” that Fukuzawa envisioned would help stabilize silver prices 
to a vehicle for promoting direct exports evolved from conflicts and compromises between 
the bank’s founders and their competing goals. In this sense, the Yokohama Specie Bank was 
not only a key component of the direct trade movement, but also was an example of the 
accidental, unplanned, and haphazard fashion in which national economic policy developed 
under Ōkuma leadership. 
 Fukuzawa biographer Norio Tamaki argues that the Yokohama Specie Bank, “was 
Fukuzawa’s brainchild.”504 Indeed, there is no question that Fukuzawa was the intellectual 
driving force behind the bank’s founding. Following the suggestions he outlined for 
regulating specie flows in A Theory of Currency, Fukuzawa urged Ōkuma in a series of 
letters to take steps first to suppress domestic demand for silver, because currency 
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speculation caused high silver prices. Arguing that a sudden increase in supply would be 
enough to stop speculators and stabilize silver prices, he suggested that Ōkuma might be able 
to cool the speculative fever for silver by selling off a million dollars’ worth of Mexican 
silver coins held in the government reserves.
505
 Fukuzawa urged Ōkuma to guard against 
future increases in silver prices by careful use of government reserves and management of 
the money supply.
506
 In order to use silver reserves to manipulate prices and supply, 
Fukuzawa recommended the creation of a new bank to oversee monetary management.
507
 
  Although some scholars argue Fukuzawa authored many of Ōkuma’s economic 
policies, most of Fukuzawa’s recommendations to Ōkuma probably served only to convince 
Ōkuma to adopt or continue courses of action he already favored. By the time Fukuzawa 
wrote to urge Ōkuma to find ways of stabilizing silver prices, the Ministry of Finance under 
Ōkuma’s direction had already established official silver exchange markets in Tōkyō, Ōsaka, 
and Yokohama with the aim of making silver coin more easily obtainable and reduce 
anxieties about silver shortages by centralizing silver trading in formal markets.
508
 Clearly, 
Ōkuma was already thinking along lines similar to those of Fukuzawa even before Fukuzawa 
began providing unsolicited advice on monetary policy. On the other hand, Fukuzawa’s 
recommendation to sell off over a million yen of silver coin held in government reserves may 
have prompted Ōkuma to make the disastrous decision to sell over 2.4 million yen worth of 
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silver from government reserves later the same year. This measure ended up depleting 
government reserves without making any lasting impact on the price of silver.
509
 Fukuzawa 
did not create all of Ōkuma’s policies but he did influence at least some of them. 
 The founding of the Yokohama Specie Bank is one instance where Fukuzawa, along 
with a group of his associates, was able to wield decisive influence over government policy. 
The Ministry of Finance had begun work on drafting a proposal for the creation of a state-
backed trade bank which was supposed to both help promote exports and help stabilize silver 
prices, but Fukuzawa was able to convince Ōkuma throw his support behind a private 
venture to create a “silver bank.” 510 Two close associates of Fukuzawa, Nakamura Michita 
and Hayashi Yuteki, headed this project to seek a safe way to profit from rising silver prices. 
Ōkuma scrapped plans for a trade bank to create a unique bank which would deal solely in 
silver and serve as a secure place for holders of silver coin to store their wealth. 
 Fukuzawa’s relationship with Nakamura Michita and Hayashi Yuteki began at the 
Keiō academy. In addition to being a bestselling author and prominent intellectual, Fukuzawa 
founded a private academy, the Keiō Gijuku, in 1871 which was the forerunner of the 
modern day Keiō University.511 Fukuzawa’s academy offered its students valuable training in 
Western languages, and Western learning. Both Nakamura and Hayashi studied at 
Fukuzawa’s academy and had attracted Fukuzawa’s attention for their linguistic and 
mathematical skills.  
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 Because of the strong emphasis Fukuzawa placed on the practical application of 
Western learning, the Keiō academy became an incubator for entrepreneurs.  Convinced that 
that Japan’s future would depend upon an active and independent entrepreneurial class, he 
began encouraging his students to take up careers in business. Despite this lofty goal, 
however, Fukuzawa’s initial interest in business was also motivated by more practical 
concerns. In running a private academy teaching Western knowledge to students, Fukuzawa 
quickly realized he needed a cheap and reliable way of obtaining Western texts for his 
students at the academy to study. The task of obtaining Western books cheaply fell on a 
group of Fukuzawa’s students who eventually founded the Maruzen Company, a trading firm 
specializing in importing books and Western medicine.
512
 
 In addition to being his students, Nakamura Michita and Hayahsi Yuteki were both 
involved with the Maruzen Company. Hayashi traded a career in medicine for business when 
he founded the company with Fukuzawa’s encouragement. As the company’s president he 
oversaw the day-to-day management of the firm’s business.513 Nakamura served as one of the 
firm’s chief accountants.514 The two men enjoyed modestly successful business careers but 
engaging in the import trade during a time of rampant silver inflation proved to be a 
challenge. As a business that specialized in importing Western goods, Maruzen was in 
constant need of Mexican silver dollars to pay for those goods. 
 Procuring silver at a time when silver prices were constantly increasing, however, 
proved vexingly difficult. Nakamura and Hayashi had lost large sums of money while 
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speculating in the volatile silver market. After suffering financial losses the two began 
seeking a safer way to secure silver dollars and profit from rising silver prices. Nakamura and 
Hayashi hit upon the idea of creating a bank which would issue short term loans in silver or 
paper currency to Yokohama merchants and collect loan payments and interest in specie. If 
their bank could readily exchange silver for paper on demand, they could gain safe profits 
through fees and interest payments on loans.
515
 Yet the real benefit of the plan was that 
Nakamura and Hayashi’s bank would receive all its profits in silver specie and, in the process, 
solve their problems in procuring silver. 
 When Fukuzawa learned of Nakamura and Hayashi’s plan to found a bank dealing in 
silver he began to lobby Ōkuma suggesting the government support his former 
students’project. Another former student, Koizumi Nobukichi, who had entered the Ministry 
of Finance a few years before, served as an intermediary between Fukuzawa and Ōkuma.516 
Judging from Fukuzawa’s letters to Ōkuma, it appears Ōkuma sought out Fukuzawa’s advice 
on the government’s plans to create a trade bank. Fukuzawa, noting that he had spoken to 
Koizumi about the “bank matter,” recommended that Ōkuma entrust the creation of detailed 
plans to Koizumi and Nakakamigawa Hikojirō (another former student of Fukuzawa).517 
After conversations with Koizumi on the matter of creating a bank, Fukuzawa urged Ōkuma 
to allow his former students Nakamura Michita and Hayashi Yūteki to head the effort to 
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create a specie bank.
518
 Within a month government plans for a trade bank gave way to the 
private venture led by a Nakamura and Hayashi. 
 The lengths to which Fukuzawa went in lobbying for Ōkuma’s support for his former 
students is readily evident in his letters to Ōkuma. On more than one occasion, Fukuzawa 
had to stress to a seemingly reluctant Ōkuma that his former student, Nakamura Michita, was 
an able choice to head the effort to create a bank.
519
 Fukuzawa emphasized that Nakamura’s 
wide connections inside the business community would enable him to attract a significant 
amount of capital from wealthy investors.
520
 This strategy would have the dual advantage of 
allowing the government to create a silver bank with a minimum of investment of its own 
resources and also help draw hoarded silver out of the pockets of the wealthy in return for 
shares in the new bank.  
 The bank that Fukuzawa envisioned and Nakamura and Hayashi were striving to 
create was different from what the Ministry of Finance had originally planned. Fukuzawa 
believed that businessmen were hoarding a significant amount of the nation’s silver stock as 
a way to guard themselves against losses due to the continuing decline of the paper currency. 
If a silver bank began operating hoarders might entrust their silver to the bank in the hope of 
gaining more profit from their holdings and thus put “inactive” hoarded silver back into 
circulation. This action would lower silver prices and stem the decline of value of the paper 
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currency.
521
 Nakamura and Hayashi also expected the bank to turn a tidy profit in the process. 
Although financing trade and promoting Japanese exports was a secondary part of the agenda, 
the enterprise Fukuzawa and his associates sought to create would primarily function as a 
silver bank which would deal exclusively in specie. 
 Nakamura travelled around the country trying to drum up investor interest in the 
venture. For potential investors, the plan for the silver bank had several potential advantages. 
Hints of tacit government backing for the scheme made investing in the bank a relatively safe 
prospect. A bank dealing exclusively in silver would also provide a safe and convenient way 
to access and store silver which was useful for importers and exporters. There was enough 
interest in investing in the bank that Fukuzawa even worried that the bank venture was 
beginning to attract attention from “unsavory businessmen” who might purchase bank stock 
in the hopes of quickly flipping their shares to earn a quick profit.
522
 
 Although Nakamura was able to secure promises of significant investment from 
important businessmen, Fukuzawa argued that to ensure the venture was a success the 
government should place large deposits with the bank. Fukuzawa wrote Ōkuma arguing this 
measure would increase public confidence in the bank and make it more effective as a central 
clearinghouse for the nation’s silver.523 Creating a bank required large amounts of capital, 
especially large reserves of silver coin which would enable to bank to act as a reliable supply 
of silver.  
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 The details of the plan were then hashed out between Nakamura, Hayashi and the 
Ministry of Finance. Nakamura and Hayashi sent a series of proposals to the Ministry 
seeking approval of their new bank. Both men claimed it would promote trade and help solve 
the problem of specie shortage, two key goals of Ōkuma’s policies. Suggesting that the initial 
capital for the venture should be 3 million yen, Nakamura and Hayashi asked the government 
to invest 1 million yen in the venture with the expectation that private capital would provide 
the remaining 2 million yen. They also requested that the bank be authorized to issue bank 
notes which would be redeemable in silver coin.
524
 
 The Ministry of Finance accepted the plan with significant modifications. In return 
for the government investment in the bank, Ōkuma demanded that the government possess 
far-reaching supervisory powers over the bank’s business. The government would have the 
right to appoint a supervisor who could attend all bank board meetings, inspect the bank’s 
books and report to government officials on the state of the bank’s business. He also 
demanded that the government be able to exercise veto powers over the selection of the 
bank’s board members. Finally, he rejected Nakamura and Hayashi’s request to issue 
banknotes. Ōkuma feared that allowing the bank to issue its own notes would have 
effectively negated the bank’s role as a “silver bank” and made it little different from the 
established national banks which proved to be some of the primary sources of inflated paper 
currency. Instead he suggested the bank hold government bonds which were redeemable in 
specie. The bank could sell these back to the government in exchange for silver coin when 
needed.
525
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 With these changes the bank received a charter and opened for business as the 
Yokohama Specie Bank (Specie Bank) in 1880. By providing a secure place to store silver 
coins and a ready source of silver specie for those who needed silver to conduct commercial 
transactions, this new bank was supposed to help stabilize the price of silver currency by 
removing anxieties about a possible scarcity of silver in the market. For Nakamura and 
Hayashi, the bank was supposed to be a relatively safe and secure way of turning a profit 
from servicing the financial needs of those who needed quick access to silver. Yet it soon 
became clear that stabilizing silver prices would not be easy. 
 Within one month of its opening, the Specie Bank ran into trouble. Ironically, one of 
the biggest problems the bank encountered was a lack of demand for silver. Bank officials 
also complained that high silver prices were “killing off trade” as both import merchants in 
Japan and foreign buyers of Japanese goods held off on making purchases until silver prices 
declined.  Analyzing the source of the bank’s problems for stockholders at the bank’s first 
shareholder meeting, Namakura argued that the currency situation in Japan was rapidly 
changing. Most commercial exchanges in the country were now almost exclusively using 
debased paper currency. Traders were using silver coin primarily just as collateral or surety 
to secure loans.
526In short, the silver the bank held was largely sitting in the Specie Bank’s 
vaults as depositors collected interest payments. Exclusively dealing in silver would not yield 
the profits necessary to keep the bank afloat. 
 Realizing the need to expand their business, Nakamura and other bank officials saw 
great potential in providing exchange services for Japanese merchants even if these deals did 
not involve silver. By dealing in paper currency and financing exporters, the bank could 
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capture a portion of the rich profits the export trade offered.  Yet to expand into commercial 
loans in paper currency, the bank would need to receive government approval. The 
Yokohama Specie Bank thus lobbied the government for an injection of capital for the 
promotion of Japanese exports. The Specie Bank’s officers proposed to start lending to 
merchants dealing in tea and silk exports using the goods those merchants intended to export 
as surety. The bank would make loans in paper currency and insist on repayment in specie.
527
 
 Ōkuma and the Ministry of Finance saw this option as a welcome chance to create a 
mechanism to promote Japanese exports. In 1878 Maeda Masana in the Ministry of Finance 
had proposed the creation of a trade bank which would lend to exporters and the Yokohama 
Specie Bank’s founders’ initial request had made a vague pledge to “gradually recover our 
commercial rights in the field of foreign exchange.”528 The Meiji government decided to 
approve the Yokohama Specie Bank’s request to issue loans in paper to exporters and 
deposited 800,000 yen with the bank. This was the beginning of the bank’s exchange loan 
(gaikoku ni-kawase) and cargo loan (ni-kawase) programs. As a condition for this support, 
the Ministry of Finance stipulated that the Specie Bank could use the money only to supply 
low interest rate loans to exporters. The government also required the bank to create separate 
“specie” and “paper currency” divisions to ensure that the administration of these 
government funds remained separate from the rest of the bank’s business.529  
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 This initial deposit quickly expanded. Within a few months the loan fund was 
increased to 3 million yen and then 4 million yen within a year.
530
 The bulk of these funds 
supported exchange loans to Japanese merchants and firms that intended to engage in direct 
trade by shipping and selling their goods abroad. Profits from sales abroad would return to 
Yokohama Specie Bank branches abroad or the nearest Japanese consulate which would 
remit the money to the Yokohama Specie Bank.
531
 The bank’s main office would then 
distribute any remaining profits to the seller back in Japan after subtracting amounts to cover 
repayment of the loan and any fees. 
 Roughly 1.2 million of the 4 million yen fund went to cargo loans which provided 
loans for producers and small merchants in Japan’s interior to cover expenses involved in 
shipping export goods to the treaty ports.
532
 The exports --typically silk, tea or other goods 
produced by Japan’s indigenous industries--were to serve as surety for the loans. Although 
the cargo loan fund was a much smaller project than the exchange loan program, cargo loans 
provided a vital source of financing for small and medium sized producers who wished to 
participate in direct trade.
 533
 The program also allowed regional producers a degree of 
independence from local merchants by enabling them to ship their own goods to the treaty 
ports.  
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 The two loan programs, which began in early 1881, represented Ōkuma’s most 
important achievement in promoting exports. One must realize, however that the creation of 
the 3 million yen fund, which direct exporters would use heavily, evolved through trial and 
error. The Yokohama Specie Bank’s original mission was to stabilize silver prices, but the 
practical need to turn a profit and officials’ ambitions to promote the export trade slowly 
transformed the Yokohama Specie Bank into a trade bank, a development which they had 
anticipated but never planned. 
 
The Salad Days of Direct Trade 
 The creation of a strong government sponsored incentive in the form of cheap loans 
from the Yokohama Specie Bank proved decisive in motivating ambitious entrepreneurs to 
engage in direct trade. The availability of cheap credit and the potential for large profits as 
demonstrated by the success of early direct trading ventures proved too tempting to pass up. 
In 1880 a series of new trading companies sprang up in rapid succession, all of them 
proclaiming their intent to venture abroad to seek profit. The entrepreneurs who founded 
these companies were unquestionably opportunists seeking riches but they also proclaimed 
their patriotic intent to aid the cause of “recovering” the nation’s “trading rights” by 
eliminating foreign merchant intermediaries from Japan’s foreign trade. Although a cynic 
might dismiss such proclamations as merely a cover for the pursuit of self-interest, such 
proclamations tapped into a deep seated nationalist resentment toward Western merchant 
capital that helped to justify the direct trade movement in the eyes of many Japanese. 
 To understand the economic significance of the direct trade movement one should 
think of it as consisting of two distinct components. The first component consisted of what 
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one might term urban outsider firms. They were formed by groups of urban based 
businessmen who were highly educated and well connected to government and high finance 
but were outsiders in the sense that they were rivals to the Yokohama export merchants who 
were dominating Japan’s foreign trade through their dealings with foreign merchants. These 
businessmen hoped to exploit their knowledge and contacts to engage in direct trade in an 
attempt to establish a presence in the lucrative silk and tea trades. For these entrepreneurs 
direct trade was a way of tapping into cheap credit from provided by the Yokohama Specie 
Bank’s cargo loan program and using the bank’s exchange loans to export goods directly to 
foreign markets.  
 The second component of the direct trade movement was the campaign to create local 
cooperatives of silk and tea producers in Japan’s interior. The drive to create cooperatives 
primarily came from rural elites who served as self-appointed leaders to tea and silk 
industries in their respective locales. These local elites sought to organize local small 
producers into cooperatives to engage in direct trade for two reasons. First, direct trade with 
foreign markets offered the opportunity of bypassing both sets of middlemen in Yokohama, 
the Japanese export merchants and the foreign merchants. In their quest to eliminate these 
middlemen, the interests of producer cooperatives aligned with those of urban outsider firms, 
but the most active members of the direct trade movement sought to create their own silk 
trading firm, the Mutual Advancement Company which would function as the trading arm of 
the nation’s cooperatives. Selling directly to foreign customers would allow producers to 
reap the bulk of the profits from silk and tea sales that those merchants otherwise would have 
captured. Second, producers hoped to invest some of the cheap credit the government 
promised to extend to direct traders in improving the quality of local products in order to 
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improve their reputation and raise their prices. By creating higher quality silk and tea for 
export, local elites hoped to fully exploit demand in foreign markets. 
 
A Typical Urban “Outsider” Firm: the Trade Company 
 A typical example of the urban merchant “outsider” firm was the Trade Company 
(Bōeki Shōkai) founded in 1880. Yet another project initiated by associates of Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, it manifested all the distinctive characteristics of the urban “outsider” firm. 
Members of the Trade Company’s corporate board and shareholders came from highly 
educated urban residents who had close contacts with the government and the financial world. 
The company sought to capitalize on exchange loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank to 
engage in direct trade and reap large profits. Finally, the firm made loud public 
pronouncements of its patriotic mission to free Japan’s trade from the chains of foreign 
control. 
 Clearly, Fukuzawa had a strong influence on the venture. Five out of seven founding 
members whose names appeared in the company prospectus had close connections to 
Fukuzawa. His former student, Hayashi Yūteki, became the first president of the Trade 
Company in 1880.
534
 Nakamura Michita and Koizumi Nobukichi, who had become the 
president and vice president, respectively, of the Yokohama Specie Bank, invested heavily in 
the firm.
535
 
 Some observers believed that the Iwasaki family that headed the Mitsubishi firm, also 
backed the Trade Company. Although on paper there were no clear links between the Trade 
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Company and Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi’s owner, Iwasakai Yatarō, had a close relationship with 
Fukuzawa. He had helped the Iwasakis purchase a coal mine in Kyūshū from ex-government 
official turned entrepreneur Gotō Shōjirō in 1879 by acting as a mediator between the two 
parties. Rumors suggested that Iwasaki had invested 80,000 yen in the Trade Company 
through the agency of former Mitsubishi employees who quit the firm to join the Trade 
Company.
536
 The main reason for this investment would have been to diversify the family’s 
business activities beyond shipping into trade. As discussed in Chapter 3, another wealthy 
family, the Mitsuis, had already created a trading company, Mitsui Trading, in 1876. Iwasaki 
Yatarō may have wanted to keep his investment secret to escape possible criticism of 
benefitting too much from government largess. Because the Mitsubishi firm owed much of 
its early success to generous subsidies from the Meiji government in return for expanding 
Japanese shipping, he perhaps feared revealing how profitable those contracts had been.  
 The most solid link between the Trading Company and the Iwasaki family was 
Asabuki Eiji, who became the manager of the firm. Asabuki was one of Fukuzawa’s former 
Keio pupils who had become a manager at Mitsubishi. Although, Hayashi Shiteki was 
appointed the president of the Trade Company, Asabuki became the company’s chief of 
operations.  The choice of Asabuki in this post likely resulted from a compromise between 
the Iwasakis and Fukuzawa’s Keio students. The Iwasaki family could trust their former 
employee to guard Mitsubishi interests and Fukuzawa’s pupils could be confident in having a 
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former classmate at the helm of the company.
537
 Management of the company thus appears to 
have been evenly divided between Fukuzawa allies and Mitsubishi interests.
538
  
 For Fukuzawa and his associates, the creation of a new, large-scale trading company 
that could capitalize on access to cheap credit provided by the Yokohama Specie Bank 
offered an attractive opportunity for personal profit. In his study of the Trading Company, 
Historian Kiyama Minoru has not only noted the significant overlap in the membership of the 
boards of the Trade Company and the Yokohama Specie Bank, but he has also suggested the 
enterprise seemed specifically tailored to take advantage of loans from the Yokohama Specie 
Bank. In the company’s prospectus the list of goods that the Trading Company proposed to 
handle--raw silk, tea, ceramics, metal goods, lacquer ware, textiles, tobacco, marine products, 
and sundry goods--almost exactly matched the list of goods the government had identified as 
items eligible for loans from the 3 million yen exchange loan fund administered by the 
Specie Bank.
539
 The founders of the firm also announced their desire to secure government 
contracts and function as an official purveyor of goods for the various agencies of the Meiji 
state.
540
 In short, close associates of Fukuzawa founded the Trade Company with the 
expectation that they would be able to personally profit from their connections.  This hope of 
using high level connections in business and government circles to profit was one of the 
hallmarks of the “outsider companies.” 
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  The profit motive was not, however, the sole motive for the Trade Company’s 
founding. The company’s prospectus trumpeted the patriotic cause of the “recovery of 
commercial rights” as one of the new company’s primary goals. The founders proudly 
proclaimed that the firm would sell Japanese goods around the globe and in doing so aid in 
the recovery of Japan’s trading rights. They would make their firm into one of the most 
important players in Japan’s foreign trade and therefore weaken the grip of foreign merchants 
in the treaty ports. Commerce, the founders argued, was a crucial pillar in the construction of 
national prosperity. The world’s greatest economic power, Britain, was fabulously wealthy 
despite importing more goods than it exported. Conversely, Britain’s largest colony, India, 
was mired in poverty despite a consistently positive balance of trade. If a nation’s balance of 
trade alone determined a nation’s prosperity, this situation would be impossible.541 Yet a 
nation’s prosperity did not depend merely upon the balance of its foreign trade, but its wealth 
and prosperity depended upon the ability to control trade flows. Profits earned through 
shipping, financing, and buying cheaply in one place and selling dear in another were in and 
of themselves vital methods of generating wealth which could determine the poverty or 
prosperity of a nation. The founders of the Trade Company argued that their firm would 
contribute to Japan’s prosperity by taking a leading role in world trade.542 
 Asabuki also emphasized the patriotic nature of the company’s mission in a speech he 
gave at the company’s opening ceremony. He began by observing that only a few decades 
ago Japanese patriots had taken up the sword in order to expel foreign “barbarians” from 
their country. Although today it would be the height of chauvinistic arrogance to insist that 
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the foreigners were barbarians, the fundamental struggle for dominance between Japan and 
foreigners was, nevertheless, still ongoing. Japan was fighting a struggle for its 
independence; the only difference from earlier times was that Japanese and foreigners were 
fighting by commercial, rather than military means.
543
 Unfortunately, according to Asabuki, 
Japan was losing the commercial war. Foreign traders had become the masters of Japan’s 
overseas trade while Japan’s own merchants were content to sell their goods to rich 
foreigners in the treaty ports and did not bother to venture abroad. As a result, Japan’s 
entrepreneurs were completely ignorant of foreign markets. Asabuki argued that foreign 
economic dominance of Japan’s trade amounted to a breach of Japanese sovereignty. 
Although the borders of the nation had not been compromised, in an economic sense Japan 
had already lost sovereign territory.
544
 
 The Trade Company would strike a blow for Japan by boldly entering foreign 
markets and engaging in direct trade with foreign nations. Through active engagement in 
world trade the company would help Japan to reclaim control of its foreign trade and lead the 
way to a national economic revival. Asabuki predicted that if the company was successful, 
other Japanese merchants would see the profits the company had earned and rush to imitate 
the company’s model. Then, with several firms actively engaged in trade the nation would be 
well on its way to regaining control over its trading rights.
545
 
 It might be easy to dismiss such statements as mere lip service to nationalist 
sentiment intended to put a patriotic gloss on what was ultimately a naked attempt to 
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capitalize on government policies to turn a quick profit. For Asabuki, however, this rhetoric 
was heartfelt. His first contact with Fukuzawa had been in the heady days at the end of the 
Tokugawa bakufu when Asabuki, as a young hot-headed “gentleman of spirit” (shishi),  had 
reportedly sought to assassinate Fukuzawa for the crime of studying the West.
546
 Although 
this story is likely somewhat apocryphal, Fukuzawa himself referred specifically to 
Asabuki’s anti-foreign nationalism in recommending him for a government sponsored 
mission to Europe in 1878. Besides praising Asabuki’s skills in accountancy, Fukuzawa also 
emphasized Asabuki’s burning desire to engage in direct trade with foreign countries and 
thereby “drive out the foreign merchants in Yokohama.”547 
 Possessing strong nationalist sentiments, did not, of course, preclude the simultaneous 
possession of strong business instincts. For all Asabuki’s patriotic sentiment, he also made 
clear in his speech at the Trade Company’s opening ceremony that the company’s patriotic 
mission to carry Japanese products to every last corner of the globe would also be lucrative. 
Japan’s foreign trade was rapidly increasing and, Asabuki argued, even if the Trade 
Company only captured a small portion of Japan’s growing trade, the profits would amount 
to millions of yen.
548
 As it turned out patriotism would pay dividends. 
 Asabuki’s statements reveal the mix of motives that were probably common in typical 
urban “outsider” firms. The idea that foreign intermediaries were exploiting Japan provided 
both a sense of mission of national consequence for the patriotic capitalists and led them to 
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believe that engaging in direct trade would reap large profits. After all, if foreign merchant 
houses were prospering by acting as middlemen in Japan’s foreign trade, it only stood to 
reason that there were great profits to collect if Japanese firms would take over these 
functions from foreign firms. The relative inexperience of the executives of outsider firms 
also may have encouraged naïve optimism. 
 Opening for business in 1880, the Trade Company made full use of exchange loans 
from the Yokohama Specie Bank and achieved good progress in extending its business. In 
the very first year of 1880 the Trade Company claimed the position of fifth largest silk dealer 
in the nation in total volume of sales.
549
 This position had previously been occupied by the 
Mitsui Trading Company whose silk business began to decline as it was displace by upstart 
firms the Trade Company.
550
  By the end of 1881 the firm had captured a small but 
significant share of the raw silk trade to America and had opened offices abroad. In that year 
it exported a total of 1801 bales of raw silk which was an amount roughly equal to one-tenth 
of the total of 18, 128 bales of raw silk that Japan exported that year.
551
 Despite a slight 
decline in the firm’s silk exports in 1882, the Trade Company was able to increase its exports 
to about 3,000 bales of silk in the next few years and handle about ten percent of the nation’s 
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total silk exports by volume.
552
 The venture to combine patriotism and profits appeared to be 
a smashing success.  
 The Trade Company was the most notable example of an “outsider” firm because its 
founders were vocal in publicizing their activities and the firm did briefly occupy an 
important position in Japan’s foreign trade. It was not, however, the only outsider firm. Other 
urban merchant enterprises emerged in 1880 and 1881 with the purpose of engaging in direct 
trade. One was the Fusō Company, a trading company founded in 1881.553 The firm’s 
founders were similar to those of the Trade Company in having close connections to the 
government or the financial world. Koyasu Takashi had quit his career in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to go into journalism by helping to start the Yomiuri Shinbun, which soon 
became a prominent Tōkyō based newspaper. The firm’s second partner, Nakayama Uyaji, 
had worked for the Ministry of Finance and had gained some experience in the silk business. 
Harada Jirō, the third major partner, was the director of the 74th National Bank located in 
Tōkyō.554 All three men had the additional advantage of proficiency in foreign languages and 
experience either living abroad or dealing with foreigners. 
Like the Trade Company, the Fusō Company aimed at engaging in direct trade. While 
the company appears not to have ever claimed to be undertaking a patriotic mission by doing 
so, its leaders obviously saw an opportunity in the dealing directly with foreign markets. The 
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300,000 yen in capital the founders managed to gather from investors suggested that a 
significant number of wealthy individuals saw a great deal of potential in direct trade as well.  
 
Direct Trade and the Cooperative Movement in the Silk Industry 
 Another driving force behind the direct trade movement was the campaign for 
cooperatives that arose in Japan’s interior in the late 1870s. Although the cooperative 
movement also espoused direct trade as a goal and mixed dreams of great profits from selling 
goods directly to foreigners with a vaguely patriotic impulse to strike a blow for the 
reclamation of Japan’s commercial independence, the campaign differed from the schemes of 
urban merchant outsiders in several important ways. First, the cooperative movement was a 
largely rural phenomenon born out of the concerns and frustrations of rural producers and 
small merchants who felt they were losing out in a trade system dominated by wealthy export 
merchants in the treaty ports. Second, unlike the well-educated would-be-merchants who 
founded the outsider firms, the founders of the cooperatives all had extensive experience in 
the silk and tea trades and were familiar with at least the domestic realities of those trades 
even if they were not especially knowledgeable about foreign markets. The cooperatives 
formed by rural producers aimed to displace wealthy Yokohama merchants as the main 
agents in Japan’s silk and tea trades. Like the urban “outsider” firms created to engage in 
direct trade, the cooperatives hoped to profit from direct engagement in foreign trade, 
wrapped in a vaguely patriotic rhetoric of recovering the nation’s “trading rights.” Many of 
the cooperatives aimed to sell their silk to urban outsider firms or specially created entities 
like the Mutual Advancement Company (which will be explained below) designed to 
advance the commercial interests of silk producers. 
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 The cooperative movement of the 1870s experienced its greatest progress in the 
important silk producing region of Gunma where participants aspired to boost silk producers’ 
incomes by improving the quality of locally produced raw silk and selling it directly to 
foreign markets. The movement grew from a small organization based on a few villages in 
Gunma prefecture to become a nationwide organization with its own large-scale commercial 
organization, the Mutual Extension Company (Dōshin Kaisha). Because the silk producer 
cooperatives encouraged direct trade, the government initially embraced the movement as an 
extension of its own policies in promoting exports in an effort to eliminate the nation’s trade 
deficits. 
 The cooperative movement began with Hoshino Chōtarō. As we saw in Chapter 3, 
Hoshino was the first Japanese entrepreneur to market and successfully sell his raw silk in a 
foreign market. In 1876 he had sent his younger brother, Arai Ryōichirō, to New York to 
work as his sales agent looking for buyers for silk produced in Hoshino’s factory. Hoshino’s 
ambitious plan succeeded and soon Arai had made a name for himself as a reliable supplier 
of silk in a rapidly expanding American market.
555
 
 This fortunate development presented Hoshino with new opportunities and new 
problems. Selling his silk directly to American customers proved highly lucrative. Hoshino 
was able to gain a higher price for his raw silk in New York than he would have obtained had 
he sold his goods to the export merchants in Yokohama.
556
 However, keeping his younger 
brother in New York to act as a sales agent proved to be expensive to the extent that paying 
for his brother’s living expenses ended up eliminating most of the gains Hoshino made from 
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direct sales. To fully benefit from the higher prices in New York and turn a profit, Hoshino 
had to sell more silk.
557Because news of Hoshino’s success had spread around the region 
several of his neighbors were eager to join him in exporting silk to America. 
 Hoshino invited forty silk producing households in his village of Mizunuma to join 
him in founding a village cooperative, the Watarase Association (Watarase-gumi) which 
would produce high quality silk for direct export to the American market.
558
 Upon hearing 
the announcement of the Watarase Association’s founding, neighboring villages soon rushed 
to set up similar organizations to export raw silk to America. These cooperatives soon joined 
Hoshio’s Watarase-gumi to form a larger cooperative, the Silk Company (Seishi Gensha) in 
1877.
559
 
 The Silk Company consisted of six separate village based cooperatives working 
together. Each cooperative consisted of roughly 40 members who elected their own officers. 
The elected officials of each cooperative were in charge of overseeing all steps of raw silk 
production within their cooperative. Cooperative officials collected money from members to 
purchase silk cocoons and oversaw the purchase, inspection and distribution of the cocoons 
to members of the cooperative who would process the cocoons into raw silk. Once the raw 
silk had been reeled, the officers of each cooperative would collect the raw silk and to subject 
it to a rigorous quality inspection.
560
 Silk Company officials would then inspect the raw silk 
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again, grade it, and ship to America where Hoshino’s brother Arai Ryōichirō supervised 
sales.
561
 
 This cooperative model pioneered by Hoshino’s Silk Company proved to a highly 
effective method of encouraging direct exports. By pooling capital to purchase raw materials, 
working strictly to enforce a uniform quality of silk production among its various members, 
and sharing a sales network managed by Arai, the enterprise managed to boost the earnings 
of a large number of small raw silk producers, many of whom used rudimentary human 
powered machinery to reel raw silk.
562
 By exporting their raw silk directly to the New York 
market, the cooperatives were also able to realize greater profits because they bypassed the 
hierarchical domestic trade network controlled by the export merchants and foreign 
mercantile houses in Yokohama. Villages around Gunma were soon dispatching 
representatives to study and copy Hoshino’s cooperative model.563 
 The main drawback of the Silk Company and the cooperative model was the long lag 
between the shipment of raw silk to America and the return of profits from sales. The 
shipment, sale, and final repatriation of the profits gained from the sale of raw silk abroad 
required a minimum of six to eight months.
564
 During this interval the producers in the Silk 
Company would not receive a single yen. In the meantime, these same producers also had to 
scrounge up the necessary capital to obtain cocoons to fund the next round of silk production, 
a difficult challenge for smaller-scale silk producers with limited funds.  
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 In contrast, the silk producer who agreed to sell his silk through one of the Yokohama 
export merchants faced no delay in payment. The export merchants offered cash in advance 
and loans to silk producers to help them cover their raw material and labor costs. In return, 
the export merchant would demand the exclusive right to sell the producer’s raw silk. After 
selling it, the export merchant would subtract the loan amount and a commission fee from the 
sales revenue and send any remaining cash profits back to the silk producer.
565
 Although the 
silk producer ended up paying a premium to the export merchant in return for loans and a 
quick return of profits, many small-scale silk producers were simply financially unable to 
wait six to eight months to see any return on the sale of their raw silk. They were ready to 
sacrifice a portion of their potential profits if they would see those profits quickly.  
 To solve this problem and to secure necessary capital to invest in ensuring the 
manufacture of a uniform quality of silk for the American market, Hoshino requested a 
300,000 yen loan from the local government. In a letter to Gumna prefecture officials, 
Hoshino argued that there was a great demand for Japanese silks overseas. Unfortunately, 
this high demand had encouraged the production of low quality or adulterated raw silk by a 
group of disreputable producers and merchants in the prefecture who sought to turn a quick 
profit. This trend had caused the reputation of the once highly sought after Gunma silks to 
decline in recent years, Hoshino complained. Although he and a group of other silk producers 
wished to restore the prefecture’s reputation as a region that produced only high quality silks, 
these “spirited persons” (yūshi) faced three main challenges. First, producers in Gunma 
needed to increase their output in order to become major suppliers of silk on the New York 
market and gain more leverage in negotiating a price for raw silk with customers there. 
Second, local producers needed to break the foreign merchants’ monopolistic control over 
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the pricing of raw silk by traveling abroad and selling directly to consumers in foreign 
markets. Third, local silk producers needed capital to invest in improving silk production 
techniques in order to produce a silk of uniformly high quality. Hoshino urged the prefectural 
government to help fund his cooperative so that the Silk Company could accomplish its 
goals.
566
 
 After endorsing Hoshino’s plea, the prefectural authorities forwarded to the national 
Ministry of Finance. They emphasized the recent decline in the quality of locally produced 
silks in arguing the urgent need to encourage the production of a higher quality product. 
Although prefectural officials shared Hoshino’s concerns about the quality of locally 
produced silk and stressed the possibility of increasing local silk exports to America, the 
officials also underlined the benefits to a large segment of the local society. They suggested 
that the best way to improve the quality of local silks was to promote the gradual 
improvement of hand reeling techniques employed by many small-scale silk producers. This 
approach would avoid the expense and difficulties of investing in mechanized filatures and it 
was most quickly increase the volume of high quality silk production. Small producers could 
then benefit more fully from expanding foreign demand for higher quality Japanese silks.
567
  
The Ministry of Finance readily agreed to the full loan on generous terms- a ten-year period 
for repayment with no interest accruing for the first five years and a six-percent annual 
interest rate after that.
568
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The Creation of the Mutual Extension Company 
In the early 1880s, the role of the central government in the campaign for 
cooperatives changed in important ways. In its early stages, the energy of local entrepreneurs 
fueled the cooperative movement. The central government often was not involved in the 
creation of cooperatives, and even local officials played a limited role. Producer cooperatives 
therefore were very much a movement “from below” propelled by local initiatives in the 
private sector in the countryside. By the opening of the 1880s, however, the Meiji 
government sought to encourage the cooperative movement as part of its attempts to boost 
exports. At the same time key members of the cooperative movement looked to the 
government to overcome daunting challenges they faced in mobilizing capital. By 1881 the 
cooperative movement was leaning heavily on the state to support its activities.  
 While securing adequate finance to allow its members to continue business was a 
constant challenge for Hoshino and the Silk Company, the sales side became a source of 
concern. His brother, Arai, was a good salesman and a vital asset to the company, but his 
business partner in New York, Satō Hyakutarō, had to return to Japan in 1878 because of 
problems with creditors.
569Satō’s departure left Arai alone to cope with a rapidly expanding 
raw silk sales business.
570
 Hoshino worried that without a partner, Arai might not be able to 
sustain the business, let alone manage to handle the expanded volume of raw silk that the 
Silk Company was shipping to America.
571
 Hoshino hoped to increase sales by enlisting 
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partners to help with Arai’s New York operations. If other silk producers joined his direct 
trade ventures, they could provide additional capital to expand operations in New York. 
 Government efforts to foster greater contact between producers in the silk, tea, and 
other rural industries would provide Hoshino with an opportunity to solve his problems. In 
1879 Matsukata Masayoshi, then head of the Agricultural Promotion Bureau (Kannōkyoku) 
in the Ministry of the Interior, had just returned from a fact-finding mission in Europe. He 
was particularly impressed by the various agricultural fairs and exhibitions he had attended. 
Europe’s governments and industry associations used these events to encourage the 
improvement of agricultural products through competitions and awarding prizes to superior 
agricultural produce. Upon his return to Japan, Matsukata immediately set about organizing 
“mutual progress societies” (kyōshinkai) which organized both competitive exhibitions and 
industry association meetings for tea and silk producers where participants could share 
knowledge about new production techniques and discuss common issues of concern.
572
 
 One of the earliest annual mutual progress society meetings held for silk producers 
occurred in Yokohama in 1879. The event featured a competitive agricultural exhibition 
where producers from around the country displayed their raw silk before a panel of judges 
who awarded prizes to the highest quality silks as well as an industry meeting where 
producers socialized, exchanged information on the latest innovations in silk reeling, and 
discussed problems of common interest. Inspired by speeches by Matsukata and other 
government officials emphasizing the need to increase silk exports, a group of silk producers 
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agreed to meet in Tōkyō a few days afterwards to discuss issues of common concern and 
deepen intra-industry cooperation.
573
 
 This Tōkyō meeting proved to be an important moment in the development of the 
cooperative movement. Major silk producers from across the nation attended, as did Hiyami 
Kenzō, Hoshino Chotarō’s former mentor and now the Meiji government’s chief expert on 
the silk industry. Hayami’s presence signaled the government’s intense interest in 
developments in the industry. At the meeting the silk producers expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the current state of the silk trade and agreed to join together to create a 
new national company which would export raw silk directly to foreign markets. They set 
March 1880 as the tentative date for the company to open its doors.
574
 
 A widespread frustration with the current state of the silk trade motivated producers 
to create a new silk export company. In particular, silk producers located in Japan’s interior 
resented the power of urban silk merchants who dominated the trade. In a brief statement of 
purpose outlining the goals of the proposed silk company, the silk producers pointed out that 
producing high quality silk was a difficult and expensive process which required great effort. 
Unfortunately, they complained, Japan’s silk merchants were totally ignorant of the 
complexities involved in silk production and therefore were unable to fairly assess the true 
value of high quality silk. Similarly, foreign merchants in Yokohama were all lower level 
functionaries of large commercial houses who were poorly trained, possessed little specialist 
knowledge of the silk trade, and thus also incapable of accurately assessing the value of a silk 
producer’s goods. Due to this widespread lack of knowledge among silk merchants both 
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foreign and domestic, silk producers were unable to gain a fair price for their wares. They 
could not advance Japan’s national interests until they could reach foreign customers who 
would appreciate the high quality of Japanese silk and pay a generous price for it.
575
 
 The solution to the dilemma was, naturally, to directly penetrate foreign markets. In a 
statement of purpose declaring their intent to form a new trade company, rural silk producers 
attending the Yokohama meeting noted that individual efforts to reach foreign consumers had 
had mixed success. Attempts to sell Japanese raw silk in the French market had proved 
unsuccessful. The successful efforts by Hoshino Chōtarō and Sano Rihachi in Nagano to 
export to America were too modest to take advantage of that important and growing market. 
The only way to develop direct trade was for silk producers to abandon their individual 
efforts and pool their resources to form a national company which could utilize their 
collective capital and resources to sell silk producers’ goods under a single banner. The silk 
producers’ preliminary plan envisioned a new company with a branch office in Lyon to sell 
Japanese silk to the French market. The company would open additional offices in Britain 
and America as needed.
576
 
 Although government officials were encouraging, the silk producers who founded the 
company hoped to maintain a semblance of independence from government authority. When 
searching for a suitable person to serve as the president of their new company, the silk 
producers turned to Hayami Kensō. They demanded that he resign his government post to 
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avoid any possible accusations of conflict of interest and to keep the company independent of 
government interference.
577
 
 The new enterprise which took the name the Mutual Extension Company (Dōshin 
Kaisha) functioned according to the same cooperative principles as the Silk Company. The 
company’s activities focused on the financing, collection, and marketing of raw silk. In its 
role as financier, the company took advantage of the government’s direct trade promotion 
polices to borrow large sums from the Yokohama Specie Bank’s exchange loan program. 
The firm divided and funneled the money to corporate members to help fund silk production 
and bring their goods to Yokohama. Once the company received silk shipments from its 
members, it would inspect and package the silk for shipment and sale abroad. When the silk 
arrived in foreign markets, agents from the Mutual Extension Company would handle the 
sale. Revenue from overseas sales would return to Japan where company officials would 
calculate each member’s share according to the volume and sale price of the silk sold by each 
member. The Company would then subtract from each member’s share the amount received 
by each member in advance loans plus any interest accrued on the loan. The member would 
receive the remaining money as profit.
578
 
 Thus the Mutual Extension Company acted as a trading firm. It did not engage in silk 
production. It remained centered on individual entrepreneurs who functioned as independent 
firms that merely shared a common finance, sales, and marketing arm. The creation of the 
enterprise therefore did not radically alter the nature of the silk industry from the viewpoint 
of the medium to large-scale silk producers. The company did, however, present a challenge 
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to local silk merchants and the powerful mercantile interests in Yokohama. By organizing 
finance, sales, and marketing abroad, the firm effectively replaced the Yokohama export 
merchants who dominated these aspects of the silk trade. For local silk dealers the company 
also presented a potential threat, because it replaced them as gatherers of silk in the 
countryside and took away their role of carrying out inspections of silk to rate its quality and 
of shipping it to the port. This change was, of course, partly by design. The creation of the 
Mutual Extension Company resulted from the frustrations of rural producers with the 
structure of the silk trade and their desire to realize greater profits by cutting out some of the 
middlemen in the Yokohama port trade.  While purporting to help recover Japanese control 
of the nation’s foreign trade, the Mutual Extension Company would advance the interests of 
rural silk producers at the expense of export merchants in Yokohama and local merchants in 
the countryside. 
 Like the Trade Company, the Mutual Extension Company was able to use the 
Yokohama Specie Bank’s exchange loan program to turn itself into an important player in 
Japan’s silk trade. In its first year of business the company exported 1,206 bales of raw silk, 
or roughly 6 percent of Japan’s total raw silk exports for that year (1881). Within the next 
few years the company’s direct exports expanded steadily to a total of 2,664 bales of silk in 
1884. Though the percentage of the total silk trade handled by the company varied slightly, 
in the early 1880s, the company could boast that it handled between 5 and 10 percent of the 
nation’s silk trade.579 
 
From a Cooperative to a Company: the Jōmō Silk Improvement Company 
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The creation of a large scale trade organization solved some of the basic problems 
silk producers had in getting their goods to market, but it did not solve the challenge of 
producing uniformly high quality silk that foreign markets demanded. The Silk Company 
provided some help in achieving the aim of standardizing production and in promoting direct 
trade, but producers urgently needed more capital. Producing large amounts of silk of 
uniform quality required larger investments in everything from planting more mulberry trees 
to feed silkworms and boost the production of cocoons, to training local farmers in efficient 
methods of silk reeling, and creating new mechanized filatures. These measures were 
necessary to fully exploit the growing overseas market for Japanese silks.
580
 
 The leaders of the cooperative movement in Gunma prefecture were therefore pleased 
when the mangers of the 33
rd
 National Bank (Sanjūsan Kokuritsu Ginkō) based in Tōkyō 
thought they had spotted a commercial opportunity. Anticipating rapidly growing silk exports 
to the United States, the bank decided to begin financing the Silk Company’s direct trade 
ventures. Demand for loans from silk producers, however, soon far outstripped what the 
available funds at the 33
rd
 National Bank. In response, the bank’s managers advised local 
producers to band together to form an even larger company. It company would focus on 
improving local silk manufactures and utilize the services of the Mutual Extension Company 
to export its silk directly to the United States. According to bank executives, by forming a 
large company and posting land deeds as collateral for loans, silk producers stood a good 
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chance of securing a large loan from the government to fund investment in improved silk 
production.
581
  
 Taneda Seiichi, the director of the 33
rd
 National Bank travelled to Gunma prefecture 
in early 1880 to address a gathering of 300 local silk producers who had formed their own 
local silk improvement association. Taneda’s proposition to secure a large loan from the 
government spurred the local silk producers to launch a campaign to gather together their 
land deeds to post as surety for a loan of 1 million yen.
582
 When Taneda learned that a major 
government official, Inoue Kaoru, happened to be visiting the local hot springs, Taneda 
rushed off to pitch his idea for a large-scale loan to the Gunma silk producers. Inoue gave his 
unofficial blessing to the venture by making an informal visit to a gathering of silk producers 
on his way back to Tōkyō. During his brief stop-over Inoue inspected samples of raw silk 
and addressed a gathering of local silk producers on the need to form associations and work 
together to increase the nation’s silk exports. Within a few weeks local producers managed to 
collect 1.2 million yen worth of land deeds which they intended to present to the government 
as surety in securing a government loan.
583
 
 The next step was to begin negotiations with the government. Hoshino Chōtarō, 
Fukazawa Yukizō, another leading figure in Gunma’s silk industry, and Taneda Seiichi all 
travelled to Tōkyō to discuss the matter with government leaders. Hoshino visited Inoue at 
his private residence to present a formal request for a loan. Inoue voiced his approval for the 
venture, but noted that only the Minister of Finance, Ōkuma Shigenobu, could approve a loan. 
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A subsequent visit with Ōkuma yielded similarly inconclusive results. Ōkuma readily 
expressed his enthusiastic approval of the idea in principle, but emphasized that the ministry 
would have to conduct an official review.
584
 Yet after several months there was no sign that 
the MOF had taken any action. Tired of waiting for the review to start, Hoshino sent another 
formal request to the Council of State (Dajōkan). It decided to send Maeda Masana, at the 
time a MOF official, to Gunma to investigate the state of the local silk industry. After 
constant lobbying by Taneda, Hoshino, and Gunma governor Katori Motohiko, Maeda 
finally arrived in November1880.
585
  
 What happened next became a matter of controversy. Letters to Governor Katori from 
the Ministry of Finance stated that Maeda had the authority to discuss all matters involving 
silk production and the requested loan. Maeda met with silk producers and lectured them on 
the need for a collective effort in promoting silk exports. Utilizing military terminology, 
Maeda declared raw silks were Japan’s “elite troops” in a commercial war and that it was the 
duty of all Japanese subjects to ensure that the nation’s elite forces functioned effectively to 
secure victory. Maeda added that to defend the nation the government had to adequately 
equip its elite troops—an apparent reference to the need for government support. He did not, 
however, make a direct reference to the requested loan.
586
 
 That night Maeda attended a private dinner with Hoshino and Governor Katori. When 
pressed on the loan issue, Maeda informed them that the Ministry of Finance had still not 
rendered a final decision on the request but he was certain that the government would 
                                                 
584
 Ibid., 411. 
 
 
585
 Ibid., 411-412. 
 
 
586
 Ibid., 412. 
 259 
 
eventually consent to at least a 700,000 yen loan to the collective of silk producers if they 
organized themselves to form a larger company. Taking Maeda at his word, Gunma’s silk 
producers reorganized their informal association into a company the Jōmo Silk Improvement 
Company (Jōmō Mayukei Kairyō Kaisha).587 
 A report submitted by Sekine Chikamitsu, however, reached a very different 
conclusion. Dispatched by the Ministry of Finance’s Commercial Bureau to investigate the 
viability of a loan to the local silk producers’ cooperative a month prior to Maeda’s mission, 
Sekine noted that a loan to the local cooperative would encourage more silk producers to join 
the enterprise and thus make a larger injection of capital necessary.
 588
  Left unchecked, loans 
to any cooperative might merely result in requests for larger loans until the government was 
subsidizing the entire silk industry. The report also expressed doubts about the silk producers’ 
prospects for success and the profitability of the direct export venture.
589
 
 In any event the loan of 700,000 yen failed to arrive.  Meanwhile the Ministry of 
Finance acted as if the new company would soon receive a large loan. The ministry required 
the Jōmō Company to return money it had borrowed from the Yokohama Specie Bank, 
because, the ministry argued, once the company received a loan directly from the 
government, the company could not take advantage of the bank’s cargo loans. Within a few 
months, however, the company was once again authorized to borrow from the bank which 
issued a series of small bridge loans to help the firm bring its goods to market. Finally, later 
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in the year, the Yokohama Specie Bank extended a 300,000 yen line of credit to the company 
to facilitate trade, rather than fund improvement in regional silk production.
590
 
 Attempts by the cooperative movement in Gunma to gain government support for 
improving the quality of local silks and promoting direct trade ended in frustration. Despite 
local producers’ efforts in forming the Jōmō Silk Improvement Company and doing 
everything in their power to obtain government approval for financial support, the state gave 
only paltry funding for the company through a series of half-measures which did little to help 
local producers realize their ambitious goals. The case of the Jōmō Silk Improvement 
Company provides one instance where miscommunication between the state and business 
resulted in confused and ineffective policies. Gunma’s silk producers had formed the Jōmō 
Silk Improvement Company with the understanding that they had received tacit government 
support for their scheme when in fact the government ended up being hesitant to support the 
company. The case of the Jōmō Silk Improvement Company was one instance where the ad 
hoc approach to commercial policy did not work. 
  
Conclusion 
 By the beginning of 1881, a broad based movement to promote direct trade seemed 
well underway. Patriotically minded readers of the Hōchi Shinbun who shared the paper’s 
enthusiasm over the creation of the Trade Company could be satisfied in the knowledge that 
their country was taking the necessary first steps to break foreign merchant control over 
Japan’s commerce. These patriotic readers had every reason to believe that they were 
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witnessing the dawn of a new era in the development of their nation’s commercial prowess 
and that Japan would soon join the ranks of mighty commercial nations like Britain.  
 These readers could point to specific accomplishments. A new specie bank had 
emerged with a special fund to support Japanese exports and aid the rapid expansion of direct 
trade ventures. New trading firms declared their intent to carry Japanese goods to distant 
lands. Groups of “spirited gentlemen” in Japan’s interior had formed cooperatives to promote 
local silk and tea industries and take their products directly to consumers in the West. For a 
brief moment it appeared as if the momentum of the direct trade movement would propel 
Japan’s ascendancy to greatness as a mercantile nation. 
 Some of the greatest accomplishments of the direct trade movement were the result of 
collaboration and mutual arm twisting between the state and the private sector. The single 
most important achievements of the direct trade movement, the creation of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank and its cargo loan program, are apt examples. Fukuzawa Yukichi first 
convinced Minister of Finance Ōkuma Shigenobu to create a private specie bank that could 
help stabilize the currency. After officials realized that the newly created Yokohama Specie 
Bank could not survive just by dealing in silver, they supported its transformation into a trade 
bank. When the bank’s management requested that the government permit the bank to issue 
loans to exporters, officials responded by creating the cargo loan program and demanding 
stronger supervisory powers over the bank.  
 Throughout the process neither the state nor the private sector was able to set the 
agenda. Instead the interactions between the state and the bank’s founding managers 
resembled a process of negotiation in which both officials and bank executives influenced the 
policies of the bank. A similar pattern can be seen in the foundation of direct trading 
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companies and producer cooperatives. Entrepreneurs created many of the trading companies 
in order to capitalize on government support for direct trade, yet their existence also created a 
constituency demanding government support for direct trade. In a similar fashion, the 
government encouraged greater contact and cooperation among producers in Japan’s 
indigenous industries, a development which led to the creation of producer cooperatives. 
Some of these cooperatives, in turn, sought out state assistance to improve their products and 
engage in direct trade ventures. 
 Because the interactions between the state and private industry were a process of 
give-and-take, the resultant economic policies to promote direct trade and the direct trade 
movement itself were haphazard and impromptu, rather than carefully planned or thought-out. 
Economic policies to promote direct trade typically resulted from historical accidents, rather 
than clearly crafted plans. While the government hoped to encourage direct trade, it did not 
plan to create exchange and cargo loan funds at the Specie Bank, it did not anticipate the 
creation of new trading companies, and it did not drive the formation of producer 
cooperatives. The state indirectly contributed to all of these developments, but all three 
responded primarily to various demands from private industry and attempts to adapt policy to 
realize the goal of promoting direct trade. These measures were not part of a master plan by a 
group of officials to promote direct trade. Instead they were making up economic policy in an 
ad hoc fashion, sometimes in response to demands from the private sector and sometimes in 
response to a crisis.  
 The patriotic rhetoric of the direct trade movement which appeared to give the 
movement a semblance of united purpose and coherence also papered over tensions between 
the conflicting priorities of those participating in the movement. While the government, 
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urban “outsider” merchant firms, producer cooperatives, and the general public all shared a 
desire to challenge foreign merchants’ dominance over Japan’s overseas trade, each group 
had other goals. The government saw direct trade as a way of halting inflation and 
accomplishing its goal of building a strong modern polity. Urban outsider merchants seized 
on direct trade as a new business opportunity that promised generous profits. Silk producers 
utilized direct trade as a slogan to encourage their peers to mobilize against the powerful 
foreign mercantile houses and the Yokohama export merchants who dominated the trade in 
raw silk. These various agendas attached to direct trade both explain the movement’s broad 
appeal and, demonstrate the primary reason for the unorganized, spontaneous character of the 
movement. Beyond challenging the dominance of foreign merchants, the direct trade 
movement had no clear agenda.  
 Undoubtedly, many entrepreneurs imagined that direct trade provided a 
convenient combination of patriotism and profits. Believing that they would reap great 
profits if only they could reach foreign consumers directly, would-be direct traders hoped 
they would receive handsome rewards for their efforts in creating new networks of trade 
abroad. It was unclear how long they would be willing to sustain those ventures without 
substantial material gains and to what extent the government was willing to support the 
movement. The greatest threat to the movement would come from the established kingpins in 
Japan’s foreign trade, the Yokohama export merchants and foreign mercantile houses. One 
would not expect that they would docilely cede their profitable business. Indeed, a major 
confrontation would erupt in the fall of 1881. 
  
CHAPTER 6: 
 
 
The Skeins of Power: silk, national sovereignty and the United Silk Storing Company 
incident 
 
On the evening of September 20, 1881, a group of foreign merchants held an 
impromptu meeting at the Club Germania in Yokohama. The European and American 
merchants who gathered in the club’s rooms were worried about an ominous new 
development in Japan’s silk trade. Only a few days before a group of Japanese silk merchants 
in Yokohama announced they had pooled their capital together to found a new company they 
christened the United Silk Storing Company (Rengō Kiito-niatsukarijō). This group of 
Japanese silk suppliers declared that their new company would serve as the main 
warehousing agent for all shipments of silk moving in and out of Yokohama and would be 
the center for all future silk trading in the city. To realize these aims, the Japanese merchants 
who founded the company pledged to entrust all of their silk to the United Silk Storing 
Company’s warehouse and to conduct all sales of silk products exclusively at the company’s 
offices. The merchants participating in the company also agreed to refuse to do business with 
any party that sold or purchased silk from anyone other than the United Silk Storing 
Company’s affiliated members.  
 Reacting to the announcement from their Japanese counterparts, the foreign 
merchants acted swiftly and decisively. They publicly condemned the United Silk Storing
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Company as a naked attempt by a group of would-be monopolists to seize control of Japan’s 
silk trade. Within two days of their initial meeting over thirty foreign merchant firms, 
including some of the largest purchasers of Japanese silk, formed an association for the 
express purpose of opposing the United Silk Storage Company and its affiliated Japanese 
merchants. The foreign merchants sent an open letter expressing their surprise and dismay in 
learning of the new company’s founding and the new restrictions that the Japanese merchants 
affiliated with the company sought to impose on the silk trade. The foreign merchants openly 
declared they would refuse to purchase any silk from the new company since it “was not safe” 
to do so and they pledged to work together to defeat the new company.
591
 
 For the next two months the rival groups of Japanese and foreign merchants were 
locked in an increasingly bitter feud that threatened to develop into a full-blown economic 
crisis. With Japan’s main silk suppliers refusing to sell to foreign firms unless they agreed to 
recognize the legitimacy of the new company and foreign firms refusing to purchase silk 
until the company was dismantled, Japan’s silk trade, a trade which accounted for nearly half 
of all of the nation’s export trade, came to a complete standstill. It caused economic 
difficulties for many Japanese from Yokohama’s dockworkers to silk producers in the 
nation’s interior.  
 In the meantime, a popular campaign to support the United Silk Storing Company and 
the Yokohama export merchants in their fight with the foreign merchants began. Japanese 
newspapers jumped on the story by portraying the dispute as a brave struggle by patriotic 
merchants to recover the nation’s “commercial rights” (shōken) from “haughty” and “unjust 
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foreign merchants.”592Japanese banks and transport companies pledged to support the United 
Silk Storing Company by refusing to finance or ship any silk cargoes going to foreign 
merchants. In a show of solidarity, Yokohama’s import merchants (hikitorishō) promised to 
suspend all purchases of foreign goods until the silk dispute was resolved. The nation’s most 
prominent businessmen in the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce put the full weight of their 
prestige in support of the company by issuing a resolution calling on fellow businessmen 
around the country to refuse to sell silk to foreign merchants. From the countryside, small 
scale silk producers and silk merchants sent letters of thanks, promises of support, and 
donations of cash and gifts as tokens of appreciation for what they praised as the company’s 
brave stance against the foreign merchants.  
 Why did this seemingly mundane commercial dispute between Japanese silk traders 
and a small group of foreign businessmen in Yokohama become an issue of national attention 
and the subject of frenzied public campaigns on both sides? The answer to this question lies 
in the coincidence of the silk dispute occurring at the precise moment when an active 
movement to “recover commercial rights” had reached its high watermark. Motivated by 
concerns over Japan’s negative balance of trade and spurred on by a popular movement to 
revise the unequal treaties and obtain equality with the West was well as a desire for profits, 
Japanese entrepreneurs had begun to challenge the dominant position foreign merchants 
enjoyed in handling the nation’s overseas trade. With the government’s help, Japanese 
businessmen had established the Yokohama Specie Bank which promised to displace foreign 
banks in financing Japan’s overseas trade, and patriotic merchants rushed to create new 
trading companies with the aim of selling goods directly to foreign consumers, bypassing 
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foreign merchants. The government initiated the exchange and cargo loan programs to 
promote direct exports and promised more initiatives to support the expansion of direct 
trading. Local producers had formed cooperatives to improve the quality of their silk to make 
it more marketable abroad. In this environment, the silk dispute appeared to signal a vital 
turning point in the campaign to recover the nation’s commercial rights. A victory in the 
showdown over the control of the silk trade, the single most lucrative branch of Japan’s 
foreign trade, would mark a decisive victory in the effort to free Japan from the bonds of 
foreign control.  
 In the end, Japan’s merchants failed in their bid to transform the shape of the silk 
trade in the treaty ports. After two months of suspended trading, Japanese and foreign 
merchants agreed to resume trading under a slightly reformed version of old silk trading 
conventions that failed either to address the grievances of Japanese silk traders or challenge 
the dominant position of the foreign mercantile houses in the trade. By the end of the year the 
United Silk Storing Company was effectively dissolved and silk trading continued much as it 
had before. 
 Despite the failure of the United Silk Storing Company and its affiliated merchants to 
transform Japan’s silk trade, the silk dispute marked a pivotal moment in the history of the 
Japanese commercial policy and in the development of the direct trade movement. The 
significance of the silk dispute was threefold. First, it intensified the economic nationalist 
movement by wedding commercial issues with the larger concern for protecting Japanese 
sovereignty in the popular imagination. For the first time the state of Japan’s commerce 
became an issue of widespread national concern. Many Japanese who had never had any 
reason to ponder the nature of Japan’s foreign trade learned from the popular press and 
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statements by silk merchants that Japan was a victim of Western commercial exploitation. In 
the mind of the public, staunch opposition to foreign commercial interests and the promotion 
of Japanese trade became part of the larger project of reclaiming Japanese sovereignty and 
achieving equality with the Western powers. This situation provided advocates of direct trade 
and commercial nationalists a welcome chance to bring their ideas to the public’s attention 
and helped contribute to the creation of a dedicated core of activists who would continue to 
agitate for direct trade promoting policies long after the government abandoned most of its 
direct trade initiatives.  
 At the same time the United Silk Storing Incident marked the debut of organized 
economic interests as actors on the Meiji political scene. The incident was the first time 
business interests around the country gathered together in common cause to influence the 
outcome of an economic issue. The leadership exercised by prominent businessmen like 
Shibusawa Eiichi and Masuda Takeshi during the crisis demonstrated that business interests 
were beginning to form their own groups and institutions in order to speak with a unified 
voice. Attempts by the business community to organize and engage in collective action in 
support of the United Silk Storing Company paved the way for the beginning of a new era in 
which organized interest groups politics would serve as powerful forces in the economic 
policy-making process.  
 The United Silk Storing Company Incident also revealed growing divisions and 
conflicts within Japan’s changing silk industry. A fundamental division was emerging 
between the Yokohama export merchants and mechanized silk producers on one hand, and a 
loose coalition of upstart trading firms and rural handicraft silk producers on the other. All 
silk producers and merchants, however, shared a desire to challenge the dominance of 
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foreign mercantile houses over the silk trade and construct a silk trading system which would 
be firmly under Japanese control.  
 Yet the silk industry was divided over the pace and extent of change. The Yokohama 
export merchants that were the driving force behind the United Silk Storing Company sought 
to forestall the direct trade movement while introducing reforms to in the treaty port trade 
that would give them a more equal footing in dealing with the foreign mercantile houses that 
purchased silk. This change would allow them to maintain their dominant position in the 
domestic silk trade while paving the way for a gradual transition to direct trade which they 
could control. In contrast, upstart trading firms and rural silk producers enthusiastically 
embraced the idea of immediately implementing direct trade and a rapid transformation of 
the silk trade. These merchants and producers favored rapid and far-reaching change, because 
a shake-up in the silk industry represented their best chance to challenge the dominant forces 
in the silk trade, both the export merchants and the foreign merchants in Yokohama, and 
establish themselves as major players in the trade. As long as the silk dispute remained a 
fight with foreign merchants over the shape of the silk trade, both groups could maintain a 
united front, but once actual changes in the conventions of the silk trade became an issue for 
debate these tensions emerged.  
 
The Yokohama Export Merchants and the Silk Trade 
 To understand the origins of the United Silk Storing Company, one must first grasp 
the motives of its founders. The primary backers of the enterprise were a small group of 
major wholesalers of raw silk commonly referred to as “export merchants” (urikomishō or 
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urikomi-donya) operating in the port city of Yokohama.
593
 As discussed previously these 
export merchants played a crucial facilitating role in the silk trade. They were the main 
financiers of silk production in Japan’s provinces and they served as middlemen in selling 
silk delivered to them from Japan’s interior to foreign mercantile houses in the treaty ports.594 
The export merchants exercised tremendous influence over the silk trade. 
 A combination of financial muscle and expertise in dealing with foreign merchants 
were the primary keys to the export merchants’ power. The most prominent could take 
advantage of intimate ties with major banks in the Tōkyō-Yokohama area to take out large 
loans which they used to help finance silk production in Japan’s interior. The export 
merchants typically used the funds from the banks to issue advance loans to smaller scale silk 
merchants in the provinces known as silk dealers (ni-nushi).
595
 These silk dealers then used 
the money they borrowed from the export merchants to issue advance loans to rural silk 
producers who then could purchase necessary material to produce raw silk.
596
  In some cases, 
the owners of mechanized silk filatures and other large-scale silk producers might contract a 
loan directly from the export merchants, but such direct links between export merchants and 
silk producers was still relatively rare in 1880. 
Silk producers and dealers in Japan’s provinces also depended upon the export 
merchants to sell their silk to foreign buyers in Yokohama. This was, in part, a matter of 
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logistics. Most silk producers and dealers probably possessed neither the necessary time nor 
the money to travel to Yokohama to search for a foreign buyer for their silk. It was much 
more practical to entrust one’s silk to an export merchant who maintained offices in 
Yokohama and had regular dealings with foreign mercantile houses. The export merchants, 
moreover, used their financial muscle to ensure they would serve as the middlemen in any 
silk trading. Whenever a silk dealer or producer took out a loan from an export merchant, the 
loan contract included clauses which awarded the lender the exclusive right to sell silk 
produced or collected by the borrower.
597
  
Once the contracted silk arrived in Yokohama an export merchant would search for a 
foreign buyer. He would negotiate directly with the foreign mercantile houses in acting as the 
agent for dealers and producers in the interior. After selling the silk, he would deduct the loan 
amount, plus interest, and a commission fee from the proceeds of the sale and pay whatever 
profits remained to the dealer or producer who had provided the goods.
598
  
 New developments in the late 1870s posed a potential threat to this lucrative business. 
Government policies designed to promote direct trade threatened to undermine the export 
merchants’ position as the main financiers of the silk trade. In particular, the provision of 
low-interest loans directly to producers through the government sponsored Yokohama Specie 
Bank exchange and cargo loan programs created in 1880 (see Chapter 5) provided a rival 
source for the financing for silk producers and dealers in the interior.  This option gave them 
a degree of independence from the export merchants.  
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Furthermore, the creation of silk producers’ cooperatives, like Hoshino Chōtarō’s 
Jōmō Silk Improvement Company and the Mutual Advancement Company (See Chapter 5), 
that sought to engage in direct exporting had the potential to make the intermediary role of 
the export merchant obsolete. Direct traders proposed to bypass foreign mercantile houses in 
Yokohama and sell directly to foreign consumers in their home markets. This change would 
mean that the export merchants, the intermediaries in the treaty port trade who sold silk to 
those foreign mercantile houses, would no longer have any meaningful role to play in the silk 
trade.  
For some of the most militant advocates of direct trade, undermining the export 
merchants was, in fact, one of the main attractions of the movement. Hoshino Chōtarō, a silk 
producer and advocate of direct trade, 
599
 argued that creating silk producer cooperatives that 
would engage in direct trade was necessary because of the shortcomings of Japan’s 
mercantile classes.   Hoshino lamented that, “…it is as if our merchants are completely 
without spirit. Although the wicked plots of foreigners are apparent, our countrymen lack 
courage to venture abroad.”600 Meanwhile, advocates of direct trade in the government like 
Maeda Masana were busily hatching plans to establish a series of state backed companies 
which would export Japanese goods directly to foreign markets, making the mediation of 
export merchants superfluous.
601
Export merchants must have been aware that these 
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advocates of direct trade viewed the export merchants as little more than servants of 
foreigners and hoped to undermine the treaty port trade.  
  The recent developments in government trade policy and the appearance of the direct 
trade movement disturbed the Yokohama merchants. In a proposal to the government, the 
export merchants complained about what they believed was the government’s excessive 
“protection” of direct trade firms and argued that reform of the treaty port trade was an 
equally vital part of the maintaining a healthy foreign trade.
602
 Although the number of firms 
proposing to engage in direct trade was relatively small and the Yokohama Specie Bank’s 
exchange and cargo loan programs had just started, the export merchants felt that they 
needed to find some way of responding to the new developments that would ensure their 
continued survival. 
 Worries about the future of the silk trade were not the only reason for taking action. 
Like the silk producers in the interior who advocated direct trade, the export merchants had 
their own complaints about the operation of trade in Yokohama. They complained, for 
example, that foreign merchants in Yokohama frequently refused to honor contracts, a 
problem known in the jargon of the silk business as “peke.”603 Buyers and sellers typically 
sold silk on the basis of informal oral contracts. The seller would bring samples of raw silk to 
foreign merchants who would inspect the quality of the sample. If the sample proved to be 
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satisfactory, the two parties would negotiate an initial oral contract outlining the volume of 
silk to be purchased, price per unit, and an estimate of the total amount of the sale.
604
  
This initial contract, however, was merely provisional. After agreeing to the initial 
contract, the seller (the export merchant) would hand over the entire shipment of silk to the 
foreign buyer who would then hold the goods in his own warehouse to conduct a vigorous 
quality inspection of the entire shipment. It was only after the foreign buyer had inspected the 
silk that he would finalize the sale.
605
  
 During this time disputes between foreign and Japanese merchants commonly arose. 
Quality inspections by foreign buyers could take several days and would sometimes last for 
over a week.
606
 If the buyer deemed that the silk shipment did not match the quality of the 
original sample, foreign merchants might agree to purchase only a fraction of the silk 
shipment, demand a reduction in the previously agreed upon sale price, or, in the worst case, 
simply send the entire shipment back to the seller.
607
 Possession of the raw silk and the 
results of the quality inspection gave the foreign merchant significant power over Japanese 
merchants in dictating the terms of any trade.  
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 The export merchants often accused their foreign counterparts of abusing their power. 
According to the export merchants, foreign mercantile houses frequently used quality 
inspections as a pretext to manipulate silk trading in their favor. Once the foreign merchant 
had a shipment of silk securely stored in his warehouse he would await information about 
current silk prices back in his home country before completing the purchase. If the market 
price proved to be favorable, the foreign merchant would purchase the silk according to the 
terms of the initial contract. However, if prices proved to be too low, the foreign merchants 
would simply return the silk to the seller without any qualms about violating the original 
contract.
608
 The cost of transporting the silk out of the foreign merchant’s warehouse would 
be borne by the seller himself who would then be stuck not only with a shipment of 
unwanted silk, but also a bill for its transport as well.
609
 
 Even if contracts were not broken, Japan’s export merchants complained that foreign 
merchants were manipulating silk trades to their advantage in several other ways. Because 
the foreign merchant carried out the inspection of silk in his own warehouse, he could easily 
manufacture some problem with the quality of the silk and use that alleged flaw to demand a 
lower price. Foreign merchants frequently rejected silk shipments by claiming that the 
product did not match the quality standards of the initial sample. Foreign merchants were 
also accused of confiscating a certain amount of silk under the pretext that a larger sample 
was needed for detailed testing and of loading the scales to their advantage when weighing 
the silk.
610
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 To add insult to injury, the purchasing agents of the foreign merchant houses would 
demand informal fees from sellers. Chinese employees of foreign merchant houses who often 
handled initial negotiations with Japanese sellers charged numerous under-the-table 
inspection and handling fees which Japanese silk sellers had to pay in order to have their 
goods considered for purchase.
611
 Foreign merchant houses usually did not approve these 
fees which served only to line the pockets of their employees. Nevertheless, the existence of 
these informal fees and the pressure that Japanese sellers felt to pay them starkly 
demonstrated the power foreign merchant houses had over Japanese merchants.  
 Disputes between foreign buyers and Japanese sellers of silk were frequent, especially 
disputes over the quality of silk. Although the foreign side unquestionably committed abuses, 
Japanese silk producers and merchants were not always innocent victims. Shipments of silk 
often contained products of inconsistent and varying quality and Japanese producers gained a 
reputation for ingenuity in finding new ways to adulterate their silk to cover up 
inconsistencies in its quality or increase its weight.  Even Japanese observers noted that the 
rampant production of shoddy and adulterated goods blocked the development of Japan’s 
export trade.
612
  
  
A Silk Guild? 
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 Desirous of a way to correct what they saw as foreign abuses in the silk trade and 
needing some way of responding to the direct trade movement, the export merchants in 
Yokohama eventually seized on a novel idea. A group of wealthy export merchants, who 
together handled the bulk of domestic sales of silk to foreign merchants, submitted a proposal 
to the Minister of Finance, Sano Jomin, in November of 1880. Playing to well known 
concerns of the ministry regarding inflation, the merchants expressed concern about the 
nation’s persistent trade deficits and the effect of the trade gap on the value of Japanese paper 
currency. Agreeing with the basic tenets of Ōkuma Shigenobu’s analysis of the crisis (see 
Chapter 4), the merchants argued that Japan’s trade deficits were clearly the result of a lack 
of exports and that abuses committed by foreign merchants in the treaty ports hindered 
expansion of exports. Fitting the nationalist rhetoric of the time, the signatories posited that 
only the recovery of “commercial rights” could eliminate trade deficits and proposed that an 
important step in establishing firm Japanese control over the nation’s trade would be to create 
a warehouse for conducting all silk trades.
613
 
 The export merchants proposed to form a new company. The main business of the 
company, to be given the unimaginatively utilitarian name the United Silk Storing Company 
(Rengō Kiito Niazukarijo), would be to receive shipments of silk from silk sellers around the 
country, subject the wares to a process of strict quality inspections, and warehouse the silk 
until its final sale to a foreign buyer. These measures would transform the silk trade in 
Yokohama in order to give Japanese silk sellers an edge over their foreign customers.
614
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To achieve their ambitious goal of overhauling the nation’s silk trade and eliminating 
foreign “abuses,” the export merchants unveiled a novel organization for their new company. 
The United Silk Storing Company would be more than simply a company in the Western 
sense. Three separate sets of rules would govern the functions of the company, regulate the 
behavior of the export merchants who were the company’s major shareholders, and establish 
a system of affiliated companies in Japan’s interior which would bind regional silk producers 
and dealers to the export merchants’ project of reforming the silk trade. This complex set of 
rules gave the company many of the characteristics of a silk industry association that foreign 
merchants would later complain constituted, in effect, a guild that would restrict freedom of 
trade in Japan.  
The company publicized its structure and the rules for its operations in August, 
1881.
615
 Some aspects were similar to those one might find in any modern public corporation. 
The United Silk Storing Company would be a limited liability firm which raised capital from 
the sale of shares (Article 3), have a corporate board to manage the company’s affairs 
(Article 14), hold bi-annual meetings where the stockholders would meet to discuss the 
company’s business (Article 17), pay dividends to shareholders (Article 37) and limit its 
business to the storage of silk and silk products (Article 1).
616
  
Yet, the company also had restrictions on membership that made it similar to a guild. 
The company regulations strictly limited the ownership of shares to “…such persons as have 
shops in the port of Yokohama and are actually engaged in the sales of silk and silk 
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goods…to foreign firms,” or, in other words, export merchants (Article 4).617 This stipulation 
effectively made the company more of an association or federation of export merchants than 
a joint stock company. Other requirements ensured that company shareholders would behave 
more as members of an industry association or cartel rather than a corporation.  The 
shareholders could not sell or transfer their shares to anyone outside of the company and 
could not retire from the company without express permission from the company’s president 
(Articles 6 &7).
618
 The company could annul shares if their owners violated any of 
company’s rules (Article 8).619 
They required shareholders to follow a set of strict procedures in silk trading. All 
shareholders—in effect, export merchants--had to keep their silk in the company’s 
warehouses. They could take only a single bale out of the warehouse as a sample to show to 
potential foreign buyers but could not otherwise remove their silk without prior notice 
(Articles 19 & 24).
620
 The shareholders also had to conduct all exchanges of goods for money 
on company premises and could not transfer any silk out of the warehouse unless the 
shareholder had received payment in full for the product (Article 27).
621
 Shareholders also 
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had to abide by the United Silk Storing Company’s procedures for the weighing of silk 
(Article 28 & 29).
622
 
A second set of rules outlined further regulations regarding the behavior of the export 
merchants who were to be the United Silk Storing Company’s main stockholders.623 The 
“bye-laws” forbade any member company from dealing with anyone selling silk to foreign 
buyers without channeling the sale through the company (Article 13).
624
 Company members 
also had to refuse to do business with anyone who “…has sent even a single bale to a 
commission merchant [export merchant] outside [of] the union…” (Article 14)625  To ensure 
all members of the company abided by the rules, each stockholder had to deposit a bond of 
1,000 yen in a common account at the 2
nd
 National Bank which would be forfeited if the 
stockholder violated any of the rules (Article 15).
626
 
A third set of rules aimed at organizing silk producers and dealers in the interior to 
serve the United Silk Storing Company’s scheme of transforming the silk trade.627 Regional 
silk producers and dealers would form local affiliated companies which would inspect and 
sort silk. The “Rules of the Silk Sorting Company” promoted the creation of such enterprises 
by regional merchants who had agreed to subject their wares to careful quality inspection and 
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abide by strict standards for sorting and packaging silk for sale (Articles 1& 2).
628
 Although 
members of the silk sorting companies could “negotiate sales directly with merchants” 
(Article 17), this freedom was somewhat dubious since members could not employ anyone 
“as their agents at the open ports persons who do not belong to the [United Silk Storing] 
Company” (Article 21). Moreover traveling to the treaty ports to negotiate in person with 
foreign merchants was likely to be extremely inconvenient for most silk dealers and 
producers.
629
 The freedom of trade of the members of local silk sorting companies was 
further restricted by the requirements that they refuse to do business with any agents or 
suspected purchasing agents of foreign merchants unless those agents agreed to pay for silk 
goods immediately on delivery (Article 20).
630
 In addition, the silk sorting companies were 
subject to fines for delivering silk to any buyer (except export merchants who were members 
of the company) prior to full payment (Article 18). Finally, the sorting companies could not 
withdraw from the company if they joined (Article 9).
631
 
These three sets of rules had important overarching goals. First detailed regulations 
imposed on silk trading aimed to eliminate the established customs in the silk trade that the 
export merchants found most objectionable. All three sets of regulations included specific 
clauses banning delivery of goods prior to full payment and attempted to insure the operation 
of silk trading on a payment-on-delivery basis.  This procedure would make all silk sales 
final and prevent foreigners from changing the terms of a sale. Regulations concerning the 
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weighing of silk and adherence to a system of silk inspection would take these processes out 
of the hands of foreign merchants and put them under the supervision of Japanese silk 
producers and merchants. Enforcing domestic grades and standards would force foreign 
merchants to accept Japanese methods of inspection and sorting and eliminate any disputes 
over quality. Overall, these changes would eliminate the seemingly arbitrary practices of 
foreign merchants and make silk trading more predictable for sellers. 
To ensure the attainment of these goals, however, the United Silk Storing Company 
needed to be able to coerce unwilling parties to comply with the new rules. Gaining this 
leverage required the export merchants to use their collective power as the main silk brokers 
in the country to impose conformity to the new rules upon silk producers and dealers in the 
interior. Thus, these company regulations depended upon all of the export merchants obeying 
and supporting the new procedures. The Japanese could impose these new regulations on 
unwilling foreign merchants only if the Japanese--producers, dealers in the interior and 
export merchants--presented a united front. 
The restrictions on freedom of trade and the coercive nature of some of the 
regulations, though, raised suspicions that the company aimed to further extend export 
merchants’ control over the silk trade. Both contemporary observers and later historians have 
viewed the United Silk Storing Company as little more than a conspiracy of a small number 
of wealthy silk merchants in Yokohama to gain monopolistic control of the silk trade for 
their own self-enrichment. They, of course, never expressed such a desire, but one cannot 
deny that the United Silk Storing Company, as a creation of the export merchants, would 
have exercised strong control over the domestic silk trade.  
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Whether intended to serve such a function or not, the United Silk Storing Company 
was, in a sense, a good public relations move. By creating an organization dedicated to 
reforming the silk trade and eliminating foreign merchant “abuses,” the export merchants 
showed they were not lackeys of Western oppressors but were acting as vigorous defenders 
of the nation’s “commercial rights.” By emphasizing the patriotic goals of the new company 
the export merchants could deflect some of the critique coming from advocates of direct 
trade. By presenting the goal of the company as the reform of domestic trade, the founders of 
the company also sought to convince government officials that they too deserved support, 
because they could play a useful role in solving the trade deficit. 
Fully aware that the creation of a new company would fundamentally challenge the 
status quo and threaten the privileged position of foreign buyers, the export merchants 
backing the company predicted that foreign mercantile houses would oppose it by blocking 
all silk trading for several months. Such a cessation of trade in Yokohama would force 
Japanese silk merchants to engage in direct trade to dispose of the nation’s silk stocks. The 
export merchants therefore asked the government to lend a large sum of cash directly to the 
export merchants to help fund the silk trade.
632
   
 Had the proposal been approved, it would have instantly put the export merchants at 
the forefront of the direct trade movement and guaranteed an even more powerful position in 
the silk trade. Officials, however, appeared to ignore the suggestion. Its general intent fit the 
nationalist economic stance of Ōkuma’s commercial policies, but officials hesitated to 
support the silk warehouse project because they feared accusations from foreign powers that 
the government sought to interfere with foreigners’ freedom of commerce which the unequal 
treaties had guaranteed.  
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 In any event, the export merchants proceeded to form their company. Prominent 
export merchants Hara Zenjirō, Mogi Sobee, and Shibusawa Kisaku together with the large 
firms Mitsui Bussan and Bōeki Shōkai and prominent businessmen Shibusawa Eiichi 
announced their intent to create the United Silk Storing Company as a joint stock enterprise. 
Initial plans for a stock offering met opposition from smaller retail merchants who 
complained of a lack of shares and high share prices which effectively excluded them from 
participation in the new company. After some deliberation, the founders increased the shares 
in the initial public offering and lowered the price per share. Despite this concession towards 
small investors, the export merchants and representatives from large trading firms still 
dominated the company. Three export merchants, Hara Zenjiro, Shibusawa Kisaku, and 
Mogi Sobee, held roughly twenty-five percent of its shares. Combined with the holdings of 
other large stockholders including Asabuki Eiji, Makoshi Kyōhei (representatives of 
Mitsubishi and Mitsui interests respectively) and Shibusawa Eiichi, large-scale investors held 
roughly a third of the company’s stock.633  In early September, shareholders elected 
Shibusawa Kisaku to head the new enterprise and appointed Asabuki and Makoshi to the 
board of directors. The company began operating on September 15. 
  
The Gentlemen Object: foreign merchant reaction to the United Silk Storing Company 
 The foreign merchant community in Yokohama reacted with alarm to news of the 
United Silk Storing Company’s creation and the changes in the silk trade. On the morning of 
September 20
th
, 1881, a group of foreign merchants issued a call for an impromptu meeting 
of all those involved in the silk trade to take place that night at the Club Germania in the 
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foreign quarters of Yokohama. Despite the short notice over seventy merchants attended the 
meeting.
634
 The meeting focused on discussing how the foreign merchant community should 
react to the United Silk Storing Company and the new rules the company sought to impose 
on silk trading.  
 The participants quickly objected to the Storing Company’s attempts to change the 
terms of the silk trade. One of the main criticisms was that the new enterprise would require 
foreigners to place greater trust in Japanese merchants whom foreign merchants viewed as 
untrustworthy and dishonest. A.J. Wilkin, a partner in the firm Wilkin and Robison who had 
been elected to chair the meeting, summarized this opinion. He hinted that the present system 
of silk trading needed some changes by suggesting that, “the scheme just launched by the 
Japanese seems to contain within it some principles of such improvement.”635 Yet he rejected  
the changes the company sought to introduce to the method of silk trading, because they 
required foreign buyers to “place implicit confidence in the Japanese…in their 
straightforwardness and honesty...”636 This was simply impossible since, Wilkin noted, “…in 
no direction is the trickery of the natives more conspicuous than in the silk 
business.”637Wilkins argued that a foreign buyer would have to closely monitor the sorting, 
weighing, and packaging of silk carefully, because at every step, Japanese sellers were prone 
to attempt to slip in hanks of shoddy or substandard silk, misrepresent the weight of silk, and 
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mislabel shipments to fool the buyer into buying low quality or adulterated silk at a premium 
price.
638
  
 Because one could place no faith in the honesty of Japanese merchants, Wilkin 
explained, the Storing Company’s demands for payment on delivery were unacceptable. He 
was willing to concede that, in principle, demanding payment prior to delivery might be 
justified. Yet Japanese merchants had proved they felt no obligation to honor contracts and 
paying for goods on delivery would remove the single most important check foreign buyers 
could exercise to prevent fraud by Japanese sellers.  If payment on delivery became standard 
practice, the only remaining way to redress grievances against Japanese merchants would be 
in a Japanese court of law which Wilkin deemed to be, “practically unavailing.”639 
Other Western merchants wholeheartedly agreed. A Mr. Kingdon, a partner in the 
firm Kingdon and Schwabe, complained about the manner in which the United Silk Storing 
Company had sought to change the unwritten rules of silk trading. He accused the Japanese 
merchants behind the company of acting “…secretly and without any due notice and without 
consulting us.” If the Japanese merchants had any legitimate grievances or were dissatisfied 
with the state of the silk trade it was their duty to “…come to us and state their grievances 
plainly, instead of banding themselves together in a manner I can only designate as an insult 
to foreign merchants.”640 Considering what he saw as the underhanded manner in which the 
Japanese merchants had created the Storing Company, Kingdon argued that the foreign 
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merchant community could not place sufficient trust in the company to “transact business 
with it.”641 
 Rejecting any suggestion that the Japanese merchants had formed the United Silk 
Storing Company as part of an honest attempt to improve the system of silk trading, the 
foreign merchants imagined that hidden motives lay behind the company’s creation. Wilkin 
speculated that the company was little more than an attempt by a group of merchants to 
control the silk trade. He observed, “…if we enquire as to the origin and basis of the 
movement, we may with some reason conjecture that it is for the benefit of a few, --to 
provide some sung [sic] places, and to put the control of the trade in the hands of these 
favored ones”.642 
 This theory proved sufficiently compelling to the foreign merchants who were quick 
to denigrate the Storing Company as a monopolistic enterprise by referring to it as the “Silk 
Guild or simply “the Guild.”643 Foreigners harbored fears, too, that the Japanese government 
might secretly have urged the creation of the new company to achieve some hidden goal. 
Wilkin speculated that perhaps the company was part of a scheme in which the 
“…Government hopes to find in [the company] a convenient outlet for the floating of more 
paper money.”644 
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 Besides suspicions about the motives of the company and the honesty of Japanese 
merchants in general, Western merchants protested that the new system the United Silk 
Company sought to impose would make silk trading difficult for buyers. Wilkin pointed out 
that the United Silk Storing Company’s insistence on conducting all inspection of 
merchandise at its own warehouses would be an unbearable inconvenience. Foreign silk 
inspectors would waste valuable time travelling to and from the company’s warehouses to 
carry out inspections.
645
 
The foreign merchants also claimed that they needed flexibility in purchasing. 
Because they usually received orders from customers in Europe that requested specific types 
and grades of silk, forcing the foreign merchant to adopt the Storing Company’s own 
standards for sorting would complicate the challenge of matching purchases of silk to 
customer demand in Europe and America.
646
 Wilkin also raised objections to stricter 
procedures for weighing silk by arguing that a purchaser of raw silk had to take into account 
the well-known tendency of silk to lose moisture and thus some of its weight during the long 
journey to Europe or the United States.
647
 In effect, he claimed that a foreign merchant was 
justified in understating the weight of the silk he might purchase in Yokohama, because the 
load would lighten by the time it reached its final market.  
 Wilkin’s complaints about the new inconveniences being visited upon silk buyers 
were substantiated by James Walter who gave a detailed report of his own experiences in 
attempting to purchase silk from the company. Walter told his fellow merchants that he had 
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visited the company’s warehouse the previous day to purchase “100 to 150 bales” of silk. 
The main difficulty he experienced was inspecting the silk in question, because inspection 
facilities were inadequate: “There was apparently no lack of willingness to make matters 
easy but the ability was wanting. Every bale had to be taken away after inspection to make 
room for another and the difficulty of getting them down to the carts, the number of coolies 
and hangers on, and other inconveniences made the whole business of sorting and inspecting 
little more than a farce. I only succeeded in getting through 14 bales in the afternoon and then 
gave the thing up as hopeless.”648 Walter concluded that it would be impossible to carry out 
inspections under the current conditions and do business on the United Silk Storing 
Company’s terms. Walter was, however, willing to view the United Silk Storing Company as 
an honest if flawed attempt to improve the manner of silk trading. He urged his fellow 
merchants to meet with the Japanese “and devise some method of mending matters.”649 
 Most of his peers, however, were in no mood to negotiate. They swept aside any 
suggestions of holding talks with representatives of the company in favor of issuing a 
strongly worded condemnation of the enterprise. The meeting unanimously approved a 
resolution that Kingdon submitted: “…this meeting resolves that it is not safe, considering 
the large scale interests at stake, to purchase silk from the Rengo Ki-ito Ni-adzukari-jo 
[United Silk Storing Company], under the present rules and conditions imposed by that 
association.”650 Participants agreed to send a strongly worded letter of protest to the 
leadership of Storing Company along with a copy of the resolution signed by representatives 
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of all foreign merchant firms supporting it.
651
 Two days later, the foreign merchant group had 
gathered signatures from most of the foreign silk buyers in Yokohama and resolved to meet 
again to discuss further measures.  
 Wilkin composed the letter to the board of the United Silk Storing Company. He 
expressed “surprise” and “disappointment” at the “sudden and abrupt manner in which your 
association has commenced its operations.”652Although Wilkin complained that the foreign 
merchants should have been consulted beforehand, he did promise to give his, “best 
consideration” to any grievances Japanese silk merchants might present regarding foreign 
firms and expressed a desire for Japan’s silk trade to prosper. Until then the signatories of the 
resolution clearly stated that they would refuse to purchase any silk from the United Silk 
Storing Company or anyone affiliated with it.
653
A few days later representatives of the 
prominent trading firms of Jardine Matherson Company, W.B. Walter, and W.M Strachan & 
Co. issued a separate declaration that they would “…do all in our power to defeat the 
combination of Japanese dealers,” even though they had not signed their names to the 
original resolution passed by the foreign merchant group.
654
 The battle over the silk trade had 
begun. 
 
A War of Words: the Silk Dispute in Print 
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 With the declaration from the major foreign silk buyers in Yokohama that they would 
refuse to do business with the United Silk Storing Company, Japan’s silk trade ground to a 
halt. For the next few weeks the foreign merchants in Yokohama and the United Silk Storing 
Company would engage in an increasingly acrimonious war of words fought in a series of 
circulars, letters, and newspaper editorials in an effort to win over the support of the Japanese 
public.  The two sides sought to present rival interpretations of the nature of the silk trade and 
the causes of the dispute. The foreign merchants employed an economic rationale to justify 
the current silk trading system in arguing that it was a natural and rational response to market 
conditions in Japan which required silk buyers to protect themselves against fraud committed 
by unscrupulous silk suppliers. They condemned the Storing Company’s challenge as a 
devious plot hatched by a small group of would-be monopolists to gain control of the silk 
trade at everyone else’s expense.  
 In contrast, the United Silk Storing Company portrayed the dispute as part of the 
political struggle to defend Japanese pride and independence from the encroachment of 
agents of Western oppression. The firm argued that the silk trading system in Yokohama 
imparted unfair advantages to foreign buyers and was part of the inherently discriminatory 
system created by the unequal treaties which denied Japan equal rights as a member of the 
family of civilized nations. The company portrayed its own efforts as part of a campaign to 
seek redress for foreign “abuses” and reclaim Japan’s “commercial rights” as well as the 
control of domestic commercial transactions that all nations rightfully possessed.  
 The foreign merchants outlined their views in two circulars that went to silk dealers 
and producers around the country and were publicized in both the Japanese and foreign press. 
The foreign merchants defended the silk trading system as ensuring the smooth operation of 
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the silk trade by protecting the interests of silk buyers. The foreign merchants argued that “It 
is well known that silk very seldom conforms to the sample shown,” and that “dishonest 
practices…are known to have long existed in the packing and selling of silk…”655 Given that 
these “dishonest practices” were commonplace, the custom of delivery prior to payment was 
necessary because it enabled silk buyers to carefully inspect all silk to ensure that it actually 
met the quality standards that the seller claimed it did.
656
 In an environment where the buyer 
was unable to place complete trust in sellers, it was only logical for buyers to protect their 
own economic self-interest by demanding as delivery prior to payment. 
 The foreign merchants also strove to show there were other ways in which the custom 
of delivery prior to payment might have evolved as the result of legitimate business practices 
and rational pursuit of self-interest. If a Japanese silk seller brought his silk to Yokohama 
only to find the market weak, would it not be logical for the seller to seek to entice buyers to 
purchase his silk “by offering to send a lot of silk to the foreign godowns with the condition 
that it may remain there for a week or more on offer?” queried the foreign merchants. 
Viewed in this light, delivery prior to payment worked to the advantage of the seller. 
Similarly, the foreign merchants’ habit of waiting to receive news of price movements in 
international silk markets before finalizing purchases was, the foreign merchants claimed, a 
legitimate commercial practice: “there is nothing improper or unusual in making a purchase 
or sale conditional upon telegraphic reply…Such transactions occur every day all over the 
                                                 
655
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world.”657 As long as both parties agreed to conduct business in this manner, argued the 
circular, the transaction would be “quite legitimate.”658  
 The circulars also sought to demonstrate that the silk trading system in Yokohama 
benefitted all involved. Seeking to deny claims that the silk trade was somehow 
impoverishing Japanese merchants, the foreign merchants asked the Japanese public, “…if 
what the Urikomi doniya [sic] say is true…the silk business in Yokohama would have ceased 
long ago…Can any one [sic] believe that these Commission agents have suffered for twenty 
years from outrage and injustice on the part of their customers, and yet in the meantime have 
grown from being poor and humble men to be rich and powerful?”659 The foreign merchants 
contended that the continued existence of the current silk trading system since the opening of 
the treaty ports and the increase in both the volume and value of Japanese exports proved that 
the system was “reasonable and good.”660 
 If the current silk trading system was indeed “reasonable and good” then it logically 
followed that the United Silk Storing Company was either misguided in its attempts to 
reform that system or harbored some hidden motive. The foreign merchants depicted Storing 
Company as little more than a group of would-be monopolists conspiring to seize control of 
the trade. The first circular declared that “combinations always tend to confer special 
advantages on a few persons, to the detriment of general business,” and implied the company 
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had sinister designs. Some foreign merchants “…cannot help suspecting there are other 
motives…than those which are published and that this combination of Japanese merchants’ 
desires to obtain control of the whole silk trade of Japan to the injury of everyone else 
engaged in it whether foreign or native.”661 
 The second circular did not accuse the United Silk Storing Company of being 
aspiring monopolists but it continued to portray the group as representing the interests of a 
very small group of Japanese merchants to the detriment of everyone else. The circular 
noted: “…when reform of the silk business is thought to be desirable, it is not the silk sellers 
in Yokohama who propose to bear any of the inconveniences connected with it…the 
prosperous commission agents of Yokohama (many of whom were poor men only a few 
years ago, though they are now Bank proprietors) are not to suffer in the least degree. On the 
contrary they are to have more power and less trouble than before.”662According to the 
foreign merchants, local silk producers and dealers in the countryside would pay the price of 
reforming the silk trade.  
 In contrast to the economic rationale that the foreign merchants used to explain the 
crisis, the United Silk Storing Company and the Japanese press portrayed the silk dispute as a 
political struggle for national independence and equality. The circular issued by the Storing 
Company rejected any notion that the enterprise would benefit only a few merchants and 
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instead insisted that the company aspired solely to correct “abuses” committed by foreign 
merchants by making the relationship between buyers and sellers more equitable.
663
  
 The United Silk Storing Company did not explain why the current system had come 
into being, but the Japanese press spiritedly argued that the silk trading system reflected the 
inherently unequal relationship between Japan and the Western powers. According to the 
Hōchi Shinbun, the foreign merchants’ superior knowledge of overseas trade had allowed the 
foreign buyers to take advantage of Japanese naiveté. The paper explained: “…when the 
ports were first opened, our merchants, then being ignorant of the modes of foreign trade 
were void of even enough knowledge to discover the deception and ridicule of the foreigners, 
from which they always suffered, and consequently all their dealings were subject to the 
management of strangers, while our merchants had, it seemed, no control over any kind of 
transactions.”664 Echoing this analysis, the Choya Shinbun implied that Japanese merchants’ 
relative lack of experience with foreign trade was a major reason for the commanding 
position foreigners enjoyed in Japan’s overseas trade. The paper asked its readers, “How 
could our merchants, who have not sufficient experience, offer staunch resistance?”665 The 
Japanese press also blamed the extraterritorial privileges that the “unequal treaties” imposed 
upon Japan for allowing foreign merchants to act with impunity in their dealings with 
Japanese sellers. The Choya Shinbun declared, “…foreigners entrenched behind the strong 
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bulwark of extraterritoriality, hold us in contempt…”666 The inequality that existed between 
buyers and sellers in the silk trade thus stemmed from the unequal relationship between 
Japan and the Western powers by which the West was able treat Japan as an inferior and 
subservient partner. 
 The natural result of this unequal relationship was a silk market that foreign 
merchants controlled. The circular issued by the United Silk Storing Company explaining its 
views of the conflict accused the foreign merchants of “fixing prices” and condemned 
payment before delivery of silk as “…the arbitrary proceedings of Foreign silk-
merchants…”667 The Yokohama Mainichi Shinbun similarly accused the foreign merchants of 
utilizing a double standard in their business dealings. For example, when the treaty ports first 
opened for trade foreign merchants had demanded that Japanese merchants purchasing 
imported goods pay prior to delivery. However, when Japanese merchants discovered that 
discrepancies existed “…in the quality of the samples and that of the bulk…,” foreign 
merchants “…did not show even the slightest inclination of taking the matter into 
consideration.”668 Yet, when the foreigners themselves wished to purchase silk they had the 
seller entrust his merchandise to the buyer’s warehouse where the buyer could not only 
inspect the merchandise at his leisure, but could also concoct any number of excuses to 
justify rejecting the silk if the market back home proved to be disadvantageous.
669
 Other 
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practices such as the procedures for weighing silk also seemed to privilege foreign buyers at 
the expense of Japanese sellers.
670
 
 According to the Japanese press and the United Silk Storing Company, this unequal 
system was robbing the nation of legitimate economic gains it should be making from trade. 
In a circular mailed to provincial silk producers and dealers explaining its view of the dispute, 
the company complained that “…indescribable abuses have hitherto existed in the silk 
trade…we have always submitted to the absolute exercise of their commercial rights by 
Foreign merchants, and the country has suffered heavy losses as a consequence.”671 The 
Choya Shinbun added that foreign merchants “…sometimes secure exorbitant profits under 
arbitrary and improper contracts.”672 Claiming that the methods used to weigh silk utilized by 
foreign merchants worked to line the foreigners’ pockets at the expense of Japanese sellers, 
the circular noted that “All this money represents the profits improperly accruing to 
Foreigners under the old arbitrary system….”673 The Nichinichi Shinbun concurred with this 
analysis in stating that the method of weighing silk enabled foreigners to obtain 
“profit…without their paying for it.”674 Refuting the argument in the foreign merchant 
circular that the prosperity of the export merchants proved that the silk trading system was 
fair to all, the Hōchi Shinbun fumed: “To try to prove the non-existence of abuses in the 
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original customs of the silk business by the prosperity of the present Urikomi-doiya, is as 
stupid as an indiscreet expression employed by a man to deceive a child…Dealings in silk 
are of course lucrative, but owing to the prevalence of abuses, there may have been cases in 
which we have lost half an inch of profits when we should have properly gained one inch, 
had we possessed equal tradal [sic] privileges with foreigners. And thus we could not get 
profit undisturbed by loss.”675 The inherently unequal system that existed in the silk trade 
therefore allowed foreign merchants to pocket profits that should have gone to Japanese 
merchants under a trading system where buyer and seller would have met in the marketplace 
as equals. The silk trading system was therefore cheating Japanese merchants and the nation 
of justly earned riches. 
 Viewed in this light, the new rules that the United Silk Storing Company sought to 
impose on the silk trade became a just fight for equal treatment in the marketplace. The 
Choya Shinbun explained the creation of the United Silk Storing Company in these terms: “in 
order to definitively break down long existing abuses and to regain our commercial rights, 
our energetic merchants have lately established the Kiito Ni-adzukari-jo, with the hope, 
under regulations, to establish that the right of our traders is equal to that of foreign 
merchants, and to shake ourselves from unrighteous oppression in the future”.676The 
Mainichi Shinbun noted widespread support for reform of the silk trade in reporting that in 
recent years both export merchants and producers and dealers in the interior had “…begun to 
express their sorrow that our commercial rights were controlled by aliens” and argued the 
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intent of the company’s founders was to “extirpate the abuses existing in…transactions and 
to assert the rights of our merchants.”677 The Hōchi Shinbun informed its readers that the 
company was established “…with a view to compass the advantage of our merchants, and to 
restrict foreign traders from a monopoly of the benefit.”678  
 If the silk dispute was essentially a fight for equal treatment in the marketplace, it 
therefore followed that foreign merchants’ objections to the new rules were only the 
complaints of a group of economic tyrants who resented having to treat their Japanese 
counterparts on an equal footing. The Hōchi Shinbun lambasted the foreign merchants by 
stridently declaring “…foreign traders, long being accustomed to a monopoly of benefits 
attempt, whenever our business men propose to restore our commercial rights, to stifle their 
efforts by menaces, acting just as a despotic monarch does towards his subjects. How 
obnoxious they are!”679 The Choya Shinbun dismissed the complaints of foreign merchants: 
“…foreign merchants… have acted arbitrarily and improperly hitherto, and always adopted 
selfish measures in defiance of the principles of right.”680 The United Silk Storing Company 
argued in its circular that the foreign merchants opposed the company merely because it was 
“inconvenient to them.”681 
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 Despite the strong condemnation of foreign merchants in the Japanese press there 
were some faint hints of hesitancy to endorse the United Silk Storing Company. Although the 
Choya Shinbun voiced its support for the company in its dispute with the foreign merchants, 
the paper also warned that the company could indeed develop into a monopoly. The paper 
warned, “If the [company’s] goals are not changed, there is nothing to guarantee that regular 
silk merchants will, after having escaped the oppression of the foreign merchant, simply be 
subjected to the oppression of the domestic [export] merchants.”682 The paper urged the 
company to reform its own business practices and deal fairly with silk producers and dealers 
in the interior.
683
 The Mainichi was also reluctant to pronounce unqualified support for the 
company. The newspaper announced that while it supported the company, the paper would 
support the “Japanese people” (Nihon kokumin) against the company if necessary.684 Even 
the Hōchi Shinbun, perhaps the most militant backer of the company, admitted “…there are 
many who harbor objections regarding the organization [of the company].”685Yet such 
concerns did not cast doubt on the righteousness of the Japanese cause in the domestic press. 
As the Japan Weekly Mail observed, “Whether the Ito-gwaisha be an unprincipled monopoly 
or the outcome of a sturdy resolution to correct abuses, it has…received the support of all 
Japanese who prefer to cast their lot in with their own countrymen.”686 
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 Throughout the protracted war of words taking place in the initial weeks of the crisis 
each side was well aware of the arguments of the opposing side, but there was little sign of 
reconciling the two opposing viewpoints. The foreign merchants continued to explain the 
dispute in economic terms while claiming that the United Silk Storing Company was a 
conspiracy to forward the private interests of a few rich merchants. The foreigners claimed 
that the present trading system had served both sides well and that would-be reformers had to 
prove that any proposed changes would actually produce material benefits. The Japanese 
press and the United Silk Storing Company, on the other hand, continued to portray the 
dispute as essentially a power struggle in which Japanese merchants were simply asking to be 
treated as equal partners in commercial transactions. Now that both sides had outlined their 
positions and no room for compromise had emerged, the time had come for more drastic 
action. 
  
Mobilizing for Commercial War 
 One of the most remarkable aspects of the silk dispute was how quickly it 
transformed from an obscure commercial dispute between Japanese and foreign merchants in 
the treaty ports into a popular nationwide campaign. While Japan’s press utilized ink and 
paper to support the United Silk Storing Company, Japan’s wider business community began 
mobilizing to fight a protracted commercial war against the foreign merchants on the 
company’s behalf. This business campaign was remarkable for two reasons. First, the 
campaign was the first time businessmen from around the country organized in an effort to 
realize a common goal. This was an important moment in the formation of the business 
community as an organized interest group capable of working together in common purpose. 
 302 
 
In other words, the silk dispute marked the beginning of “business” as an actor on the 
Japanese political scene.  
In addition, at least an informal leadership of the business community began to 
emerge in the persons of Shibusawa Eiichi, the director of the First National Bank, and 
Masuda Takashi, the president of the Mitsui Trading Company.  The two men would play a 
leading role in the silk dispute by endorsing the cause of the United Silk Storing Company 
and by acting as the company’s unofficial negotiators in talks with the foreign merchant 
group. The dispute also saw the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce act as a leading organization. 
It provided legitimacy to the company’s cause and set an example for the efforts beyond the 
capital. 
Japan’s business community moved quickly to throw its support behind the United 
Silk Storing Company. One of the first measures was an effort to suppress the price of the 
Mexican silver dollar in financial markets. Businessmen feared that if silver prices rose too 
high, the prospect of selling silk to foreign merchants in exchange for silver coin would 
become too lucrative for many Japanese merchants to resist. With a major part of Japan’s 
export trade now suspended, the Japanese expected already scarce Mexican silver dollars to 
increase dramatically in price. The authorities in charge of the Specie Exchange in 
Yokohama decided to help by appealing to currency traders to keep trading volumes as low 
as possible to prevent any increase in the price of silver.
687
 Yokohama’s import merchants 
(hikitoriya) also announced that they would suspend their business activities until the crisis 
was resolved. The import merchants who were the nation’s largest importers were in constant 
need of silver coin to pay for the imported wares. By pledging to cease their business 
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operations, the import merchants helped cool demand for silver and suppress silver prices, 
thereby ensuring that any temptation to sell silk for cash would be minimized.
688
 
The United Silk Storing Company also secured the vital support of the nation’s banks 
in the fight.  The Yokohama Specie Bank, a major player in the financing of the silk trade, 
announced to all the banks with which it did business that they should issue no loans on any 
silk shipments that failed to pass through the United Silk Storing Company.
689
 Some fifty 
bankers meeting in Yokohama on September 29 agreed not to issue any loans to silk 
producers or dealers who did not belong to the company association.
690
  
In addition to these precautionary measures to frustrate silk shipments to foreign 
firms Japanese banks opened up their vaults to ensure the Storing company would have 
sufficient capital to weather the crisis. Banks in the area of Tōkyō and Yokohama pledged to 
issue a total of 1.5 million yen in loans so that the company could continue to provide silk 
suppliers in the interior with capital. The 15
th
 National Bank (the so-called “noble’s bank”) 
pledged to loan the company an additional 2.5 million yen in specie in case the 1.5 million 
yen proved to be insufficient.
691
 This financial support aimed to bolster confidence in the 
creditworthiness of the company as well as provide it with sufficient funds to weather 
suspension of the silk trade its members depended upon to earn their livelihood. 
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In response to rumored threats of a boycott of the shipping of Japanese goods by 
foreign shipping companies, the United Silk Storing Company reportedly persuaded one of 
the country’s major shippers, the Naikoku Tsū-un Kaisha (Internal Shipping Company) to 
refuse to carry any cargo of silk without the Storing Company’s approval.692 Some weeks 
later when a silk dealer in Yamanashi prefecture, Natori Masaki, attempted to sell silk to 
foreign merchants, the Internal Express Company refused to transport the goods.
693
 
 With initial measures by businesses to rally to the United Silk Storing Company’s aid 
and increasingly heated rhetoric in the press, the dispute over silk began to assume the 
character of a national struggle for independence. Sentiment grew within the Japanese 
business community that it should issue a formal statement on the issue. On October 12
th
, 
1881, the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce convened a meeting on the dispute involving the 
United Silk Storing Company. The meeting included prominent businessmen who were not 
directly involved in the dispute. 
 Shibusawa Eiichi, the Chamber’s president and Masuda Takashi, the head of the 
Mitsui Trading Company, dominated the meeting.
694
 Masuda, recognized for his expertise on 
foreign trade issues, recounted the cause of Japanese silk merchants’ grievances against the 
foreign merchants by pointing out that in almost every other country payment upon delivery 
of goods was the norm, but in Japan a perverse system whereby the seller entrusted his goods 
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to the buyer without payment opened up possibilities for all sorts of abuse on the buyers’ part. 
This system had “no other counterpart in any other country in the universe.” 695 
 Although the most immediately obvious solution to stopping the abusive practices of 
foreign merchants might appear to be in direct trade, Masuda argued that this was not, in fact, 
the case, because foreign merchants performed a vitally crucial role in Japan’s silk trade. 
Summing up the conventional wisdom on foreign trade, Masuda asked his fellow 
businessmen, “If abuses and injustices were the result of employing Foreign [sic] 
intermediaries here, why not eliminate those intermediaries and carry goods direct [sic] to 
consumers?”696 This reasoning, he answered, was natural, but ignored the reality of the silk 
trade. European and American customers did not simply want Japanese silk, but wanted silk 
of certain qualities. The foreign merchants’ skill was in sorting and grading silk and 
repackaging raw silk of varying qualities into lots of uniform quality and specifications. By 
doing so, foreign merchants enhanced the market value of the silk and helped ensure 
Japanese raw silk would find a foreign buyer. Both the foreign merchants’ intimate 
knowledge of foreign markets and consumers’ demands and the merchants’ expertise in 
sorting and grading silk had enhanced the value and volume of Japan’s silk exports.697 
Japanese merchants did not yet have either the required expertise in knowing how to sort silk 
or sufficient knowledge of foreign markets to replace the vital functions being performed by 
foreign merchants.  
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 Masuda thus sympathized with some of the foreigners’ complaints against the United 
Silk Storing Company. Although he hoped that eventually Japanese merchants would be able 
to gain the necessary expertise to effectively inspect and sort silk for foreign markets, it 
would take time to set up an effective system and until then foreign merchants could not rely 
on Japanese methods of sorting and inspection.
698
 Masuda also rejected the idea that foreign 
merchants were somehow exploiting Japanese producers and merchants. Foreign firms were 
merely using their superior knowledge of silk markets and expertise to obtain good silk at a 
favorable price. They were shrewd businessmen who were merely gaining a “fair commercial 
advantage,” based on their own personal ability.699Masuda emphasized that the foreign 
merchant was playing a positive role in the Japanese economy by doing what any good 
businessman would do. In this sense, many of the complaints against foreign businessmen 
were misguided. 
 Yet, Masuda argued that United Silk Storing Company was an honest attempt by 
Japanese silk merchants to make silk trading more convenient for both parties and that the 
foreign merchants’ opposition to the scheme was unreasonable. The company’s system of 
silk inspection and sorting, although inadequate at the moment, promised to eventually 
develop into a well functioning system that would prove convenient to foreign buyers and 
Japanese sellers alike. Because the Storing Company had taken pains to provide adequate 
inspection facilities to foreign customers, there was no good reason for the foreign merchants 
to oppose the scheme.
700
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 Believing that the future of the nation’s trade depended on a favorable resolution of 
the issue, Masuda urged his fellow members of the Chamber to support the United Silk 
Storing Company in the dispute. Not only did the company promise to bring real and positive 
changes to Japan’s silk trade which would benefit all parties, but a defeat of the company 
would bode ill for future attempts to re-assert domestic control over Japan’s foreign trade. A 
defeat of the company would set a precedent that would doubtlessly frustrate future attempts 
to address any abuses of foreigners against Japanese merchants. Therefore the Chamber had 
to express its support for the company.
701
 
 The prevailing opinion in the Chamber was that the dispute represented a test of 
strength between the foreign merchants and the Japanese business community. Several 
members speaking after Masuda emphasized that the foreign merchants needed to understand 
Japanese grievances and only maintaining a unified front against the foreigners would make 
them back down. If the foreign merchant community understood that the entire nation was 
ready to support the United Silk Storing Company, they would be more willing to make 
concessions. The Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce voted to announce its support of the 
company in the dispute and to send requests to the nation’s other Chambers of Commerce 
urging them to back the company as well.
702
 
 This meeting of the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce was the final step in transforming 
what was initially a simple commercial dispute into national campaign against the foreign 
merchants.  The Tōkyō Chamber then assigned itself the role of coordinator and leader of this 
movement. In a declaration of support on October 16
th
, the Chamber announced to the United 
                                                 
701
 Ibid., 1192-1193. 
 
 
702
 Ibid., 1194. 
 308 
 
Silk Storing Company that it had “…appointed a special committee to devise the best means 
for your assistance…,” and proposed to “…consult with energetic men in every province, 
encourage combinations, and communicate the actual state of affairs in Yokohama…”703 
Besides volunteering to lead the effort to oppose the foreign merchants, the pronouncement 
of the Chamber also lent the considerable weight of some of the nation’s leading business 
figures behind the movement. This commitment prompted a wave of other organizations and 
businessmen to pledge their support for the company. 
  Business groups and regional Chambers of Commerce increasingly voiced their 
support for the United Silk Storing Company and enthusiastically set about to prevent silk 
producers and merchants in their locales from selling silk to foreigners. A group of 
merchants in the Kōfu district of Yamanashi prefecture were perhaps the most vocal. There a 
group of forty silk producers and dealers published a manifesto declaring their support for the 
company as a just attempt to rescue the rights of Japanese commerce from unscrupulous 
foreign merchants.
704
 The Yamanashi group also proclaimed that the merchants in the group 
would police silk trading in the area and ensure that no silk was sold to any entity other than 
the company. A charter from the group revealed that they would require all silk products 
from the area must bear the Yamanashi Chamber of Commerce’s seal in order to be shipped 
outside of the prefecture, local authorities would conduct a careful inspection of shipping 
invoices to prevent illicit shipments of silk, and a new inspections station would strengthen 
monitoring over the silk trade.
705
 Vaguer demonstrations of support came from the Chambers 
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of Commerce in Kōbe and Sendai. Although neither was a major silk trading area, such 
announcements of support indicated the nationwide popularity of the United Silk Storing 
Company and its mission.
706
  
The Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce’s appeal also seems to have energized individual 
firms and businessmen to make their own pledges of support. On October 18
th
 the Yasuda 
Bank, a large private bank owned by Yasuda Zenjirō, a prominent financier, publicly offered 
a 100,000 yen line of credit to the Storing Company to help it weather the crisis.
707
 Two 
businessmen in the port city of Kōbe named Horiushi and Arima who claimed to represent 
the “energetic men of Kōbe and Higo, also promised to provide the company with “…funds 
to such an amount as we can dispose,” should the company find itself in financial difficulties. 
In a dramatic, if largely symbolic, gesture from another group of Higo merchants sent five 
casks of saké bearing the label “commercial rights” (shōken) to the United Silk Storing 
Company along with a letter that declared the merchants’ hearty approval that the company 
was “…now in arms against an enemy in the great battle-field of commerce…,” and 
expressed the wish that “while you are comfortably drinking liquor…your courage will rise 
higher and higher and you will circumvent any secret strategy of your wily foe, secure 
complete victory over Europe and America, and liberate us all from their arbitrariness, and 
thus restore our commercial rights.”708 
In the frenzied rush to pledge support the United Silk Storing Company the Japanese 
government was the only powerful organization that refrained from public participation in 
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the dispute. There were, however, rumors of government involvement. The Japan Weekly 
Mail reported that several Japanese merchants claimed that the government was supporting 
the Storing Company behind the scenes by providing both cash loans and forcing silk 
producers and dealers in the interior to join the company.
709
 Then in early October uniformed 
policemen intercepted in Yokohama 24 bales of silk that an independent silk dealer had sold 
to W. M. Strachan & Company.
710
 To the foreign merchants the ability of the United Silk 
Storing Company to summon state authorities to enforce the boycott against the foreign 
merchants suggested that the company had official support. 
Despite the rumors and incidents, however, there is no real evidence that the Japanese 
government was ever involved in the dispute in any meaningful way. Early on the 
government had refused requests from the United Silk Storing Company’s founders for a 
large government loan and evidently did not pressure banks to support the company. The 
government itself denied giving any support for the company and never issued any official 
statement on the silk dispute other than a letter to the British Ambassador explaining that the 
dispute was a purely commercial matter in which the government had no role.
711
 A 
government investigation revealed that the attempt of uniformed police officers to disrupt a 
silk shipment in Yokohama was an unauthorized action carried out by off-duty police 
officers who were moonlighting as security guards for the United Silk Storing Company.
712
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Crisis 
 Despite the popular enthusiasm for the fight against the foreign merchants, silk 
producers and dealers in the interior came under great stress. Because many of them 
depended upon silk for their livelihood, the virtual halt of the silk trade in Yokohama meant 
they were having difficulty keeping their businesses afloat. By the middle of October the 
situation for them was beginning to look especially grim as the dispute had become a war of 
attrition with both camps essentially waiting to see whose resolve would break. Still, 
producers and dealers seemed to be holding up. 
Then in late October came a shocking discovery. The Mutual Extension Company 
revealed that it had sold 40 bales of silk to a foreign merchant, W. Sagel, without the 
mediation of the United Silk Storing Company. Forty bales was not a large amount of silk, 
but the sale was the largest one made to a foreign buyer since the silk dispute had begun. The 
sale showed that cracks were beginning to appear in the resolve of some of Japan’s silk 
producers in the interior.
713
  
 Although the Mutual Extension Company focused on selling silk directly in foreign 
markets, the company had joined the United Silk Storing Company as a shareholder. 
According to later memoirs of one of the key figures in the Mutual Extension Company, its 
stockholders were not enthusiastic about being part of the United Silk Storing Company, 
because they viewed the reform of the domestic trade as superfluous to their goal of shipping 
and selling raw silk abroad. They feared that an attempt to change the terms of the domestic 
trade would detract from their company’s main mission. Nevertheless, swayed by 
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nationalistic sentiment, company executives felt joining the fray would be a relatively 
harmless commitment that would not significantly conflict with their firm’s main goals.714  
 By joining, the Mutual Extension Company officially pledged not to have any 
dealings with foreign merchants in Yokohama unless the United Silk Storing Company 
served as an intermediary. Thus the sale of silk to a foreign firm appeared to be a clear 
violation of this agreement. While the Mutual Extension Company representatives claimed 
that the sale was part of its direct trading activities and therefore did not constitute a breaking 
of the ranks on the boycott of foreign firms, critics saw the sale as nothing less than an act of 
treason. The Mutual Extension Company argued that W. Sagel had merely contracted to be a 
sales agent and that the company had consigned 40 bales over to him so that he could serve 
as an intermediary for the company in selling the silk abroad.
715
 Critics pointed out, however, 
that the Sagel Company had paid the export taxes on the 40 bales of silk which suggested the 
ownership of the bales had been transferred to Sagel as the result of an outright sale.
716
  
 This sale of silk by the Mutual Extension Company was potentially devastating for 
the prospects of the United Silk Storing Company.  Up until this point, the silk merchants and 
producers had maintained a united front with the Storing Company. Although the press had 
reported some small-scale sales of silk to foreign firms, all of these deals had involved silk 
dealers in the interior who had either refused to join the United Silk Storing Company or 
were bit players in the silk trade. Also, in most of these cases public pressure proved 
sufficient to convince would be sellers to cancel the sales before any silk actually reached 
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foreign warehouses. The Mutual Extension Company’s sale was, however, much more 
significant. Because the Mutual Extension Company was one of the founding members of the 
United Silk Storing Company, this sale of silk amounted to a defection of one of the key 
members of the inner circle. The sale therefore exposed serious divisions within the Japanese 
camp which might cause the foreign merchant community to believe that Japanese resolve 
might soon crumble. If the resolve of producers and dealers began crack and they began 
selling silk to foreign merchants, the gamble to change the established customs of the silk 
trade would fail.  
 The United Silk Storing Company quickly expelled the Mutual Extension Company, 
but the expulsion itself caused new problems. The boycott of sales to foreign merchant firms 
would only be effective as long as all the nation’s major silk suppliers were willing to stand 
behind it. Expelling such a large silk dealing firm opened up the possibility that the firm 
might simply choose to start selling to foreign firms according to the previously established 
system. This change could potentially trigger a mass defection of firms from the Storing 
Company. The announcement by the Sekitanya firm that it was willing to sell silk to foreign 
buyers “on the old terms” seemed to suggest that desertions were already starting.717 
 With the fate of the boycott hanging in the balance, the United Silk Storing Company 
and allied merchants called a special meeting on November 1
st
 in Yokohama. In addition to 
the company stockholders, forty-one “delegates of the provincial silk owners” attended, 
along with Shibusawa Eiichi and Masuda Takashi who were acting as the company’s chief 
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negotiators with the foreign merchants in the dispute.
718
 The goal of the meeting was twofold. 
The United Silk Storing Company had to repair the fissures that were beginning to emerge 
within it. The company also had to shore up morale among the silk producers and merchants 
in the interior. 
 One of the primary tasks was to give local silk producers and dealers a rousing pep-
talk. Shibusawa Eiichi, the most prominent of all businessmen of the era, urged the members 
of the company to continue their fight. Shibusawa claimed that the United Silk Storing 
Company aimed not just to address grievances of a few Japanese merchants against foreign 
silk buyers but to promote “the principles of equity and justice.”719 Masuda Takashi also 
urged unity and confidence in victory over the foreign merchants.
720
 In addition, Masuda and 
Shibusawa reassured the audience that talks with foreigners were yielding progress and might 
soon produce a resolution in the dispute.
721
 
 Yet merely rallying the troops and promising progress in talks with foreign merchants 
were not enough to sustain the campaign. The United Silk Storing Company shareholders 
had to promise some sort of immediate action. At the meeting, the head of the company, 
Shibusawa Kisaku, told the businessmen that the only way forward now lay in direct trade. If 
the foreign merchant houses in Yokohama refused to deal with the company, there was no 
choice but to venture abroad and sell Japanese silks directly to buyers in the markets of 
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Europe and America. Shibusawa proposed a vote be taken on whether or not to pursue direct 
trade, so that preparations might begin.
722
  
 Shibusawa’s proposal prompted an outburst of enthusiasm. Local silk merchants were 
especially excited about the proposal which the meeting passed with a unanimous vote.
723
 
The resolution proclaimed: “So long as the foreign merchants decline to conform in their 
transactions to the rules of the Rengo Ki-ito Ni-adzukari-jo, the Guild shall, after 
arrangement of the necessary regulations, effect direct export of the whole staple now in 
Yokohama, and of all parcels which may subsequently arrive from any locality. Further, until 
we obtain our object, we bind ourselves mutually, under solemn obligation, not to dissolve 
our combination.”724   
In his study of this dispute, historian Unno Fukuju has suggested that despite the 
declaration that the United Silk Storing Company intended to “export the whole staple,” this 
declaration was never “anything more than a bluff.”725 Unno argues that, in reality, the 
Yokohama export merchants who were the major stockholders in the company opposed 
direct trade, because it could potentially undermine the lucrative business they did as 
intermediaries in the silk trade. If silk producers and merchants in the interior could sell raw 
silk directly to foreign customers, who would need export merchants? 
Unno suggests that instead of being a serious declaration of intent the declaration to 
export silk directly to foreign markets was carefully calculated to frustrate what was an even 
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greater threat to the interests of the export merchants, an effort to create a public auction 
house for raw silk. Lead by the head of the Trade Company, Asabuki Eiji, (See Chapter 5) 
some traders advocated the creation of an auction house in Yokohama where Japanese sellers 
would bring their raw silks to be auctioned off to foreign buyers.
726
 By conducting all silk 
trading at the auction house and forcing foreign buyers to engage in competitive bidding for 
Japanese silk, this procedure would eliminate the custom of delivery before payment and put 
buyers and sellers on a more equal footing. It would also, according to Unno, eliminate any 
need for export merchants, since the auction house would be open to all buyers and sellers. 
Theoretically, any silk producer or dealer from the interior would be able bring his silk and 
auction it off directly to potential foreign buyers.
727
 Thus, according to Unno, the export 
merchants wanted to find a way to kill the idea. Hence they issued their own bold proposal to 
“export the whole stable” abroad.728 
Unno’s theory is attractive, but it assumes that creating a public auction house was a 
viable and realistic option, rather than what it really was, a desperate hope. Although silk was 
sold by auction in some parts of the world, the most prominent example being the London 
silk auction, there were several major obstacles to the establishment of a public auction house 
in Japan.
729
 The most important barrier was the opposition of the foreign merchants. The 
Japan Weekly Mail noted that the idea of public auctions would be unacceptable unless all 
lots of silk put up for auction could be laid out for inspection in the auction room. Otherwise 
                                                 
726
 “From the Japan Daily Mail,” The Japan Weekly Mail (Yokohama), 5 November, 1881, 1280. 
 
 
727
 Unno Fukuju, Meiji no bōeki, 196. 
 
 
728
 Ibid. 
 
 
729
 “From the Japan Daily Mail,” The Japan Weekly Mail (Yokohama), 5 November, 1881, 1280. 
 317 
 
auctions would depend upon samples, and the foreign community would not trust Japanese 
sellers to supply silk of a consistent quality. The Japan Weekly Mail predicted that sellers 
would probably have to sell their silk at a significant discount if the auction system was to 
work.
730
  
Instead, the declaration to export all of Japan’s silk directly served as a gesture to 
placate silk producers and dealers in the interior. By pledging that the United Silk Storing 
Company would simply bypass the stubborn foreign merchants and export silk abroad 
directly, the company was appealing to producers’ and dealers’ sense of patriotism. By 
making a bold and dramatic gesture the company convinced them that they were not engaged 
in a mere commercial dispute but were contributing to a grand, national project to restore 
Japan’s commercial independence. The declaration also suggested that measures to alleviate 
their plight were possible. By promising to “export the whole staple,” the company gave 
producers hope that they could sell their silk even if the foreign merchants continued to 
refuse to accept any changes in the silk trade. A tough and defiant declaration could also 
serve as a negotiating tool. Unno allows that the proposal showed the foreign merchants the 
strength of Japanese resolve.
731
 As Masuda stated, “I believe a report of tonight’s resolution 
will give our side a great advantage when we meet again with the American ambassador.”732 
Beyond merely shoring up morale on the Japanese side, the meeting also had to repair 
the fractures in the association. Reportedly a group of top level officials from some of the 
major city banks--Nakamura Michita of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Hara Rokurō of the 
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100
th
 National Bank, and Kawamura Denbei of the 33
rd
 National Bank--pressed the United 
Silk Storing Company to take the Mutual Extension Company back into the fold.
733
For 
appearance’s sake, the Mutual Extension Company now blamed the sale of silk to a foreign 
firm on a rouge employee, Takaki Saburō, who allegedly had deluded himself into thinking 
that he might get away with selling silk under the pretext that he was merely entrusting the 
silk to a foreign merchant for export.
734
 After the Mutual Extension Company fired Takaki as 
a sacrificial lamb and issued a letter of apology, the Storing Company re-admitted the firm.
735
 
 The direct trade pronouncement sparked a new round of pledges from local silk 
producers and merchants who all swore their loyalty to the cause of commercial sovereignty 
and promised not to have any dealings with foreign merchants until the United Silk Storing 
Company prevailed in the dispute. A pledge of support for the company signed by over 40 
local silk producers and dealers in Yamanashi prefecture incited a wave of similar pledges to 
pour into Yokohama from around the country. Letters of support to the company and private 
donations even streamed in from non-silk producing regions. The cause of the United Silk 
Storing Company had become a populist cause célèbre.  
Despite these measures and the constant appeal to patriotic sentiment, real conflicts of 
interest between export merchants in Yokohama and silk producers in the interior became 
increasingly clear. Although most observers condemned the Mutual Extension Company’s 
sale of silk as a treasonous act, grumblings about the United Silk Storing Company and the 
export merchants were beginning to surface. Hoshino Chōtarō and Miyazaki Yūkei, both 
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leading figures of Gunma prefecture’s silk industry, drafted a letter to the Storing Company 
which appeared in the November 15
th
, 1881, edition of the Tōkyō Yokohama Mainichi 
Shinbun.
736
 The two men were writing as representatives of the Jōmō Silk Improvement 
Company which they had recently founded as part of an effort to export silk directly to 
America (see Chapter 5). They lamented that the Storing Company’s recent actions were 
having an effect “contrary to the [company’s] stated intent” by causing damage to silk 
producers in the nation’s interior. 737  Because the company had initially intended to correct 
the abuses perpetrated by foreign merchants and “put the power to buy and sell in our grasp,” 
silk producers welcomed it. They were grateful to have, “…the devious plots of the foreign 
merchant removed.”738 Yet, far from aiding silk producers, the company had triggered an 
unnecessary dispute with the foreign merchants that was “closing the routes of trade” and 
harming silk producers.
739
 
 Missteps might be forgivable, but the letter noted that the United Silk Storing 
Company was doing quite well, despite the halt in trade. Hoshino and Miyazaki complained 
that the company had taken out loans from the large city banks at a low 6 percent interest rate, 
only to turn around and lend out the same funds it had obtained from the large banks to silk 
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producers at 18 percent interest, a rate three times higher.
740
 For an organization supposedly 
created to fight for the interests of all of the nation’s silk producers and merchants, the 
company’s lending policies seemed to enrich the company at the producers’ expense. 
Hoshino and Miyazaki concluded that export merchants had formed the company mainly 
“…out of desire for profits.”741  
 On top of these usurious loans the United Silk Storing Company charged a host of 
handling and inspection fees which silk producers had to bear. Under the company’s silk 
inspection system, a supplier of silk had to pay inspection and handling fees both to local silk 
inspection stations maintained by the company in his own region and a further set of 
handling and inspection fees to the company’s headquarters when the silk reached its 
warehouses in Yokohama. Added to these fees were the traditional commission fees charged 
by the export merchants who controlled the company. In essence, Hoshino reasoned, silk 
suppliers were now facing three separate sets of fees where they had previously only had to 
worry about paying one set of commission fees. The new system of fees proved that the 
company placed the entire burden of creating a new trading system in silk on silk producers 
while the rich Yokohama export merchants lined their pockets.
742
  
 Hoshino and Miyazaki argued that although the cause of recovering “commercial 
rights” was laudable, silk producers were bearing all the sacrifice while Storing Company 
itself sacrificed nothing. The letter explained, “While we producers are experiencing 
hardships…your company alone lends out capital you borrowed at 6 percent at a high interest 
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rate monopolizing the profits thereby obtained…,” and concluded, “…producers are bleeding 
money and losing their business….”743 Producers simply could not survive if the dispute was 
to last much longer. 
 Hoshino and Miyazaki dismissed the Storing Company’s plans to directly “export the 
whole staple” as unrealistic. The two men declared, “…for us producers the chances of 
obtaining a victory from this dispute are already nonexistent.”744 The company did not have 
the capacity to ship large lots, lacked the ability to sort silk appropriately to meet the needs of 
foreign customers, and had insufficient experience doing business in foreign markets to 
ensure the silk could be sold at a favorable price.
745
 
 Hoshino and Miyazaki issued a set of three tough demands to the United Silk Storing 
Company. They demanded that the company reduce the interest charged on its loans to 6 
percent, and called on the company to cover any losses that might arise from any drop in silk 
prices that occurred since the dispute began and any losses that might result if silk was sold 
abroad at a low price.
746
 In sum the two men demanded that the company take on a greater 
share of the sacrifice that might result from the dispute. 
 Hoshino and Miyazaki’s letter reveals the frustrations of silk producers in the interior 
and suggested, for the first time, that their interests might not be identical with those of the 
export merchants who controlled the United Silk Storing Company. With storage fees and 
interest on loans piling up, rural silk producers and dealers, most of whom had only limited 
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capital, desperately needed revenue. It the silk trade did not resume soon, they would go 
bankrupt. At the same time, Hoshino and Miyazaki raised disturbing questions about who 
would really stand to benefit from a reform of the silk trade. They suggested that the Storing 
Company’s battle would benefit of the export merchants who would assume a commanding 
position in the silk trade while producers and dealers in the interior gained little in the way of 
tangible benefits. Hoshino’s letter showed that despite the façade of unity and patriotic 
sentiment there were divisions in the interests of the different parts of the silk industry. 
 
Compromise or Capitulation? 
From early on the United Silk Storing Company began to search for a possible 
solution to the crisis through talks with the foreign merchants. The cessation of the silk trade, 
the most important component of Japan’s export trade, threatened to cause real economic 
damage to the nation’s economy if it continued for too long. The nation’s business 
community was also nervous about a drawn out dispute. Although business leaders supported 
the idea of asserting the nation’s economic independence, they worried about the costs 
involved in the struggle. Almost as soon as news of the dispute reached Shibusawa Eiichi and 
Masuda Takashi, two of the most prominent members of the Tōkyō-Yokohama business 
community, they began to seek ways of settling the conflict. The two men met with US 
Ambassador John Bingham to discuss a compromise solution.
747
 At the same time, the export 
merchants asked the Yokohama import merchants (hikitorishō) to act as intermediaries. 
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Prominent import merchants and the foreign merchant group led by Wilkins met several 
times.
748
   
 Despite increasingly harsh rhetoric on both sides, informal talks between prominent 
businessmen on both sides continued. After all silk trading virtually ground to a standstill for 
almost two months, everyone was growing weary of the impasse. Neither side had 
anticipated that the dispute would last as long as it had and the efforts to undermine the other 
side proved largely fruitless. The United Silk Storing Company had so far only succeeded in 
completely stopping the silk trade, a situation which hardly benefited its members, and 
attempts to force a new system of silk trading on unwilling foreigners showed no sign of 
working. On the foreign side, efforts to undermine the association by driving a wedge 
between urban merchants and silk dealers and producers in the interior appeared for a brief 
moment to be working after the defection of the Mutual Extension Company, but, as 
described above, the United Silk Storing Company healed the rift. Even if some producers 
were starting to complain, on the surface the Japanese managed to maintain a united front. 
Plans to push for the dissolution of the company through diplomatic pressure looked 
increasingly unviable since no foreign power seemed willing to take up the foreign 
merchants’ cause.  
 The realization that any resolution must involve a compromise helped spur some 
progress in meetings between Shibusawa Eiichi and Masuda Takashi and the foreign 
merchant group. After discussing the situation with Ambassador Bingham, Shibusawa and 
Masuda finally managed to arrange direct talks with Wilkin and Walsh.
749
 Conferring at the 
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American Legation on November 2
nd
, 1881, Shibusawa, Masuda, Wilkin and Walsh resolved 
to hammer out a settlement to the dispute. 
 Wilkin and Walsh offered a largely cosmetic change in the methods of silk trading. 
The foreign merchants argued the only real point of contention was the “detention of silk in 
buyers’ godowns [warehouses].”750 Any complaints that Japanese silk sellers might have 
could easily be remedied by the use of a system of written contracts specifying the terms of 
sale, according to Wilkin and Walsh. By providing a clear contract specifying the amount to 
be purchased and price, sellers would have a reliable guarantee of sale.
751
 Wilkin and Walsh 
suggested that the price indicated on the contract would be a price, “according to sample,” 
which implied that a buyer could still reject any silk that he judged to be below the quality of 
the sample.
752
 They did not explain the procedure for enforcing such contracts, even though 
Masuda pointed out that there would be no incentive for the buyer to keep up his end of the 
bargain.
753
 
 Shibusawa and Masuda insisted that only the creation of a central silk market where 
buyers and sellers would meet as equals would solve the long-standing problems in the silk 
industry. Shibusawa argued that Japanese merchants were dissatisfied with much more than 
simply the “detention of silk in buyers’ godowns” and that only a total transformation of silk 
trading methods would satisfy them. A system of contracts might serve as a temporary, short-
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term fix, but the silk trade needed “the establishment of a central market or warehouse 
convenient to both parties and where the rights of both may be equally secure.”754 
 With two very different positions on the issue staked out, the two sides tried to forge 
a compromise. Although Wilkin argued that the creation of a central marketplace was not a 
workable short-term solution, because it would “take one or two years” to organize, he did 
suggest that foreign merchants would accept a central market with adequate silk inspection 
facilities, as long as it did not impose too many inconveniences on buyers.
755
Masuda and 
Shibusawa continued to insist that the only way to remedy the sources of friction in the silk 
trade would be to create a central marketplace, but they were prepared to agree to resume 
trading according to the contract system outlined by Wilkin and Walsh in exchange for the 
foreign merchant community’s approval of the proposal for a central warehouse to be 
constructed and managed by the Japanese.
756
The two parties agreed to go back and discuss 
the compromise with their respective associations to try to secure support for it. 
 The compromise agreement represented a significant retreat from the goals of the 
United Silk Storing Company.  In theory the creation of a central warehouse to store all silk 
and carry out all silk trading would put an end to the “peke” problem while preserving the 
right of foreign merchants to inspect shipments of silk. Foreign merchants and Japanese 
producers and traders could inspect silk together at the central warehouse and agree upon a 
price for the entire shipment. This prospect depended on the belief that the warehouse would 
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actually materialize and that foreign merchants would honor their promises to conduct all silk 
trading there. Until that time, the Japanese side would essentially concede defeat.  
 The United Silk Storing Company’s stockholders discussed the compromise several 
days later on November 10th.
757
 During the debate, one of the stockholders, Koyasu Takashi, 
the president of the Fusō Trading Company, put forward a competing proposal. Believing 
that the compromise yielded too much to the foreign merchants, he proposed to resume with 
the requirement that all silk purchases be completed at the offices of the export merchants. 
This procedure would mean the foreign merchants would have to finalize all sales at 
Japanese establishments and there would be neither storing of silk in foreign merchants’ 
warehouses for a probationary period nor any changes in contract due to disputes over the 
quality of merchandise.
758
 Foreign merchants would pay money and receive silk at Japanese 
establishments and all sales would be final.
759
 Only in cases where the silk seller did not have 
sufficient inspection facilities would he be allowed to hand over raw silk prior to sale and 
then only when the foreign merchant had signed a “proof of consignment” (hikikomi 
yakuteisho) which indicated the number of days required to inspect silk and provided a 
guarantee of fire insurance.
760
 Koyasu was essentially proposing to do away with the United 
Silk Storing Company altogether and replace it with an everyman-for-himself system which 
would nevertheless favor Japanese merchants. Surprisingly, Koyasu’s proposal was popular 
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with the company’s stockholders. A majority of them, including representatives of the 
Mutual Extension Company, approved the plan.
761
  
 The approval of Koyasu’s plan sparked a row within the ranks of the United Silk 
Storing Company.
762
Opponents of the Koyasu proposal insisted on another special meeting 
of the association to reconsider the issue on the next day with all shareholders and 
representatives of the regional silk holders in attendance. Opponents contended that Koyasu’s 
proposal would cause the dissolution of the Storing Company and a complete defeat for 
Japan. At the end, an alliance of export merchants and regional silk dealers approved 
Shibusawa and Masuda’s proposal for the temporary use of new types of contracts and the 
creation of a central marketplace in a few years. 
 Unno Fukuju has suggested Koyasu’s proposal and the controversies surrounding it 
stemmed from a fundamental clash of interests between advocates of direct trade and export 
merchants who used the cause of reform to solidify their dominance over the silk trade.
763
 In 
Unno’s account, Koyasu’s proposal found its strongest support among advocates of direct 
trade and it was the Yokohama export merchants who quickly moved to kill the proposal 
which threatened to undermine their own commanding position in the domestic silk trade.  
To the degree that Unno highlights a conflict of interest between advocates of direct 
trade and the interests of the export merchants, his interpretation contains a grain of truth. 
Yet the argument is both overstated and overly simplistic.  First, it is difficult to see how 
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Koyasu’s proposal, which would require silk trading to be conducted at Japanese shops 
typically run by export merchants would undermine the position of the export merchants.  
Unno also consistently overestimates the strength of the direct trade movement in 
assuming that direct trading firms might have somehow benefited from rejecting the 
compromise plan and potentially prolonging the crisis. Informed Japanese observers 
indicated direct trading firms had neither the capacity nor the expertise to export the bulk of 
Japan’s raw silk abroad.764 Pouring the full energies of Japan’s silk industry into direct trade 
might benefit direct traders in the long term, but a switch to direct trade promised to be a 
long and painful process which would require much trial and error. Although many silk 
producers and upstart companies desired to engage in direct trade, most lacked the necessary 
resources to invest in developing their own direct trade links. Many small producers lacked 
the sufficient capital to ride out the dispute and desperately needed trade to resume. 
 The behavior of the silk dealers and producers who threw their support behind the 
settlement negotiated by Shibusawa and Masuda illustrated this situation. It would have been 
in the long term interests of silk producers and dealers to support direct traders and work 
against the export merchants. Yet they supported the Shibusawa-Masuda plan that offered 
little to them beyond a return to the status quo, because their short-term survival required 
trade to resume as soon as possible.  
 Finally, Unno’s view of conflicts within the Japanese camp in the silk dispute relies 
on an overly simplistic analysis of the interests of direct traders and export merchants. 
Advocates of direct trade and export merchants stood to gain from a transition to direct trade.   
Producers who advocated direct trade saw direct trade as a way to bypass networks of trade 
controlled by foreign merchant houses and export merchants and thus capture a greater share 
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of the profits from the silk trade for themselves. The only problem was that many of direct 
trade advocates lacked the resources to engage in direct trade. To the degree that direct trade 
would displace foreign merchants, the Yokohama export merchants also stood to benefit 
from direct trade. With access to greater amounts of capital than producers the export 
merchants also stood a better chance of building successful direct trade ventures. The main 
problem was the pace of change. Export merchants hoped to introduce a more gradual 
transition to direct trading and to allow themselves the time to slowly build up their 
capacities and ensure they would continue to be the dominant force in Japan’s silk trade. 
 Developments within the foreign merchants’association mirrored what happened in 
its Japanese counterpart. A group of hardliners led by Kingdon opposed any compromise and 
denounced Wilkin by claiming that the chairman of the foreign merchant association had no 
right to act as representatives of association in negotiations with the Japanese. The rebels 
managed to engineer a coup by passing a motion to censure Wilkin and strip him of his 
chairmanship. In his place, Kingdon was elected chair. 
 At a meeting of the foreign association held on November 16
th
 to consider the 
compromise proposal, Kingdon used his newfound position to frustrate any attempt to 
resolve the dispute. He claimed that the Japanese association would soon collapse if the 
foreign association held out just a bit longer. He dismissed the idea of a central marketplace 
by asserting that the creation of such an institution would merely reconstitute the United Silk 
Storing Company in a modified form and arguing that Shibusawa and Masuda could not be 
trusted to keep their word.
765
 He urged his colleagues to reject the compromise proposal. 
 As the architects of the compromise, Walsh and Wilkin defended their plan and 
argued a central market would benefit everyone. Walsh contended the creation of a central 
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marketplace would correct many of the abuses committed by both sides under the current 
system of silk trading and make silk trading more convenient for everyone. He also 
suggested that the new Japanese militancy in regard to trade issues might even be a healthy 
sign. Although much of the rhetoric was overtly nationalistic and claims of grievances were 
often inflated, Walsh suggested this attitude indicated a real desire for change and perhaps a 
willingness to act more honestly in business dealings.
766
 A central marketplace might indeed 
be merely a cover for another attempt to establish a Japanese monopoly over the silk trade, 
but this effort, according to Walsh, should not provoke serious concern. Any monopoly was 
unlikely to succeed, because the individual desire for profit would eventually win out over 
patriotic sentiment. In the unlikely event that the Japanese could resist the individual desire 
for profit to maintain a monopoly, the foreigners had still reserved the right to oppose 
it.
767
Walsh argued that the compromise proposal should be accepted. Ultimately the 
moderate faction won the day as the foreign merchant community approved the settlement 
hammered out with Shibusawa and Masuda. 
 Examining Koyasu’s protest against the compromise proposal side-by-side with 
Kingdon’s objections to the plan suggests the protests of both men were little more than 
opposition movements of malcontents within the Japanese and foreign communities. 
Kingdon’s opposition to the compromise solution stemmed from the belief that if the foreign 
merchants held out a little longer they would be able to force the Japanese side to concede 
complete defeat. Similarly, the main purpose of Koyasu’s proposal seems to have been to 
prolong the silk dispute by putting forward a plan that the foreign side was sure to reject, 
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perhaps in the hopes that the foreign merchants would eventually cave-in to Japanese 
demands. In both cases objections to the compromise solution seemed to reflect tactical 
considerations rather than any conflict between interest groups within the two camps. 
 
The Aftermath of the Incident 
 The disappointing resolution of what came to be called the United Silk Storing 
Company Incident foreshadowed greater disappointments to come. After the resumption of 
silk trading, both demand for silk and silk prices dropped dramatically. The dip in silk prices 
in part resulted from a sudden glut of raw silk which flooded the market. During the two 
month hiatus in silk trading large stockpiles had been accumulating in Yokohama 
warehouses. With the resumption of trade this huge stock of silk all came onto the market at 
the same moment.
768
 Unfortunately, this oversupply occurred just as the demand for silk 
abroad was weakening. When the silk dispute had begun, both the European and American 
demand had been strong and market prices had been high. Two months later, however, both 
markets were experiencing recessions and, as a result, demand for silk, which was still a 
luxury, for many consumers declined.
769
 Many of the foreign merchant houses in Yokohama 
delayed purchases until demand and prices in their home markets began to pick up again.  
 At the same moment deflationary policies enacted by the government caused the price 
of the Mexican silver dollar in Japan to plummet. This drop in silver prices hit many 
exporters hard. They had funded their activities through borrowing paper currency and then 
receiving silver coin in exchange when they sold their goods to foreign merchants. Increasing 
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silver prices made it easier to repay loans denominated in paper and improved profit margins. 
Lower silver prices meant there would be no such bonus generated by a beneficial gap 
between the values of silver versus paper currencies.  
 In particular, the downturn in the silk market proved devastating to many silk 
producers and merchants. Many of them had taken out loans to fund silk production and to 
ship their silk to market during the crisis. The two month dispute made swift repayment of 
loans impossible and, while the United Silk Storing Company and the foreign merchants 
battled one another, producers and dealers in the interior watched interest accrue on their 
loans. Had the silk market still been strong after the settlement, the situation need not have 
been dire, but the sluggish overseas demand and low prices for silk meant that many 
producers could not earn enough to repay their loans. Added to these problems was an 
economic downturn in Japan which was triggered by the government’s deflationary policies. 
In the wake of the incident many silk producers and local dealers went bankrupt.  
 An analysis of the silk trade after the incident also shows that the Japanese failed to 
achieve any of their goals. Although Japanese merchants banded together again in 1885 to 
boycott a foreign merchant house accused of a particularly flagrant violation of the terms of a 
purchase contract with a Japanese silk seller, breach of contract continued to occur in the silk 
trade.
 770
 In 1885 foreign merchants returned roughly twenty percent of the silk they agreed 
to purchase in violation of initial verbal agreements. In other words for every 5 bales of silk 
contracted for sale, foreign merchants returned an average of one bale of silk.
771
  Despite the 
agreements hammered out between the United Silk Storing Company and the foreign 
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merchants, the movement to recover trading rights in the silk trade had failed to yield any 
significant changes in the way silk was traded. 
 Finally, the silk warehouse which Shibusawa and Masuda had proposed to create was 
never built. In 1882 the United Silk Storing Company stockholders agreed to reorganize the 
company into a silk warehousing corporation. Having drawn up plans to purchase land in 
Yokohama, the stockholders sought funding for the construction of buildings. The local 
banks, however, refused to help. After already loaning 3 million yen to the company, the 
banks were in no mood to increase lending to a group essentially comprised of the same 
people.
772
 The general economic downturn did nothing to encourage the banks to loosen their 
purse strings. Subsequently, the new warehouse company agreed to suspend its activities 
“until the return of more favorable business conditions.”773 
 
Conclusion 
 The United Silk Storing Incident represented the zenith of the direct trade movement. 
With the outbreak of the dispute between foreign mercantile houses and Japanese silk 
merchants, the realities of Japanese commerce and direct trade became issues which captured 
nationwide attention. By linking opposition to the business practices of foreign merchants 
and reform of the silk trade to the greater nationalist cause of defending Japanese sovereignty 
from foreign encroachment, the cause of commercial nationalism and direct trade came to be 
associated with the patriotic defense of the nation itself. The legacy of the silk dispute was 
that this association of direct trade and nationalist sentiment led to the creation of a dedicated 
                                                 
772
 Ibid., 795-797. 
 
 
773
 Ibid., 797. 
 334 
 
core of commercial nationalist devotees who would continue to advocate for policies to 
promote direct trade. 
 Yet the silk dispute also proved that patriotic sentiment alone was not enough to 
overcome economic reality. Despite possessing a strong determination to change the terms of 
the silk trade and enjoying widespread support from Japan’s business community and public 
at large, Japanese silk merchants failed to effect any meaningful change in the silk industry. 
This failure cast doubt on the viability of the direct trade movement and commercial 
nationalism in the near term. Although nationalist sentiment would continue to be a powerful 
source of inspiration that informed future debates over commercial policy, there was also a 
growing realization that the transformation of Japanese foreign trade was a long-term project. 
The lesson of the silk dispute for many was that commercial nationalism had to be tempered 
with a pragmatic recognition that economic realities would not change overnight. Achieving 
cherished economic goals would require concerted and sustained effort.  
 The silk dispute was also an important moment in the emergence of organized 
economic interests as actors trying to influence national economic policy. Although criticized 
by foreign merchants for its guild-like structure, the United Silk Storing Company was an 
early example of an effort to create an industry-wide organization that could work to effect 
meaningful change in an important sector of Japan’s economy. The creation of the Storing 
Company therefore signaled the beginning of the increasing institutionalization of business 
into organized interest groups. 
 More importantly, the silk dispute itself served as a learning process by which 
business leaders could test methods for mobilizing the business community to work toward a 
common purpose and establish an important set of precedents for representing the business 
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community in domestic and international disputes. The collective effort to support the United 
Silk Storing Company required Japanese businessmen to coordinate their efforts, maintain 
lines of communications between themselves, and adopt a common set of policies which 
would help them realize a common goal. Banks, shipping companies, and regional chambers 
of commerce worked together to prevent the shipment of silk to foreign merchants and 
provided financial assistance and moral support to the Storing Company. This experience 
served as a grand experiment in mobilizing business interests on a nationwide scale. The 
experience also set important precedents for articulating business opinion at the national level 
and especially in international disputes. In the confrontation with foreign silk merchants the 
Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce took a leading role as the official voice of businessmen across 
the nation. The dispute also established a tradition by which nationally recognized 
businessmen, including the head of the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce, would act as leaders 
in settling economic disputes. In short, the dispute established forms of organization, 
methods of mobilization and a set of precedents that would pave the way for a new era in 
which organized business groups would play a dominant role in Japan’s political economy. 
 On the other hand, the United Silk Storing Incident illustrated the beginnings of 
fragmentation of the silk industry into groups with competing interests on some issues. Silk 
producers in the less advanced silk producing regions and upstart trading firms used the 
dispute as an opportunity to attempt a major shake-up of the silk trade that would allow them 
to become major players. These silk producers and merchants saw direct trade as a prime 
opportunity to capture a large share of the silk export trade and its profits for themselves. The 
Yokohama export merchants, who dominated the domestic portion of the silk trade, hoped to 
forestall the transition to direct trade until they had built up their own capacities for exporting 
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goods overseas and could guarantee that they were able to continue to dominate the silk trade. 
Instead of direct trade, the Yokohama export merchants pushed for a reform of the treaty 
trade which would maintain their commanding position in the trade while addressing some of 
frustrations they experienced in dealing with foreign merchants houses. This division 
between advocates of rapid change and supporters of incremental change in the silk trade 
would become a driving force in the future disputes within the silk industry. 
  
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
 In the wake of the 1881 United Silk Storing incident, the direct trade movement 
began to stall. In the following years the movement experienced a series of setbacks and by 
1890 the once energetic popular movement appeared to be a lost cause supported solely by a 
small circle of intractable ideologues. The reasons for the direct trade movement’s deplorable 
end are complex. Shifts in the government’s commercial and monetary policies in the 1880s 
weakened programs designed to promote direct trade. At the same time, changes in Japan’s 
foreign trade made the promotion of direct trade seem less urgent. Japan started importing 
less and began to experience annual trade surpluses which did much to ease anxieties over 
the state of the nation’s foreign trade among government officials and the public. The direct 
trade movement also began to lose constituents.  Due to structural changes in the silk 
industry in the 1880s, divisions emerged among silk producers who had been some of the 
direct trade movement’s main constituents. While some silk producers continued to push for 
direct trade, another group found the existing treaty port trade to be satisfactory and opposed 
further state sponsored measures to promote direct trade. Finally, the politics of economic 
policy-making were beginning to change. The creation of new government agencies and 
industry groups transformed what had been a chaotic and haphazard process of economic 
policy making dominated by individuals and sporadic movements into a more organized 
process involving negotiations between organized interest groups. After 1890 a small handful 
of advocates would continue to press for commercial policies that promoted direct trade, but
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 they would do so as a small, well-organized interest group and not as part of a popular 
movement. 
 The shift in the government’s commercial policies that contributed to the decline of 
the direct trade movement took place on three fronts. The first change was a gradual shift in 
the emphasis of policy at the Yokohama Specie Bank from promoting exports to 
accumulating specie from abroad in order to improve the bottom line of the bank. The result 
was a gradual dismantling of the cargo loan program. Instead of focusing on the promotion of 
Japanese exports, the Yokohama Bank began to concentrate on gaining a larger share of the 
financing of Japan’s foreign trade in general, including loans to foreign merchants. As a 
result, the bank would no longer serve as the financial pillar of direct trade. The end of the 
cargo loan program had a dramatic effect on efforts to establish direct trade links by 
removing much needed financial support. 
 Deflationary monetary policy also knocked the wind out of the sails of the direct trade 
movement. Trading companies and rural cooperatives that had sought to engage in direct 
trade suffered in the economic downturn that followed the introduction of deflationary 
policies. Most the firms hastily established in the sudden wave of enthusiasm for direct trade 
in 1880 and 1881 proved to be short lived. Of a total of nine commercial firms engaged in 
direct trade in 1881, only two, the Trade Company and the Mutual Extension Company, 
would remain in business for several years. Ultimately, even these two companies ceased to 
exist after the Yokohama Specie Bank’s cargo loan program effectively ended in 1888. 
Meanwhile, the cooperatives that hoped to engage in direct trade as a way of realizing greater 
profits for producers were hit hard by the deflationary recession and lack of access to 
financing. The Jōmō Silk Improvement Company, perhaps the most notable achievement of 
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the cooperative movement, serves as an excellent example of what happened to many 
cooperatives. It faced painful restructuring by banks and the government in an attempt to 
make the ailing enterprise profitable.  After a long and desperate struggle to stay afloat the 
cooperative ceased to exist in 1890.  
 The creation of new institutions and organizations was also changed the nature of 
disputes over commercial policy. The creation of a new government agency, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce, in 1881 altered the debate over commercial policy. Afterwards 
disputes over commercial policy were intimately tied to attempts by the ministry to promote 
the formation of producer associations and encourage the self-regulation of important export 
industries. Advocates of direct trade hoped to use the new government initiatives to their 
advantage by utilizing producer associations as lobbying bodies to press for state support of 
direct trade. They also hoped that by allying themselves to the government’s initiatives to 
encourage local associations and self-regulation, they would be able to win state support for 
direct trade measures. This effort, however, ended in failure.  
 Structural changes in important export industries like silk, however, militated against 
any government attempt to regulate the industry and dampened enthusiasm for state 
sponsored initiatives to support direct trade. With the dismantling of silk producer 
associations in 1891 one historical era of commercial policy had officially come to a close. 
 
Matsukata and the End of the Cargo Loan Program 
 After 1881, robust government support for direct trade ventures began to collapse. 
One of the key reasons for this decline was a change in political leadership. Ōkuma 
Shigenobu, the most important backer of direct trade, was forced out of the Meiji government 
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in 1881.
774
  Because Ōkuma had been the chief architect of the Meiji government’s economic 
policies since 1873, his removal from the government signaled a new stage in economic 
policy making. Ōkuma was replaced by Matsukata Masayoshi. His ascendancy to a position 
of leadership in the Ministry of Finance was to have a major impact on government policy, 
especially toward the Yokohama Specie Bank.  
 Like Ōkuma, Matsukata was deeply concerned about the problem of domestic 
inflation and believed that the government had to do everything it could to accumulate 
specie. While Matsukata also saw government support for direct trade as one way to bring in 
specie, he was not as ideologically committed to the idea of direct trade as Ōkuma. Direct 
trade was to become one method of accumulating specie among many instead of being a 
priority. Matsukata would also take a much more severe approach to taming domestic 
inflation. Unlike Ōkuma, Matsukata believed an inflationary monetary policy rather than an 
unfavorable balance of trade caused Japan’s inflation. Budget cuts and a shrinking of the 
money supply were therefore necessary to reduce inflation. This conviction would have a 
major impact on Matsukata’s attitudes toward the Yokohama Specie Bank.  
 Although some scholars examining Ōkuma and Matsukata’s monetary policies have 
concluded that the two finance ministers held radically different and opposing visions of 
economic policy, it is difficult to detect any clear-cut difference in the commercial policies of 
the two. Export promotion polices did not change dramatically after Matsukata assumed the 
position as Minister of Finance. The Yokohama Specie Bank’s cargo and exchange loan 
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programs to finance direct trade remained in place.
775
 Matsukata saw the continued 
promotion of direct trade as a way to obtain specie from overseas and build up sufficient 
reserves to restore convertibility.
776
 Yet Matsukata believed the bank had to tighten up the 
cargo and exchange loan programs. Starting in late 1881, he introduced a series of reforms 
designed to make the programs more effective. These changes gradually shifted the priorities 
of the bank from promoting trade to accumulating specie.
777
 
 Matsukata, imposed more stringent requirements on borrowers. Officials had long 
suspected that many of the borrowers utilizing the Yokohama Specie Bank’s cargo and 
exchange loans were using the money to speculate in the silver market instead of actually 
engaging in trade.
778
 In January, 1882, Matsukata ordered all potential borrowers to subject 
their goods to strict quality control inspections by bank officials. This measure aimed 
ostensibly to keep shoddy goods from being exported, but was in fact meant to ensure 
exporters actually were engaged in trade rather than speculation.
779
 Borrowers also had to 
repay their loans in full before any goods entrusted to local consulates overseas would be 
released for distribution to buyers. In other words, the local consulates held the borrower’s 
goods until the borrower could prove that he had made a sale and would be able to repay the 
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bank loan.
780
 This measure was intended to ensure the prompt repayment of loans. Because 
the bank typically made loans in paper currency and required repayment in specie, the new 
rules sought to end speculation in exchange rates and to enhance the predictability of 
exchange transactions by requiring that repayment accord with the market exchange rate 
between paper currency and specie on the day of the original loan.
781
  
 The changes gave the bank stronger oversight over borrowers and reduced the risk of 
loan default. The setting of clear exchange rates would reduce the exchange rate risk for 
exporters. Under the old system, exporters took the foreign currency they gained from the 
sale of goods in foreign markets to the nearest Yokohama Specie Bank branch office or 
Japanese consulate. There the branch office or consulate would take possession of the foreign 
currency and issue a receipt to the exporter which indicated an amount of Mexican silver 
dollars equal to the amount of foreign currency to be paid to the holders of the receipt.  
Exporters could then take their receipt to the Yokohama Specie Bank’s main office in 
Yokohama which would then convert the Mexican silver dollars into yen at the current 
market rate in Japan. This process made exporters vulnerable to shifts in exchange rates 
between paper currency and the Mexican silver dollar in both foreign and Japanese markets. 
The reforms allowed bank officers and consulate employees to note the exact amount of 
foreign currency received along with the current exchange rate for that day. Receipts would 
record these amounts along with an expiration date. Until the expiration date the exporter 
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was guaranteed a set exchange rate at which the bank would convert his foreign currency.
782
 
This change made speculation using exchange loans much more difficult. The lending rates 
were also raised to increase the profitability of the bank. 
 Despite these changes, the Yokohama Specie Bank faced difficult times in late 1881 
and 1882. The bank had been overzealous in its lending policies and in the general recession 
that gripped the nation in starting in 1881 many of the banks’ borrowers declared bankruptcy 
or refused to repay their loans. The accumulation of bad debts put the bank in the red. By 
1882 the bank’s stock price had dropped dramatically, as investors fled from a bank they 
expected to become insolvent.
783
 The engine that was supposed to promote Japanese exports 
appeared to be on the brink of a breakdown. 
 Troubles at the bank convinced the government to begin exercising a stronger role in 
the bank’s management. This decision triggered a power struggle over control of the bank 
between an alliance of stockholders and officials with close ties to Ōkuma Shigenobu and the 
Ministry of Finance, now under the leadership of Matsukata.  In January of 1882, the 
ministry decided to strengthen its oversight of the bank by recalling its supervisor at the bank 
and replacing him with three Ministry of Finance appointed members who would sit on the 
bank’s board.784 Within months Nakamura Michita, Fukuzawa’s former pupil and an ally of 
Ōkuma, stepped down from his position as head of the bank. His successor, Ono Mitsukage, 
was evidently not a supporter of the ministry, as he complained about the ministry’s 
interference in the bank’s business and lobbied for greater independence from the 
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government.
785
 Ono resigned his post in November when the government refused to honor a 
request for an emergency loan for the bank.  
 Ono’s antics convinced Matsukata to institute a purge of the bank’s shareholders and 
personnel to eliminate any pro-Ōkuma elements.  Under Matsukata’s direction, the Ministry 
of Finance began to purchase large amounts of bank stock at favorable rates and resell it at 
market rates. This move diluted the ownership of the bank and reduced the proportion of 
stocks owned by Ōkuma and Fukuzawa’s circle.786 These moves succeeded in removing 
pockets of opposition and paved the way for Matsukata to conduct a thorough reform of the 
institution. 
 Once the Ministry of Finance had gained a firmer grip on the bank, it nominated Hara 
Rokurō, the president of the 100th National Bank, to serve as the head of the Yokohama 
Specie Bank. As the Yokohama Specie Bank’s newly installed chief, Hara’s main task was to 
ensure that the bank remained solvent. To do this Hara immediately proposed major reforms 
in the bank’s operations aimed to shore up the bank’s balance sheet and restore profitability. 
Since silver prices were starting to decline and the value of paper currency was climbing, he 
argued the bank should dispose of the majority of the silver coin it held and deal primarily in 
paper. By selling off silver while prices were still favorable and gaining paper currency 
which was increasing in relative value, the bank could earn a profit. The side-effect of this 
measure was that the bank would deal primarily in paper and its dealing in specie would 
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become more of a side business.
787
 Matsukata approved this massive switch to dealing in 
paper currency.
788
  
 Hara also wanted to refocus the bank’s lending to a small group of relatively low risk 
clients, such as a handful of large scale firms and prominent entrepreneurs.
789
  This policy 
left the bulk of small and medium sized firms in rural districts out in the cold. To add insult 
to injury, Matsukata announced the end of the government sponsored cargo loan program 
upon which rural producers depended to help them bring their goods to Yokohama. 
Matsukata reasoned that such loans would not help bring any specie into the country and 
merely acted as a subsidy to rural producers. Only those engaged in direct trade qualified for 
loans.
790
 As a result, many rural producers could no longer participate in the Yokohama 
Specie Bank’s loan programs.  
 The need to sustain the bank as a profit making enterprise caused Matsukata and Hara 
to turn away from subsidizing direct exports and instead focus strictly on the bank’s bottom 
line. The bank would begin to abandon its role as a promoter of direct exports in 1883, but 
this change in direction would ironically aid the bank in realizing a small part of the goal of 
recovering the nation’s commercial rights. 
 
The Yokohama Specie Bank’s New Mission 
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 If the need to ensure the Yokohama Specie Bank’s continued existence as a profitable 
enterprise forced the government to first revise and then eliminate the cargo loan program, 
changing economic conditions transformed the very fiber of the financial institution.  By 
1882 Japan was in the throes of a major recession, yet the nation’s balance of trade improved 
dramatically, registering surpluses for the first time in years. As the declining value of silver 
made imports more expensive, the total value of Japan’ s import trade declined from a high 
of approximately 38 million yen in 1880 to slightly over 29 million yen in 1883.
791
 In the 
same period total exports jumped from just over 28 million yen over 37.9 million yen.
792
 In 
1880 Japan had a 9 million yen trade deficit. In 1883 Japan enjoyed an 8.8 million yen 
surplus.
793
  
 The appearance of trade surpluses undermined one of the central theses of the 
commercial nationalist analysis of Japan’s foreign trade. Commercial nationalists and 
advocates of direct trade contended that foreign merchants’ dominance of Japan’s trade 
robbed the nation of the profits it otherwise would have gained from engaging in trade with 
other nations and that therefore the conduct of foreign trade in the treaty ports merely served 
to drain the nation’s wealth. As long as trade deficits continued, this argument appeared 
convincing, but, when Japan began to enjoy trade surpluses in the absence of any major 
reforms in Japan’s foreign trade in the 1880s, this argument become harder to sustain. When 
specie started to flow into Japan, the reform of the treaty port trade and promotion of direct 
trade seemed less urgent. 
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 Trade surpluses also began to change the financial scene in Japan. As Japanese banks 
started to accumulate capital and build up reserves of specie, the reserves at foreign banks 
operating in Japan were beginning to decrease as they had to use specie in order to help their 
Western clients pay for Japanese goods.
794
 With growing reserves of specie, Japanese banks 
could begin financing the nation’s trade. 
 Starting in November 1883 the Yokohama Specie Bank even began to lend to foreign 
merchant houses. This was a shrewd business decision designed to improve the bank’s 
profits. As established commercial ventures, the foreign merchant houses were low-risk 
borrowers. Moreover, many of the commercial houses were major buyers of Japanese goods 
and were likely to require large loans which would pay handsomely in terms of servicing fees 
and interest. The decision to loan to foreigners, however, went against the very idea of an 
institution that would promote Japanese exports and the recovery of “commercial rights.” By 
loaning money to the very foreign merchants who were held to be exploiting Japan, the 
Yokohama Specie Bank was aiding and abetting the enemy. 
 Initial lending to foreigners, however, proved to be too lucrative to pass up. By the 
end of 1883 a pilot program to lend money to foreign merchants in Yokohama had proved to 
be wildly successful. The Yokohama Specie Bank’s directors were soon bragging about the 
high demand and high profits the bank was earning through loans to foreigners.
795
 This 
success convinced Matsukata to make lending to foreigners easier. He also decided to allow 
foreign merchants to take out special low interest loans from the government sponsored 
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exchange loan program at the bank. In July 1884 the new rules went into effect.
796
 Within a 
short time the exchange loan program was lending more to foreign merchants than it was to 
direct traders.
797
 This was a complete reversal of the program’s original intent. Instead of 
supporting direct trade, the program was now helping foreign merchants in the treaty ports 
continue their business and helping to shore up the treaty port trade system. 
 In another sense, however, the Yokohama Specie Bank’s new policies did help in the 
struggle to reclaim “commercial rights.” The success of the loan program enabled the bank to 
enlarge its capital and reserves of specie. This capital allowed it to continue lending to 
foreigners and made the bank a major player in the financing of Japan’s trade. For the first 
time since the opening of the treaty ports, a Japanese bank financed a large portion of Japan’s 
trade. The profits from the interest and fees attached to those loans were increasingly 
enriching the Yokohama Specie Bank, instead of foreigners. The Japanese were thus 
capturing larger portion of the benefits of trade.  Although conducted with much less fanfare 
than initiatives to promote direct trade up until 1881, the new focus on the bank’s 
profitability probably did substantially advance the cause of the recovery of “commercial 
rights.” 
 Lending to direct traders through the exchange loan program continued, but its days 
were now numbered. On the one hand, with loans to foreign firms providing tidy profits, the 
bank no longer had a strong incentive to lend to direct exporters. On the other hand, despite 
having access to subsidized loans many direct trade ventures continued to struggle to survive. 
Defaults on loans to direct traders became common and promotion of direct trade merely 
                                                 
796
 Ibid., 681. 
 
 
797
 Ibid., 682. 
 349 
 
threatened to undermine the new lucrative business the Yokohama Specie Bank did with 
foreign firms. In 1887 the bank announced the end of the exchange loan program. At the 
request of exporters, the program continued for one more year to prevent a sudden collapse in 
silk and tea prices.
798
  
 The end of the cargo and exchange loan programs proved devastating to direct 
exporters. At the direct trade movement’s height in 1881 there were at least nine direct 
trading ventures: by the end of the 1880s there were only two direct trading firms still 
operating: the Mutual Extension Company and the Trade Company. Neither firm, however, 
proved capable of surviving for long without government subsidized loans. The Trade 
Company ceased to function as a viable business by the beginning of 1890 and the Mutual 
Extension Company soon followed. By the start of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894 all of 
the direct trade ventures created during the direct trade movement’s height had disappeared.  
 
The Battle over the Jōmō Silk Improvement Company 
 Changes in government policy and the general economic downturn beginning in the 
first half of the 1880s caused the campaign to create cooperatives in the silk industry, which 
had been a driving force in the direct trade movement, to collapse. The most dramatic 
episode in the decline of the silk cooperative movement was the slow implosion of the Jōmō 
Silk Improvement Company in Gunma prefecture. The company’s difficulties began as soon 
as it opened its doors in 1881. Because it began operations at the beginning of the mulberry 
cultivation season, many members sought advance loans from the company. An initial loan 
of 70,000 yen from the Yokohama Specie Bank proved insufficient to meet this demand. 
Furthermore, the government refused to provide additional funds. Therefore the firm had to 
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take out large loans from private banks. The Company borrowed an additional 200,000 yen 
from the Yokohama Specie Bank in several installments. The Company also looked to the 
33
rd
 National Bank for further loans. This dependence on the 33
rd
 National Bank deepened 
when the Yokohama Specie Bank changed its lending policies in July, 1881, to cap lending 
to each silk producer at 200,000 yen. In effect, the Improvement Company could not obtain 
more loans from the Yokohama Specie Bank.
799
 
 Taking out loans from privately owned banks instead of relying on subsidized 
government loans hurt the company’s balance sheet. Because executives expected to secure a 
low-interest, long-term loan from the government, they assumed the company would have 
ample funds to invest in improvements in local silk production. Relying on more expensive 
private loans meant that they had to use the bulk of the profits earned from the sale of raw 
silk to cover loan repayments. Without being able to build up a significant pool of operating 
capital, the company could not invest in local improvements of production and lived from 
loan to loan in a precarious hand-to-mouth existence. Company officials continued to lobby 
the government in an attempt to secure funds, but the most they were able to procure was a 
100,000 yen bridge loan from the Yokohama Specie Bank that had to be repaid in 45 days.
800
 
 The Jōmō Silk Improvement Company’s trouble in securing financing for its member 
producers struck at the heart of its business. Silk producers required advance loans to engage 
in production and, if the company could not provide advance loans, producers were likely to 
look elsewhere. The next option for many silk producers in Gunma became the Jōmō Product 
Company (Jōmō Bussan Kaisha), founded in June, 1881, with the financial backing of the 
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Yokohama export merchants and silk dealers in Maebashi. Many members of the Jōmō Silk 
Improvement Company abandoned it to join the ranks of the Jōmō Product Company or 
simply sell their silk elsewhere.
801
 
 In an attempt to reverse the trend the Improvement Company made another bid to 
secure government loans in the amount of 400,000 yen for strengthening the silk industry. 
Even though the company submitted letters of support from the 33
rd
 Bank and the Gunma 
prefectural government, the Ministry of Finance refused the request. When the Yokohama 
Specie Bank in 1882 suspended loans for domestic cargoes and prior loans started to come 
due, the company faced a crisis.
802
 
 Despite its troubles, the Improvement Company managed to become an important 
player in Gunma prefecture’s silk trade. The enterprise handled volumes of silk equivalent to 
somewhere between one-fifth to one-fourth of the prefecture’s total output. By the end of 
November 1881, the company had taken out over 1, 319,000 yen in loans and had repaid 
785,000 yen with a remaining 534, 000 yen left to be paid back.
803
  
 Unfortunately, the company had used most of the remaining funds to issue long term 
loans to silk producers to help them improve their facilities and equipment. This strategy left 
little cash on hand to finance the next round of silk trading and made the company dependent 
on the banks just to continue its operations. The company was vulnerable should any of its 
lenders decide to call in their loans. Over the next few years, it lurched from crisis to crisis.  
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 During the downturn in the silk business in 1882, the Improvement Company found 
itself unable to secure loans and the amount of silk it handled fell rapidly.
804
 Only funds from 
the cargo loan program of the Yokohama Specie Bank enabled the company to fund much of 
its activities.
805
  Meanwhile, officials in MAC worried that the failure of the enterprise might 
damage the local economy in Gunma prefecture, one of the country’s most important silk 
producing regions. In 1886, the MAC minister wrote a request to the MOF asking for 
government funding for the company. While the Ministry of Finance continued to refuse a 
direct loan to the company from government coffers, the ministry approved additional loans 
of 300,000 yen through the Yokohama Specie Bank.  
 The government loan, however, entailed stronger supervision from Gunma’s 
prefectural government to ensure repayment. Prefectural officials were more concerned with 
the overall health of the company and its ability to repay the loan, than with direct trade or 
the improvement of local silks. This stress on profitability required a more businesslike 
approach to managing company business. At a July 15
th 
meeting of company shareholders, 
Gunma’s governor, Saitō Yōzō, demanded that the company abandon its exclusive focus on 
direct exports and ordered it to sell silk by whatever method was most profitable, including 
selling to export merchants in Yokohama.
806
 
 This change in strategy had an important impact on the company’s business. No 
longer able to engage solely in direct trade, the company was in the uncomfortable position 
of engaging in trade with local silk dealers who also sold local silk to export merchants. The 
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emergence of the Jōmō Silk Improvement Company as organization which made local silk 
dealers redundant by creating a direct tie between local silk producers and large direct trading 
firms like the Mutual Extension Company, was a disturbing development to silk dealers in 
Gunma prefecture. They increasingly threw their support behind the Jōmō Product Company 
as a way of counterbalancing the Improvement Company’s advantage.807 
 To make matters worse, almost as soon as the Ministry of Finance approved the new 
300,000 yen loan, the local government appeared to change its mind about the deal. In 
November Takase Shirō, an official dispatched by the prefecture’s Agriculture and 
Commerce division, suddenly demanded immediate repayment of the loan. Then, in an 
emergency meeting of company shareholders, Takase, accompanied by the director of the 
33
rd
 National Bank, Taneda Seiichi, announced a complete restructuring of the company. To 
raise much needed new capital the company was to abandon its previous charter and its 
cooperative character and become a public corporation in which any investors, not just silk 
producers, could purchase stock.
808
 
 The restructuring of the company triggered a major internal power struggle. The “old” 
shareholders, the silk producers who had joined the company at its start, saw the restructuring 
as a way to allow the 33
rd
 National Bank, silk dealers, and outsiders with little interest in the 
silk business to take over the company. “New” shareholders, who were focused on profits, 
opposed any policies which benefitted producers at the expense of possible dividends. In an 
attempt to reconcile the two sides, Kawase Hideji, a former Ministry of Finance bureaucrat 
and supporter of direct trade, became the head of the company. However, Kawase was 
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booted out shortly afterward when the 33
rd
 National Bank rejected his plan for restoring the 
company to financial health. The bank installed one of its own representatives as head of the 
company, but he clashed with other stockholders over issues of executive compensation and 
resigned within four months of assuming the job.
809
 
 The resignation of the 33
rd
 National Bank’s representative from the company put the 
plans to restructure the company’s finances and pay off debts in limbo. The bank was now 
ready to write the company off as no longer worth saving. As a result the 33
rd
 National 
pressed the company for repayment of its debts. The bank moved to seize the 300,000 yen 
fund that the central government had ordered the Yokohama Specie Bank to lend to the 
company. This move sparked off a legal dispute with Gunma prefecture which argued the 
bank had no rights to the money since it had been loaned to the company for a specific 
purpose and therefore could not be claimed as an asset of the company. Local courts ruled in 
the 33
rd
 National’s favor, allowing the bank to seize the funds.810  
 Afterwards, the Jōmō Silk Improvement Company headed toward its final decline. As 
a result of the court ruling and the loss of the 300,000 yen fund, the company went into 
receivership. Rather than promote direct exports, the enterprise had to focus on repaying its 
debts, primarily by collecting money from silk producers who owed the company money. A 
ray of hope for the company appeared in 1889 as the period of receivership came to an end. 
Shareholders appointed Miyazaki Yūteki, a longtime ally of Hoshino Chōtarō, as chief 
executive. In an effort to revive the company, he negotiated a deal with the Jardine 
Matherson Company that would have made the Improvement Company a silk supplier of the 
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British firm, but other members of the board rejected the deal.
811
 In 1891 the Jōmō Silk 
Improvement Company met an ignominious end. The Mitsui Bank seized the 33
rd
 National 
Bank’s assets after its collapse, including the land deeds of the Improvement Company’s 
members. Mitsui promptly sold the deeds to large landlords in Gunma prefecture, dealing the 
final blow to the cooperative.
812
 
  
Silk Industry Associations and Intra-industry Conflict 
 During the 1880s, as a softening of government support for direct trade began to 
impact the silk cooperative movement, the creation of a new government agency and new 
industry associations began to change the way in which commercial policy was debated and 
decided. What had been a haphazard decision making process in the government was slowly 
undergoing a process of institutionalization as a regular system or procedures and rules 
governing the decision making process evolved. Mirroring the developments in government, 
the silk industry also began to become more organized and structured. Industry associations 
emerged to handle intra-industry disputes and address issues of common concern. The era of 
sporadic policy- making and popular movements to influence economic policy was 
beginning to give way to an era dominated by organized interest groups.  
 Direct trade advocates in the silk industry hoped to capitalize on the trend toward a 
clearer structure in the economic policy-making process and use silk industry associations as 
a platform for reviving their movement, but they faced an uphill battle. In the wake of the 
United Silk Storing Incident, Japan’s silk industry faced uncertainty about its future direction. 
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The return, in effect, to the status quo in the silk trade indicated that efforts to reform the 
trade had ended in complete failure. Despite the lingering dissatisfaction with foreign 
dominance of the silk export trade, there was no clear consensus about how to overcome this 
dominance. Furthermore, serious conflicts within the silk industry that had emerged during 
the silk crisis suggested that any future attempt to introduce new reforms or regulations in the 
silk industry promised to spark new disputes. The lack of consensus over a clear program for 
reform meant that any drastic changes in the industry were unlikely. 
 Still the desire for change in the silk industry was widespread. Silk producers and 
merchants continued to search for ways to improve the quality of local silk products and 
prevent the production and circulation of low-quality inexpensive raw silk. At the same time, 
a group of dedicated advocates of direct trade also continued to insist that the government 
provide support to encourage the growth of direct sales between Japanese producers and 
foreign consumers as a way of removing what they believed were the evils of the treaty port 
trade. The Meiji government, for its part, had also begun to encourage change in the industry. 
Although it had maintained a policy of non-intervention during the United Silk Storing 
Company incident, after 1881 government agencies began to play a more active role in trying 
to reform the silk industry. The new attempts at reform would trigger more disputes. 
 During the latter half of the 1870s the Meiji government had generally refused to 
regulate the silk industry.
813
 Toward the end of the decade, however, the government began 
to introduce a series of policies designed to encourage the growth of domestic industry 
indirectly through the creation of mutual advancement societies (kyōshinkai), agricultural 
fairs, and industry related events. Matsukata Masayoshi who was the head of the Agricultural 
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Promotion Bureau in the Ministry of the Home Affairs (hereafter MOHA) in the late 1870s, 
championed this approach.  Beginning in 1879 Matsukata started voicing his dissatisfaction 
with Meiji government investment in model factories and pilot programs in agriculture by 
arguing that these state sponsored initiatives had a poor record of success. Instead, Matsukata 
urged the Meiji government to adopt economic policies which indirectly supported economic 
growth by encouraging the autonomous development of private industry.
814
 
The new Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (hereafter MAC), founded in 1881, 
adopted Matsukata’ strategy. The ministry was supposed to rationalize the administration of 
economic policy and reduce government expenses by putting under one roof the supervision 
of various agricultural, commercial, and industrial programs which had previously been split 
between various different ministries.
815
 Nevertheless, the establishment of MAC also marked 
the beginning of a new era in economic policy. Guided by the philosophy of Matsukata, 
MAC began to encourage industry wide meetings and the formation of industry associations 
to facilitate autonomous action by private industry with the government playing a supporting 
role.
816
  
 As part of the new emphasis on encouraging industry associations, the government 
called for the creation of a Silk Manufacturer’s Advisory Council (Seishi Shijunkai) in May, 
                                                 
814
 Ibid., 28. 
 
 
815
 Ōkuma Shigenobu and Itō Hirobumi, “Nōshōmushō Setsuritsu no Kengi,” Keizai Kōsō, Nihon Shisō Taikei 
vol. 8 eds. Nakamura Masanori, Ishii Kanji, and Kazuga Yutakain (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2000), 103-104. 
 
 
816
 Kamiyama, “Meiji zenki ni okeru dōgyōsha soshikika seisaku no tenkai,” 28. 
 
 
 358 
 
1883.
817
 The government invited twenty seven businessmen involved in the silk trade from 
around the country to participate in talks with government officials about how to improve 
silk production and increase silk exports.
818
 Included were advocates of direct trade such as 
Hoshino Chōtarō and Asabuki Eiji, prominent silk producers such as Sanno Rihachi and 
Ogiwara Shigejurō, and export merchants such as Mogi Sobee and Hara Zenjirō.819 The bulk 
of those invited were inevitably persons whose names were especially prominent in the silk 
trade either because of their involvement in the direct trade movement or because they had 
worked closely with provincial authorities or the central government in the development of 
their business.
820
 Hoping that the council would serve as a launching pad for the formation of 
a voluntary industry association, the government invited those figures it hoped would serve 
as guiding forces in the effort to organize the industry.
821
 
 As soon as the council began its proceedings, local silk producers immediately issued 
a series of demands for strong government regulation and support for the silk industry. 
Ogiwara Shigejirō and Katō Hikoshichirō, silk producers from Gunma and Miyagi 
prefectures respectively, urged the introduction of the legal regulation of silk production to 
prevent the manufacture of low quality goods. Silk producers from Gifu demanded the 
creation of a silk inspection station in Yokohama to prevent poor quality silks from being 
                                                 
817
 Unno Fukuju, “Sanshigyō, chagyō kumiai no seiritsu,” in Yokohama Shishi, ed. Yokohama Sōmukyoku 
Shishi Henshūshitsu, vol. 3 part 1 (Yokohama: Yokohama-shi, 1958), 799. 
 
 
818
 Kamiyama, “Meiji zenki ni okeru dōgyōsha soshikika seisaku no tenkai,” 30. 
 
 
819
 Unno, “Sanshigyō, chagyō kumiai no seiritsu,” 799-800. 
 
 
820
 Kamiyama, “Meiji zenki ni okeru dōgyōsha soshikika seisaku no tenkai,” 30. 
 
 
821
 Ibid. 
 359 
 
exported.
822
 Several members also called for the establishment of both regional and national 
associations to promote communication and information sharing within the industry.
823
 
Others pressed for renewed state support for direct trade through a new state-sponsored direct 
trade company and more generous financing from the Yokohama Specie Bank for local silk 
producers in the countryside.
824
 Despite the strong desire among many of the council 
members for stronger regulation and state support, the council closed its hearings without 
taking further action.
825
 
 Even though it failed to effect any changes in government policy toward the silk 
industry, the Silk Manufacturer’s Advisory Council did encourage the formation of silk 
industry associations. Once council members returned to their home districts, many of them 
became leaders in efforts to organize local silk producers into voluntary associations.
826
 A 
group of silk producers founded a national association, the Japan Silk Association (Dai-
Nihon Sanshi Kyōkai), in May of 1884 to coordinate the activities of the local industry 
associations. Members elected Kawase Hideji, a former MOF bureaucrat and a staunch 
advocate of direct trade, as its head.
827
 The selection of Kawase as the head of the national 
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organization suggested that direct trade advocates had a strong position in the new 
organization.  
 Not surprisingly, soon after his election as head of the Japan Silk Association, 
Kawase began to urge the government to regulate the silk industry and provide greater 
support for direct trade ventures. In June, 1884, he submitted a proposal, Advice Concerning 
the Protection and Improvement of Manufactured Silk (Nihon Seishi Kairyō no Ken ni tsuki 
Gohogo Iken), which argued for the reform of the silk trade and the promotion of direct 
trade.
828
 Kawase admitted that direct trade was fraught with difficulty and involved greater 
risks than “Yokohama selling” (Yokohama-uri), but urged the government to provide security 
to direct traders. Accordingly, the government should establish a system of insurance to 
protect direct traders and direct trading firms from bankruptcy.
829
 Officers in the Japan Silk 
Association also began to lobby for the creation of a central industry association endowed 
with legal powers to regulate the silk industry and coordinate the activities of local industry 
associations.
830
 
 Kawase repeated his call for uniform regulation of the industry and the creation of a 
strong central association at a meeting of silk producers in June, 1885. At the meeting held in 
Tōkyō as part of a government organized agricultural fair, he urged greater cooperation 
between producers in setting nationwide standards for silk production. In addition, local silk 
industry associations should lobby the government to establish clear regulations to govern the 
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local silk industry associations on the model of Gifu prefecture’s silk industry association.831 
At the meeting, Hoshino Chōtarō and Hayami Kensō, a trusted expert on the silk industry, 
emphasized the need for greater cooperation between silk producers in order to expand silk 
exports.
832
  
 The demands for stronger rules to govern industry associations and measures to 
encourage coordination between local industry associations led a group of silk producers, 
headed by Hoshino, to submit a formal proposal to the government. The Advice Concerning 
the Promulgation of Ordinances for Silkworms and Silk (Ikusan Sanshi Jōrei Gohaifu no gi 
ni tsuki Kengensho), complained of a lack of clear direction in prefectural governments’ 
attempts to regulate the silk industry.
833
 The proposal requested the government assist in the 
establishment of silk inspection facilities in all prefectures, and establish a national 
organization to serve as a headquarters for the local associations.
834
 
 In response, the government enacted regulations for local silk associations and 
encouraged the creation of a stronger central industry association. In November, 1885, MAC 
published the Regulations for Silk Associations (Sanshi Kumiai Junsoku).
835
 The Regulations 
ordered prefectural and city governments to form silk producer associations in their districts 
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to regulate the production and sale of silk cocoons and raw silk.
836
 These local associations 
were to work to improve the quality of locally produced silk cocoons and raw silk though 
ensuring uniform standards in the production and sorting of all raw silk and cocoons. One 
could not package or sell raw silk or cocoons without properly identifying the producer and 
the association to which the producer belonged. Each local association was to appoint 
officers to manage the association’s business and hire inspectors who would monitor silk 
production.
837
 A local headquarters (torishimarijo) would be established in the pertinent 
prefectural capital to supervise the local silk associations.
838
 
 The Regulations also anticipated the creation of a “central office” charged with the 
vaguely defined mission of “bringing the local headquarters into communication [with each 
other]”839 Representatives of the various prefectural headquarters would appoint officers of 
the central office and set its budget.
840
 These clauses in the Regulations would ultimately 
prove to be Achilles heel of the whole system of silk producer associations. 
 In order to establish the central office MAC called for a meeting of 42 representatives 
from the silk producing regions of the country to discuss the details of the central office’s 
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organization.
841
 To prepare for the meeting MAC appointed Kawase Hideji, Asabuki Eiji, 
and Miyazaki Yūkei as members of a special committee to draw up a proposal for the 
creation of the central association.
842
 Because all three men had participated in the direct 
trade movement, one would have expected them to advocate the creation of a powerful 
organization which would promote direct silk exports. 
 Their draft proposal did indeed recommend a strong central silk industry organization. 
It would not only create policy for the improvement of the silk industry and oversee the 
activities of local organizations, it would also establish and manage a warehouse and 
inspection station in Yokohama which would store and inspect all silk destined for export 
abroad.
 843
 The proposal also recommended that the central association find ways to improve 
trade financing for exporters.  The proposal signaled the intent of direct trade advocates to 
use a strong central association as a platform for the promotion of direct trade.  
 Unfortunately for advocates of direct trade, the desire for a strong central association 
was not shared by all silk producers. The proposal to create a central warehouse and 
inspection station became the main object of controversy in the talks to create a central 
association. Opponents of the idea contended that a silk inspection station in Yokohama 
would needlessly complicate commercial exchanges and impose hidden costs on silk 
exporters. An inspection system would require the hiring and training of a large number of 
inspectors and entail high labor costs. A common warehouse would require a large outlay of 
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capital to insure against fire and theft.
844
 Silk exporters would have to raise prices in order to 
bear these costs. Inspections would require exporters to unwrap carefully packaged silk to 
subject it to inspection and then repackage it after inspection, a process which would impose 
additional costs on silk exporters.
845
  
 Strong objections from opponents led to more modest plans for a central silk industry 
association. Participants in the meeting abandoned the idea of establishing a central silk 
warehouse and inspection system, the centerpiece component for advocates of a strong 
association,  in favor of establishing a “research bureau” (chōsajo) with a vaguely defined 
mission. The organization’s overall mission would be to serve merely as a coordinating body 
for local silk producer associations.
846
 The result of these changes was the creation of the 
Central Office of Silk Associations (Sanshigyō Kumiai Chūōbu) which now replaced the 
Japan Silk Association as the nation-wide silk industry association.
847
 Unfortunately for the 
advocates of direct trade, the new organization was no more powerful than the Japan Silk 
Association and would accomplish little to promote direct trade. 
 Right from the very moment of opening its doors on June 1, 1886, the young 
association provoked controversy. Initially a dispute arose over the association’s research 
bureau. After opening for business, one of the Central Silk Association’s first acts was to 
issue an order to the local associations requiring them to send all silk destined for export 
abroad to the association’s research bureau along with all relevant paperwork, so that the 
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research bureau could monitor exports. The inspectors in the research bureau were merely to 
take a count of the total number of bales of silk and make a preliminary check to ensure all 
outgoing silk bore the proper seals of local associations.
848
 In theory, this procedure would 
facilitate the gathering of information on silk exports and introduce some minimally intrusive 
inspections to prevent the export of counterfeit goods. The inspection order would also 
generate revenue to cover the Central Office’s operating costs, because all exporters would 
have to pay a small fee for the privilege of having their silk “investigated.”849 Mogi Sobee 
and Ono Mitsukage, two prominent export merchants who had contributed to the planning 
for the Central Office, protested the order by announcing their refusal to cooperate.
850
 The 
refusal of these representatives of the Yokohama export merchants to join the central 
association signaled broader opposition from the export merchant community which feared 
the order would add unnecessary costs and inconveniences to their silk trading activities. 
 More broadly, the order also sparked an immediate uproar which split many local silk 
associations into factions supporting and opposing of the Central Office. Nagano’s silk 
association reported in late July that its members were so divided that they could not reach a 
consensus over whether or not to comply with the order.
851
 Differences of opinion stemmed 
from fundamental disagreements over the purpose of the silk producer associations. These 
conflicts were evident in the debate that erupted, when Nagano prefecture announced plans to 
form a prefectural silk association headquarters in accordance with the 1885 Regulations. 
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Silk producers from areas where the silk industry was less developed looked to the 
prefectural headquarters to subsidize the activities of their local silk industry associations, 
establish a training center, and hire traveling silk experts to teach improved silk production 
techniques.
852
 Silk producers in less advanced silk producing regions who were mostly small-
scale producers who utilized rudimentary hand operated silk reeling machinery tended to 
favor a strong Central Office capable of providing additional technical assistance and perhaps 
provide opportunities to gain higher prices for their silks through engaging in direct trade. 
 Silk producers from more advanced areas demanded that the Nagano association 
headquarters play a much more limited role. They balked at the idea of having the association 
headquarters subsidize the activities of local associations because this aid would require the 
transfer of funds from more well-funded local associations in advanced silk producing areas 
to the local associations in less advanced areas. In addition, creating a training center and 
investing in educational programs would tend to most benefit less advanced silk producing 
regions.
853
 For producers in the advanced silk producing regions who typically owned 
mechanized silk filatures, a strong Central Office was not necessarily desirable. Owners of 
mechanized silk filatures were already capable of producing high quality silk which could 
command a high price in the domestic market. Inspection of silk cargoes, technical assistance, 
and direct trade were all issues of minor concern for these producers.  
 Opponents of the Central Silk Association’s actions also suspected that the new order 
was little more than an attempt create a silk inspection system that had been rejected in 
earlier discussions about the role silk industry associations were to play in the silk industry. 
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The vice director of Nagano’s association, Satō Hachi, travelled to Tōkyō in July to discuss 
the issue with the leaders of the leaders of the Central Silk Association Office. Satō objected 
to the order by arguing that if the Central Silk Association was going to require producers to 
send silk to its research bureau, the association would have to assume responsibility for 
warehousing the silk. According to Satō, warehousing silk constituted a commercial activity 
which was beyond the defined powers of the Central Silk Association. The association 
countered that since its research bureau would not hold the silk for any significant length of 
time, the association would not be engaging in the receipt and warehousing of silk.
854
  
 Finally, growing specialization and structural changes in the silk industry were 
beginning to cause the silk industry to fragment into groups with competing interests. In the 
1870s there were still a number of silk producers who bred and raised their own silkworms, 
and then boiled and reeled the silkworm’s cocoons to produce silk. It was not inconceivable 
for a peasant family to produce its own silk on a small scale basis. In the 1880s, however, the 
extension of railroads and telegraph networks and the development of a mechanized reeling 
industry encouraged specialization. Increasingly peasant households focused solely on 
raising silk worms and then selling the cocoons to mechanized reelers. Silkworm breeding to 
supply peasant families with silkworm eggs to rear also emerged as a separate business. The 
end result of these structural changes was a more fragmented silk industry where the interests 
of silkworm breeders, silkworm cultivators, and silk reelers began to diverge. 
 An example of this development was the controversy over “secondary inspections” 
that local silk associations carried out on cocoons from other localities. Nagano’s silkworm 
breeders were encountering protectionist measures implemented by other prefectures’ silk 
producer associations. On June 30
th
, 1886, less than a month since the launch of the Central 
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Silk Association, the local silk producers’ association in Gunma informed its counterpart in 
Nagano that it would subject all silkworm eggs imported from Nagano to careful inspection, 
even though 
855
 all silkworm eggs produced in Nagano were already subject to inspection by 
the prefecture’s own local silk associations.856 An investigation by Nagano’s prefectural 
government into the matter revealed that local silk producer associations in Ibaraki, Saitama, 
Kanagawa, Niigata, Gifu, and Yamanashi prefectures were also ordering the inspection of 
silkworm eggs imported from Nagano.  The aim was to protect nascent silkworm breeding 
industries in those regions.
857
 
 In the 1870s, Nagano’s silkworm breeders were the largest source of silkworm egg 
cards used to raise silkworms and produce cocoons for silk producers in Nagano and many of 
the surrounding prefectures. In the 1880s, however, new competition arose as silkworm 
breeding had spread in Gunma, Yamanashi, Saitama, and other regions. At the same time, the 
creation of local silk producers associations and regulation of the industry provided a perfect 
tool for local prefectural governments to protect their own silk industries. Using the excuse 
of attempting to prevent the spread of silkworm diseases, local producer associations could 
tie up silk from other regions in inspection rooms and frustrate the attempts of merchants 
from Nagano to bring in silkworm eggs. Nagano silkworm merchants also had to pay a fee 
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for the inspections. These inspection fees acted as a tariff on Nagano produced silkworms 
and served boost the incomes of local silk producer associations in other prefectures.
858
 
 Nagano’s silkworm breeders naturally objected to having their silkworm eggs 
subjected to secondary inspections. Nagano silk producers were partially successful in 
lobbying local governments in other prefectures to order the re-inspections to stop, but 
ultimately they appealed to the Central Silk Association to settle the matter. The Central 
Office, however, refused to get involved.
 859
 
 Hence, the Central Office came under fire for both being too assertive in requiring 
inspection of silk for export by the research bureau and being too passive for not preventing 
the secondary inspection of silkworm eggs. On September 14, the Nagano silk producers’ 
association headquarters called for a general meeting of representatives from local producers’ 
associations in the prefecture to debate how the headquarters should react to the recent 
actions of the Central Office. At the meeting angry silk producers condemned the Central 
Office and voted both to declare that Nagano would withdraw from the Central Office and to 
call for the abolition of the Central Office itself.
860
 
 The Nagano association headquarters did not immediately make good on its members’ 
decision to withdraw from the Central Silk Office. First the Nagano headquarters dispatched 
two representatives, Kurashima Shōhei and Shimazu Tadasada, to negotiate with the Central 
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Silk Association.
861
 They demanded that the Central Office eliminate its research bureau, 
reduce the number of its employees, change its funding formula, and move its offices to 
Yokohama.
862
 When the Central Office rejected these demands, the Nagano association 
headquarters announced it was withdrawing from the Central Silk Association.
863
 
 The representatives of the Nagano association headquarters explained the reasons for 
leaving the Central Office in a brief notice.
864
 Kurashima and Shimazu’s main criticism of 
the organization was that it was largely a useless body which brought no substantial benefits 
to silk producers. The Central Office’s attempts to inspect silk exports were, the two men 
argued, little more than a joke. Since export merchants refused to participate in the Central 
Office, the majority of exported silk did not show up in the Central Office’s records. Those 
statistics reported only a meager amount of silk exported by direct trade firms that supported 
the Central Office and complied with its regulations. To add insult to injury, silk producers 
had to pay fees to the Central Association to carry out this worthless investigation.
865
 
According to Kurashima and Shimazu the Central Office’s other activities were equally 
worthless. Although the Central Office published statistics on various aspects of the silk 
industry, Kurashima and Shimazu argued the statistics published typically covered 
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information that was either already commonly known or trivial.
866
 For example, gaining 
recent statistics on the monthly increase in mulberry planting was hardly likely to be helpful 
to most silk producers.
867
 
 The notice also complained about the Central Silk Office’s inaction in dealing with 
the secondary inspection dispute. One of the Office’s key missions was to coordinate policies 
among local silk producer associations, noted the Nagano representatives, but when a real 
dispute had arisen the Office had failed to mediate. Silk producer associations in other areas 
were abusing regulations in order to protect their own local industries and levy, in effect, a 
protective tariff by demanding re-inspection of silkworms from other regions. The Central 
Office had proved unable to solve the problem.
868
 
 In addition to angering members of the Nagano Silk Association, the new 
requirement for inspection of silk exports by the research bureau prompted the export 
merchants into action. They encouraged provincial silk producers and dealers to ignore the 
Central Office’s new rules by shipping silk directly to export merchants. Complaining that 
the Central Office was overstepping its authority, they asked MAC to intervene to maintain 
freedom of trade in the silk business.
869
 
 A similar opposition movement flared up in Fukushima. There a prominent silk 
producer, Sano Rihachi, had worked with local officials to create a silk sellers’ cooperative 
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for the prefecture.
870
 The cooperative would have all silk producers in the prefecture bring 
their silk to a central warehouse which would handle the sorting and sale of the silk. By 
selling their silk through a single company, local producers would gain a measure of 
independence from local silk dealers and avoid paying local merchants commission fees.
871
 
Several silk dealers in the area protested, because they would lose their business, while small 
scale producers were concerned about losing the freedom to sell their silk freely.
872
 Believing 
the Central Office was behind the plan for the restrictive rules the prefectural association 
introduced, silk producers and dealers announced their opposition to the Central Office.  
 Even in Gunma prefecture where Hoshino and his allies dominated the local silk 
industry association, a rancorous debate broke out about the role of the Central Silk 
Association. Hoshino Chōtarō and direct trade advocates represented the “expansionist” 
faction which argued for stronger rules and regulations to govern the silk industry. On the 
other side, a group of “reductionists” demanded that the Central Office should scale back its 
operations and scrap the new rules requiring the “investigation” of silk cargoes. 
 In an effort to stave off the complete collapse of the Central Office, its leaders 
decided to use its annual meeting in March, 1887, as a platform to smooth over the emerging 
divides in the industry.
873
 Representatives of the local silk industry associations discussed 
changes in the Central Silk Association’s structure and mission. At the meeting, the Nagano 
and Yokohama local silk associations agreed to rejoin the Central Silk Association, in return 
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for the abolition of the association’s research bureau, a major reduction in the association’s 
budget, and a restructuring of the association to give a greater voice to representatives of 
local silk associations from Nagano, Yokohama and Fukushima.
874
 After these changes, the 
Central Silk Association’s activities were essentially limited to publishing a monthly 
newsletter.
875
 
 If advocates of tighter regulation by a powerful central association had lost their 
battle, some were unwilling to give up their dream. They made one last effort to realize their 
ambitions. This time, however, they did not aim to change the national organization, but 
instead sought to convince the government to rewrite the rules of governing the local silk 
associations. In February, 1888, the representative of the Yamanashi prefecture silk 
associations proposed new rules to control the silk industry.
876
 In particular, he wanted 
regulations to force all silk producers to join local associations and he wanted uniformity in 
the regulations of local associations.
877
 Since MAC had to approve the changes in the 
regulations, the ministry, under the leadership of Inoue Kaoru, convened a conference of silk 
producers and merchants in October, 1888, to discuss possible reforms. 
 Although Inoue was a staunch advocate of the idea of “self-government” and an 
economic liberal by inclination, the tone of his speech suggested that he hoped to persuade 
the participants at the meeting to agree to stronger regulation. Inoue invited the assembled 
guests to express their candid opinions regarding the utility of silk associations, but reminded 
                                                 
874
 Ibid. 
 
 
875
 Ibid., 47. 
 
 
876
 Ibid. 
 
 
877
 Ibid. 
 374 
 
them that their trade was vital to the nation’s future. He hinted that France’s recent conquests 
in Southeast Asia would mean Japan’s silk producers would soon face more competition 
from Southeast Asian produced silk in the French market. He complained that it was nearly 
impossible to obtain silk of a uniform and consistent quality in Japan and those who engaged 
in sericulture often took up the trade “rashly” without a clear understanding of how to 
cultivate quality silk. While stopping short of either advocating or opposing stronger 
regulations, Inoue implied that the domestic silk trade needed to be more rationally organized 
and supervised.
878
 
 Subsequent debate between silk producers and merchants in the MAC conference 
displayed a clear split between three different factions. One group demanded complete 
freedom of trade and the abolition of all rules and regulations governing the local silk 
associations. The second group argued for the status quo with just minor changes to the rules. 
A third group insisted on new rules which would strengthen the regulation of industry 
associations.
879
 Many members recognized the unfeasibility of total uniformity of regulations 
because they needed to take into account different conditions in different regions. 
 Inoue’s response was ambivalent. In line with his opening remarks, he stated that 
“reducing government interference and leaving [regulation] up to the regions is theoretically 
most preferable…but it is not yet time to entrust things to local government…the regulations 
should stay in place with some revision.” Yet the following day Inoue appeared to 
completely reverse his previous decision by indicating that any government interference 
                                                 
878
 “Notes,”Japan Weekly Mail (Yokohama), 27 October, 1888 (reprint, The Japan Weekly Mail, vol. 43, 
Tōkyō: Edition Synapse, 2006), 387. 
 
 
879
 Kamiyama, “Meiji zenki ni okeru dōgyōsha soshikika seisaku no tenkai,”47. 
 375 
 
would be futile unless members of the silk industry could agree on general policies. He then 
recommended replacing all of the current rules.
880
  
 After the conference, MAC weakened the rules governing local associations. The 
changes introduced by MAC, however, did little to stem the tide of opposition to the Central 
Silk Office. While supporters of regulation had attempted to enlist MAC’s support, the effort 
failed, as the rebellion against regulation and local industry associations flared back up. 
 Resistance to the local silk industry association, for example, had been growing in 
Nagano. In addition to grievances of silk breeders over attempts by local silk industry 
associations in other prefectures to use regulations as a protectionist weapon to prevent the 
inflow of Nagano produced silkworm eggs, managers of mechanized silk filatures were also 
finding regulations burdensome. Rules designed to restrict the movement of labor and 
prevent silk reelers from poaching skilled labor from one another hampered the ability of 
larger producers to procure workers. Some of the larger mechanized silk producers in the 
Suwa district of Nagano now banded together to demand the abolition of the local silk 
industry association. The large manufacturers complained that it was largely staffed by 
overpaid and incompetent bureaucrats, that inspection of silk by the local association was 
little more than a revenue raising device which did little to prevent low quality silk from 
entering the market, and that the silk industry organization simply could not represent the 
very different needs and interests of what was, in fact, a diverse industry.
881
 Opposition to 
local industry organizations and regulation from large-scale mechanized reelers was a sign of 
the changing nature of the business in the 1880s. Increasingly, large scale reelers were 
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succeeding in establishing direct contacts with the Yokohama export merchants and 
eliminating the intermediation of local silk dealers. These large-scale silk reelers were now 
more confident in their own ability to produce high quality silk and were not interested in 
inviting a new intermediary organization to complicate their business.
882
 
 At the same time, silk worm breeders began a campaign to eliminate both the Central 
Office and all national rules governing silk associations all together. In March of 1888, silk 
breeders in the Koken district of Nagano prefecture invited prominent liberal economists and 
journalists Taguchi Ukichi and Ban Naonosuke as guest speakers in what was billed as a 
“Gathering of Shinshū Silk Industry Tradesmen.” The two men gave speeches calling for the 
abolition of both the Central Silk Association and all rules governing the operation of local 
industry associations.
883
 At the same gathering silkworm breeders proposed the division of 
the local silk industry association into separate groups for silkworm breeders, sericulturists, 
and silk reelers.
884
 
 Dissatisfaction with industry regulations and industry associations reached a fever 
pitch at the annual meeting of the Central Silk Association in February, 1889. During 
discussion of the association’s projected budget, one of the representatives from the Nagano 
silk industry abruptly proposed that the members of the association vote to dissolve both the 
association and the rules governing associations. After several days of debate, an 
overwhelming majority of the association’s members voted to abolish the organization. The 
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final vote was 45 in favor of abolishing the association versus a mere 3 votes against 
dissolution.
885
 
 The abolition of the Central Silk Association spelled the effective end of an almost 
decade long fight to organize and regulate the industry. Although MAC declared that the 
Central Silk Association was not empowered to abolish itself, the ministry did nothing to 
force the rebellious silk tradesmen to revive the organization. Without a central association, 
the national rules governing local silk associations essentially became a dead letter.
886
 The 
collapse of local associations soon followed. In April, 1889, Nagano prefecture accepted a 
proposal submitted by local silk producers to abolish both the local silk association and the 
prefectural rules governing the silk trade. The old regulations were replaced with a new set of 
regulations designed only to regulate the activities of voluntary associations.
887
 
 In the wake of the fall of the Central Silk Association, advocates of silk regulation 
now moved to form their own voluntary association. Hoshino Chōtarō and likeminded silk 
producers created the Central Silk Industry Association (Sanshigyō Chūō Kyōkai) in 1891and 
the Association for the Promotion of the Silk Industry (Sanshigyō Shinkōkai) in 1892.888 Both 
organizations sought to bring members of the silk industry together in a unified body, but 
both organizations were voluntary and largely composed of Hoshino’s allies.889 
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 The dissolution of the Central Silk Association marked the end of a distinctive era in 
Japan’s commercial policy. In 1889 the government promulgated a new constitution and 
announced plans to create an elected legislative body, the Diet, which would henceforth 
exercise the power to make laws and assume control over taxation and government spending. 
The creation of the Diet did not end all of the authoritarian aspects of the early Meiji state, 
but it did make an elected legislative body the center of policymaking. From 1890 onward 
economic policy would become even more intimately intertwined with politics. The creation 
of the Diet would change the direct trade movement dramatically. No longer would Hoshino 
Chōtaro and advocates of direct trade simply be lobbying government ministers. Instead they 
would be addressing a wider group of law makers representing the elite upper-crust of the 
Japanese public in an arena where they were forced to compete with other conflicting 
interests. All interest groups now had to attempt to justify themselves in terms of the greater 
national welfare and find ways to appeal to other groups that may not share their own 
concerns.  
 In another sense, the collapse of the Central Silk Association also marked the end of 
the road for advocates of direct trade. With the collapse of direct trade firms, the elimination 
of the Yokohama Specie Bank cargo loan program, the failure of the cooperative movement, 
and the dissolution of any hopes of using the Meiji government’s push to create producer 
associations and regulate the silk industry to revive the support for direct trade policies, 
direct trade advocates had faced nothing but setbacks. Having exhausted all avenues of direct 
appeals to the central authorities, the movement toward direct trade in the private sector came 
to center on a small circle of dedicated ideologues, such as such as Hoshino Chōtarō. 
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Conclusion 
 The story of the direct trade movement from its birth to its untimely death provides a 
window through which one can glimpse the nature of economic policy-making in Meiji 
Japan and an important moment in the development of the modern Japanese state and society. 
Viewed in a certain light, the picture that emerges from a careful examination of the impact 
of shifts in commercial policy and the direct trade movement on Japan’s all-important silk 
industry is dismal. The history of the commercial practices and policies pursued by both 
bureaucrats and businessmen from 1868 to the mid-1880s is marked less by brilliant 
successes of either the state or market, and more by continuous setbacks, trips down blind 
alleys, and failure. Important decisions evolved in an ad-hoc and haphazard fashion. In some 
instances, a few well connected businessmen or intellectual figures with the right connections 
could easily sway government officials to change their policies. In addition, a romantic 
nationalism and desire to obtain equality with the Western powers in trade clouded the 
judgment of leaders in business and government in leading them to pursue an unrealistic 
policy of promoting direct trade. 
A more positive assessment, however, is also possible. Despite setbacks a young and 
inexperienced regime was active and flexible when it came to finding an effective 
commercial policy. Officials constantly sought out new opportunities to improve the position 
of the nation’s exports and felt little shame in making policy reversals when necessary. 
Government officials were receptive to new ideas from businessmen and intellectuals and 
were willing to work with those in the private sector to create new institutions and 
experiment with bold new policies. Concerns about foreign threats to the nation’s 
independence infused officials and businessmen with a sense of urgency and purpose. For 
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those in business and government who participated in the direct trade movement and even for 
those who did not, the goals of commercial policies went beyond commerce to become part 
of an effort to ensure the survival of the nation itself. In the midst of many setbacks, failures, 
and struggles, small achievements laid the foundation for future economic success. The 
creation of the Yokohama Specie Bank and its transformation from a “silver bank” to a trade 
bank which dominated currency exchanges necessary to maintain Japan’s foreign trade is one 
example of this process. 
 These two differing views are not necessarily incompatible. Arguably, a state that 
takes an active role in the economy and is flexible in its policy responses to economic 
problems is by definition one that may oftentimes act in an ad-hoc and haphazard fashion. As 
the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter noted, capitalist economies are always 
experiencing “creative destruction,” and economic conditions are constantly changing. This 
volatility held doubly true for the early Meiji period when the Japanese economy experienced 
rapid change stemming from the abolition of Tokugawa era restrictions on economic activity, 
increasing integration of the various regions of the country into a single national market, and 
adjustments accompanying deeper commercial ties with the outside world. This era of 
dramatic change created a constant flurry of activity on the part of government officials who 
were trying to react to new developments in the economy. In attempting to navigate their way 
through an era of radical change, these officials had no choice but to adopt a flexible and 
improvisational attitude toward economic policy.  
What enabled this state to play an active role in the economy while maintaining a 
flexible stance on commercial policy?  The answer is twofold. Meiji leaders believed they 
were living in a brutally Darwinian world. They perceived that Japan had entered into a 
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merciless arena of imperial and economic competition where only the strong would survive. 
The state and business had to adapt to the new order or face extinction as an independent 
polity. This sense of crisis encouraged both activism but also pragmatism.  Officials felt 
compelled to intervene in the economy, but if certain commercial or economic policies failed 
to yield results they were eventually abandoned.  
 At the beginning of the Meiji era survival meant creating a relatively stable national 
economy and ensuring the central government had sufficient revenue to establish its authority 
over the country and thwart potential foreign predators. In the first few years of the Meiji 
period direct trade with foreign countries was primarily a way of generating revenue for the 
Meiji government and gaining much needed hard currency to pay back foreign loans that had 
been incurred by the Tokugawa regime and the various daimyō prior to the Meiji period and 
the bonds the Meiji government had floated in London to fund the construction of Japan’s 
first railway. Fiscal concerns drove economic policy and the direct trade ventures sponsored 
by the government aimed to obtain currency abroad.  
 By the mid-1870s, with consistent foreign trade deficits and domestic inflation 
plaguing Japan, direct trade attracted support as a method of stabilizing the currency. For 
Ōkuma Shigenobu and Maeda Masana, direct trade was the only short term way to increase 
the inflow of specie into Japan in order to strengthen the yen. For Maeda Masana direct trade 
was also the only way to save traditional Japanese rural industries which he believed were 
suffering under the control of foreign merchants. Only through direct trade could Japanese 
producers break free of foreign control and avoid total collapse.  
 After the United Silk Storing Company Incident, government policy took a radical 
turn away from the fiscally expansive policies of Ōkuma Shigenobu. Yet this transformation 
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happened not because the Meiji leadership had a change of heart over the direction of 
economic policy, but rather because officials had to adapt to survive. This pragmatic 
approach was manifest in Matsukata’s attitude toward the cargo loan program at the 
Yokohama Specie Bank. Far from abolishing these subsidies for exporters, Matsukata 
continued them. It was only once they proved ineffective that he abandoned them in favor of 
lending to foreigners; in turn, those loans to foreign firms only continued because the 
program proved to be profitable for the bank and brought in specie which allowed a return to 
a convertible currency. 
 Similarly, Japanese entrepreneurs in the Meiji believed they faced a battle for survival 
in a rapidly changing economic environment. With the opening of the ports in 1858 Japan 
began a painful process of full integration into a larger world economy which entailed 
tremendous economic change. Entrepreneurs struggled to discern and profit from the waves 
of economic change and protect their livelihoods and prosperity. One example of such an 
entrepreneur is Hoshino Chōtarō, a man who wagered his family’s declining fortune on the 
silk business. For Hoshino direct trade was a long shot last hope to keep his business afloat 
that just happened to work in his case. Hoshino’s lifelong commitment to the promotion of 
direct trade was, in some respects, a largely irrational attempt to cling onto a successful 
strategy that had proved to work once before.  
 Similarly the cooperative movement in the silk industry was a campaign by silk 
producers in less advanced silk producing areas motivated by a desire to survive and thrive in 
a changing economy. Small scale silk producers banded together to share common facilities 
to export their silks abroad and earn a higher rate of profit.  They also worked together to 
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attempt to improve the quality of locally produced silks to prevent low quality goods from 
being exported and ensure the continued demand for Japanese produced silks abroad. 
 Direct trading firms were also bold experiments for entrepreneurs to succeed in the 
new economy. The Mitsui house founded the Mitsui Trade Company as part of an attempt to 
re-invent itself and guarantee its continued prosperity in a new era. Although one might 
assume this was merely part of a shrewd pursuit of profit, Mitsui opened its new unit at a 
time of profound crisis when it appeared the family’s business was on the brink of collapse. 
The success of the Mitsui Trade Company was, much like Hoshino’s direct trade ventures, an 
adaptation that happened to work.  
 Other direct trading companies were also efforts to adapt and prosper in a new era of 
international trade, but were less successful.  Companies like the Trade Company (Bōeki 
Kaisha) or the Fusō Trading Company were founded by ambitious businessmen with foreign 
experience or education in modern management techniques on the premise that their superior 
training and experience would give their firms an edge when it came to engaging in foreign 
trade. These executives anticipated, too, rich profits were waiting for the taking once a 
Japanese firm was able to engage in direct trade.  
 The observation that the actions of Meiji businessmen and entrepreneurs resulted 
from a deep sense of urgency and worries about survival also helps us to understand the 
ideological underpinnings of economic policy making in the early Meiji period and the 
worldview of direct trade advocates in particular. Meiji leaders and businessmen believed 
themselves to be engaged in a life and death competition with the Western powers where the 
very existence of Japan as an independent polity was at stake. In commercial policy direct 
trade advocates viewed the predominance of foreign merchant firms in Japan’s overseas trade 
 384 
 
as harmful to the future health and continued independence of the state itself.  Only the 
restoration of Japan’s “commercial rights,” the control over the nation’s trade which all 
independent countries claimed, would assure Japan’s independence. Only the existence of 
such a mentality can explain the case of the United Silk Storing incident where a mundane 
commercial dispute between Japanese and foreign merchants developed into a national crisis.  
 If Japanese economic policy can be characterized as activist, yet haphazard, and 
flexible, yet pragmatic, the economic policy making process itself was unorganized and 
chaotic. A relative lack of firmly established institutions and procedures prevented the Meiji 
government from undertaking the coherent and focused planning of economic development 
that Chalmers Johnson argued was the hallmark of the “plan-rational,” “developmental state.” 
On the other hand, the relative lack of established institutions or procedures for forging 
economic policy might have had the advantage of allowing officials and bureaucrats to 
maintain flexibility in their approach to economic policy.  Because input from outsiders with 
the right connections could easily influence government officials and policies, officials could 
implement ideas from businessmen without having to go through a process of negotiation 
with other interest groups. In short, it was a period in which bold experimentation was 
possible to an unusual extent. This ability to experiment helped Meiji leaders discover 
effective economic policies.  
If the story of commercial policy and the direct trade movement teaches us anything 
about the character of the Meiji Japan, it is that the Meiji state was simultaneously autocratic, 
pluralistic, and porous. With a small circle of oligarchs essentially ruling by fiat, ostensibly 
in the Emperor’s name, the Meiji government prior to 1890 was not a democracy. It was, 
however, a pluralistic state that tolerated different interests and ideas and competition 
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between them. This pluralism or openness to different ideas allowed economic 
experimentation to occur and helped lead to economic successes. The Meiji state was also 
porous in the sense that it yielded readily to influence from the private sector. Well-
connected businessmen, intellectuals, or journalists were able to shape the direction of 
government policy through direct appeals to prominent government officials. Masuda was 
able to convince the government to subsidize a scheme that would allow the Mitsui Trading 
Company to export coal to Shanghai. In a similar vein, Fukuzawa Yukichi was able to 
convince Ōkuma Shigenobu to back the creation of the privately owned Yokohama Specie 
Bank and abandon preliminary plans to create a government owned trade bank. Again this 
circumstance lent flexibility to economic policy that the times required.  
 Decisions on economic policy were subject to developments beyond the control of 
entrepreneurs, such as shifts in the market.  The growth of the American silk industry in the 
late nineteenth century made Hoshino’s dreams of direct trade possible and began a long 
process of change in Japan’s silk industry to fully exploit the new American demand. Sudden 
changes in fiscal policy could cause officials and businessmen to discard trade policies. As 
Matsukata’s deflationary policies made generous state subsidies for industry more difficult in 
the early 1880s, other officials abandoned support for direct trade and throttled the private 
momentum for direct trade.  
 To argue that the process of economic policy making in early Meiji Japan was chaotic 
does not imply that it was ineffective. Even if the economic policy making never achieved 
anything resembling steady incremental improvements or some sort of institutional learning, 
the process of competition and contestation played a positive role in the Meiji state’s 
economic successes.  Contestation and competition required both the state and the private 
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sector to remain adaptable and flexible in their approach to economic problems. Since no 
ideological camp or interest group ever triumphed for long in debates over economic policy, 
it often took the most pragmatic middle road. Constant contestation and competition also 
helped in creating effective economic policies, not through an orderly process of trial-and-
error refinement, but rather through a blind hit-and-miss approach which generated many 
failures and a few successes.  
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